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PETITIONER: SRI SARANGADEVAR PERIA MATAM AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAMASWAMY GOUNDER (DEAD) BY LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/09/1965

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. SUBBARAO, K. MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1966 AIR 1603            1966 SCR  (1) 908  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1992 SC1110  (30)

ACT: Indian  Limitation  Act  (9 of 1908), s. 28  and  Art.  144- Absence of legally appointed mathadhipathi-Right of math  to recover endowed properrty-Starting point of Iimitation.

HEADNOTE: The mathadhipathi of the, appellant math granted a perpetual lease  of  the  math  properties, at a  fixed  rent  to  the predecessor of the respondent in 1883, but without any legal necessity.  The mathadipathi died in 1915.  From 1915  there was  only a de facto manager of the math for 20  years.   In 1939, the present mathadhipathi was elected and in 1950  the math obtained possession of the properties.  Since 1915  the respondent and his predecessors did not pay any rent to the, math.   In 1954, the respondent filed the suit  against  the math  reprcsented  by  the  mathadipathi,  for  recovery  of possession  of he properties claiming title by adverse  pos- session.  The trial court decreed the suit.  On appeal,  the decree was set aside, but was restored by the High Court  on further appeal. in  the appeal to this Court the appellants  contended  that adverse possession could not run till the mathadhipathi  was appointed, because, the right to sue for the recovery of the math  properties  vested  only  in  the  legally   appointed mathadhipathi; and before possession could be adverse  there must be a competitor who, by due vigilance, could avoid  the running of time,. HELD : In the absence of legal necessity, the lease of  1883 endured   only  during  the  life  time  of   the   previous mathadhipathi  and  terminated  on his death  in  1915,  and possession thereafter of the respondent and his  predecessor was adverse to the math.  Therefore, the time under Art. 144 of  the Limitation Act, 1908, commenced to run in  1915  and the  absence  of a legally appointed mathadhipathi  did  not prevent the running of time.  Thus, the title of the math to the  suit  properties became extinguished in  1927  and  the ’respondent acquired title by prescription, by operation  of s. 28 and art. 144. [910 E; 913 H; 914 C] A math is the owner of endowed property and like an idol  is

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a juristic person having the power of acquiring, owning  and possessing  properties and having the capacity of suing  and being  sued.  It. may acquire property by  prescription  and likewise lose it by adverse possession.  A legally appointed mathadhipathi  has  large beneficial interests in  the  math properties and he may sue on its behalf for recovery of  its properties.  In his absence, a de facto mathadhipathi may do so, and where necessary, a disciple or other beneficiary  of the  math may take steps for vindicating its  legal  rights. Therefore,   if  before  the   mathadhipathi’s   appointment limitation  under art. 144 had commenced to run against  the math, the appointment does not give either the, math or  the mathadhipathi a new right of suit or a fresh starting  point of  limitation,  and  so, if the title of the  math  to  any property  is extinguished by adverse possession, the  rights of  all beneficiaries of the math in the property  are  also extinguished. [912 A-D; 912 H-913 B] Jagadindra  Nath Roy v. Hementa Kumari Debi, (1904)  1.1.R.. 32 Cal. 129, distinguished.                             909

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 544 of 1963. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated July 16, 1959 of Madras High Court in Second Appeal No.  513 of 1957. A.V. Viswanatha Sastri, S. S. Javali and Ganapathi Iyer, for appellants. R.   K.  Garg.  S. C. Agarwal, D. P. Singh and M.  K.  Rama- murthi, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. Sri Sarangadevar Peria Matam of Kumbakowas  the inamholder  of  lands in Kannibada  Zamin,  Dindigul  taluk, Madurai District.  In 1883, the then mathadhipathi granted a perpetual lease of the melwaram and kudiwaram interest in  a portion of the inam lands to one Chinna Gopiya Goundar,  the grandfather of the plaintiff-respondent on an annual rent of Rs.  70.   The demised lands are the subject-matter  of  the present  suit.  Since 1883 until January 1950 Chinna  Gopiya Goundar and his descendants were in uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the suit lands.  In 1915, the mathadhipathi died  without  nominating  a  successor.   Since  1915,  the descendants of Chinna Gopia Goundar did not pay any rent  to the math.  Between 1915 and 1939 there was no mathadhipathi. One  Basavan  Chetti  was in management of the  math  for  a period of 20 years from 1915.  The present mathadhipathi was elected by the disciples of the Math in 1939.  In 1928,  the Collector  of  Madurai  passed an order  resuming  the  inam lands,  and  directing  full assessment  of  the  lands  and payment of the assessment to the math for its upkeep.  After resumption, the lands were transferred from the "B" Register of  inam lands to the "A" Register of ryotwari lands  and  a joint  patta  was issued in the name of  the  plaintiff  and other  persons  in possession of the lands.   The  plaintiff continued to possess the suit lands until January, 1950 when the math obtained possession of the lands.  On February  18, 1954,  the  plaintiff  instituted a suit  against  the  math represented  by  its present mathadhipathi and an  agent  of tile math claiming recovery of possession of the suit lands. The plaintiff claimed that he acquired title to the lands by adverse  possession end by the issue of a ryotwar; patta  in

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his  favour on the resumption of the inam.  The  Subordinate Judge  of Dindigul accepted the plaintiff’s contention,  and decreed the suit.  On appeal, the District Judge 910 of Madurai set aside the decree and dismissed the suit.   On second  appeal,  the  High  Court  of  Madras  restored  the judgment   and  decree  of  the  Subordinate   Judge.    The defendants  now  appeal  to this  Court  by  special  leave. During the pendency of the appeal, the  plaintiff-respondent died and his legal representatives have been substituted  in his place. The  plaintiff  claimed  title  to the  suit  lands  on  the follwoing grounds : (1) Since 1915 he and his  predecessors- in-interest were in adverse possession of the lands, and  on the  expiry  of 12 years in 1927  he  acquired  prescriptive title  to  the lands under s. 28 read with Art. 144  of  the Indian   Limitation  Act,  1908;  (2)  by   the   resumption proceedings and the grant of the ryotwari patta a new tenure was created in his favour and he acquired full ownership  in the  lands;  and  (3)  in  any  event,  he  was  in  adverse possession of the lands since 1928, and on the expiry of  12 years  in 1940 he acquired prescriptive title to  the  lands under  s. 28 read with Art. 134-B of the  Indian  Limitation Act, 1908.  We are of the opinion that the first  contention of  the plaintiff should be accepted, and it is,  therefore, not  necessary  to  consider the other two  grounds  of  his claim. In   the   absence   of  legal   necessity,   the   previous mathadhipathi had no power to grant a perpetual lease of the math properties at a fixed rent.  Legal necessity is neither alleged  nor  proved.  But the mathadhipathi  had  power  to grant  a  lease which could endure for  his  lifetime.   The lease of 1883, therefore, endured during the lifetime of the previous  mathadhipathi,  and terminated on  hi,;  death  in 1915.   Since 1915, the plaintiff and his  predecessors  in- interest  did  not  pay  any rent  to  the  math,  and  they possessed  the  lands on their own behalf adversely  to  the math.   Before  the insertion of Art. 134-B  in  the  Indian Limitation Act, 1908 by Act 1 of 1929, the suit for recovery of the lands from the defendants would have been governed by Art.  144.  The controversy is about the starting  point  of limitation of a suit for the recovery of the math properties under Art. 144.  Did the limitation commence on the date  of the death of the previous mathadhipathi, or did it  commence on the data of election of the present mathadhipathi ? On  behalf of the appellants, Mr. Ganapathy  lyer  contended that  the  right  to  sue for  the  recovery  of  the  math- properties vests in the legally appointed mathadhipathi  and adverse   possession  against  him  cannot  run  until   his appointment.   In support of his contention, be relied  upon the minority judgment of a Full Bench                             911 of    the   Madras   High   Court   in    Venkateswara    v. Venkatesa(1),  Kameswara  Rao  v.  Somanna(2)  and  Manikkam Pillai  v.  Thani Kachalam Pillai(3).  He argued  that  this view  has  received legislative sanction in Art. 96  of  the Indian  Limitation Act, 1963.  He relied upon the  following observations  in  Jagadindra  Nath  Roy  v.  Hemanta  Kumari Debi(4)  "the  possession and management  of  the  dedicated property  belongs to the sebait.  And this carries  with  it the  right  to bring whatever suits are  necessary  for  the protection  of  the property.  Every such right of  suit  is vested in the sebait and not in the idol." Relying on Murray v.  The  East  India  Company(-’)  and  Meyappa  Chetty   v. Subramanian Chetty(6) and several decisions under Arts.  120

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and  110  of the Indian Limitation Act, 1910,  he  submitted that  the cause of action does not accrue and time does  not commence  to run unless there is someone who  can  institute the  suit.   Relying  on  Radhamoni  Devi  v.  Collector  of Khulna(7) and Srischandra Nandy v. Baijnath Jugal Kishore(8) he  contended  that before possession can be  adverse  there must  be a competitor who by due vigilance could  avoid  the running of time. Mr. Garg on behalf of the respondents contended that adverse possession commenced to run against the math on the death of the mathadhipathi who granted the lease and the operation of the  Limitation Act is not affected by the fact  that  there was  no  legal  manager  of the math.   In  support  of  his contention, he relied upon the majority judgment of the Full Bench  of the Madras High Court in  Venkateswara’s  case(1), Monmohan  Haldar  v. Dibbendu Prosad  Ray  Chaudhuri(9)  and Administrator-General  of  Bengal v.  Balkissen  Misser(10). Relying   on  Pramatha  Nath  Mullick  v.  Pradyumna   Kumar Mullick(11),  he submitted that a math, like an idol, has  a juridical status with the power of suing and being sued.  He argued   that  in  the  absence  of  a   legally   appointed mathadhipathi, a defacto manager could institute a suit  for recovery  of the math properties, and the  Beneficiaries  of the endowment could take appropriate steps for the recovery, and,  in  any event, the mere absence of machinery  for  the institution  of  the suit would not suspend the  running  of limitation. We  are  inclined  to accept  the  respondents’  contention. Under   Art.  144  of  the  Indian  Limitation  Act,   1908, limitation   for  a  suit  by  a  math  or  by  any   person representing it for possession of im- (1). L. R. 1941 Mad. 599. (2) A. 1. R. 1955 Andhra Pradesh. 212. (3) A. 1. R. 1917 Mad. 706. (4) (1904) 1. L. R. 32 Cal. 129,141. (5) (1821) 5 B. & Ald. 204,217  . (6) (1916) L. R. 43 1. A. 113,120. (7) (1900) L. R. 27 1. A. 136. (8) 1. L. R. 14 Patna. 327 P. C. (9)  (1949) T. L. R. 2 Cal. 263. (10) (1924) 1. L. R. 51 Cal. 953, 957-960. (11) (1925) L. R. 52 1. A. 245, 250. 912 movable  properties belonging to it runs from the time  when the  possession  of  the defendant becomes  adverse  to  the plaintiff.   The math is the owner of the endowed  property. Like an idol, the math is a juristic person having the power of  acquiring, owning and possessing properties  and  having the  capacity  of  suing and being  sued.   Being  an  ideal person, it must of necessity act in relation to its temporal affairs,   through   human   agency.    See   Babajirao   v. Laxmandas(1).   It may acquire property by prescription  and may  likewise lose property by adverse possession.   If  the math while in possession of its property is dispossessed  or if the possession of a stranger becomes adverse, it  suffers an  injury and has the right to sue for the recovery of  the property.  If there is a legally appointed mathadhipathi, he may  institute the suit on its behalf; if not, the de  facto mathadhipathi  may do so, see Mahadeo Prasad Singh v.  Karia Bharti(2);  and  where,  necessary,  a  disciple  or   other beneficiary  of the math may take steps for vindicating  its legal  rights  by  the  appointment  of  a  receiver  having authority  to sue on its behalf, or by the institution of  a suit  in its name by a next friend appointed by  the  Court. With  due diligence, the math or those interested in it  may

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avoid  the  running  of time.   The  running  of  limitation against  the  math under Art. 144 is not  suspended  by  the absence  of  a  legally  appointed  mathadhipathi;  clearly, limitation would run against it where it is managed by a  de facto   mathadhipathi.   See  Vithalbowa  v.  Narayan   Daji Thite(3),  and  we think it would run equally  if  there  is neither a de jure nor a de facto mathadhipathi. A  mathadhipathi is the manager and custodian of the  insti- tution.   See  Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v.  Balusami  Ayyar(4). The  office carries with it the right to manage and  possess the  endowed properties on behalf of the math and the  right to sue on its behalf for the protection of those properties. During the tenure of his office, the mathadhipathi has  also large  beneficial interests in the math properties, see  The Commissioner,  Hindu  Religious Endowments,  Madras  v.  Sri Lakshmindra  Thirtha  Swamiar  of Srirur  Mutt(5).   But  by virtue  of  his office, he can possess and enjoy  only  such properties as belong to the math.  If the title of the  math to  any property is extinguished by adverse possession,  the rights of all beneficiaries of the math in the property  are also  extinguished.  On his appointment,  the  mathadhipathi acquires  no  right  to recover  property  which  no  longer belongs  to the math.  If before his appointment  limitation under Art. 144 has (1) (1904) 1. L. R. 28 Bom. 215,223. (3) (1893) 1. L. R. 18 Bom. 507, 51 1. (2) (1934) L.R.62T.A. 47,51. (4)  L. R. 48 1. A. 302 at 311,315. (5)  [1954] S. C. R. 1005,1018-1020. 913 commenced to run against the math, the appointment does  not give  either  the math or the mathadhipathi a new  right  of suit  or  a fresh starting point of  limitation  under  that Article for recovery of the property.  In the instant  case, the present mathadhipathi was elected in 1939 when the title of  the math to the suit lands was already  extinguished  by adverse  possession.   By his election in 1939  the  present mathadhipathi  could  not acquire the right to  possess  and enjoy  or to recover properties which no longer belonged  to the math. In  Jagadindra Nath Roy’s case(1), the dispossession of  the idol’s lands took place in April, 1876.  The only shebait of the  idol was then a minor, and he sued for recovery of  the lands  in October. 1889 within three years of his  attaining majority.  The Privy Council held that the plaintiff being a minor  at the commencement of the period of  limitation  was entitled  to  the benefit of s. 7 of the  Indian  Limitation Act,  1877  (Act XV of 1877) corresponding to s.  6  of  the Indian  Limitation Act 1908, and was entitled  to  institute the  suit  within  three years of his coming  of  age.  This decision  created an anomaly, for, as pointed out  by  Page, J.in Administrator-General of Bengal v. Balkissen  Misser(2) at  p.958,  in  giving the benefit of s.  7  of  the  Indian Limitation  Act,1877  to  the  shebait,  the  Privy  Council proceeded  on  the  footing  that  the  right  to  sue   for possession  is to be divorced from the proprietary right  to the property which is vested in the idol.  We do not express any  opinion  one  way or the other on  the  correctness  of Jagadindra  Nath  Roy’s case(1).  For the purposes  of  this case,  it is sufficient to say that we are not  inclined  to extend  the  principle of that case.  In that case,  at  the commencement of the period of limitation there was a shebait in  existence entitled to sue on behalf of the idol, and  on the institution of the suit he successfully claimed that  as the  person entitled to institute the suit at the time  from

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which the period is to be reckoned he should get the benefit of  s. 7 of the Indian Limitation Act 1877.  In the  present case,  there was no mathadhipathi in existence in 1915  when limitation  commenced to run.  Nor is there any question  of the  minority of a mathadhipathi entitled to sue in 1915  or of applying s. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. For  these reasons, we hold that the time under Art. 144  of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 commenced to run in 1915  on the death of the, mathadhipathi, who granted the lease,  and the  absence  of a legally appointed mathadhipathi  did  not prevent the running of time under Art. 144.  We,  therefore, agree (2)  (1924) I.L.R. 51 Cal. 953. (1)   (1904) I.L.R. 32 Cal. 129. Sup. C. 1/65-15 914 with  the answer given by the majority of the Judges to  the third question referred to the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Venkateswara’s case() at pp. 614-615, 633-634.   We express  no opinion on the interpretation of Art.  134-B  of the  Indian  Limitation Act, 1908 or Art. 96 of  the  Indian Limitation   Act,  1963.   Under  Art.  96  of  the   Indian Limitation  Act, 1963, the starting point of  limitation  in such  a  case would be the date of the  appointment  of  the plaintiff  as  manager of the endowment,  but  this  Article cannot be considered to be a legislative recognition of  the law existing before 1929. We hold that by the operation of Art. 144 read with S. 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 the title of the math to the suit  lands became extinguished in 1927, and  the  plaintiff acquired  title to the lands by prescription.  He  continued in possession of the lands until January, 1950.  It has been found  that  in  January,  1950  he  voluntarily   delivered possession  of the lands to the math, but such  delivery  of possession did not transfer any title to the math.  The suit was instituted in 1954 and is-well within time. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. (1) 1. L. R. 1941 Mad. 599 915