http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: SRI-LA-SRI SUBRAMANIA DESIKA GNANASAMBANDAPANDARASANNADHI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/02/1965

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) HIDAYATULLAH, M. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M.

CITATION:  1965 AIR 1578            1965 SCR  (3)  17

ACT: Madras  Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments  Act,1951, (Mad. Act 19 of 1951), s. 64(4),--Order under whether quasi- judicial--Reasonable opportunity, whether necessary.

HEADNOTE:     By a notification issued in 1937 the respondent State of Madras  had made Ch. VI-A of the Hindu Religious  Endowments Act,  1926,  applicable to the  Thiyagarajaswami  temple  at Tiruvarur.  In 1956 the aforesaid notification was  extended for a period of five years beginning on September 30,  1956. This  was done in exercise of powers under s. 64(4)  of  the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,  1951. The  appellant  challenged the  issue  of  the  notification under s. 64(4) in a writ petition before the High Court.  At the hearing it was urged that the impugned notification  was invalid  as it had been passed without giving  a  reasonable opportunity  to the appellant to show cause against it.  The High  Court  while accepting this  contention,  nevertheless refused to issue. the writ prayed for because: (1) the  said plea  had  not been taken in the writ petition and  (2)  the period  for  which the notification had  been  extended  was shortly  due  to expire. The appellant came to  the  Supreme Court with certificate of fitness.     It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the two reasons given by the High Court for not issuing a writ  were wrong. The respondent State on the other hand contended that no  quasi-judicial  enquiry was necessary for  extending  an existing  notification  under  s.  64(4)  although  such  an enquiry was necessary before issuing a notification for  the first time under s. 64(3).     HELD:  (i)’  Whether f,or issuing a  notification  under 64(3)  or  for extending an existing notification  under  s. 64(4)  the process of dec.ision is the same. In either  case the Government had to satisfy itself whether supervision  by the Executive Officer under the notification is required for public   good.  The  Government  cannot   legitimately   and satisfactorily  consider  the  question as  to  whether  the notification  should be cancelled without hearing the  party asking  for  cancellation;  nor  can  it  legitimately   and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

reasonably decide to extend the notification without hearing the  trustee. Circumstances could arise after the  issue  of the first notification which would help the Trustee to claim that  the notification should either be cancelled or  should not be extended. The nature of the order which can be passed under  s. 64(4) and its effect on the rights of the  Trustee are  exactly similar to the order which can be passed  under s. 64(3). [25 A-E]     The  High Court was therefore right in holding  that  it was  obligatory  on  the respondent State  as  a  matter  of natural justice to give, notice to the appellant before  the impugned notication was passed by it. [25E]     Shri  Radeshyam Khare & Ant. v. State of Madhya  Pradesh and Ors. [1959] S.C.R. 1440, distinguished. 18     (ii) Although the plea of denial of natural justice  had not been taken by the appellant in his writ petition, it had been  taken in the rejoinder, and the respondent  thereafter had full notice of the said plea. Therefore the first reason given  by  the High Court for refusing the writ  was  wrong. [25G-H]     (ii)  The  High Court ignored the fact  that  before  it delivered  its   judgment  a new Act had  come  into  force, namely,  Madras  Act XXII of 1959, whereby the life  of  the impugned  notification  had  been  extended.  Therefore  the second  reason  which  weighed with the High  Court  in  not issuing a writ in favour of the appellant, that the impugned notification  would  remain in operation for  a  very  short period  after  it delivered its judgment,  was  also  wrong. [26C-E]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: CIVIl. APPEAL No. 560  or 1964.   Appeal  from the judgment and order dated August 11,  1961 of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition No. 295, of 1958. A.V.  Viswanatha  Sastri. R.  Thiagarajan for  R.  Ganapathy lyer, for the petitioner.     A.  Ranganadham Chetty and A.V. Rangam, for the  respon- dents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar,C.J.  On  August  4, 1956,  the  Governor  of Madras  issued  a  notification in exercise  of  the  powers conferred  on him by sub-section (4) of s. 64 of the  Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. 1951  (Madras Act XIX of 1951) directing that notification No. 638,  dated the 25th May, 1937. relating to Sri Thiyagarajaswami Temple, Tiruvarur, Nagapattanam Taluk, Tanjor District, be continued for  a  period of five years from September  30,  1956.  The earlier  notification  which was thus continued  had  itself been issued by the respondent State of Madras    in exercise of  the powers conferred on it by clause (b) of  sub-section (5)  of  s.65A of the Hindu Religious Endowments  Act,  1926 (Madras  Act  1I  of 1927). declaring  that  the  temple  in question and the specific endowments attached thereto  shall be   subject to the provisions of Chapter VI-A of  the  said Act. In other words, the earlier notification which  brought the  temple of Sri  Thiyagarajaswami at Tiruvarur under  the purview  of the earlier Madras Act has been extended by  the notification  issued  on  4th August, 1956.  for  a  further period’  of  five years. By a writ  petition  filed  by  the appellant,  Sri-la-Sri  Subramania  Desika  Gnana   Sambanda Pandarasannadhi, Hereditary Trustee of the Rajan Kattalai of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

the  temple  in question, in the High Court  of  Madras  the validity  of  this latter notification was  challenged.  The High Court has rejected the pleas raised by the appellant in support  of  his  case that  the  impugned  notification  is invalid,  and has dismissed the writ petition filed by  him. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court  with  a certificate granted by the  High  Court.  The controversy  between  the parties as it has  been  presented before  us   in  appeal. really lies within  a  very  narrow compass.  but in order to appreciate the points  raised  for our  decision, it is necessary to set out very  briefly  the background of the present litigation. 19    In  the town of Tiruvarur in Thanjavur Dist. there is  an ancient temple. The Presiding Deity is Sri  Thyagarajaswami. A  distinguishing feature of this temple is that apart  from an allowance called the Mohini allowance’, there is no other property  which  can be treated as devoted for  its  general maintenance.  A large number of specific  endowments  called ’Kattalais’  with specific reference to special services  in the  temple,  its  festivities  and  several  charities   in glorification of the principal deity, have however been made in  respect  of this temple. It is said’ that there  are  13 such  Kattalais,  the important amongst  them  being   Rajan Kattalai,    Ulthurai   Kattalai,  Abisheka   Kattalai   and Annadanam  Kattalai.  In respect of these  Kattalais,  large endowments have been made. According to the appellant, these endowments  were   made  by  the  Indian  Rulers  who  ruled Thanjavur  before the establishment of the British Rule.  It appears  that the management of each one of these  Kattalais is vested in a certain Trustee or Trustees hereditarily. The trusteeship  of  Rajan  Kattalai vests in the  head  of  the Dharmapuram mutt in the Thanjavur district. The  Dharmapuram mutt  itself has large endowments of lands in Thanjavur  and Tirunelveli  districts.  The head of this mutt is  known  as Pandarasannadhi  and under his management there are about 27 temples.  Having  regard to the nature of the duties of  the head  of a mutt of this importance and magnitude, it is  not possible  for  the  Pandarasannadhi  to  supervise  all  the temples  personally, and so, Deputies are appointed  on  his behalf  to  supervise and look after the management  of  the various institutions. With regard to the services  connected with  the  Rajan Kattalai in Sri Thyagarajaswami  temple  at Thiruvarur, the head of Dharmapuram mutt generally functions through a deputy known as Kattalai Thambiran.     Ordinarily,  a  Kattalai  is  a  specific  endowment  in respect  of which it would be competent for the  founder  to prescribe  the line of trustees for its management, and  so, the property endowed for the performance of the Kattalai  in question  cannot be held to be transferred in trust  to  the trustee vesting the legal estate therein in him; such  legal estate would vest in the deity itself. Thus, the position of the Kattalai trustee would normally be no more than that  of a  manager  of  a Hindu Religious  Endowment.  It,  however, appears   that   Kattalais  which  are   attached   to   Sri Thyagarajaswami  temple at Thiruvarur have been  treated  as constituting  a  slightly different category by  the  Madras High  Court in  Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi  v.  Somasundara Mudaliar(1)  but with that aspect of the matter, we are  not concerned  in  the  present appeal. In  practice,  a  scheme appears to have been evolved that in .regard to the  various services  in  the temple in respect of which  Kattalais  had been  endowed,  the management of  the  allotted  properties vested  in  separate  trustees and in that  sense,  all  the trustees  administering separate Kattalais could be said  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

constitute a kind of corporation in which (1)[1894] I.L.R. 17 Mad. 199. 20 the management of the temple properties vested. each one  of its   members  being  in  charge  of  particular  items   of properties  the proceeds of which would be utilised for  the performance of a specific Kattalai.     In course, of time, however, this practice did not  work harmoniously  and  coordination between the  duties  of  the various  trustees  worked  unsatisfactorily,  because   more emphasis  came  to  be placed on the  individuality  of  the Kattalais   and  that  led  to  anomalies  in   the   actual administration of the said Kattalais. As a result. in  1910, a  suit was flied under s.92 of the Code of Civil  Procedure for the settlement of a scheme to manage the affairs of  the temple   in  the  Sub-Court  at  Thanjavur.  A  scheme   was accordingly  settled.  and  when the  matter  was  taken  in appeal,  the  High Court substantially  confirmed  the  said scheme  (vide Gnana Sambanda v. Vaithilinga  Mudaliar).  (1) The scheme thus framed governed the management of the temple thereafter.     It  appears  that the affairs of the said  temple  again came up for consideration before the Madras  High  Court  in Ramanathan  Chettiar v. Balayee Ammal(2). In that case,  the High  Court rejected the contention of one of  the  Kattalai trustees  that subject to the performance of  services,  the endowments  in question had to be treated as his  .property; the  view taken by the High Court on this occasion was  that all the Kattalais were appendages of the temple; though each Kattalaidar was a separate trustee, there was no question of private ownership.     In the year 1931, there was another suit  under s.92  of the Code on the file of the District Court,  East  Thanjavur for  the modification  of  the  scheme  already framed.   It was   urged  that  certain defects in the  scheme  had  been noticed  in the actual working, and so, it was necessary  to make  some  modifications. Accordingly,  some  modifications were made.     Meanwhile,  the  Madras Legislature  passed  the  Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927. The object of this Act was to provide for the proper administration and  governance of certain Hindu Religious Endowments. The Act  contemplated the  supervision of these  endowments  through  a  statutory body  called the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board. It divided    the  temples  into  "excepted  and   non-excepted temples".  It also provided for the framing of a scheme  for the  management  of  the temples. This Act  was  amended  by Madras Act IX of 1937. The result of the amendment was  that Chapter   VI-A   was  added  to  the  Act   of   1927.   The provisions  .of this chapter laid down that  notwithstanding that  a temple, or specific endowment attached to  a  temple was  governed by a scheme previously framed by the Board  or settled by a Court, the Board if it were satisfied that  the temple  or  endowment was being mismanaged and that  in  the interests  of the administration of the temple or  endowment it was necessary to take (1) [1928] 18 L.W. 247.           (2) [1923] 27 L.W. 33. 21 proceedings  under  the  said Chapter,  might  "notify"  the temple  or  endowment.  and  on  the  publication  of   such notification, the administration of the temple or  endowment would go under the control of the Board notwithstanding  the scheme  which  might  have been framed  already.  On  taking management of a notified temple or endowment, the Board  was authorised  to appoint an Executive Officer and  define  his

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

duties.   In  consequence,  such  Executive  Officer   would virtually displace the trustee and would function under  the control   of  the  Endowment  Board.  The  result   of   the notification  in  substance would. be  that  the  previously existing scheme would be suspended, and the management would vest in the Board.     Soon  after  this  Act  was  passed,  proceedings   were commenced  by  the Board for the purpose  of  notifying  the temple  with which we are concerned in the  present  appeal, and  the  Kattalais attached thereto. The  Trustees  of  the various  Kattalais  naturally opposed this step,  but  their objections  were  over-ruled,   and  on  May  25,  1937,   a notification  was  issued.  To  this  notification  we  have already  referred. In pursuance of this   notification,   an Executive  Officer  was appointed by the Board on  July  12, 1937. On July 30, 1937, the Board defined the powers of  the Executive Officer and directed him to take charge and be  in possession of the temple and the various Kattalais  attached thereto.  As a result of this order, the  Executive  Officer began  to  exercise  all the Dowers and  discharge  all  the functions  of a trustee of a non-excepted temple,  and  that left very little powers in the hands of the trustees of  the several Kattalais.     The  Pandarasannadhi  of the Dharmapuram  Mutt  who  was then the hereditary Trustee of the Rajan Kattalai instituted C.S.  No.  20  of  1938  in the  Madras  High  Court  for  a declaration  that the said notification was illegal and  for setting aside the orders issued by the Board in pursuance of the  said  notification. It appears that the  suit  did  not proceed  to  a  trial, because the parties  entered  into  a compromise. In substance, as a result of the compromise, the notification  was  maintained,  but the  possession  of  the Kattalai  properties was restored to the Trustee who was  to manage  the  same by a staff under his control. and  had  to keep  accounts.   Certain  other  provisions  were  made  to safeguard  the efficient management of the said  trust,  and the overall control and supervision of the Executive Officer was maintained. One of the clauses of the compromise, clause (k) expressly reserved to the Board liberty to re-define the powers  and  duties as specified above in case  the  trustee commits any wilful breach of the above terms and  conditions or  is  guilty  of wilful neglect of  the  duties  specified above,  provided  that the Board shall not do so  except  on notice   to  the   trustee  and  after   giving   reasonable opportunity  to  him  to  be heard  in  his  defence.   This compromise  decree was passed on August 1, 1940,  and  since then,  the  administration of the Kattalai in  question  has been conducted jn accordance with the terms of this decree. 22    After  the  Constitution came into force on  January  26, 1950,the Hindu Religious Endowments Act of 1927 was repealed and  in  its  place Act XIX of 1951  was  substituted.  This latter Act came into force on September 30. 1951.  Section 5 of  this Act repealed the earlier Act of 1927.  The  Chapter relating  to   notification of temples  and  endowments  was numbered  as Chapter VI in the new Act. Section 64  of  this new  Act  provided  for the notification of a  temple  or  a religious  institution, and sub-s.(4) laid down  that  every notification  published under this section shall  remain  in force  for  a  period of five years from  the  date  of  its publication;  but  the  Government may at  any  time  on  an application  made  to  them cancel  the  notification.  This section had made provision for the notification of religious institutions  after  this new  Act came  into  force.Section 103(c)  dealt with cases where notifications had  been  made

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

trader  the previous enactment. That section  provided  that the  notification published under s.65A. sub-s.(3)  or  sub- s.(5)  of the said Act and in force immediately  before  the commencement  of  the  new  Act would  be  deemed  to  be  a notification published under s.64 and would be in force  for five years from the date of the commencement of the new  Act (No. XIX of 1951).     In  1956,  another  Amending Act (No. IX  of  1956)  was passed.  Section  2 of this Amending Act substituted  a  new sub-section  in the place of s.64(4). Under that  provision, every notification published or deemed to be published under that  section  shall remain in force for a  period  of  five years.  but it may by notification be cancelled at any  time or  continued  from  time to time for a  further  period  or periods not exceeding five years at a time as the Government may  by notification in each case think fit to direct. As  a consequence,  s.103(c) was also amended, and the words  "and shall  be  in  force for five years from  the  date  of  the commencement  of this Act" were omitted. The result of  this amendment  was that the notification issued or deemed to  be issued  under the relevant provisions of the new  Act  would remain  in  force  for a period of five  years;  it  can  be cancelled even before the said period expired, or it can  be continued  after the expiry of the said period from time  to time  for such further period or periods as  the  Government may  deem  fit.  We  have already  seen  that  the  impugned notification  has  been issued under s.64(4) of Act  XIX  of 1951. That, broadly stated, is the background of the present dispute  between the appellant and the respondent  State  of Madras.     Two  principal  contentions were urged before  the  High Court  by  the, appellant in support of his  plea  that  the impugned  notification  is invalid. It was argued  that  the trusteeship  of the Rajan Kattalai being hereditary  in  the head  of the Dharmapuram Mutt. is a right of property  under Art.  19(i)(f) of the  Constitution, and since s.64  of  the Act empowers the respondent State to take away that right of property  in  an  arbitrary  and  capricious  manner.   that provision  is  Constitutionally invalid. The  second  ground which  was urged by the appellant was that the  notification was issued without 23 giving an opportunity to the appellant to show cause why the earlier  notification should not be extended. and that  made the  notification invalid. The High Court has  rejected  the first   contention,and  we  are really not  called  upon  to consider  that  finding  of the High Court  in  the  present appeal, because the arguments urged before us covered a much narrower  ground. In regard to the second contention  raised by the appellant. the High Court has found in favour of  the appellant that the proceedings authorised to be taken  under s.64(4)  are  in the nature of  quasi-judicial  proceedings. and  the order which can be passed under the said  provision is  a quasijudicial order; and so, the High  Court  conceded that before making such an order, it was necessary that  the appellant should have been given an opportunity to be heard, for that is the requirement of natural justice; but the High Court thought that this specific point had not been taken by the appellant in his writ petition;  that  is why it was not inclined  to allow it. The High Court refused to uphold  the said   point  for  the  other  reason  that   the   impugned notification  would soon expire on September 30,   1961  and the Government would then have to consider whether it should be  renewed or not. and the High Court thought that on  that occasion, the Government would certainly hear the  appellant

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

before making up its mind on that issue. The judgment of the High  Court was delivered on August 11. 1961, and since  the High Court thought that the impugned order can last only for a  short  period thereafter, it would serve  no  purpose  to issue a writ quashing the said order on the ground that  the principles  of  natural justice had not been  complied  with before  passing it. Mr. Viswanatha Sastri for the  appellant contends  that both the grounds given by the High  Court  in support  of  its  refusal  to  issue  a  writ  are   plainly erroneous, and were satisfied that Mr. Sastri is right.     Before  dealing  with  these  grounds,  however,  it  is necessary  to consider the argument urged by Mr.  Raganathan Chetty on behalf of the respondent State that the High Court was in error in holding that the Order which has been passed under   s.64(4)  is  a  quasi-judicial  order  and  can   be legitimately passed only after complying with the principles of  natural justice. He argues that though  the  proceedings contemplated  by  s.63 and s.64(1), (2) and (3)  are  quasi- judicial  proceedings. the position in regard to  the  Order which can be passed under s.64(4) is entirely different.  He concedes  that  in  making  the  first  order  notifying  an institution  under  s.64(3). principles of  natural  justice have to be complied  with: in fact. express provisions  have been  made  in  that behalf, but he  argues  that  the  said principles do not apply where a notification validly  issued under  s.64(3) has merely to be cancelled or extended  under 64(4). Chapter VI of Act XIX  of 1951 which consists of sections 53 to   69,   deals   with  the   notification   of   religious institutions.  Secion 63(1) in terms requires the  issue  of notice  to show cause why a specific institution should  not be notified. Sub-section (2) requires 24 that the said notice shell state the reasons for the  action proposed, and specify a reasonable time, not being less than one  month  from the date of the issue of  the  notice,  for showing  such cause. Subsection (3) allows objections to  be filed  by  the  trustee; and sub-s.(4)  requires  that  such objections   shall  be  in  writing  and  shall  reach   the Commissioner  before the period specified.  Having  provided for the issue of a notice and for objections to be filed  by the  trustee,  s.64  deals with  the  consideration  of  the objections, if any, and notification of institution. S.64(2) requires an enquiry to be held by the Commissioner at  which the  validity of the objections would have t9  be  examined. Section 64(3) authorises the Commissioner to make, a  report to  the  Government  that in his  opinion,  the  institution should be notified. Thereupon, the Government can issue  the notification  in question. Thus, it is plain that the  issue of  a notification has to be preceded by an enquiry and  the trustee  in  question  is entitled to  urge  his  objections against  issue of such a notification; and so, there can  be no doubt that these proceedings are quasi-judicial, and if a notification is issued under s.64(3) without complying  with the  requirements of the provisions of s.63 and s.64(1)  and (2), it would be invalid. Mr.  Cherry. however,  contends  that  the  position   under s.64(4)  is entirely different. We have already quoted  this provision.  According  to  Mr. Cherry, the  decision  as  to whether a notification should be cancelled before the period of five years is over, or continued from time to time, is  a purely administrative decision. The Government is already in possession  of  the  material relevant for  the  purpose  of deciding the question. This material has been placed  before the Government at time of the  enquiry which is held by  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

Commissioner     under    s.64(2)    before   the    initial notification  is issued, and all that the Government has  to do  on subsequent occasions is to consider whether the  said notification  should  be  cancelled  or  continued.  Such  a decision   needs   no   further  enquiry   and   cannot   be characterised  as  quasi-judicial. That is  how  Mr.  Cherry supports  the validity of the impugned notification,  though it has been issued without giving notice to the appellant.     In  support of this contention, he has relied  upon  the decision of this Court in Shri Radeshyam Khare & Anr. v. The State  of  Madhya Pradesh and Others. (1) In that  case,  it was   held  that  ss.  53A and 57  of  the  C.P.  and  Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, differed materially in their scope and  effect, and that the nature of the orders which can  be passed  under the two respective sections was not the  same. That  is why this Court found that whereas in taking  action under  s.53A  the  State Government was   required  to   act judicially,  the  same could not be said to  be  true  about s.57.  We’  do  not see how this  decision  can  afford  any assistance   to Mr. Chetty in support of his  argument  that s.64(4) is entirely  different (1)[1959] S.C.R. 1440. 25 in character from s.64(3). It is plain  that  just  as while acting  under  s.64(3)  the  Government  has  ultimately  to consider whether a case has been made out for the  issue  of a  notification,  so while acting under s.64(4),  Government has  to consider whether a  case  has  been  made  out   for cancelling  the   notification or for extending it.  and  on each  occasion,  where  a decision has  to  be  taken  under s.64(4),  the process of  reaching the  decision is  exactly similar to the process in reaching a decision under s.64(3). All  relevant  facts  in regard to  the  management  of  the endowment must be taken into account, and the question to be considered  on  each  occasion  would  be  whether  or   not supervision by the Executive Officer under the  notification is required in the interests of public good. It is difficult to   see   how   the   Government   can   legitimately   and satisfactorily  consider  the  question as  to  whether  the notification should be cancelled, unless it hears the  party asking for such cancellation. Similarly, it is difficult  to understand  how Government can legitimately  and  reasonably decide  to  extend-the  notification,  unless  it  gives  an opportunity  to the Trustee to show cause why it should  not be  continued. One can imagine several  circumstances  which may  arise  after the issue of the  first  notification  and which would help the Trustee to claim that the  notification should  either be cancelled or should not be extended.   The nature  of the order which can be passed  under s.64(4)  and its effect on the rights of the trustee are exactly  similar to  the  order which can be passed under  s.64(3).  We  are. therefore,  satisfied  that  the High  Court  was  right  in holding that it was obligatory on the respondent State as  a matter of natural justice to give notire to   the  appellant before the impugned notification was passed by it.   That  takes us to the consideration of  the  question   as to  whether  the  two reasons given by  the  High  Court  in support of this decision are valid. The first reason, as  we have already indicated, is that the High Court thought  that the plea in question had not been raised by the appellant in his   writ petition.  This reason is no  doubt,  technically right in the sense  that  this plea was not mentioned in the first   affidavit filed by the appellant in support  of  his petition;  but  in the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed  by  the appellant  this plea has been expressly taken. This  is  not

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

disputed  by Mr. Chetty, and so, when the matter was  argued before  the High Court, the respondents had full  notice  of the  fact  that one of the grounds on  which  the  appellant challenged  the validity of the impugned Order was  that  he had  not  been  given a chance to show cause  why  the  said notification  should  not  be  issued.  We  are,  therefore, satisfied that the High Court was in error in assuming  that the  ground in question had not been taken at any stage   by the  appellant before the matter was argued before the  High Court. The  second  reason given by the High Court  appears  to  be plainly  erroneous.   In assuming that the  impugned   Order would  come to an end on September 30, 1961, the High  Court appears  to have ignored the fact that before  it  delivered its judgment, a 26 new Act had come into force (Madras Act XXII of 1959).  This Act came into operation on January I, 1960. Section 72(7) of this    Act provides that any notification  published  under sub-s.(1)  or sub-s.(3) of s. 64 of Act XIX of  1951  before the   commencement  this Act shall be as valid  as  if  such notification  had  been  published  under  this  Act.   This provision  has again been subsequentlyamended by Act  XL  of 1961,  and the amended provision is retrospectively  brought into operation from January 1. 1960. We do   not propose  to consider  in  this appeal the effect  of  these  amendments, because  it is enough for our purpose to  state  that  as  a result  of  the subsequent Act which had already  come  into force  on  the  date  when  the  High  Court  delivered  its judgment,  it  is  obvious that  the  impugned  notification would  not  automatically come to an end  on  September  30, 1961.  This  position  is not disputed  by  Mr.  Chetty  and appears  to be plain; so that the main reason which  weighed with  the High Court in not issuing a writ in favour of  the appellant  that  the impugned notification would  remain  in operation  for  a very short period after it  delivered  its judgment,  is  found  to  be  erroneous;  and  the  impugned notification   would  continue  in  operation  without   the appellant getting an opportunity to show cause why it should not   continue  to  be  in  operation.  We  are,  therefore, satisfied that the High Court should have granted the prayer made  by the appellant for the issue of an appropriate  writ cancelling  the impugned notification. Though  the  impugned notification  has  been issued in 1956 for five  years,  its life  gets statutorily extended, and the only way  in  which the  appellant.  ’would be able to show cause why  the  said notification  should  not  be extended .in  respect  of  his Kattalai is to quash the said notification.     In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the  order passed  by the High Court, and direct that  an   appropriate writ   or order be issued quashing the notification   issued by  the  respondent State on August 4, 1956.  The  appellant would be entitled to his costs throughout.                                     Appeal allowed. 27