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PETITIONER: SRI RAM RAM NARAIN MEDHI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BOMBAY(and connected petition)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/11/1958

BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. SUBBARAO, K. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1959 AIR  459            1959 SCR  Supl. (1) 489  CITATOR INFO :  R          1959 SC 519  (12,13)  R          1960 SC 796  (3)  F          1960 SC1008  (10)  R          1960 SC1080  (16,75)  RF         1961 SC 954  (23)  R          1961 SC1517  (1)  R          1962 SC 137  (8)  R          1962 SC 694  (25,27,67)  R          1962 SC 723  (42)  R          1962 SC 821  (5,10,54)  R          1965 SC 632  (11)  R          1967 SC1110  (11,12)  R          1967 SC1373  (40)  RF         1970 SC 126  (5)  R          1970 SC 398  (2)  R          1970 SC 439  (6)  D          1971 SC1992  (9,16)  R          1972 SC 425  (30)  R          1972 SC2284  (19)  RF         1973 SC2734  (32)  D          1974 SC 543  (14)  RF         1975 SC1193  (17)  RF         1979 SC1055  (12)  RF         1981 SC1881  (1)  R          1982 SC 149  (254)  F          1983 SC 643  (6)  R          1983 SC 648  (2)  RF         1983 SC1213  (10)  E&D        1990 SC1771  (13)  R          1992 SC  96  (14)

ACT: Land Reform-Distribution   of  ownership  and   control   of agricultural   land--Purchase   by   tenants--Validity    of enactment--Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Bom. XIII of 1956), ss. 32 to 32R-Constitution of India,  Arts.  14, 19, 31, 31A, Entry 18, List  II,  Seventh Schedule.

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HEADNOTE: The petitions challenged the constitutional validity of  the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural lands (Amendment) Act, 1956, (1)  [1955] 2 S.C.R. 303. 62 490 (Bom.   XIII of 1956) which, in further amending the  Bombay Tenancy  and  Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bom.   LXVII  of 1948),  ;Ought  to distribute the ownership and  control  of agricultural  lands  in  implementation  of  the   Directive principles  of State policy laid down by Arts. 38 and 39  of the  Constitution.   The impugned Act  sought  to  distribut equitably the lands between the landholders and the tenants, except   where   the  landholder  required  the   same   for cultivation  by himself, by way of compulsory  _Purchase  of all  surplus  lands by tenants in  possession  thereof  with effect  from April 1, 1957, called the ’tiller’s day’.   The basic  idea underlying the Act was to prevent  concentration of agricultural lands in the hands of the landholders.   The Act  thus, being a legislation in respect of rights  in  and over land, affected the-relation between landlord and tenant and provided for the transfer and alienation of agricultural lands.  The petitioners, who were landholders as defined  by s.  2(9)  of  the  Act  contended  that  (1)  the   impugned legislation   was  beyond  the  competence  of   the   State Legislature,  (2) that, not being protected by Art. 31A,  of the  Constitution, it infringed Arts. 14, 19 and 31  of  the Constitution  and  (3)  that it was a  piece  of  colourable legislation  vitiated  in part by  excessive  delegation  of legislative power to the State.  On behalf of the respondent it was urged that the impugned legislation fell within Entry 18  in List 11 Of the Seventh Schedule to the  Constitution, that  ’provided  for the extinguishment or  modification  of rights  to estates and was as such protected by Art. 31A  of the Constitution and that there was no excessive  delegation of legislative power. Held, that it was well settled that the heads of legislation specified in Entry 18 in List 11 of the Seventh Schedule  to the  Constitution  should not be construed in a  narrow  and pedantic  sense  but  should be given a  large  and  liberal interpretation.   There could, therefore, be no  doubt  that the impugned Act fell within the purview of Entry 18 in List 11 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and the  plea of legislative incompetence must fail. British  Coal  Corporation v. The King, (1935)  A.C.  500  ; United  Provinces  v . Atiqa Begum, [1940]  F.C.R.  110  and Navinchandra  Mafatlal  v. The Commissioner  of  Income-tax, Bombay City, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 829, relied on. There  could be no doubt that the Bombay Land Revenue  Code, 1879, was the existing law relating to land tenures in force in the State of Bombay within the meaning of Art.  31A(2)(a) of  the Constitution and the word ’estate’ as defined by  S. 2(5)  Of the Code clearly applied not only to lands held  by the  various tenure-holders of alienated lands but  also  to land-holders and occupants of unalienated lands.  There  was no   ambiguity  in  that  definition  and,   therefore,   no justification  for putting a narrower construction  on  that word  so as to mean the land-holders of the former  category alone  and  not of the latter; even if there  was  any,  the wider  meaning of the word was the one to be adopted in  the context of the objective of the Act. 491 Case law discussed. The word ’landholder’ as defined in s. 2(9) of the Act  also made no distinction between alienated and unalienated  lands

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and  showed  that  the interest of such  a  landholder  fell within  the definition of ’estate’ contained in s.  2(5)  of the Code. There was no warrant for the proposition that extinguishment or modification of any rights in estates as contemplated  by Art.  31A(1)(a)  of  the Constitution must  mean  only  what happened  in the process of acquisition of any estate or  of any  rights  therein  by the State.   The  language  of  the Article was clear and unambiguous and showed that it treated the two concepts as distinct and different from each other. Sections 32 to 32R of the impugned Act clearly  contemplated the  vesting  of the title in the tenure on  the    titter’s day,  defeasible  only on certain  specified  contingencies. They  were designed to bring about an extinguishment  or  in any  event  a modification of the landlord’s rights  in  the estate   within  the  meaning  of  Art.  31A(1)(a)  of   the Constitution.    The  impugned  Act,  therefore,   was   not vulnerable  as being violative of Arts.14, 19 and 31 of  the Constitution.   It would not be correct to contend that  the sections   merely   contemplated   a   suspension   of   the landholders’ right and not their extinguishment. Thakur  Raghubir  Singh  v. Court of  Wards,  Ajmer,  [1953] S.C.R. 1049, held inapplicable. Where   the  Legislature  settled  the  policy   and   broad principles of the legislation, there could be no bar against leaving  matters of detail to be fixed by the executive  and such  delegation of power could not vitiate  the  enactment. In the instant case, since the Legislature had laid down the policy  of  the Act in the preamble,  enunciated  the  broad principles in ss. 5 and 6 and fixed the four criteria in  s. 7  itself,  the  last of which had necessarily  to  be  read ejusdem  generis with the others, it was not correct to  say that  the  impugned Act by s. 7 had  conferred  uncontrolled power  on the State Government to vary the ceiling  area  or the  economic  holding  or  that s. 7  was  vitiated  by  an excessive delegation of legislative power to the State. Parshram Damodhar v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1957 Bom.  257, disapproved. Dr.   N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi, [1950] S.C.R.  519; The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Saykar, [1952]  S.C.R. 284  and Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India,  [1957]  S.C.R. 233, referred to.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 13 & 38. 41 of 57  and 55 of 1958. Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India  for the enforcement of Fundamental rights. V.   M.  Limaye  and S. S. Shukla, for the  petitioners  (In Petitions Nos. 13, 38-411/57). 492 Purshottam   Tricumdas  and  J.  B.  Dadachanji,   for   the petitioner (In Petition No. 55/58). H.   N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, H.  J.  Umrigar,  K.  L. Hathi and R.  H.  Dhebar,  for  the respondent. 1958.  November 18.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI,  J.-These  six  petitions under  Art.  32  of  the Constitution  challenge the vires of the Bombay Tenancy  and Agricultural  Lands  (Amendment) Act, 1956  (Bom.   XIII  of 1956) (hereinafter referred to as the " impugned Act ").  It was  an  Act  further  to  amend  the  Bombay  Tenancy   and

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Agricultural   Lands  Act,  1948  (Bom.   LXVII   of   1948) (hereinafter called the 1948 Act "). The petitioners are citizens of India and landholders within the  meaning of the 1948 Act holding several acres  of  land within  the  State of Bombay out of which a  few  acres  are under  their  own cultivation, the bulk of the  lands  being under  the cultivation of tenantsexcept in the case of  -the petitioners  in Petition No. 58 of 1958 where the  whole  of the lands are under the cultivation of tenants. The  1948 Act had been passed by the State Legislature as  a measure of agrarian reform on December 28, 1948, with a view to amend the law relating to tenancies of agricultural lands and  to  make certain other provisions in  regard  to  those lands and the objectives sought to be achieved were thus set out in the second paragraph of the preamble:- "  AND WHEREAS on account of the neglect of a landholder  or disputes   between  a  landholder  and  his   tenants,   the cultivation of his estate has seriously suffered, or for the purpose  of improving the economic and social conditions  of peasants or ensuring the full and efficient use of land  for agricultural purposes, it is expedient to assume  management of  estates held by landholders and to regulate  and  impose restrictions on the transfer of agricultural lands, dwelling houses, sites and lands appurtenant thereto belonging to  or occupied by agriculturists, agricultural labourers and (1)                    493 artisans  in the Province of Bombay and to  make  provisions for       certain      other      purposes       hereinafter appearing................ Section 2(8) of the said Act defined " Land " to mean: "(a)  land  which  is used for  agricultural  purposes,  and includes- (a)  the  sites of farm buildings appurtenant to such  land; and used for agricultural purposes, and (b)......................................................... (i) the sites of dwelling houses occupied by agriculturists, agricultural  labourers or artisans and land appurtenant  to such dwelling houses. (ii)........................................................" "Landholder  "  was defined in s. 2(9) of the  said  Act  to mean:- "a zamindar, jagirdar, saranjandar, inamdar, talukdar, malik or a khot or any person not hereinbefore specified who is  a holder  of land or who is interested in land, and  whom  the State  Government has declared on account of the extent  and the value of the land or his interests therein to be a land- bolder for the purposes of this Act." Under  s.  2(21) of the said Act the words  and  expressions used  in  the Act but not defined were to have  the  meaning assigned to them in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879,  and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as the case may be. With  a  view  to achieve the objective  of  establishing  a socialistic  pattern  of  society in the  State  within  the meaning of Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution, a further measure  of  agrarian  reform  was  enacted  by  the   State Legislature,  being the impugned Act, hereinbefore  referred to,  which was designed to bring about such distribution  of the  ownership and control of agricultural lands as best  to subserve  the common good thus eliminating concentration  of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.  The said  Act received the assent of the President on March  16, 1956, was published in the Bombay Government 494 Gazette  on March 29, 1956, and came into  force  throughout the State on August 1, 1956.

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In  about November, 1956, certain landholders from  Kolhapur and  Sholapur  districts  in  the  State  of  Bombay   filed petitions  in  the Bombay High Court under Art. 226  of  the Constitution   challenging  the  constitutionality  of   the impugned  Act on various grounds.’ A Division Bench  of  the Bombay  High Court pronounced its judgment on  February  21, 1957, dismissing those petitions with costs except in regard to a declaration as regards the invalidity of section 88D of the  Act.   The  petitioners herein  thereupon  filed  these petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging  the vires of the impugned Act and praying for a writ of mandamus against  the State of Bombay ordering them to  forbear  from enforcing  or  taking any steps in enforcement of  the  act, costs and further  reliefs. Petition  No.  13  of 1957 appears to  have  been  filed  on December  3,  1956, but effective steps therein  were  taken only when an application for, stay with a prayer for an  ex- parte order being C.M.P. No. 359 of 1957 was filed herein on March 21, 1957.  Petitions Nos. 38 to 41 of 1957 were  filed on March 21, 1957, and Petition No. 55 of 1958 was filed  on March 19, 1958. All  these petitions followed a common pattern and the  main grounds  of attack were: that the State Legislature was  not competent to pass the said Act, the topic of legislation not being covered by any ’entry in the State List; that the said Act  was beyond the am bit of Art. 31-A of the  Constitution and  was therefore vulnerable as infringing the  fundamental rights  enshrined in Arts. 14, 19 and 31 thereof;  that  the provisions of the said Act in fact infringed the fundamental rights  of the petitioners conferred upon them by Arts.  14. 119  and  31 of the Constitution; that the said  Act  was  a piece  of colourable legislation and in any event a part  of the provisions thereof -suffered from the vice of  excessive delegation  of legislative power.  The answer of  the  State was  that  the impugned Act was covered by Entry No.  18  in List 11 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, that it was  a  piece  of  legislation  for  the  extinguishment  or modification of 495 rights in relation to estates within the definition  thereof in  Art. 31-A of the Constitution and that therefore it  was not open to challenge under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 thereof  and that  it was neither a piece of colourable  legislation  nor did  any part thereof come within the mischief of  excessive delegation. As to the legislative competence of the State Legislature to pass the impugned Act the question lies within a very narrow compass.  As already stated, the impugned Act was a  further measure  of agrarian reform enacted with a view  to  further amend  the 1948 Act and the object of the enactment  was  to bring about such distribution of the ownership and,  control of  agricultural lands as best to subserve the common  good. This  object  was sought to be achieved  by  fixing  ceiling areas  of  lands  which could be held by a per  son  and  by prescribing  what  was an economic holding.   It  sought  to equitably  distribute the lands between the landholders  and the  tenants and except in those cases where the  landholder wanted  the  land for cultivating the  same  personally  for which due provision was made in the Act, transferred by  way of  compulsory  purchase all the other lands to  tenants  in possession of the same with effect from April 1, 1957, which was called the " tillers day ". Provision ’Was also made for disposal  of balance of lands after purchase by tenants  and the basic idea underlying the provisions of the impugned Act was  to prevent the concentration of agricultural  lands  in

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the  hands  of  landholders to the  common  detriment.   The tiller  or  the cultivator was brought into  direct  contact with the State eliminating thereby the landholders who  were in  the  position  of intermediaries.   The  enactment  thus affected the relation between landlord and tenant,  provided for the transfer and-alienation of agricultural lands, aimed at land improvement and was broadly stated a legislation  in regard   to   the  rights  in   or   over   land:-categories specifically  referred  to  in Entry 18 in List  11  of  the Seventh  Schedule to the Constitution, which  specifies  the head of legislation as " land, that is to say, rights in  or over  land, land tenures including the relation of  landlord and tenant, and the collection of 496 rents;  transfer and alienation of agricultural  land;  land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization ". It  is well settled that these heads of  legislation  should not  be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense but  should be  given  a  large  and  liberal  interpretation.   As  was observed  by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council  in British Coal Corporation v. The King (1):- "Indeed,  in interpreting a constituent or  organic  statute such  as the Act, that construction most beneficial  to  the widest possible amplitude of its powers must be adopted." The  Federal  Court also in the United  Provinces  V.  Atiqa Begum (2) pointed out that none of the items in the Lists is to  be  read in a narrow or restricted sense and  that  each general  word should be held to extend to all  ancillary  or subsidiary  matters which can fairly and reasonably be  said to  be  comprehended  in it.   This  Court  in  Navinchandra Mafatlal v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City  (3) also expressed the same opinion and stated:- "The cardinal rule of interpretation, however, is that words should  be read in their ordinary, natural  and  grammatical meaning subject to this rider, that in construing words in a constitutional  enactment conferring legislative  power  the most  liberal construction should be put upon words so  that the  same may have effect in their widest  amplitude."  (See also Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan(4)). Having  regard to the principle of  construction  enunciated above, it is clear that the impugned Act is covered by Entry 18  in List II of the Seventh Schedule to  the  Constitution and is a legislation with reference to "land " and this plea of  legislative  incompetence of the  State  Legislature  to enact the impugned Act therefore fails. If,  then, the State Legislature was competent to enact  the impugned  Act,  is the Act ultra vires the  Constitution  as infringing any of the fundamental (1)   [1935] A.C. 500,518. (3)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 829, 836, 837. (2)   [1940] F.C.R. 110, 134. (4)   [1955]2S.C.R 303,329. 497 rights conferred upon the petitioners ? In the course Of the arguments  before  us learned counsel  for  the  petitioners confined  their attack only to the constitutionality of  ss. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17A, 31A to 31D and 3 to 32R of the  impugned Act  as violative of the fundamental right guaranteed  under Art.  19(1)(g) of the Constitution.  The first  question  to consider in this context however is whether the impugned Act is protected by Art. 31-A of the Constitution because if  it in  so  protected, no challenge on the score of  the  provi- sions  thereof  violating  Arts. 14,19 and 31  of  the  Con- stitution would be available to the petitioners. The  relevant  portions  of  Art.  31-A  which  fall  to  be

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considered here read as follows:- "(1) Notwithstanding  anything contained in Art. 13, no  law providing for:- (a)  the  acquisition by the State of any estate or  of  any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of  any such rights.................. shall be deemed to be void  on the  ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes  away  or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14,  article 19 or article 31. Provided  that  where  such  law  is  a  law  made  by   the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved  for the  consideration  of  the  President,  has  received   his assent............... (2)  In this article,- (a)the expression " estate " shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its  local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land  tenures in  force  in that area, and shall also include  any  jagir, inam,  or muafi or other similar grant and in the States  of Madras and TravancoreCochin any janmam rights. (b)  the  expression  " rights " in relation to  an  estate, shall  include  any  rights vesting in  a  proprietor,  sub- proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat, 63 inder-raiyat  or  other  intermediary  and  any  rights   or Privileges in respect of land revenue." The question which we have to address ourselves intially  is whether the lands held by the petitioners,who are admittedly landholders  within the 8 Act, are of the term contained  in s. 2.(9) of the 194 "estates " within the meaning of Art. 31 A of the constitution. Before  we launch upon that enquiry it would perhaps  be  of helP  to  note  how the  various  land  tenures  originated. Baden-Powell  in  his Land-Systems of  British  India  (1892 Ed.), Vol. 1, dealing with the general view of land  tenures traced the origin and growth at @p. 97 of different  tenures in the manner following at pp. 97-99 (Chapter IV):- "  4.  Effects of Land-Revenue Administration  and  Revenue- farming.  Then again the greater Oriental governments  which -preceded  ours,  have  always, in  one  -form  or  another, derived the bulk of their State-revenues and Royal  property from  the land.  In one system known to us, "Royal  lands  " were  allotted in the principal villages, and this fact  may have suggested to the Mughals their plan of allotting spcial farms  and villages to furnish the privy Purse, and has  had other  survivals.   But, speaking generally,  the  universal plan of taking  revenue was by taking a share of the  actual grain  heap  on the the threshing-floor  from  each  payment levied  on  each  estate or each field  as  the  case  might be...............   To  collect  this  revenue,  the   ruler appointed or recognized not only a headman and accountant in each  village, but also a hierarchy of graded  officials  in districts  and  minor  divisions  of  territory  formed  for administrative   purposes.    These  officers   were   often remunerated  by  holdings  of  land, and  a  class  of  land -tenures  will  be found in some parts of India  owning  its origin to these hereditary official holding s. Not only  so, but  during  the  decline which  Oriental  governments  have usually  undergone, the Revenue official have been  commonly found  to  merge in, or be superseded,  by  revenue-farmers- persons who 499 contracted for a certain sum of revenue to be paid int,  the Treasury from a given area, I as representing the State dues

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exigible  from  the land-holdings within  that  area.   Such revenue-farmers,  or officials, whatever their origin,  have always tended to absorb the interest of the land-holders and to become in time the virtual landlords over them. Nor is it only that landlord tenures arise in this way.   No sooner does the superior right take shape than we find  many curious  new tenures created by the landlord or arising  out of his attempts to conciliate or provide for certain eminent claims in the grade below him. S.   5. Effects of Assignment or Remission of LandRevenue. Yet  another class of tenures arises in connection with  the State  Revenue-administration;  and that is when  the  ruler either  excuses  an  existing land-holder  from  paying  his revenue,  either  wholly  or in part; or "  alienates  "  or assigns the revenue of a certain estate or tract of  country in  favour of some chief, or other person of importance,  or to provide funds for some special objects, or to serve as  a recompense for services to be rendered. At  first such grants are carefully regulated, are for  life only, and strictly kept to their purpose, and to the  amount fixed.   But  as matters go on, and the ruler is  a  bad  or unscrupulous  one, his treasury is empty, and he makes  such grants to avoid the dificulty of finding a cash salary.  The grants become permanent and hereditary; they are also issued by officials who have no right to make them; and not only do they  then  result  in landlord tenures  and  other  curious rights, but are a burden to after times, and have  furnished a  most  troublesome legacy to our own  Government  when  it found  the revenues eaten up by grantees whose  titles  were invalid, and whose pretensions, though grown old in times of disorder, were inadmissible. Such  grants  may have begun with no title to the  land  but only a right to the revenue, but want of 500 supervision and control has resulted in the grantee  seizing the landed right also. Here  we find the distinction between the State owned  lands which  are  unalienated where the tenures arise out  of  the exigencies  of  revenue collection and alienated  lands  the revenue  whereof is remitted either wholly or in part or  in other  words  "  alienated " or  assigned  to  grantees  for various purposes. Various   land   tenures  thus  developed  and   series   of proprietorships came into existence.  The main tenures which the  British found when they came into power comprised:  (1) the Khas or tenure by Government; (2)the Raiyatwari  tenure; (3)  the Zamindari or landlord tenure and (4) the  Taluqdari or double tenure. It  is  interesting to note in this connection that  in  the table compiled by Baden-Powell in Vol.III of his Book at  p. 142  giving some idea of the distribution of  the  different classes of landed estates in Madras the different classes of landed   estates   described  therein  included   not   only Zamindaris  but  also  " estates " hold  by  Raiyats  paying diverse sums as and by way of land revenue. So far as the area within the State of Bombay was  concerned the position is thus summed up in Dande- kar’s Law of Land Tenures, Vol. 1 at p. 12:- Section III.  Classification of land according to the interest of the holder: "Land is either Government land or not Government land; that is,  it is either unalienated or alienated.  The  expression for unalienated land is khalsa or ryatawari in some parts as opposed to dumala or inam lands, that is, alienated lands In Gujrat Government lands are called " sarkari " as opposed to

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"baharkhali"lands   meaning   alienated   lands-lands    the produce.of  which  had  not  to be  brought  to  the  common threshing  ground.   In  some parts of  Gujrat  there  are," talpad  " (Government) lands as opposed to " Wanta "  lands. In old Regulations two kinds of land have been referred  to, namely, malguzarry land and lakhiraj land.  The former meant land paying 501 assessment to Government, whereas the latter meant land free from  payment of assessment.  Khalsa land in  the  permanent occupation  of holders was denominated, before  the  survey- settlements,  in the different parts of ’the  Presidency  by the expressions mirasi, dhara, suti and muli.  I  Government arable  land not in the permanent occupation of an  occupant was  and  is  described by the  name  sheri.   In  alienated villages,  lands corresponding to Government "sheri "  lands are denominated by the expressions, "sheri " ".Khas Kamath " and  " Ghar Khedu ". Lands in leasehold or  farmed  villages are called khoti lands.  Lands which are given under  leases and  the  assessment  of which is  regulated  by  the  terms thereof are called kauli lands." It  will be observed that Mirasi, Dhara, Suti and Muli  were all  tenures  in regard to unalienated  lands,  the  tenure- holders  being permanent holders of land  having  hereditary interests  in  their holdings. , The Khoti  tenures  in  the Konkan and the Bhagdari and Narvadari tenures in some  parts of Gujrat were also tenures in regard to unalienated  lands, there venue being assessed on those lands on entire villages and not on specific pieces of land either in lump or on  the basis  of a fixed Bighoti assessment on each field  and  the tenure-holders being responsible for the payment of the, sum in certain specified modes.  The general prevailing  tenure, however,  was the Raiyatwari tenure where the Raiyat or  the tenant  had  the right of an occupant in his  holding.   The right of an occupant was a heritable right and on the  death of a registered occupant the name of his heir was entered in his  place.   All  these were land  tenures  in  respect  of unalienated  lands and the Bombay Survey and Settlement  Act (Bom.  1 of 1865) passed in 1865. applied, generally to  the same.   There were of course certain Acts which  dealt  with specific   tenures  mentioned  above,  e.g.,  Bhagdari   and Narvadari   Tenures  Act  (Bom.   V  of  1862),  and   Khoti Settlement Act (Bom. 1 of 1880); but by and large they  were tenures in regard to unalienated lands and were governed  by the  Bombay  Survey and Settlement Act, 1865.  In  1879  the State Legislature 502 enacted, the Bombay Land Revenue Code (Bom.  V of 1879) with a view to consolidate and amend the law relating to  Revenue Officers, to the assessment and recovery of land revenue and to other matters connected with land revenue administration. This  Act  extended  to the whole of  the  State  of  Bombay excluding the City of Bombay and certain other areas therein mentioned.   We  shall  have occasion to  refer  to  certain provisions of this Act hereafter. Turning  now  to  alienated lands  in  which  category  were comprised  lands not belonging to government and  lands  not paying  revenue to government which were exceptions  to  the principles of State proprietorship and of liability of land- holders  to pay land revenue to government we find that  the alienations  were classified as: (1) political tenures  such as  Jagirs and Saranjams; (2) Service Inams ;  (3)  Personal Inams   and   (4)  Religious  endowments.    The   principal alienations  were  Inams, Jagirs or  Saranjams  and  Watans. Each  of  them was considered as a tenure, had got  its  own

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history,  its  own  features  and  peculiarities.    Summary settlements  were  effected  by the  government  with  these tenure-holders  and their rights as such  recognized.  There were Taluqdari tenures or estates in Gujrat which also  came under this category and it may be noted that several  pieces of  legislation  were  passed by the  State  Legislature  in regard  to those several tenures of alienated lands, e.  g., Titles  to  Rent-Free  Estates  Act  (Bom.   XI  of   1852); Ahmedabad   Taluqdar’s  Act  (Bom.   VI  of  1862);   Bombay Hereditary Offices Act (Bom.  III of 1874); Broach and Kaira Encumbered Estates Act (Bom.  XIV of 1877); Broach and Kaira Encumbered  Estates  Act (Bom.  XXI of 1881);  Matadars  Act (Bom.   VI  of 1887) and Gujrat Taluqdars Act (Bom.   VI  of 1888).   Our attention was also drawn in this connection  to the  various Acts passed by the State  Legislature  (between 1949 and 1955) abolishing the several land tenures in Bombay where  the  government was not in direct  contact  with  the tiller  of  the  soil  but there  was  an  interposition  of intermediaries  between  them,  the  intermediaries   having leased out parts of 503 the  lands to the tenants who actually cultivated  the  soil and it was urged that the interests of these  intermediaries were estates properly so called. It is to be noticed, however, that the several land  tenures which  were thus abolished were not only tenures in  respect of  alienated  lands but also  comprise  unalienated  lands, e.g.,  the Bombay Bhagdari and Narvadari  Tenures  Abolition Act, 1949 (Bom.  XXXII of 1949); The Bombay Khoti  Abolition Act,  1949  (Bom.   VI  of  1950)  and  the  Bombay   Merged Territories  (Janjira and Bhor) Khoti Tenure Abolition  Act, 1953  (Bom.  LXXI of 1953).  There was no  distinction  made thus  between land tenures in regard to alienated lands  and those in regard to unalienated lands.  It may also be  noted that  all  these Acts followed a common pattern,  viz.,  the abolition  of these land tenures, award of  compensation  to the tenure holders whose tenures were thus abolished and the establishment of direct relations between the government  on the  one hand and the tenure-holders cultivating  the  lands personally  and  the  tenants cultivating the  soil  on  the other.   All these persons, thus cultivating the  soil  were given  the status of occupants and direct  relationship  was thus  established  between the government and  them.   These Acts  so  far as our present purpose is concerned  are  only mentioned to show the different types of land tenures  which existed  in the State of Bombay prior to their abolition  as aforesaid. These  were the various land tenures known in the  State  of Bombay  and we may at this stage appropriately refer to  the statistics (1886-87) of these tenures given by  Baden-Powell in Vol.III of his said Book at p. 251 504 ----------------------------------------------------------- Tenure  -- Number of -- Number of -- Area in -- Remarks.    estates or   Village.     acres    holding ------------------------------------------------------------ Village land holders:      1284,238  30,118 1/2   475,016    I have added Raiyatwari                         (occupied    together Village.                           land only)  these                                         paying at                                         full rates                                         and

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------------------------------------------     the much                                        smaller number                                        paying at                                        privileged                                        rates the                                        latter                                        are 213,405                                        and how far                                        these repre-                                        sent bhagdar                                      etc.,etc.,I have                                      no means of tra-                                            velling. Overlord      530 1/2   530 1/2  1,419,397 tuners                          (gross area) Taluqdari      41        41      79334 Mewasi Udhad          123       123      194,830 Jambandi Kot         17,32 1/2  17,32 1/2  2160,517 Issafat         7         7       3608 Revenue-free 2165 3/4  2165 3/4   4483,343  These refer to i.e.inam &                                  whole villages Jagir                                       or estates not                                      to revenue                                      privileges                                      on individual                                      fields,etc.,                                      which are                                     includeded                                     in village                                     land holding. 505 It  is to be noted that the holdings of the  landholders  in Ryatwari villages apart from others were also styled therein as estates or holdings. It was vehemently urged before us by learned counsel for the petitioners  that  the expression " estate "  aptly  applied only  to  lands  held  by  the  various  tenure  holders  of alienated  lands  above referred to, and that it  could  not apply to the holdings of occupants who had merely a right of occupancy in specific pieces of unalienated lands.  The word " estate " had been defined in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879,  in s. 2(5) to mean : " any interest in lands and  the aggregate of such interests vested in a person or  aggregate of  persons  capable of holding the same," and  would  prima facie cover not only an interest in alienated lands but also in  unalienated  lands.   It  was  however  urged  that  the expression  "  estate " should be construed  in  a  narrower sense   having  regard  to  the  legislative   history   and particularly  to the fact that the lands held by the  tenure holders  of  alienated  lands only had prior  to  1879  been recognized as estates and the holding of an occupant was not treated  as  such.  The distinction thus sought to  be  made between   holders  of  unalienated  lands  and  holders   of alienated lands. is not of much consequence because even  in regard to unalienated lands besides the occupants there were tenure holders called Bhagdars and Narwadars and Khotes  who had  interests  in lands held by them  under  those  several tenures  which lands were unalienated lands.  The  interests which these tenure holders enjoyed in the lands held by them were " estates " and it could not therefore be predicated of the  expression  "estate"  that it could  only  be  used  in connection  with alienated lands.  If this  distinction  was therefore of no avail, we have only got to consider if there

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is any reason why a narrow interpretation should be put upon the  expression  "estate" as suggested by  the  petitioners. Reliance   was  placed  by  the  learned  counsel  for   the petitioners  on  a  decision of  this  Court  in  Hariprasad Shivshankar  Shukla  v.  A. D. Divikar (1)  where  the  word retrenchment " as defined in s. 2(00) and the word (1)  [1957] S.C.R. 121, 132. 64 506 retrenchment  "  in s. 25F of the Industrial  Disputes  Act, 1947,  as amended by Act XLIII of 1953 were held to have  no wider  meaning  than the ordinary  accepted  connotation  of those  words and were held to mean the discharge of  surplus labour  or staff by the employer for any reason  whatsoever, otherwise  than  as  a  punishments  inflicted  by  way   of disciplinary  action,  and did not  include  termination  of services  of all workmen on a bona fide closure of  industry or  on  change  of ownership or  management  thereof.   Even though  the word " retrenchment" was defined as meaning  the termination  of services by an employer of the  workmen  for any  reason  whatsoever,  otherwise  than  as  a  punishment inflicted  by way of disciplinary action, which  words  were capable  of including within their scope the termination  of services  of all workmen on a bona fide closure of  industry or on change of ownership or management thereof, the word  " retrenchment  " was construed in a narrow sense because  the word  " retrenchment " connoted in its  ordinary  acceptance that  the business itself was being conducted and a  portion of  the staff or labour force was discharged as  surplusage. This  Court observed in the course of the judgment  at  page 132:- "  In the absence of any compelling words to  indicate  that the intention was even to include a bona fide closure of the whole  business,  it  would,  we  think,  be  divorcing  the expression  altogether  from its context to give it  such  a wide meaning as is contended for by learned counsel for  the respondent.  What is being defined is retrenchment, and that is  the  context  of the definition.  It  is  true  that  an artificial  definition may include a meaning different  from or  in excess of the ordinary acceptation of the word  which is  the  subject  of  definition; but  there  must  then  be compelling words to show that such a meaning different  from or  in excess of the ordinary meaning is  intended.   Where, within  the  framework of the ordinary  acceptation  of  the word,  every single requirement of the definition clause  is fulfilled,  it  would  be wrong to take  the  definition  as destroying the essential meaning of the word defined." 507 Reliance  was  also  placed on a decision of  the  Court  of Appeal in England in Re The Vexatious Actions Act, 1896,  In re Bernard Boaler (1) where the words " legal proceedings  " were  held not to include criminal proceedings, in spite  of the  words being prima facie capable of including the  same. Kennedy,  C. J., expressed his view at page 32 that  it  was impossible to say that the meaning of the expression " legal proceedings  "  was  in  itself  and  by  itself  clear  and unambiguous and followed the dictum of Lord Esher in Rex  v. City of London Court(2):- "  If the words of an Act admit of two interpretations  then they  are not clear ; and if one interpretation leads to  an absurdity  and the other does not, the Court  will  conclude that the Legislature did not intend to lead to an absurdity, and will adopt the other interpretation.  " Scrutton, J., also expressed the same opinion at p. 41 :- "  I  find  general words used in the  Act  capable  of  two

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meanings, a wider and a narrower one.  On the whole I  think the  language is more suited to the narrower than the  wider meaning.  The narrower meaning will affect the liberties  of the  subject  to some extent; the wider  meaning  will  most seriously  affect the liberties of the subject in a  matter, his  personal liberty and safety, which I see no  reason  in the  Act  to  believe  was  in  the  contemplation  of   the Legislature.    I   decline  to  make  this   more   serious interference  with  the liberty of the subject,  unless  the Legislature  uses language clear enough to convince me  that that  was  its  intention,  and I  think  ample  meaning  is provided for its words, and ample remedy is provided for the grievance in respect of which Parliament was legislating  by putting  the narrower construction on the general  words  it has used.  " Are there any circumstances in the present case which  would compel us to put a narrower construction on the expression " estate " in s. 2(5) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879  ? It is true that the expression " estate " was used prior  to 1879 in connection (1) [1915] 1 K.B. 21. (2) [1892] 1 Q.B. 273, 290. 508 with  the  interests  which the various  tenure  holders  of alienated  lands held in their respective lands but it  does not therefore follow that that expression could be used only in  connection  with  those interests and  no  others.   The Watandars, Saranjamdars, Inamdars and Taluqdars and the like were  no  doubt holders of " estates " but  does  that  fact militate  against the occupants also holding " estates "  in the  lands which were the subject-matter of  their  tenures. The  words  of the definition contained in s.  2(5)  of  the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, were clear and  unambiguous. They meant any interest in lands and the expression "  lands "  was capable of comprising within its ambit alienated  and unalienated lands. As  a matter of fact, the definition of " Superior holder  " in s. 2(13) and the definition of " alienated " in s.  2(20) of  the  Code,  provisions of s. 111 in  regard  to  revenue management  of  villages  or estates not  belonging  to  the Government,  of  s.  113 with regard  to  the  partition  of estates  and  of  s. 36 prescribing  liability  for  revenue amongst others refer not only to alienated lands but also to unalienated  lands  and  the expression  "  estates  "  used therein  can have reference not only to alienated lands  but also  to  unalienated  lands.   If  the  definition  of  the expression  "  estate " in the context of the Code  is  thus clear  and  unambiguous  as comprising both  the  types  -of lands,  there  is no reason why a narrower  construction  as suggested  by  the  petitioners  should  be  put  upon   the expression " estate ". (See the observations of Kennedy,  L. J., in Vexatious Actions Act, 1896, In re.  Boaler (1) at p. 31 and the observations of this Court in Baia Sri  Sailendra Narayan  Bhanja  Deo v. The State of Orissa  (2).   Even  if there  was  any  ambiguity  in  the  expression,  the  wider significance  should  be  adopted  in  the  context  of  the objectives of the Act as stated above. We  are, therefore, of opinion that the expression estate  " had  the  meaning  of any interest in land and  it  was  not confined merely to the holdings of landholders of  alienated lands.   The expression applied not only to such " estate  " holders   but  also  to  land  holders  and   occupants   of unalienated lands. (1) [1915] 1 K. B. 21. (2) [1956] S.C.R. 72.

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                   509 It  was however contended on behalf of the petitioners  that the Bombay Land Revenue Code was not a law relating to  land tenures  in force in the State of Bombay and  therefore  the definition  of the expression " estate "  contained  therein would not avail the respondent.  It was urged that the  Code was passed by the State Legislature in order to  consolidate and  amend the law relating to Revenue Officers, and to  the assessment  and  recovery  of Land  Revenue,  and  to  other matters  connected with the Land Revenue  Administration  in the  Presidency of Bombay and was merely concerned with  the collection  of land revenue by the State and had nothing  to do  with  land  tenures as such.   This  argument,  however, ignores the various provisions of the Code which define  the status  as also the rights and obligations of  the  occupant who  has  been defined in s. 2(16) of the Code to  mean  the holder in actual possession of unalienated lands other  than a tenant provided that where the holder in actual possession is  a  tenant, the landholder or superior landlord,  as  the case may be, shall be deemed to be the occupant.  Chapter VI deals with the Grant, Use and Relinquishment of  unalienated lands  and  s. 65 thereof prescribes the uses  to  which  an occupant  of  land for purposes of agriculture may  put  his land.   Under s. 68 an occupant-is entitled to the  use  and occupation of his land for the period therein prescribed  on fulfilling the conditions therein mentioned and under s.  73 occupancy  is  stated  to  be  transferable  and  heritable. Section 73 as it was enacted in 1879 read as follows: "  The right of occupancy shall subject to the provisions contained in section 56, and to any conditions lawfully annexed to the occupancy and save as otherwise prescribed by law, be deemed an heritable and transferable property." Certain  amendments have  been  made  in this section  by  various  Bombay  Land Revenue  Amendment Acts, (Bom.  VI of 1901 and Bom.   IV  of 1913)  and  the section as it stands at present  reads:"  An occupancy  shall,  subject to the  provisions  contained  in section  56, and to any conditions lawfully annexed  to  the tenure,  and save as otherwise prescribed by law, be  deemed an heritable and transferable 510 property." This goes to show that an occupant holds the land under  a tenure and occupancy is a species of land  tenures. The  provisions contained in s. 73(A) relating to the  power of  the State Government to restrict the right  of  transfer and the provisions in regard to relinquishments contained in ss. 74, 75 and 76 also point to the same conclusion.   These and  similar provisions go to show that occupancy is one  of the  varieties of land tenures and the Bombay  Land  Revenue Code, 1879, comes within the description of " existing  laws relating  to land tenures in force" in the State  of  Bombay within  the  meaning of Art. 31A  (2)(a).   BadenPowell  has similar  observations to make in regard to these  provisions in his Land Systems in British India, Vol.  1 at p. 321:- "Nothing  whatever  is said in the Revenue  Code  about  the person in possession (on his own account) being " owner " in the  Western sense.  He is simply called the "  occupant  ", and  the Code says what he can do and what he  cannot.   The occupant may do anything he pleases to improve the land, but may  not  without permission do anything which  diverts  the holding  from  agricultural purposes.  He has  no  right  to mines or minerals. These are the facts of the tenure; you may theorize on  them as  you please; you may say this amounts to  proprietorship, or this is a dominium minus plenum; or anything else." There  is  no doubt therefore that the Bombay  Land  Revenue

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Code, 1879, was an existing law relating to land tenures  in force  in Bombay at the time when the  Constitution  (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, was passed and Art. 31A in its amended form was introduced therein and the expression "estate " had a  meaning  given to it under s. 2(10) there,  viz.,  "  any interest  in  land  "  which  comprised  within  its   scope alienated  as  well  as unalienated lands  and  covered  the holdings of occupants within the meaning thereof. The 1948 Act was passed by the State Legislature in order to amend the law which governed the relations between landlords and  tenants of agricultural lands the object sought  to  be achieved being as hereinbefore 511 set out.  Section 2 of the Act defined the expressions "  to cultivate personally " (s. 2(6)); ,landholder " (s. 2(9)); " protected tenant " (s. 2(14) ) amongst other expressions and provided in s. 2(21) that words and expressions used in this Act but not defined shall have the meaning assigned to  them in  the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, and the Transfer  of Property Act, 1882, as the case may be.  This brought in the definition of the expression " estate " which had the  mean- ing assigned to it in that Code, viz., any interest in  land ". The expression " landholder in s. 2(9) above was  defined to  mean  "  a  zamindar,  jagirdar,  saranjamdar,  inamdar, talukdar,  malik  or a khot or any person  not  hereinbefore specified  who is a holder of land or who is  interested  in land, and whom the State Government has declared on  account of the extent and value of the land or his interests therein to be a landholder for the purposes of this Act." The latter part  of this definition is significant and shows  that  not only  holders  of  alienated  lands  but  also  holders   of unalienated lands were comprised therein provided,  however, the extent and value of the land or their interests  therein were such as to deserve a declaration in that behalf at  the hands of the State Government.  The only point to note  here is  that  no distinction was made even in this  Act  between alienated  lands and unalienated lands and all interests  in land howsoever acquired were treated on a par so far as  the holdings  were concerned, necessarily implying that even  an occupant would come within the description of landholder and his interests therein would come within the definition of  " estate  " as defined in the Bombay Land Revenue Code,  1879. Chapter  III  made provisions for protected  tenants,  their special  rights and privileges and whoever came  within  the category of protected tenant was given the right to purchase from  the  landlord the land held by him as  such  protected tenant notwithstanding any. thing contrary in law, usage  or contract subject to the provisions of sub-s. 6 which imposed restrictions  on  the  holdings  of  landlords  as  well  as tenants.  These provisions were analogous to the  provisions contained in ss. 32 to 32 R of the impugned Act except  that in the 512 1948 Act the protected tenant had the option to purchase the land  whereas under the impugned Act there was  a  provision for  compulsory  purchase  of the land by the  tenant  on  a specified   date  subject  to  certain  conditions   therein mentioned.  Section 34 of the 1948 Act gave the landlord the right   to   determine  protected  tenancy   under   certain conditions  and was analogous to s. 31 of the  impugned  Act which  empowered the landlord to terminate the  tenancy  for personal cultivation and non-agricultural purposes. 50 acres of  land were prescribed as the limit of the holding  either by the landlord or the protected tenant which provision  was analogous to the one found in the impugned Act in regard  to

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ceiling area and economic holdings.  Power was given to  the State Government under s. 36 to reduce the limit of 50 acres by a notification in the official gazette and power was also given similarly to direct that the limits of fifty acres  or the  reduced  limit  specified in  such  notification  shall comprise  such kind or kinds of lands in the area as may  be specified  in  the notification.  This power  was  analogous again to the power given to the State Government under s.  7 of  the  impugned Act to vary the ceiling area  or  economic holding originally prescribed in ss. 5 and 6 of the Act. These  instances culled out from some of the  provisions  of the  1948 Act go to show that the agrarian reform which  was initiated by that Act was designed to achieve the very  same purpose  of  distribution of the ownership  and  control  of agricultural  lands  so as to subserve the common  good  and eliminate   the  concentration  of  wealth  to  the   common detriment  which  purpose  became more  prominent  when  the Constitution  was  ushered in on January 26, 1950,  and  the directive principles of State Policy were enacted inter alia in Arts. 38 and 39 of the Constitution.  With the advent  of the Constitution these provisions contained in the 1948  Act required to be tested on the touch-stone of the  fundamental rights   enshrined  in  Part  III  thereof  and   when   the Constitution   (First  Amendment)  Act,  1951,  was   passed introducing Arts. 31A and 31B in the Constitution, care  was taken to specify the 1948 Act in the Ninth Schedule so as to make it immune from                     513 attack on the score of any provision thereof being violative of  the  fundamental  rights  enacted in  Part  III  of  the Constitution.   The  1948 Act was the second  item  in  that schedule and was expressly saved from any attack against the constitutionality thereof by the express terms of Art. 31B. The  impugned Act which was passed by the State  Legislature in  1956 was a further measure of agrarian  reform  carrying forward  the  intentions which had their roots in  the  1948 Act.   Having  regard  to the  comparision  of  the  various provisions of the 1948 Act and the impugned Act referred  to above  it  could be legitimately urged that if  the  cognate provisions of the 1948 Act were immune from attack in regard to their constitutionality, on a parity of reasoning similar provisions  contained in the impugned Act, though they  made further  strides  in the achievement of the objective  of  a socialistic  pattern  of society would be  similarly  saved. That  position, however, could not obtain  because  whatever amendments  were  made by the impugned Act in the  1948  Act were  future  laws within the meaning of Art. 13(2)  of  the Constitution  and  required to be tested  on  the  self-same touchstone.   They would not be in terms saved by  Art.  31B and would have to be scrutinized on their own merits  before the  courts  came to the conclusion that they  were  enacted within  the constitutional limitations.  The very  terms  of Art. 31B envisaged that any competent legislature would have the  power to repeal or amend the Acts and  the  Regulations specified  in  the  9th Schedule thereof  and  if  any  such amendment  was ever made the vires of that would have to  be tested.  (Vide  Abdul Rahiman Jamaluddin  Hurjuk  v.  Vithal Arjun Undare That  brings us back to the provisions of Art. 31A and to  a consideration   as  to  whether  the  impugned  Act  was   a legislation  for the acquisition by the State of any  estate or  of  any  rights    therein  or  the  extinguishment   or modification of any such rights within, the meaning of  sub- article (1)(a) thereof We have already held that the  Bombay Land Revenue Code,, 1879, was

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(11)(1957)59:Bom L.R.579. 65 514 an  existing  law relating to land tenures in force  in  the State of Bombay and that the interests of occupants  amongst others  fell  within  the expression "  estate  "  contained therein.  That, however, was not enough for the  petitioners and  it  was  further contended on their  behalf  that  even though  the  impugned  Act may be a law in regard  to  an  " estate  " within the meaning of the definition contained  in Art. 31A(2)(a) it was not law providing for the  acquisition by the State of any estate or any rights therein or for  the extinguishment  or  modification of any  such  rights.   The impugned Act was certainly not a law for the acquisition  by the  State  of any estate or of any rights  therein  because even  the provisions with regard to the compulsory  purchase by tenants of the land on the specified date transferred the title  in those lands to the respective tenants and  not  to the  State.   There was no compulsory acquisition of  any  " estate " or any rights therein by the State itself and  this provision  could not help the respondent.   The  respondent, however, urged that the provisions contained in the impugned Act  were enacted for the extinguishment or modification  of rights  in  " estates " and were, therefore, saved  by  Art. 31A(1)(a).    It  was  on  the  other  hand  urged  by   the petitioners  (1) that the extinguishment or modification  of any  such,  rights  should only be in  the  process  of  the acquisition  by  the ,State of any estate or of  any  rights therein  and  (2) that the provisions in  the  impugned  Act amounted  to  a  suspension of those rights but  not  to  an extinguishment or modification thereof We shall now  proceed to examine these contentions of the petitioners. Art. 31A(1)(a) talks of two distinct objects of legislation; one  being the acquisition by the State of any estate or  of any  rights therein and the other being  the  extinguishment or modification of any such., rights,.  If the = acquires an estate or any rights therein that acquisition would have  to be  a  compulsory  acquisition within the  meaning  of  Art. 31(2)(A)  which was also introduced in the  Constitution  by the    Constitution    (Fourth   Amendment)    Act,    1955, simultaneously  with  Art.  31A(1) thereof.   There  was  no provision  made  for the transfer of the  ownership  of  any property to the 515 State  or  a Corporation owned or controlled by  ’the  State with  the result that even though,these provisions  deprived the  landholders of their property they did not amount to  a compulsory  acquisition  of the property by the  State.   If this  part of Art. 31A(1)(a) is thus eliminated what we  are left  with is whether these provisions of the  impugned  Act provided for an extinguishment or modification of any rights in  " estates ". That is a distinct concept  altogether  and could  not be in the process of acquisition by the State  of any " estate " or of any rights therein.  Acceptance of  the interpretation which is sought to be put upon these words by the petitioners would involve the addition of words " in the process of the acquisition by the State of any estate or  of any rights therein " or " in the process of such acquisition "  which according to the well known canons of  construction cannot  be done.  If the language of the enactment is  clear and unambiguous it would not be legitimate for the Courts to add any words thereto and evolve therefrom some sense  which may  be  said to carry out the supposed  intentions  of  the legislature.   The  intention of the Legislature  is  to  be gathered  only  from  the  words used  by  it  and  no  such

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liberties  can  be taken by the Courts  for  effectuating  a supposed intention of the Legislature.  There is no  warrant at all, in our opinion,’ for adding these words to the plain terms of Art. 31A (1)(a) and the words  extinguishment    or modification of any such rights    must  be  understood   in their plain grammatical sense without any limitation of  the type suggested by the petitioners. It,  therefore,  remains to consider  whether  the  relevant provisions of the impugned Act were designed to bring  about an  extinguishment or modification of the landlord’s  rights in their " estates ". These provisions are contained in  ss. 32  to 32R of the impugned Act and are under the  heading  " Purchase  of lands by Tenants ". Section 32 provides that  " on the first day of April, 1957 (hereinafter referred to  as "  the  tillers day ") every tenant shall,  subject  to  the provisions  of  the next succeeding sections, be  deemed  to have purchased from his landlord, free of all incumbrances 516 subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held by him  as tenant........................  provided certain  conditions are  fulfilled.  Under s. 32A the tenant shall be deemed  to have  purchased  the lands up to the ceiling  area  and  the tenant  shall not be deemed to have purchased lands held  by him  as  such tenant if he holds lands partly as  owner  and partly  as tenant but the area of the land held as owner  is equal to or exceeds the ceiling area (s. 32B).  Section  32C empowers the tenant to chose the land to be purchased if  he holds  lands separately from more than one landlord  and  in spite  of  anything contained in the  Bombay  Prevention  of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947  (Bom. LXII  of 1947) the tenant shall be deemed to have  purchased even  such fragments of the land held on tenancy  (s.  32D). The balance of any land after the purchase by the tenant  as above is to be disposed of as if it were land surrendered by the tenant (s. 32E); and the right of the tenant to purchase such  land where the landlord is a minor, or a widow,  or  a person  subject  to any mental or physical disability  or  a serving  member  of the armed forces is postponed  till  one year  after  the cessation of disability.  The price  to  be paid  by the tenant is to be determined by the  Tribunal  as soon as may be after the tiller’s day and the Tribunal is in the  first instance to record in the prescribed  manner  the statement  of  the tenant whether lie is willing or  is  not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant and  if the  tenant fails to appear or makes a statement that he  is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal is to declare by  an order in writing that such tenant is not  willing  to purchase  the land and that the purchase is ineffective  (S. 32G).   These  provisions also apply to a  sub-tenant  of  a permanent  tenant who is deemed to have purchased  the  land subject  to  the conditions specified in ss. 32 to  32E  (S. 321).   Section  32J  provides for an appeal  to  the  State Government  against the decision of Tribunal.   Section  32K prescribes  the mode of payment of price by the tenant;  and the purchase price is recoverable as arrears of land revenue (S. 32L).  Under s. 32M on the deposit of the price in  lump sum or of 517 the last instalment of such price, the Tribunal is to  issue a  certificate of purchase to the tenant in respect  of  the land,  which  certificate of purchase  shall  be  Conclusive evidence of purchase.  If a tenant fails to pay the lump sum within the period prescribed or is at any time in arrears of four  instalments the purchase is to be ineffective and  the land  is  to  be at the disposal of the  Collector  and  any

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amount  deposited  by such tenant towards the price  of  the land  is  to  be refunded to him.   Section  32N  gives  the landlord  a  right  to recover rent  when  purchase  becomes ineffective,  as if the land had not been purchased at  all. Section  32P gives the power to the Collector to resume  and dispose  of  land not purchased by tenants.  The  amount  of purchase  price  is to be applied  towards  satisfaction  of debts  (s. 320) ; and the, purchaser is to be  evicted  from the  land  purchased  by him as aforesaid  if  he  fails  to cultivate the land personally (s. 32R). It is argued on the strength of these provisions that  there is  no  effective  purchase or effective sale  of  the  land between  the landlord and the tenant on the tiller’s day  or the  alternative  period  prescribed in  that  behalf  until certain conditions are fulfilled.  To start with it is  only an  inchoate right which is given to the tenant to  purchase the  land which he can perfect on a statement being made  by him  before the Tribunal that he is willing to purchase  the land.   Even  if he does so, the land does not vest  in  him because only on the payment of the purchase price either  in lump  or  by  instalments  can he  get  the  certificate  of purchase  from the Tribunal.  If he commits default in  pay- ment,  the purchase is ineffective and he gets no  title  to the  land.  These provisions, it is submitted, do  not  vest the  title to the land in the tenant at all until all  these conditions  are fulfilled and if any one or more of them  is not fulfilled the purchase becomes ineffective-in fact it is no  purchase  at all-with the result that the title  to  the land which is already vested in the landlord is not at,  all transferred  to the purchaser.  If that is so, there  is  no compulsory  sale  or  compulsory purchase  of  the  land  in question  on the tiller’s day or the alternative  period  of time prescribed therefor and 518 there  is no extinguishment of the rights of  the  landlord. His  rights  in  the  land are  merely  suspended  and  such suspension is certainly not an extinguishment of his  rights therein nor a modification thereof within the meaning of the expression  used in Art. 31A (1)(a).  Reliance is placed  in support  of  this proposition on the  observations  of  this Court in Thakur Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer (1). In that case, this Court considered the provisions of s. 112 of  the  Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act (XLII  of  1950) which  provided that if a landlord habitually infringes  the rights of a tenant under the Act he would be deemed to be  a landlord who is disqualified to manage his own property  and his  property  would  be  liable  to  be  taken  under   the superintendence of the Court of Wards.  Mahajan, J., (as  he then was) observed at p. 1055:- " Section 112 of the Act XLII of 1950, intended to  regulate the rights. of landlords and tenants, is obviously not a law providing  for  "  the acquisition by the  State  "  of  the estates of the landlords, or of any rights in those estates. It  is  also not a law providing for the  extinguishment  or modification  of  any such rights.   The  learned  Attorney- General  laid emphasis on the word " modification"  used  in Article  31 A. That word in the context of the article  only means  a modification of the proprietary right of a  citizen like  an  extinguishment of that right  and  cannot  include within  its  ambit  a  mere  suspension  of  the  right   of management of estate for a time, definite or indefinite." These observations were confined to suspension of the  right of  management of the estate and not to a suspension of  the title  to the estate.  Apart from the question  whether  the suspension  of the title to the estate for a time,  definite

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or  indefinite would amount to a modification of a right  in the  estate  within  the meaning of  Art.  31A  (1)(a),  the position  as  it obtains in this case is that  there  is  no suspension  of the title of the landlord at all.  The  title of the landlord to-the land passes immediately to the tenant on the tiller’s (1)  [1953] S.C.R. 1049.                     519 day  and  there is a completed purchase or sale  thereof  as between the landlord and the tenant.  The tenant is no doubt given a locus penitentiae and an option of declaring whether he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by him  as a  tenant.  If he fails to appear or makes a statement  that he  is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal  shall by  an  order  in writing declare that such  tenant  is  not willing  to  purchase  the land and  that  the  purchase  is ineffective.   It  is  only by such  a  declaration  by  the Tribunal that the purchase becomes ineffective.  If no  such declaration is made by the Tribunal the purchase would stand as  statutorily  effected  on  the  tiller’s  day  and  will continue to be operative, the only obligation on the  tenant then  being the payment of price in the mode  determined  by the Tribunal.  If the tenant commits default in the  payment of such price either in lump or by instalments as determined by  the  Tribunal,  s.  32M  declares  the  purchase  to  be ineffective but in that event the land shall then be at  the disposal  of the Collector to be disposed of by him  in  the manner  provided therein.  Here also the purchase  continues to be effective as from the tiller’s day until such  default is  committed  and  there is no question  of  a  conditional purchase  or  sale  taking place between  the  landlord  and tenant.   The title to the land which was vested  originally in the landlord passes to the tenant on the tiller’s day  or the  alternative  period prescribed in  that  behalf.   This title is defeasable only in the event of the tenant  failing to  appear or making a statement that he is not  willing  to purchase  the land or committing default in payment  of  the price  thereof  as determined by the Tribunal.   The  tenant gets a vested interest in the land defeasable only in either of  those  cases and it cannot therefore be  said  that  the title  of landlord to the land is suspended for  any  period definite  or indefinite.  If that is so, there is an  extin- guishment  or in any event a modification of the  landlord’s right  in the estate well within the meaning of those  words as used in Art. 31A(1)(a). We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the impugned Act is covered by Art. 31A and is protected 520 from  attack against its constitutionality on the  score  of its  having  violated the fundamental rights,  enshrined  in Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.  That being so, the attack  levelled against ss. 5, 6, 8, 9, 17A, 31 A to  31  D and  32 to 32R on the score of their being violative of  the fundamental  rights conferred upon the petitioners is of  no avail  to the petitioners.  This being the true position  it is  not  necessary  for  us  to  consider  the   interesting questions which were argued before us at some length,  viz., the nature, scope and extent of the provisions contained  in Arts.  31(1) and 31(2) of the Constitution and the  line  of demarcation between them as also the impact of Art. 31(1) on the  fundamental  right enshrined in Art.  19(1)(f)  of  the Constitution.   Suffice  it to say that  under  the  circum- stances no fundamental right of the petitioners before us is infringed by the impugned Act or the provisions thereof  and the petitions under Art. 32 cannot be sustained.

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The impugned Act being within the legislative competence  of the State Legislature no question as to its being a piece of colourable  legislation can arise.  It is not a  legislation resorted to by the State Legislature with a view to  by-pass the  provisions  of List II of the seventh schedule  to  the Constitution,  attempting   to  do something  which  it  was otherwise  not  competent  to  do.   The  legislation  being covered  by  Entry 18 of the said List is really  a  further measure  for  agrarian reform which it was well  within  its competence to enact.  It is not an expropriatory legislation in  the guise of one covered by Entry 18 in the  said  List. It only fixes the ceiling area for the holding of the  land- lord  cultivating  the  land personally  and  transfers  the excess  holding to the tenant in actual cultivation  thereof and there too the price of the land as fixed by the Tribunal has  got  to  be paid by the tenant to  the  landlord.   The tenant also is not entitled to hold land beyond the  ceiling area and there is a balance sought to be struck between  the interests  of the landlord and those of the tenants so  that the means of production are not concentrated in the hands of one  party  to the common detriment.  The price  payable  is also either 521 in  lump or in such instalments as may be determined by  the Tribunal  and on default committed by the tenant in  payment thereof the purchase becomes ineffective and the land deemed to  have  been  purchased  by  the  tenant  reverts  to  the Collector to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions contained  in  the  Act  in that behalf.   It  may  be  that instalments may be spread over a particular period which may thus  be  determined by the Tribunal and unless  default  is committed  by the tenant in payment of four instalments  the purchase does not become ineffective.  That, however, is not a  provision which makes the payment of price in any  manner illusory.  The landlord is entitled to the rents of the land as  if there had been no purchase of the land by the  tenant and the payment of such rent is made the first charge on the land.   There is, therefore, no scope for the argument  that the  provisions  in this behalf contained in  the  Act  were illusory  or that the impugned Act is a piece of  colourable legislation. The  only question that now survives is whether s. 7 of  the impugned  Act  is bad by reason of excessive  delegation  of legislative  power.  Section 7 invests the  Government  with the  power  to vary the ceiling area  and  economic  holding which  have  been  prescribed in ss. 5 and  6  of  the  Act. Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act read as under :- "  5.  Ceiling area: (1) For the purposes of this  Act,  the ceiling area of land shall be- (a)  48 acres of jirayat land, or (b)  24 acres of seasonally irrigated land or paddy or rice land, or (c)  12 acres of perennially irrigated land. (2)  Where the land held by a person consists of two or more kinds of land specified in sub-section (1), the ceiling area of such holding shall be determined on the basis of one acre of  perennially irrigated land being equal of two  acres  of seasonally  irrigated  land or paddy or rice land,  or  four acres of jirayat land. 66 522 6.   Economic  holding-(1) For the purposes of this  Act  an economic holding shall be- (a)  16 acres of jirayat land, or (b)  8 acres of seasonally irrigated land, or paddy or  rice

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land, or (c)  4 acres of perennially irrigated land. (2)  Where the land held by a person consists of two or more kinds  of  land  specified in sub-section  (1)  an  economic holding  shall be determined on the basis applicable to  the ceiling area-under sub-section (2) of section 5. 7.   Power  of Government to vary ceiling area and  economic holding:  Notwithstanding anything contained in  sections  5 and 6, it shall be lawful for the State Government, if it is satisfied  that  it  is expedient so to do  in  the  public. interest, to vary, by notification in the Official  Gazette, the acreage of the ceiling area or economic holding, or  the basis  of  determination of such ceiling  area  or  economic holding, under subsection (2) of section 5, regard being had to- (a)  the situation of the land, (b)  its productive capacity, (c)  the  fact that the land is located in a backward  area, and (d) any other factors which may be prescribed." It is contended that s. 7 does not fix any criteria for  the guidance of the State Government and that the power which is given  to the State Government to vary the ceiling area  and economic  holding is unguided and unfettered and that it  is possible to exercise it at the sweet will and discretion  of the State Government even in favour of a, single  individual or  in  favour of political sufferers and the like.   It  is urged that no broad principle or policy is enunciated by the Legislature in this behalf and it would be open to the State Government to exercise this power arbitrarily and even in  a discriminatory manner and that such entrustment of power  to the  State  Government amounts to  excessive  delegation  of legislative  power  and s. 7 therefore must be  held  to  be void.                     523 The  principles  by  which  the courts  are  guided  in  the determination of this question are now well settled.  In the State  of  Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar  Singh  of Darbhanga (1) Mahajan, J., (as he then was observed):- The  legislature  applied its mind to the  question  Of  the method  and manner of payment of compensation.   It  settled its  policy  and the broad principles.  It  gave  the  State Government  the power to determine matters of  detail  after having  settled vital matters of policy.  It cannot be  said that the legislature did not apply its mind to the  subject- matter  of  the legislation and did not lay down  a  policy. The proportion in which compensation was payable in cash  or in  bonds or whether the whole of it was to be paid in  cash is  a matter which only the State Government could  fix  and similarly,  the  interval of instalments and the  period  of redeemability of the bonds were also matters of detail which the executive could more appositely determine in exercise of its rule-making power.  It cannot be said in this case  that any  essential legislative power has been delegated  to  the executive  or  that the legislature did  not  discharge  the trust  which  the Constitution had reposed in  it.   If  the rule-making authority abuses its power or makes any  attempt to  make  the payment illusory the  expropriated  proprietor will not be without a remedy." If  the  legislature  settles  the  policy  and  the   broad principles  of legislation, there is no bar against  leaving the matters of detail to be fixed by the executive and  such delegation  will  not  amount  to  excessive  delegation  of legislative power such as to vitiate the enactment.  In  the case before us the preamble to the Act says what the  policy

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of the impugned Act is, viz., further to amend the 1948  Act which  as  we  have  already  observed  sets  out   specific objectives  to be achieved.  Sections 5 and 6 prescribe  the ceiling area and the economic holding which are fixed by the legislature  itself having regard to the  normal  conditions then prevailing within the State.  The legislature knew what were the different types, of land, their situation (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 889, 954. 524 and  productive  capacity  and  having  regard  to  all  the relevant  factors  determined the ceiling area as  also  the economic   holding.   There  were,  however,  bound  to   be differences  between district and district and one  part  of the  State and another and having therefore  enunciated  the broad principles and policy which were embodied in ss. 5 and 6  of  the Act the legislature enacted s. 7  empowering  the State  Government to vary the ceiling area and the  economic holding  if it was satisfied that it was expedient so to  do in  the  public interest, regard being had  to  the  various criteria therein specified.  The State Government was to  be guided  in  arriving at its satisfaction in  regard  to  the expediency thereof by (a) the situation of the land, (b) its productive  capacity, (c) the fact that the land is  located in  a backward area, and (d) any other factors which may  be prescribed.  In so far as the situation of the land and  its productive  capacity were variable factors, more so  if  the land  was located in a backward area, the  State  Government was enjoined to have regard to these factors as  determining the variations one way or the other from the normal standard adopted by the Legislature in ss. 5 and 6 of the Act.  " Any other  factors  which may be prescribed " would  be  factors ejusdem  generis  to the factors mentioned  earlier  in  the section and could not be any and every factor which  crossed the  mind of the executive.  The very terms of  the  section preclude any single individual being treated in this  manner because  it talks of the variation in the ceiling  area  and the   economic  holding  being  considered  by   the   State Government  to be expedient in the public interest  and  the satisfaction of any individual interest could hardly be said to be a matter of public interest. No  doubt individuals would be benefited by  the  variations contemplated  in  s.  7  but  for  that  purpose  the  State Government  has got to be satisfied that it is expedient  in the  public interest to do so and no variation in regard  to ceiling area or the economic holding of a single  individual can ever be said to have been contemplated within the  terms of s. 7. It appears however that this argument found  favour with  the  Bombay High Court in its  decision  in  Parashram Damodhar v. 525 State of Bombay (1) where the Court observed that the  power to  issue  a notification may be exercised in  favour  of  a single  individual under the authority reserved under  s.  7 and  may  lay  the  State Government open  to  a  charge  of favouritism.   With great respect to the learned  judges  of that  High Court, we are of the view that no such  thing  is ever contemplated in the terms of s. 7 of the Act.  There is also no warrant for the suggestion that the State Government might  vary the ceiling area and the economic  holding,  say for instance, for benefiting the political sufferers  within the State.  If the situation of the land and its  productive capacity  as  also the fact that the land is  located  in  a backward  area are the criteria to be determined before  the State  Government is satisfied that it is expedient to  vary the  ceiling  area and the economic holding  in  the  public

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interest  and " any other factors which may be prescribed  " are  to  be read ejusdem generis with the above  as  already observed, no question of benefiting political sufferers  can ever  enter into the picture.  That would be  an  extraneous consideration.   It  does  not  come  within  the   criteria specified  in  s.  7.  of the Act  on  a  true  construction thereof.   Such  considerations therefore  do  not  militate against  the  validity of the provisions contained  in  that section.   In our opinion, the broad principles  and  policy have  been laid down by the legislature, the  criteria  have been fixed according to which the State Government has to be satisfied that it is expedient to vary the ceiling area  and economic  holding already prescribed by the legislature  and the mere matter of working out the details having regard  to those  criteria  which are  specifically  mentioned  therein which  has been delegated to the State Government  does  not amount to any excessive delegation of legislative power. It is also to be remembered that this power of variation  of the  ceiling area and the economic holding is vested in  the State Government and is left to its subjective  satisfaction having  regard  to the criteria therein specified.   As  was observed  by Kania, C. J., in Dr.  N. B. Khare v. The  State of Delhi (2):- (1) A. I. R. 1957 Bom, 252. (2) [1950] S.C. R. 519, 526. 526 This  whole  argument is based on the  assumption  that  the Provincial Government when making the order will not perform its duty and may abuse the provisions of the section.  In my opinion,  it is not proper to start with such an  assumption and  decide the legality of an Act on that basis.  Abuse  of the power given by a law sometimes occurs; but the  validity of   the  law  cannot  be  contested  because  of  such   an apprehension." These  observations  of  Karda,  C.  J.,  were  quoted  with approval  by Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in The State  of  West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1) where -it was stated:- "  Whether  a  law conferring  discretionary  powers  on  an administrative  authority is constitutionally valid  or  not should  not  be  determined  on  the  assumption  that  such authority will act in an arbitrary manner in exercising  the discretion committed to it." The above observations of Kania, C. J., were then quoted and the judgment proceeded:- "  On  the  contrary, it is to be  presumed  that  a  public authority  will act honestly and reasonably in the  exercise of its statutory powers..................................... We  may  lastly refer to the observations of this  Court  in Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India (2):- " It may also be remembered that this power is vested not in minor  officials  but in top-ranking  authorities  like  the Commissioner of Income-tax and the Central Board of  Revenue who  act on the information supplied to them by the  Income- tax Officers concerned.  This power is discretionary and not necessarily  discriminatory  and abuse of  power  cannot  be easily  assumed where the discretion is vested in such  high officials.  (Vide Matajog Dobey v. H. S. Bhari, [1955] 2  S. C.  R.  925,  932).  There is moreover  a  presumption  that public officials will discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with the rules of law. (Vide People of the  State of  New York v. John E. Van De Carr, etc., (1950-310-199  U. S. 552; 50 L. Ed. 305)).  It has also been observed by  this Court in A. Thangal Kunju (1) (1952] S. C. R. 284, 301. (2) [1957] S. C. R. 233. 257, 258.

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527 Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti, [1955] 2 S. C. R.  1196, with reference to the possibility of discrimination  between assessees  in the matter of the reference of their cases  to the  Income-tax Investigation Commission that " it is to  be presumed,   unless  the  contrary  were  shown,   that   the administration of a particular law would be done " not  with an evil eye and unequal hand " and the selection made by the Government  of  the  cases of persons  to  be  referred  for investigation    by    the   Commission   would    not    be discriminatory." This  presumption, however, cannot be stretched too far  and cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must  be some undisclosed and unknown reason for  subjecting certain   individuals   or  corporations  to   hostile   and discriminatory treatment (Vide Gulf, Colorado, etc. v. W. H. Ellis,  (1897) 165 U.S. 150; 41 L. Ed. 666).  There  may  be cases  where  improper  execution of power  will  result  in injustice  to the parties.  As has been  observed,  however, the  possibility  of such  discriminatory  treatment  cannot necessarily invalidate the legislation and where there is an abuse  of such power, the parties aggrieved are not  without ample  remedies  under the law (Vide  Dinabandhu.   Sahu  v. Jadumony Mangaraj, [1955] 1 S. C. R. 140,146).  What will be struck  down in such cases will not be the  provision  which invests the authorities with such power but the abuse of the power itself." It,  therefore,  follows  that s. 7 of  the  Act  cannot  be impugned   on   the  ground  of  excessive   delegation   of legislative power. All  the  various  contentions  urged  by  the   petitioners therefore fail and the result is that the petitions filed by the petitioners before us must be dismissed with costs.  The State  of Bombay which is the only respondent in  all  these petitions will however get only one set of costs therein.                       Petitions dismissed. 528