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PETITIONER: SREE RAGHUTHILAKATHIRTHASREEPADANGALAVARU SWAMIJI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/04/1962

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1966 AIR 1172            1963 SCR  (2) 226

ACT: Landlord and Tenant-Rent-Enactment providing for fixation of maximum  rent-Constitutional  validity-Notification   sixing standard rent-Validity-Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,  1948 (Bom. 67 of 1948), s. 6-Mysore Tenancy Act,  1952 (Mysore 13 of 1952), ss. 6(1) (2), 12-Constitution of India, Art. 14,19(1) (f), 26,31,31A.

HEADNOTE: The  Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952, was enacted, inter alia,  for the  purpose  of  regulating  the  law  which  governed  the relations  of landlords and tenants of  agricultural  lands. Subsection   (1)   of   s.  6  of   the   Act   provided   : "Notwithstanding any agreement, usage, decree or order of  a court or any law, the maximum rent payable in respect of any period...... by a tenant for the lease of any land shall not exceed one-half of the crop or crops raised on such land  or its  value  as determined in the prescribed  manner".   "The Government may, by notification in the Mysore Gazette, fix a lower  rate  of the maximum rent payable by the  tenants  of lands situate in any particular area or may fix such rate on any other suitable basis as they think fit".  In exercise of the  powers  conferred by s.6(2), the Government  of  Mysore issued  a notification purporting to fix the  standard  rent for land 227 specified  in  Sch.  I which dealt with Maidan  areas  i.e., lands  on  the plains at one third of the produce,  and  for those  specified  in Sch.II which dealt  with  Malnad  areas i.e., lands on hilly tracts at one fourth. The  appellant  who  owned garden land in  the  district  of Shimoga in Mysore State and who had leased out the land to a tenant, challenged the validity or s 6(2) of the Act as well as  the  notification on the rounds  that  they  contravened Arts. 14, 19(1) (f), 26, 31 and 31 A of the Constitution  of India,   and  that,  in  any  case,  the  notification   was inconsistent  with  s. 6(1) inasmuch as it was based  on  s. 6(2)  which  being  an exception to S.  6(1)  could  not  be allowed  to  swallow  up  the  general  rule  and  that  was

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precisely what the notification purported to do.  The Mysore Tenancy  Act  was  modelled on the  pattern  of  the  Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and the provisions of s.6 of the Mysore Act were. similar to s.6 of the  Bombay Act.  In  Vasantlal  Maganbhai Sanjanwala v.  The  State  of Bombay,  [1961] 1. S. C. R. 341 ; it was held that s.  6  of the  Bombay Act was vaild.The appellant contended  that  the aforesaid  decision  was not applicable because  there  were difference,;  between  the two Acts inasmuch as (1)  in  the preamble to the Bombay Act it was stated that it was  passed inter  alia  for the purpose of improving the  economic  and social conditions of peasants and this was not mentioned  in the  Mysore Act, (2) unlike the Mysore Act, the Bombay  Act, made  a distinction between the irrigated and  non-irrigated land (3) the Bombay Act while prescribing a maximum took the precaution of also prescribing a minimum and the absence  of the  latter  provision in the Mysore Act made a  I  material difference. Held,  that  :  (1)  the  Mysore  Tenancy  Act,  1952,   was substantially  similar  to Bombay Tenancy  and  Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and that the question as to be whether s. 6 (2)  of the Mysore Act was valid must be held to be  covered by  the decision the Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala  v.  The State of Bombay [1961] 1 S. C. R. 341.  Accordingly,  s.6(2) of the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952, was valid. (2)  on its true construction, s. 6(1) of the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952, wag intended to apply to all agricultural  leases until  a notification was issued under s.6(2) in respect  of the areas where the leased lands might be situated ; s  6(2) could  not,  therefore,  be considered as  an  exception  to s.6(1) Consequently, the notification in question was valid, 228 Macbeth  v. Ashley, (1874) L.R. 2 Sc.  App. 352,  considered and held inapplicable.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 537 of 1960. Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 23,  1959, of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. 229 of 1955. S.   S. Shukla and E. Udayarathnam, for the appellant. H.   N.  Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of  India,  R. Gopalakrishnan  and P. D. Menon, for the respondents Nos.  1 and 2. R. Gopalakrishnan, for respondent No. 3 1962.  April 18.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR,  J.-This appeal arises from a writ  petition filed by the appellant, Raghutilaka Tirtha  Sripadangalavaru Swamiji,  in the Mysore High Court challenging the  validity of  s. 6 (2) of the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952 (XIII of  1952) hereafter called the Act, and the notification issued  under the said section on March 31, 1952. The appellant’s case as set out in his writ petition  before the High Court was that the impugned section as well as  the notification  issued  under  it  infringed  his  fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 14, 19 (1) (f), 26, 31 and 31A of  the Constitution.  This contention has been rejected  by the High Court and it has been hold that the section and the notification  under challenge are valid and  constitutional. The  appellant then applied for a certificate from the  High Court, both under Art. 132 and Art. 133 of the Constitution. The High Court granted him a certificate under Art. 133, but refused to certify the, case under Art. 132.  There 229

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after  the  appellant applied to this Court for  liberty  to raise   a   question  about  the   interpretation   of   the Constitution  and  permission  has  been  accorded  to   the appellant  accordingly.  That is how the present appeal  has come to this Court. The appellant owns 6 acres and 30 ghuntas of garden land  in village Mulbagilu in Taluka Thirthahalli in the district  of Shimoga.  Respondent No. 3, Ramappa, Gowda, is his tenant in respect of this land.  A registered lease deed was  executed in favour of respondent No. 3 by the appellant on March  11, 1943; under this document respondent No. 3 undertook to  pay 82-1/2  maunds of areca in addition to Rs. 17/12-in cash  as rent   per  year.   In  1955  respondent  No.  3  filed   an application  before  respondent  No.  2,  the  Tehsildar  of Thirthahalli,  under section 12 of the Act and claimed  that the standard rent payable by him to the appellant should  be fixed  (Tenancy case 85 of 1955-56).   Meanwhile  respondent No.  1,  the Government of Mysore, had, in exercise  of  the powers  conferred  on  it  by s. 6  of  the  Act,  issued  a notification  No. R9. 10720/- L. S. 73-54.2 on March  28/29, 1955.  This notification purported to fix the standard  rent for  lands  of  the category to which  the  appellants  land belongs  at one third of the produce.  Feeling aggrieved  by this  notification  the  appellant filed  the  present  writ petition  in the High Court on December 16, 1955,  His  case was that s. 6 (2) as well ’as the notification issued  under it were ultra vires, invalid and inoperative. Before dealing with the contentions raised before us by  Mr. Shukla  on behalf of the appellant it would be necessary  to consider  very briefly the scheme of the Act.  The  Act  has been passed by the Mysore Legislature because it was thought necessary to regulate the law which governs the relations of landlords and tenants of agricultural lands and to  regulate and impose restrictions on the 230 transfer  of agricultural lands, dwelling houses, sites  and lands  appurtenant  thereto  belonging  to  or  occupied  by agriculturists  in  the  State  of  Mysore  except   Bellary District  and to make provisions for certain other  purposes appearing in the Act.  That is the recital contained in  the preamble to the Act.  It would thus be seen that the primary object  of  the Act is to afford much needed relief  to  the agricultural  tenants  by regulating  their  relations  with their  landlords  and in that respect the Act bears  a  very close  resemblance to the provisions of the  Bombay  Tenancy and  Agricultural  Lands Act, LXVII of  1948.   Indeed,  the material  provisions of the Act with which we are  concerned are substantially similar. Chapter  I  of the Act deals with the preliminary  topic  of defining  the  relevant terms used in the Act.   Chapter  II contains general provisions regarding tenancies.  Section  4 defines  persons  who are deemed to be tenants.   Section  5 provides that no tenancy would be for less than five  years. Section  6  deals  with  the maximum  rent  payable  by  the tenants.   Section  8 provides for the calculation  of  rent payable in kind in the manner indicated by cls. (i) and (ii) and prohibits the landlord from recovering or receiving rent calculated in any other manner.  Under a,. 9 receipt of rent in  terms  of service or labour is prohibited.   Section  11 abolishes all ’cases and s. 10 enables the tenants to  claim a  refund of rent which has been recovered in  contravention of  the provisions of the Act.  Section 12 then  deals  with enquiries  with regard to reasonable rent.  Sub-section  (3) of  s. 12 lays down five factors which have to be  borne  in mind  by the authority dealing with an application  for  the

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fixation  of reasonable rent.  Section 13 is a corollary  of s. 12 and authorises the reduction of rent after  reasonable rent has been determined under s. 12.  Section 14 deals with suspensions or remission of rent.  Section 15 231 provides  for  termination  of  tenancy.   Under  s.  18   a statutory  bar is created against the eviction of  a  tenant from  a  dwelling house and under s. 19 the tenant  has  the first option of purchasing the site on which he has built  a dwelling house.  Similarly, under s. 22 the tenant is  given an option of purchasing the land leased out to him.  section 24 deals with some cases where relief can be granted against termination  of  tenancy  and  s.  25  with  relief  against termination of tenancy for non-payment of rent.  Section  30 provides  for  the  procedure  to recover  rent  and  s.  31 protects  the tenants’ rights under any other law.   Chapter III deals with the procedure and jurisdiction of Amildar and provides  for appeals against the decisions of the  Amildar. Chapter IV deals with offences and prescribes penalties  for them and Chapter V contains miscelaneous provisions.   That, in its broad outlines, is the nature of the provisions  made by  the  Act  in order to give relief  to  the  agricultural tenants.               Section 6 with which we are directly concerned                             in the present appeal reads thus:-               "6. (1) Notwithstanding any agreement,  usage,               decree  or  order of a court or any  law,  the               maximum rent payable in respect of any  period               after  the date of coming into force  of  this               Act  by,  a tenant for the lease of  any  land               shall not exceed one-half of the crop or crops               raised on such land or its value as determined               in the prescribed manner :               Provided  that  where  the  tenant  does   not               cultivate  the land the rent payable shall  be               the  reasonable  rent  to  be  fixed  by   the               Amildar.               (2)   The  Government may, by notification  in               the  Mysore Gazette, fix a lower rate  of  the               maximum rent payable by the tenants of lands               232               situate in any particular area or may fix such               rate on any other suitable basis as they think               fit." As we have already indicated, the provisions of the two sub- clauses of a. 6 are substantially similar to the  provisions of  s.  6  ( 1) and (2) of  the  corresponding  Bombay  Act. Indeed,  it would be correct to say that Act with  which  we are concerned has been modelled on the pattern of the Bombay Act  and has adopted most of its important provisions.   The validity  of  s. 6 of the Bombay Act was  challenged  before this Court in "VasantalMaganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State  of Bombay  (1)" and it has been held that the said  section  is valid.   The  reasons given by this Court in  upholding  the validity  of is. 6 of the Bombay Act apply with equal  force in support of the validity of s. 6 of the Mysore Act and  so the  point  raised  by  the  appellant  in  challenging  the validity  of the impugned section is really covered  by  the earlier decision of this Court. Mr.  Shukla, however, contends that the preamble to the  Act differs from the preamble of the Bombay Act inasmuch as  the latter preamble refers to the fact that that Act was  passed inter  alia  for the purpose of improving the  economic  and social  conditions  of peasants and ensuring  the  full  and efficient use of land for agriculture and so  considerations

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of social justice on which the validity of the corresponding provision  of  the  Bombay Act was sought  to  be  sustained cannot  be invoked in dealing with the present  appeal.,  We are  not  impressed by this argument.  It is true  that  the preamble  to  the Act merely says that the  Act  was  passed because  it was though necessary to regulate the  law  which governs   the   relations  of  landlords  and   tenants   of agricultural lands and it does not refer to the  requirement of  social  justice  or does not  specifically  mention  the object of ensuring the full and efficient (1)  [1961] 1 S.C.R. 341. 233 use  of  land for agriculture.  But in dealing  with  a  law which  has  been  passed for the  purpose  of  effecting  an agrarian reform it would be pedantic to ignore the essential basis  of its material provisions merely on the ground  that the  concept of social justice on which the said  provisions are  based  has not been expressly stated to be one  of  the objects  of  the  Act  in the  preamble.   We  have  already examined  briefly  the  broad scheme of the Act  and  it  is obvious  that  the  important  provisions  of  the  Act  are intended  to improve the economic and social  conditions  of the agricultural tenants and so the policy of social justice can be safely said to be writ large on the face of the  Act. Therefore, we do not think that the argument based upon  the fact  that  the preamble does not refer  to  social  justice distinguishes s. 6 of the Act from the corresponding section of the Bombay Act. Then it is urged that unlike the Mysore Act, the Bombay  Act has  distinguished between irrigated land and  non-irrigated land  and  has  provided by s. 6(1) that  the  maximum  rent payable in the case of irrigated land shall not exceed  one- forth  and in the case of other lands shall not exceed  one- third of the crop of such land or its value as determined in the  prescribed manner.  It is true that s. 6(1) of the  Act makes  no  such  distinction  between  irrigated  and   non- irrigated lands.  But that, in our opinion, is not a  matter of essential importance.  Like s. 6(1) of the Bombay Act  s. 6(1)  of  the  Act also intends to  provide  for  a  maximum ceiling  beyond which agricultural rent will not be  allowed to  soar and so far as the fixation of a maximum ceiling  of rent  is  concerned it is not essential that  a  distinction must  necessarily be made between. irrigated lands and  non- irrigated  lands.   It must be borne in mind that  what  the section does is to prescribe the maximum and not to  provide for a minimum In prescribing a maximum it may be open to the Legislature to provide for a maximum which would be 234 common to all lands whether irrigated or not, That is why we are not inclined to attach any importance to the point  that in the absence of classification of land, while  prescribing a maximum s. 6(1) suffers from any infirmity. Then  it is argued that the Bombay Act while  prescribing  a maximum  has  taken  the precaution of  also  prescribing  a minimum  and  the absence of the latter  provision  makes  a material difference.  This argument is clearly misconceived. It  is  true  that s. 8 of the Bombay  Act  which  had  been inserted  by the Bombay Legislature in 1956 did provide  for the  maximum  and the minimum rent, but as the  decision  of this Court in the case of Sanjanwala (1) shows in  upholding the validity of the impugned provision of the Bombay Act  no reliance  was placed upon the fixation of the minimum  rent. Indeed,  the  minimum  rent  was  fixed  subsequent  to  the decision  of  the High Court which was under  appeal  before this Court in that case and the fact that a minimum had been

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prescribed subsequently has been only incidentally mentioned in  the  judgment.   Therefore the absence  of  a  provision fixing the minimum rent does not introduce any infirmity  in the  impugned provision.  We are, therefore, satisfied  that the case of the impugned section is substantially similar to the case of s. 6 of the Bombay Act with which this Court was concerned in the case of Sanjanwala (1) and the challenge to the  validity  of  section  in  the  present  appeal   must, therefore, be held to be covered by the said decision. That  takes  us to the question as to whether  the  impugned notification is invalid.  This notification has been  issued in exercise of the powers conferred on the State  Government by  s.  6(2) and it provides that the rate of  maximum  rent payable  by  the  tenants of lands  situated  in  the  areas specified in Schedule I and Schedule If to the notification 235 shall  be one-third and one-fourth respectively of the  crop or  crops  raised on such lands with effect  from  the  year commencing  on April 1, 1955.  Schedule I deals with  Maidan areas in which the maximum rent or rents shall be  one-third of  the,  crop or crops and Schedule If deals  with  Malanad areas in which the maximum rate of rent shall be  one-fourth of the crop or crops raised. It  appears that the classification of lands between  Maidan an Malanad lands is well known in Mysore.  Maidan lands  are lands  on  the plains, whereas Malanad are  lands  on  hilly tracts.  The distinction between the two categories of lands takes  into account the different conditions of  rain  fall, the different nature of the cultivation, the difference’  in the living conditions and the availability of labour and the difference  in the quantity and the quality of the  produce. It  is  true that the notification does  not  prescribe  the lower rate of the maximum rent area by area in the sense  of district by district, but it purports to prescribe the  said maximum by classifying the land in the whole of the State in the two well-known categories of Maidan and Malanad lands. It is urged by Mr. Shukla that the impugned notification  is invalid,  because it is inconsistent with the provisions  of s.  6(1).  The argument is that s. 6(1) lays down a  general rule  and  s.  6(2) provides for an exception  to  the  said general  rule.  On that assumption it is contended  that  an exception  cannot be allowed to swallow up the general  rule and that is precisely what the notification purports to  do. This argument is based on the decision of the House of Lords in Macbeth v. Ashley It would be noticed that this  argument raises  the question about the construction of the two  sub- clauses   of  s.6.  Before  addressing  ourselves  to   that question, (1)  [1874] L.R. 2 SC.  App. 352. 236 however, we may refer to the decision of the House of  Lords on which the argument is based. It  appears that II o’clock at night was the hour  appointed for  closing public-houres in Scotland, although in  special cases,  and  for well considered reasons,  a  deviation  was allowed  with  reference to any particular  locality  really requiring  it.  The Magistrates of Rothesay had ordered  for closing at 10 instead of 11 and the effect of the order  was that it embraced every public-house in the burgh.  The House of  Lords held that the Magistrates order .was ultra  vires. The  statutory provision with which the House of  Lords  was concerned was contained in the Act of Parliament, 25 and  26 Vict. c. 35.  As a result of these provisions 11 o’clock  at night  was  appointed  to be the  hour  for  closing  public houses.  There was however, a proviso which said inter  alia

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that  in any particular locality requiring other  hours  for opening and closing inns, hotels, and public houses it shall be lawful for such justices and Magistrates respectively  to insert  in the schedule such other hours, not being  earlier than  six  or later than eight o’clock in  the  morning  for opening,, or earlier than nine o’clock or later than  eleven o’clock  in the evening for closing the same as  they  shall think fit.  It is in pursuance of the authority conferred on them  by the said proviso that the Magistrates  of  Rothesay passed an order embracing every public-house in the burge by which  a  deviation  from the  statutorily  fixed  hour  was effected. In  dealing  with the validity of the order  issued  by  the Magistrates  Lord  Chancellor  Lord  Cairns  expressed   his opinion  that if the exception is to swallow up the rule  it ceases, of course, to be an exception at all and that  which might fairly have been an exercise of discretion becomes  no exercise  of the kind of discretion mentioned in the Act  of Parliament.  It was for this reason that the order 237 issued  by the Magistrates was declared to be  ultra  vires. It  was conceded that the Magistrates had a discretion,  but the  Lord  Chancellor observed that  the  words  "conferring discretion"  expressly bear with reference to  a  particular locality and not with the whole burgh.  What should be  true about the whole burgh had been treated as a matter  reserved for  and  determined by the consideration  of  the  Imperial Parliament.  The Lord Chancellor did not express any opinion on  the-question as to whether the discretion vested in  the Magistrates  can  be exercised by them more  than  once  but without  deciding that point he held that the order  of  the Magistrates really amounted to evading an Act of Parliament. In  substance,  the Magistrates had once for  all  attempted with  regard to all the public-houses in their  district  to change  the rule laid down by the Act of  Parliament.   Lord Chelmsford, who concurred with the opinion expressed by  the Lord Chancellor, rested his conclusion on the ground that it was impossible to say that the limits which the  Magistrates had  defined  could be called a particular  locality  within burgh and so it appeared that what the Magistrates had  done was  something  very  like an attempt to evade  the  Act  of Parliament.   According  to Lord  Selborne,  the  participle "requiring" is connected with the substantive "locality" and therefore  it  must  be a requirement  arising  out  of  the particular  circumstances  of the place.  That is  why  Lord Selborne thought that the Magistrates must in exercise of an honest and bona fide judgment, be of opinion that the particular locality which they ex(opt from the ordinary rule is  one which, from its own special circumstances,  requires that difference to be made. It  would thus be seen that though the general basis of  tHe decision,  as it has been expressed by Lord Cairne,  appears to  be that the exception cannot swallow up the rule one  of the reasons which 238 ultimately  influenced the decision was that the  discretion had to be exercised bona fide and after due deliberation  in respect  of  a particular locality and that  the  manner  in which  the order was issued indicated that the  requirements of  the particular localities had not been duly examined  by the Magistrates.  It is significant that though Lord  Cairns posed the question as to whether the discretion in  question can be exercised more than once, he did not choose to answer it; but the trend of the opinions expressed by the Law Lords during the course of their speeches may seem to suggest that

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the discretion cannot be exercised more than once and in any case,  it  must  be exercised by special  reference  to  the particular  locality  as indicated by the  proviso.   If  an order  is  made  in respect of the whole of  the  burgh,  it cannot be said that it has been passed after exercising  due discretion in respect of the requirements of each particular locality.   With respect, if the discretion is given to  the Magistrates  to  provide  for  a  departure  from  the  rule prescribed   by  the  general  provision  by  reference   to particular  localities, it is not easy to see why  the  said discretion  cannot  be exercised more  than  once.   Indeed, situations  may  arise  when the  Magistrates  may  have  to consider  the  matter  from  time  to  time  in  respect  of different  localities and if it appears to  the  Magistrates considering the cases of different localities that in regard to each one of them a departure from the general rule should be  made, it is not easy to follow why the proviso does  not justify different orders being passed by the Magistrates  in respect  of  different but particular  localities.   On  the other hand, if the main provision is construed to mean  that the  time prescribed by it was to apply generally only  with certain  exceptions contemplated by the proviso, that  would be a different matter.  However, it is not necessary for  us to pursue this point further and to express a definite  239 opinion on the general proposition that an exception  cannot swallow the general rule because, as we will presently show, this  rule  cannot be applied to the provisions of s.  6  at all.   In  this connection we may, however, point  out  that both in Max- a well and in Craies, the decision in Macbeth’s case  (1) appears to have been treated as an  authority  for the  proposition  that an order like the one passed  by  the Magistrates  in  that  case amounted to an  evasion  of  the Parliamentary statute, because it was not in honest and bona fide exercise of the discretion vested in them. (Maxwell  on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., p. 121, and Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn., p. 75.) But  assuming  that  the proposition for  which  Mr.  Shukla contends on the authority of the decision in Macbeth’s  case (1) is sound, does it apply to s. 6 at all and the answer to this  question  will  depend upon the  construction  of  the provisions  contained  in the two sub-clauses of  s.  6.  It would  be  noticed that s. 6(1) declares  a  maximum  beyond which  no  landlord can recover rent from  his  tenant.   In other  words, as soon as the Act came into force  a  ceiling was fixed beyond which the landlord cannot recover rent from his  tenant  even though it may be justified  by  agreement, usage,  decree  or order of a court or any  other  law,  The provisions  of  this  sub-section  apply  individually   and severally   to  all  agricultural  leases  and  govern   the relations of individual landlords and tenants in respect  of payment  of rent by the latter to the former.  The  fixation of  the maximum by sub-s. (1) is really not intended to  lay down  a  general rule as to what a landlord  should  recover from  his  tenant  and it is in that sense  alone  that  its relation to the provisions of sub-s. (2) must be judged.  In that  connection we may point out that there is one  proviso to (1) (1874) L. R. 2 S.C App 352. 240 cultivate  the land and it lays down that in their case  the rent shall be reasonable rent to be fixed by the Amildar. Sub-section (2) is so worded that in terms it cannot be said to  be  a proviso to sub-s. (1) add in substance it  is  not such a proviso nor is it an exception to sub-s. (1).  Having

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prescribed the maximum beyond which agricultural rent cannot go under a.    6(1)   the  legislature  has  premitted   the Government to  fix  a  lower  rate of the  maximum  rent  in respect of     lands  situated  in  particular  areas.   The Government  has also been authorised to fix the  payment  of rent on any other suitable basis as it thinks fit.  In other words,  the authority conferred on the Government is  either to  fix a lower rate or to fix any other basis on which  the rent  could  be  fixed.  The  provision  is  an  independent provision  and  so  the two sub-sections  must  be  read  as different, independent, though coordinate, provisions of the Statute.   It would, we think, be erroneous to treat  sub-s. (2) as a proviso or exception to sub-s. (1).  Whereas sub.a. (1)  deals with and applies to all leases  individually  and prescribes a ceiling in that behalf, sub-s. (2) is intend to prescribe  a maximum by reference to different areas in  the State.  The object of both the provisions is no doubt  simi- lar  but  it is not the same and the relation  between  them cannot  legitimately be treated as the relation between  the general rule and the proviso or exception to it. The argument that by issuing the notification the Government has purported to amend a. 6(1) is, in our opinion, not well- founded.   As we have already seen, a. 6(1) is  intended  to apply to all the agricultural leases until a notification is issued  under  a.  6(2) in respect of the  areas  where  the leased lands may be situated.  It is not suggested that  241 under  s. 6(2) it is necessary that the Government must  fix the  lower  rates by reference to individual  lands  and  so there can be no doubt that even on the appellant’s  argument it would be competent to the Government to fix lower  rents, say districtwise.  If instead of prescribing the lower rates districtwise after classifying the lands into two categories which  are  well recognised, the Government  prescribed  the rates   by  reference  to  the  said  categories  of   lands throughout   the  State,  we  do  not  see  how   the   said notification can be said to be inconsistent with s. 6(2)  or with  s. 6( 1) either.  The scheme of s. 6 does not seem  to postulate  that after the notifications are issued under  s. 6(2)  some area must inevitably be left to be covered by  s. 6(1).   Such  an assumption would be inconsistent  with  the object  underlying the said provision itself.  What s.  6(1) has  done is to fix a general ceiling apart from  the  areas and without considering the special factors appertaining  to them.   Having thus fixed a general ceiling the  Legislature realised  that the ceiling may have to be changed from  area to area and so power was conferred on the Government to  fix the ceiling at a lower rate, The Government having  examined the  matter came to the conclusion that the  more  equitable and  reasonable  course  to adopt would  be  to  divide  the agricultural  lands into two well-known categories  and  fix the ceiling by reference to them.  Now in the very nature of things,  the  Legislature  must have  anticipated  that  the exercise  of  the power under a. 6(2) might  cover  all  the areas  in  the  State and that may  mean  that  the  general ceiling  prescribed  by s. 6(1) may not apply  to  any  land which  is covered by the notification.  If s. 6(1) is not  a general rule and s. 6(2) is not an exception to it, then the consequence   flowing  from  the  issue  of   the   impugned notification   cannot  be  characterised  as  an   exception swallowing up the 242 general  rule.   That, in substance, is the view  which  the Mysore High Court has taken in the matter and we think  that the said view is right.

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In  the  result.,  the appeal fails and  is  dismissed  with costs. Appeal dismissed.