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PETITIONER: SRI KRISHNA DAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: TOWN AREA COMMITTEE, CHIRGAON

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/03/1990

BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) SAWANT, P.B.

CITATION:  1991 AIR 2096            1990 SCR  (2)  13  1990 SCC  (3) 645        JT 1990 (2)    68  1990 SCALE  (1)550

ACT:     Town Areas Act 1914-Section 38 and Bye Laws of the  Town Area  Committee Chirgaon-Weighing dues--Payment of--User  of market  committee--Validity of weighing dues--Whether  ’tax’ or ’fee’

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant  is a commission agent,  engaged  in  the business  of  sale and purchase of grains,  rice,  oil-seeds etc. in Chirgaon, District Jhansi. By a notification  issued under s. 38(1) of the United Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914, the  provisions of Section 298(2)(F)(d) of the U.P.  Munici- palities Act, 1916 were extended to the Town Area of  Chirg- aon,  as  a result of which, the Panchayat of  Chirgaon  was empowered to make bye-laws for the establishment, regulation ’and  inspection  of market and 1or the proper  and  cleanly conduct of business therein. Later by Section 4 of the  U.P. Provinces  Town Area (Amendment) Act, the  word  "Panchayat" wherever  it occurred in the Principal’ Act was  substituted by  the  word ’Committee’. In pursuance of the  powers  con- ferred  on him the District Magistrate, Jhansi  framed  bye- laws  dated 18.11.1934 for the regulation of  the  market.in Chirgaon which inter alia provided that weighing dues  shall be charged at different rates on various articles that  came to the Town Area for sale at rates specified therein.  Since the appellant was a dealer in some of these commodities,  he was served with a notice calling upon him to pay  Rs.1892/26 as weighing dues for the period from 1.5.1962 to  30.6.1962. The  appellant  challenged  the notice by means  of  a  writ petition in the Allahabad High Court. A learned single Judge of  the  High Court dismissed the writ petition  taking  the view  that  the demand made by the respondent was  purely  a measure  of taxation. Special Appeal against the said  order was  also dismissed by the High Court. Hence this appeal  by special leave.     The  main contentions of the appellant, as urged  before the High Court, as have been repeated before this Court are; (i) that the bye-laws were invalid; (ii) that the Town  Area Committee  had no power to impose such tax; as the  Act  did not empower the TAC to levy and collect weighing dues; (iii) that  the weighing dues were discriminatory because  of  the

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exemptions; (iv) that the weighing dues were not a tax but a fee which could not be charged without quid pro quo and  (v) that there  was 14 double  taxation. It was also urged that the  imposition  of weighing  dues is tantamount to illegal  extraction  without the  authority  of law. The respondent, on the  other  hand, supported the judgment of the High Court; Dismissing the appeal, this Court,     HELD:  Under the Indian Constitution the  State  Govern- ment’s power to levy a tax is not identical with that of its power  to  levy  a fee. While the powers to  levy  taxes  is conferred  on the State Legislatures by the various  entries in List 11, in it there is Entry 66 relating to fees, empow- ring the State Government to levy fees ’in respect of any of the  matters in this List, but not including fees  taken  in any  Court’. The result is that each State  Legislature  has the  power,  to levy fees, which is  co-extensive  with  its powers to legislate with respect to substantive matters  and it may levy a fee with reference to the services that  would be rendered by the State under such law. The State may  also delegate such a power to local authority. [21C-D]     A fee is a payment levied by an authority in respect  of services performed by it for the benefit of the payer, while a  tax is payable for the common benefits conferred  by  the authority on all tax payers. [21F]     ’While there is no quid pro quo between a tax payer  and the  authority  in case of a tax, there is a  necessary  co- relation  between fee collected and the service intended  to be  rendered. Of course the quid pro quo need not be  under- stood in mathematical equivalence but only in a fair  corre- spondence  between the two, a broad co-relationship  is  all that is necessary. [21G]     Courts  cannot  review  the wisdom  or  advisability  or expediency  of  a tax as the court has no concern  with  the policy  of  legislation, so long they are  not  inconsistent with  the provisions of the Constitution. It is  only  where there is abuse of its powers and transgression of the legis- lative function in leving a tax, it may be corrected by  the judiciary and not otherwise. [24B]     Taxes  may be and often are oppressive, unjust and  even unnecessary  but this can constitute no reason for  judicial interference.  When taxes are levied on certain articles  or services and not on others it cannot be said to be discrimi- natory. [24C] Avinder Singh v. State of Punjab, [1979] 1 SCR 845, referred to.

JUDGMENT: 15      CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 748  of 1975.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  3.12.1971  of  the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 289 of 1963. R.K. Maheshwari for the Appellant.     Rachna  Gupta,  (NP) and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for  the  Re- spondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     K.N. SAIKIA, J. This appeal by special leave is from the Judgment  and  order dated 3.12.1971 of the  Allahabad  High Court  in  Special  Appeal No. 289 of  1963  dismissing  the appeal and consequently the writ petition.     The  appellant is a (Pacca Arahatiya)  commission  agent

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engaged in the sale and purchase of grains, rice,  oil-seeds and jaggery in the town of Chirgaon, District Jhansi.     On  March  4, 1933, the Government of U.P.  published  a Notification  purported  to have been issued  under  section 38(1) of the United Provinces Town Areas Act 1914 (Act-II of 1914),  hereinafter  referred to as ’the  Town  Areas  Act’, which read as under: "No.  090/XI-158-T. It is hereby notified that the  Governor acting  with his Ministers, in exercise of the  powers  con- ferred  by s. 38(1) of the United Provinces Town  Areas  Act 1914 (II of 1914) is pleased to extend the provisions of  s. 298(2)(F)(d)  of the United Provinces Municipalities Act  19 16  to the Town Area of Chirgaon in the Jhansi  District  in the modified form set forth below:           Modified  section of the United Provinces  Munici- palities  Act, 1916 (II of 1916) s. 298(2)(F)(d)  "The  Pan- chayat  may make bye-laws for the establishment,  regulation and  inspection  of market and for the  proper  and  cleanly Conduct of business therein."     Later  by  section 4 of the United Provinces  Town  Area (Amendment)  Act, 1934 (U.P. Act II of 1934) the word  ’Pan- chayat’ wherever 16 it occurred in the Principal Act was substituted by the word ’Committee’.     It may be noted that the Town Area Panchayat was  super- seded  for a period of one year with effect from  20.10.1933 to 19.10.1934 and was revived thereafter.     The  District  Magistrate, Jhansi promulgated a  set  of bye-laws dated 18.11.1934 for the establishment,  regulation and  inspection of the market in the Town Area  of  Chirgaon and for the proper and cleanly conduct of business  therein. Under Bye-law (1), sellers and purchasers of the commodities mentioned thereunder were required to pay weighing dues.  It said: "1(a)  Weighing dues shall be charged at the rate  of  1/4/6 per  cent  (eight-/8/-annas per cent from  the  sellers  and twelve and a half annas per cent from the purchaser) on  the following articles which comes to the Town Area for sale: Grains, oil seeds, oil cakes, cotton, vegetables for  whole- sale, Dhania for wholesale and gur etc. (b)  Weighing  dues on Ghi shall be charged at the  rate  of /2/6/two  and half annas per maund half from the seller  and half from the purchaser.       N.B.  In recovery of weighing dues fraction of  a  pie shall be omitted and more the figure adjusted to the nearest price. (c)  The purchaser shall be responsible for the full  amount of  weighing dues. He shall deduct the seller’s  share  from the price. (d) No weighing dues shall be charged on any article import- ed  by rail nor on rice, salt, gur and sugar  imported  from Jhansi and Moth by rail or road. (e) On refusal to pay the weighing dues it shall be recover- able as arrears of tax on circumstances and property."       Since  the  appellant was a dealer in  some  of  these commodities,  was served with a notice dated  27.7.1962  de- manding  Rs.  1892.26 as weighing dues for the  period  from 1.5.1962 to 30.6.1962. 17     The  appellant challenged the aforesaid notice filing  a writ petition on 18.8.1962 in the Allahabad High Court being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2400 of 1962. A learned Single Judge  by  his  order dated 29.4.1963,  dismissed  the  same taking  the view that the demand made by the respondent  was

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purely a measure of taxation. The appellant filed  therefrom Special  Appeal No. 289 of 1963, which was dismissed by  the impugned judgment and order.     Before  the  High Court the appellant  contended,  inter alia,  that the Bye-laws were invalid as the Town Area  Com- mittee, shortly ’the TAC’, did not frame them; that the  TAC had  no power to impose such tax; that the U.P.  Town  Areas (Amendment)  Act  1952 did not empower the TAC to  levy  and collect weighing dues; that the weighing dues were discrimi- natory  because of the exemptions; that the  weighing’  dues were not a tax but a fee which could not be charged  without quid  pro  quo; that there was double taxation; and  in  the alternative,  that the weighing dues amounted to  neither  a fee nor a tax but an illegal extraction without the authori- ty  of  law.  All the arguments were rejected  by  the  High Court.     Before  us Mr. R.K. Maheshwari, the learned counsel  for the  appellant, submits, inter alia, that the Bye-laws  were invalid  at  the time when those were framed and  could  not have  been  validated by mere adoption by the TAC  in  1935; that the weighing dues were merely in the nature of purchase tax  and  were illegal inasmuch as the TAC had no  right  or authority to levy the same when it had already been  imposed by  the State of Uttar Pradesh under section 128(1)(xiv)  of the U.P. Municipalities Act; that the TAC did not render any special service to the ’Arhatias’ or farmers who came to the town to conduct their business, nor did it incur any expend- iture in this regard; that the charging of weighing dues was discriminatory inasmuch as there were no weighing charges on some  articles imported from Jhansi or Moth Tehsil  by  rail and  on rice, salt, jaggery or sugar brought either by  road or by rail; that goods coming from villages situate  between Chirgaon  and Jhansi were not required to pay weighing  dues while  goods  from other places in the State  of  U.P.  were being  subjected to the dues; that similar tax  had  already been  imposed by the State Legislature under the  Provisions of the U.P. Sales-tax Act under Entries 52 and 54 of List II and  there  was double taxation by the TAC; that  the  goods arriving  by  car have been subjected to the  weighing  dues while  goods  arriving  by rail from Jhansi  and  Moth  were exempted;  that the levy of weighing dues by the  Town  Area Committee  Chirgaon is arbitrary and discriminatory  and  is grossly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution; 18 that  the levy, though called tax is actually a fee  and  is collected  in the disguise of tax; that double  taxation  in the  form of sales tax by the State Government and  weighing dues  by the TAC is unjustified and it imposes  unreasonable restriction on the rights guaranteed under Article  19(1)(g) of  the Constitution; and that the High Court erred in  dis- missing the appeal and the writ petition.     The  learned counsel for the respondent refutes all  the submissions  of  the  appellant and  supports  the  impugned judgment.     The first question that needs examination is the validi- ty of the Bye-laws promulgated by the District Magistrate on 18.11.1934  after the Notification published by the  Govern- ment  of U.P. issued under section 38(1) of the  Town  Areas Act. That section, as it stood at the relevant time,  empow- ered the Provincial Government to extend, by notification in the Gazette, to all town areas or to any town area or to any part  of  a town area any enactment for the  time  being  in force in any municipality in the United Provinces subject to such  restrictions and modifications, if any, as it  thought fit.  By  the instant Notification dated March 4,  1933  the

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Provincial  Government  extended the Provisions  of  section 298(2)(F)(d)  of  the United Provinces  Municipalities  Act, 1916, hereinafter referred to as the Municipalities Act,  to the  town  area of Chirgaon in the Jhansi  District  in  the modified form set forth in the Notification itself. The word ’Panchayat’  was  substituted  by the  word  ’Committee’  by section  4  of the United Provinces Town  Areas  (Amendment) Act. There could, therefore, be no doubt that the TAC  could make the Bye-laws.     The question then is the nature and extent of the  empo- werment under the above Notification. The empowerment  would naturally be what a Municipality could do under that  provi- sion, namely, section 298(2)(F)(d). Section 298 was includes in  Chapter IX of the Municipalities Act and it  dealt  with rules, regulations and bye-laws. There could, therefore,  be no  doubt that the TAC was empowered to make  bye-laws  "for the  establishment, regulation and inspection of market  and for the proper and cleanly conduct of business therein."     The  Bye-laws dated 18.11.1934 were promulgated  by  the District Magistrate. The contention that the District Magis- trate  had no power to promulgate the Bye-laws  was  rightly rejected  by the learned courts below holding that the  Dis- trict  Magistrate was at that time functioning as TAC as  it then remained suspended and those were ratified on  9.1.1935 by the TAC after it was revived. 19     Section 298(2)(F)(d) as modified in the Notification did not ex facie authorise the imposition of any tax. The Munic- ipalities  Act, Chapter V, (Sections 128 to 165) dealt  with municipal  taxation,  imposition and  alteration  of  taxes. Chapter VII of that Act which included section  298(2)(F)(d) did not deal with taxation. section 298(2)(F)(d) dealt  with markets,  slaughter  houses, sale of food  etc.  Clause  (d) thereunder did not ex facie envisage imposition of any  tax. The  Town Areas Act, Chapter III (Sections 14 to  25)  dealt with  taxation and town fund. Under section 14,  subject  to any  general rules or special orders of the Provincial  Gov- ernment  in that behalf, the taxes which a TAC could  impose had been stated. It did not mention weighing dues as such.     The Bye-laws envisaged by section 298((2)(F)(d),  there- fore,  could not ex facie be said to have empowered the  TAC to impose a tax on the subject matter of that clause. It was contended  before  the High Court that the U.P.  Town  Areas (Amendment) Act, 1952 (U.P. Act 5 of 1953) cured the defects in  the  bye-laws, if any, inasmuch as section  12  of  that Amending  Act added clause (g) to section 14(1) of the  Town Areas Act in the following terms: "Any  other tax being one of the taxes mentioned in  subsec- tion  (1) of section 128 of the U.P. Municipalities Act,  19 16."     Section 128(1) of the Municipalities Act did not mention weighing  dues  as such. But Clause (xiv)  of  that  section provided: "Any  other  tax which the State Legislature  has  power  to impose in the State under the Constitution."     At  the  relevant time, after the amendment  of  section 14(1)(g)  of the Town Areas Act, the TAC was thus  empowered to  levy any other tax, being one of the taxes mentioned  in sub-section  (1) of section 128 of the  U.P.  Municipalities Act, 1916.     The  High  Court  on the basis of  the  above  provision concluded  that the TAC became empowered to levy  all  those taxes  which the State Government could levy under  sub-sec- tion  (1) of section 128 of the Municipalities Act; and  the TAC  could impose any tax which the State legislature  could

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impose  under  the Constitution. Further, it  was  concluded that  Entry 52 of list II empowered the State Government  to impose  tax on the entry of goods into local area  for  con- sumption, use 20 or sale therein and Entry 54 of list II empowered the  State Government to impose a tax on the sale or purchase of  goods and hence the TAC could impose tax on the entry of goods  as well  as  on the sale or purchase of goods in  view  of  the Entries  52 and 54 of list II. Referring to the Bye-law  No. 1,  the High Court concluded that this imposition  was  upon the entry of the mentioned articles into Town area for  sale and it was clearly covered by entry 52 of list II of the 7th schedule and hence it could not be said that the TAC did not possess  the  requisite  power to levy this  tax.  In  other words,  the  weighing dues were construed as entry  tax  and sale or purchase of goods tax combined.     The  High  Court also held that the defect, if  any,  in this  regard was cured by section 13 of the U.P. Town  Areas (Amendment) Act, 1952 as section 13 of that Act provided: "Notwithstanding anything contained in the principal Act, (1)  where any tax of the nature described in clause (g)  of Sub-section  (1)  of Section 14 of the Principal  Act  &  by whatever name or description called has been imposed, levied or  assessed  by any Town Area Committee prior to  the  com- mencement  of  this  Act, the same shall be  and  is  hereby declared to be good and valid in law as if this Act had been in force on all material dates and the tax had been imposed, levied and assessed under and in accordance with the  appro- priate provision in that behalf." (Emphasis supplied by us)     The High Court concluded, and we think rightly, that the imposition  of this tax (weighing dues) had  been  validated retrospectively,  as if the Amending Act had been  in  force even in 1934, when the bye-laws were framed. The validity of the provision having not been challenged, it cannot be  held that the imposition of this tax was without authority of law if it could be brought within any of the taxation entries of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.  Howev- er, if the weighing dues did not amount to a tax but a  fee, then the question would be whether the TAC could levy such a fee. In fact one of the submissions of the appellant is that it was a fee and not a tax as claimed by the respondent.     A  fee is paid for performing a function. A fee  is  not ordinarily  considered to be a tax. If the fee is merely  to compensate an authority for services performed or as compen- sation for the services rendered, it 21 can  hardly be called a tax. However, if the object  of  the fee  is to provide general revenue of the  authority  rather than  to  compensate it, and the amount of the  fee  has  no relation  to the value of the services, the fee will  amount to a tax. In the words of Cooley, "A charge fixed by statute for  the service to be performed by an officer,  where  the. charge  has  no relation to the value of the  services  per- formed  and where the amount collected eventually finds  its way into the treasury of the branch of the Government  whose officer  or officers collect the charge is not a fee  but  a tax."     Under  the  Indian Constitution the  State  Government’s power to levy a tax is not identical with that of its  power to  levy a fee. While the powers to levy taxes is  conferred on the State Legislatures by the various entries in list II, in  it  there is Entry 66 relating to fees,  empowering  the State  Government  to levy fees "in respect of  any  of  the

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matters  in this List, but not including fees taken  in  any Court."  The result is that each State Legislature  has  the power,  to levy fees, which is co-extensive with its  powers to legislate with respect to substantive matters and it  may levy  a  fee with reference to the services  that  would  be rendered  by  the State under such law. The State  may  also delegate  such a power to a local authority. When a levy  or an  imposition is questioned, the Court has to inquire  into its real nature inasmuch as though an imposition is labelled as a fee, in reality it may not be a fee but a tax, and vice versa. The question to be determined is whether the power to levy the tax or fee is conferred on that authority and if it falls beyond, to declare it ultra rites.     We  have seen that a fee is a payment levied by  an  au- thority  in  respect  of services performed by  it  for  the benefit of the payer, while a tax is payable for the  common benefits conferred by the authority on all tax payers. A fee is  a payment made for some special benefit enjoyed  by  the payer and the payment is proportional to such benefit. Money raised  by  fee is appropriated for the performance  of  the service  and does not merge in the general  revenue.  Where, however,  the service is indistinguishable from  the  public services  and  forms part of the latter it is  necessary  to inquire  what  is  the primary object of the  levy  and  the essential  purpose  which it is intended to  achieve.  While there is no quid pro quo between a tax payer and the author- ity  in  case  of a tax, there is  a  necessary  co-relation between  fee collected and the service intended to  be  ren- dered. Of course the quid pro quo need not be understood  in mathematical  equivalence but only in a fair  correspondence between  the  two. A broad co-relationship is  all  that  is necessary. 22     Where  it appears that under the guise of levying a  fee the  authority is attempting to impose a tax, the Court  has to scrutinise the scheme to find out whether there is a real co-relation between the services and the levy whether it  is so co-extensive as to be a pretence of a fee but in  reality a tax, and whether a substantial portion of the fee collect- ed is spent in rendering the service.     In the instant case replying to paragraph 9 of the  writ petition in paragraph 6 to 9 of the Counter Affidavit in the High Court the TAC stated that it used to realise the amount of  weighing dues as tax and not as a fee and that no  ques- tion of quid pro quo was involved in the matter. Most of the carts  of  the cultivators who brought  their  produce  were parked  in  the cart-park which was on the land of  the  TAC ’and it maintained sanitary staff in order to keep the place clean  as bullocks and carts made the place dirty.  Arrange- ment  for  lighting the patromax lamps and for  keeping  the place clean was made by the TAC. To ensure correct weighment and to prevent cheating and defrauding bakshis and peons  of TAC  were  deputed to supervise the daily  weighing  of  the goods  and the TAC maintained standard weights and  measures in case of any dispute which were to be settled. The weights of persons were also checked and verified by the TAC and its seal was affixed to those weights in order to prevent cheat- ing.  In paragraph 12 it was stated that TAC employed  about 40 sweepers out of which about half were especially  deputed for  keeping  the places where the  sale  transactions  took place clean. One bakshi, one jamadar and one peon were  also deputed  to supervise the selling in order to see  that  the bye-laws  in respect of weighment were carried out and  that there was no cheating. Thus, the TAC justified the  charging of  weighing dues, but conceded that the same was a  tax  as

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there was no quid pro quo.     The  respondent having thus conceded that there  was  no quid  pro quo, we have to hold, as also was rightly held  by the High Court, that the weighing dues constituted a tax and not a fee.     We  do not find any merit in the appellant’s  submission that there was double taxation in this case. The  expression "double taxation" is often used in different senses, namely, in  its strict legal sense of direct double taxation and  in its popular sense of indirect double taxation. Double  taxa- tion in the strict legal sense means taxing the same proper- ty  or subject matter twice, for the same purpose,  for  the same period and in the same territory. To constitute  double taxation, the two or more taxes must have been (1) levied on the same property or subject matter, (2) by the same Govern- ment or authority, (3) during 23 the same taxing period, and (4) for the same purpose. "There is  no  double  taxation, strictly  speaking"  says  Cooley, "where  (a) the taxes are imposed by different  States,  (b) one of the impositions is not a tax, (c) one tax is  against property  and  the other is not a property tax, or  (d)  the double taxation is indirect rather than direct."     In  the instant case there cannot be said to  be  double taxation as there is no such taxation imposed by the TAC for the  same period on the same goods at the same time and  for the same purpose.     Where  more than one legislative authority, such as  the State Legislature and a local or municipal body possess  the power to levy a tax, there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent  the same person or property being subject  to  both the  State  and municipal taxation or the  same  legislature exercising its power twice for different purposes. In Avind- er Singh v. State of Punjab, [1979] 1 SCR 845, the State  of Punjab in April, 1977 required the various municipal  bodies in the State to impose tax on the sale of India made foreign liquor  @ Rs. 1 per bottle w.e.f. 20.5.1977.  The  municipal authorities  having  failed to take action pursuant  to  the directive the State of Punjab directly issued a Notification under section 90(5) of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976  and similar provision of the Municipal Act  1911.  The petitioner  challenged  the Constitutional validity  of  the said  statutes  and the levy on the, inter  alia  ground  of double  taxation.  Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for  the  Court held:  "There is nothing in Article 265 of the  Constitution from  which one can spin out the Constitutional vice  called double  taxation. (Bad’ economics may be good law  and  vice versa). Dealing with a somewhat similar argument, the Bombay High Court gave short shrift to it in Western India Theatres (AIR 1954 Bom. 261). Some undeserving contentions die  hard, rather survive after death. The only epitaph we may inscribe is: Rest in peace and don’t be re-born.  If on the same sub- ject  matter the legislature chooses to levy tax twice  over there is no inherent invalidity in the fiscal adventure save where other prohibitions exist." We do not find materials in this case to allow the contention to be re-born. The submis- sion is accordingly rejected.     The contention that the tax is discriminatory in view of the exemptions granted to some of the products and to  those that  enter  the TAC by rail or motor transport  is  equally untenable. It is for the legislature or the taxing authority to determine the question of need, the policy and to  select the goods or services for taxation. The courts cannot review these decisions. In paragraph 16 of the counter affidavit 24

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the  TAC  tried to explain the reason of  not  taxing  salt, sugar and rice stating that they were not local produce  but were  imported  from  distant places and that  the  tax  was levied only on the local produce which came from the  neigh- bouring  places. Courts cannot review the wisdom or  advisa- bility  or expediency of a tax as the court has  no  concern with the policy of legislation, so long they are not  incon- sistent with the provisions of the Constitution. It is  only where there is abuse of its powers and transgression of  the legislative  function in levying a tax, it may be  corrected by  the judiciary and not otherwise. Taxes may be and  often are  oppressive, unjust, and even unnecessary but  this  can constitute  no reason for judicial interference. When  taxes are levied on certain articles or services and not on others it  cannot  be said to be discriminatory.  Cooley  observes: "Every  tax must discriminate; and only the  authority  that imposes  it can determine how and in what  directions."  The TAC  having  decided to impose weighing dues  on  the  goods mentioned  in the Bye-Laws it is not for the court to  ques- tion  it  on  the ground that some  similar  commodities  or commodities  arriving by rail or road were not subjected  to the tax.     The tax having not been found to have been discriminato- ry  or  otherwise illegal we do not find any  force  in  the submission  that it imposed any unreasonable restriction  on the appellants’ rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g)  of the Constitution of India.     In the result, we find no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly  dismissed.  Considering the facts  and  circum- stances of the case we, however, make no order as to  costs. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated. Y. Lal                                Appeal dismissed. 25