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PETITIONER: SRI NRIPATI GHOSHAL, FIRST LANDACQUISITION COLLECTOR & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PREMAVATI KAPUR (DEAD)BY LRS. & ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       23/07/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCALE  (5)549

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                  THE 23RD DAY OF JULY,1996 Present:           Hon’ble Mr.Justice K.Ramaswamy           Hon’ble Mr.Justice G.B.Pattanaik S.Muralidhar, Rathin  Das, Advs.  for appellent  in  C.A.No. 227/92 Preveen Swarup, Adv.(Ms.A.Subhashini, Adv.(NP), for Union of India in C.A.No.3790/92 A.K.Ganguli, Sr.Adv.,  Parag P.Tripathi  Rana Mukherjee, Ms. Sumita Mukherjee,  Indeevar Goodwill,  Abha R. Sharma, Advs. with him for the Respondents.                          O R D E R The following Order of the Court was delivered: Sri Nripati Ghoshal First Land Acquisition Collector a Ors. etc. V. Premavati Kapur (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. etc.                             WITH                 CIVIL APPEAL NO.3790 OF 1992      Delay condoned.      Substitution allowed.      These appeals  by special leave arise from the order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated July 31, 1990 made in Appeal from Original Order No. T.3734/86.      The undisputed  facts are  that  the  premises  bearing No.7, Chappel  Road, Hastings, Calcutta was requisitioned on November 29,  1971 under  section 3(1)  of the  West  Bengal Premises Requisition  and Control  (Temporary Provision Act, 1947 (for  short, ’the  Bengal Act’)  due to Bangladesh war. The  Indian  Navy  had  taken  possession  thereof  and  has remained in  possession of  the said premises. Subsequently, it would appear, the respondents had filed Matter No.1295/79 in the  Calcutta High  Court questioning the legality of the requisition. It would appear that proceedings were initiated as early  as in 1975 for acquisition as the property and the

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correspondence between  various Departments  was  going  on. Notification under  Section 4  (1) of  the Land  Acquisition Act, 1894  (1 of  1984) (for short, the ’Act’) was published on  November   26,  1981.  Enquiry  under  Section  5-A  was conducted.  Thereafter,  declaration  under  Section  6  was published on November 25, 1982. The writ petition pending in the High  Court came  up for hearing. A learned single judge by his order dated April 8, 1983 had held that though there was no  public purpose for requisition under the Bengal Act, since the  acquisition was  initiated  under  the  Act  four months’ time  was granted  for completing  the award enquiry and to  pass the  award; in case of default, he directed the appellants to  hand over  possession of the  premises to the respondents. In  the meanwhile,  the acquisition proceedings were completed by making award on September 21, 1983. Notice under Section  12 was issued to the respondents on September 23, 1983.  Thus the  acquisition under  the Act  had  become final. An  oral application  came  to  be  made  before  the learned Judge  for extension  of time on July 22, 1983 since the time was to expire on August 8, 1983. But the learned Judge declined  to extend the time by his order dated August 2,  1983.  Since  the  possession  was  not  delivered,  the respondent had filed another writ petition in the High Court which the learned single Judge had dismissed on November 12, 1986. On  appeal, in  the impugned  order the Division Bench set aside  the order  of the learned single Judge and issued mandamus as  indicated in  the order.  The primary  findings recorded by the Division Bench were that there was no public purpose and  that the  acquisition was on public purpose and that the acquisition was mala fide.      The question,  therefore, is:  whether the two findings recorded by  the Division  Bench are  correct in  law?  Shri Ganguli, learned  senior counsel for the respondents, sought to support  the findings of the Division Bench on the ground that there  are no  bona fides on the part of the appellants in pursuing  the matter.  In fact,  when the  respondent had pointed out  in the  High Court  that there  was  no  public purpose in  requisitioning the  property, they  came forward with the  acquisition under the Act; when the learned single Judge had  directed the appellants to have the award enquiry completed and  the award  made within  four months, the same were not  done within  the  prescribed  time.  In  spite  of initiation of  contempt proceedings,  the possession was not delivered. These  circumstances could  be considered to show that the  acquisition was  mala fide and that, therefore, in the light  of the above background, the High Court was right in  reaching  the  conclusion.  We  find  no  force  in  the contentions.      It is  seen that  the acquisition proceedings under the Act were  initiated no  doubt after  the first writ petition was filed  challenging the requisition under the West Bengal Act.  But  the  notification  under  Section  4(1)  and  the declaration published  under Section  6 of  the  Act  became final before  the learned  single Judge had passed the order on April  8,  1983.  Thereby  the  public  purpose,  namely, defence purposes,  got crystalized  before the  judgment was rendered by  the learned  single Judge.  The learned  single Judge accepting the legal position, quite rightly, had given time to  complete the  award enquiry  and to pass the award. Unfortunately, due to lethargy on the part of authorities to have the  funds made  available, award could not be made for non-depositing  of  the  amount.  The  question,  therefore, emerges: whether  the acquisition  is mala  fide? So long as the  public   purpose  subserves,   the  finding   that  the acquisition is mala fide is ex-facie unsustainable. No doubt

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there are laches on the part of the authorities, but so long as the  acquisition proceedings  were legal  and the defence personnel remain  in possession  of  the  premises  for  the defence purpose,  the acquisition  is  for  public  purpose. Therefore, it cannot be characterised to be mala fide. It is seen that by the time the second writ petition, which is the subject matter  ultimately in this appeal, came to be filed, the acquisition had become final; the award had become final and   the    compensation   was    tendered.   Under   those circumstances,  the  High  Court,  without  going  into  the validity in  that behalf, was not right in setting aside the acquisition on  the specious  finding that  it is mala fide. Therefore, the  High Court  has not  properly consider  that aspect in the correct perspective in deciding the matter.      Pursuant to the interim direction granted by this Court appellant have  deposited rent  at the rate of Rs 7500/- per month beginning from 1.1.92. Shri Ganguli has brought to our notice that  the payments were not alleged to have been paid for the earlier period of requisition. It is also brought to our notice  that the amount of compensation was not received by the  respondents. Under  these circumstances, it would be open to the Land Acquisition Collector to vary and, if found correct, to  adjust the amounts, deposited as per the orders of the  Court, towards  the amount  payable, if  not already paid for  the period of requisition. If there is any further amount due,  that amount  may also be directed to be paid to the  respondents   within  a   specified  time.  The  amount deposited pursuant to orders of this court, if found excess, may be  adjusted towards  the amount payable as compensation for the acquired premises.      It is unfortunate that in spite of peremptory direction to pass  award and  on non-compliance  of order  to  deliver possession of the building, no prompt action has been taken. The officers have not shown diligence required in this case. Even though the contempt proceedings were initiated for non- delivery of  possession, yet no steps had been taken even to file appeal  in this Court within the prescribed limitation. That would  show apathy or absolute indifference on the part of the  concerned officers  in pursuing  the proceedings. It would be  obvious that  since  they  do  not  have  personal interest in  the Governmental  matters, they do not show the required dispatch. It is our sad experience that invariably, all cases  of the Government, be that of Government of India or State  Governments, except  presently in  the case of the Government of  Punjab, are  being filed with abnormal delay. It would,  therefore, be  high time that all the Governments should necessarily streamline the process of taking decision in time  to file  appeals. The  lack of  responsibility  and indifference further  gets compounded  from  the  fact  that though the  writ petitioner  (3rd respondent  in this  case) died on  September 18,  1993 and  notice was  given  by  her counsel to  the counsel for the Union on October 4, 1993, no steps were  taken to  bring  the  legal  representatives  on record till  August 19, 1994. In August 1994 the application for  substitution   came  to   be  filed   but  without  any explanation. These  facts do  indicate the  absolute lack of diligence and apathy or indifference in pursuing the matters on behalf of the Union of India.      It is  unfortunate that  we have  come across that even the State Governments adopt the same indifferent attitude in pursuing the  public causes  in filing  the appeals  in this Court as well as in the High Courts and the courts below. It is high time for the Government of India through the Cabinet Secretary to  constitute a  legal cell  centralising all the cases to  decide whether  appeals should  be filed and if so

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have them  filed  in  time  or  with  utmost  dispatch.  The officers responsible  should be  made  accountable  for  the delay. Same  process is  equally required  to be  adopted in case of  appeals to  be filed  in this  Court or in the High Courts by  the respective State Governments and/or the Union of India.      The Registry  is directed  to communicate this order to the Cabinet  Secretary and also to all the Chief Secretaries of the State Governments; so also to the Attorney General of India and  the Advocates  General of the concerned States so that appropriate measures could be taken in this behalf.      The  appeals  are  accordingly  allowed,  but,  in  the circumstances without costs.