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PETITIONER: THE SREE NARAYANA DHARMA-SANGAM TRUST

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SWAMI PRAKASANANDA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/04/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, D.P. WADHWA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.  This appeal,  by special  leave, arises from the  judgment of the Kerala High Court, made on January 16, 1996 in R.P. No.204/95 in C . R . P . No . 2724/94.      The dispute  has arisen  with regard to the election to the Committee  of Sree  Narayana  Dharmasanghom  Trust.  The Trust is  governed by the scheme framed by the High Court in A.S. No.14/56,  dated March  26, 1959. since the term of the elected body  was to  expire on  10.8.94, the Trust Board on 4.7.94 decided  to conduct election on 26.7.94. Disputes had arisen as  to the  validity of the elections held on 26.7.94 and the suit came to be filed. Ad-interim injunction was granted by  the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Attingal in O.S. No.247/94 on  22.11  94.  Against  the  interlocutory  order passed by the appellate authority in C.M.A. No.167/94, dated December 2,  1994 C.R.P.  No.2727/94   came to be filed. The High Court  by judgment  dated June  19,  1995  allowed  the revision, set aside the order of the appellate authority and gave certain  directions. Calling  that matter  in  question S.L.P. (C)  No.13667/95 came to be filed in this Court, This Court on June 29, 1995 passed the following order:        "We   do  not   find  any  ground      warranting interference since it is      an individual  case and that too by      an interim  order.  The  S.L.P.  is      dismissed.  However,   the    trial      Court is directed to dispose of the      suit as  expeditiously as  possible      preferably within  a period  of six      months from  the date of receipt of      this order."      Thereafter, an  application came  to be filed to review the order  passed by  the High  Court in the revision, which had been  dismissed by the High Court holding that the order passed by the High Court stood merged with the order of this Court. As  a consequence,  the High  Court cannot review the order. Thus this appeal, by special leave.      Shri  P.S.   Poti,  learned   senior  counsel  for  the appellant contends that this Court did not decide the matter on merits.  When the patent error is apparent on the face of

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the record,  it is  always reviewable by the High Court and, therefore, the  order dismissing the S.L.P. does not operate as a final order. Therefore, the High Court has the power to review its  order. We  find no  merit in  the contention. In State of  Maharashtra v.  Prabhakar Bhimaji  Ingle [(1996) 3 SCC 463]  this Court has considered the similar controversy. The facts  therein were  that the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal passed  an order  in O.A.  No 1169/93 against which S.L.P. was  filed in  this Court.  It was  dismissed by this Court on  August 28,  1993. Pending  the  S.L.P.,  a  review petition was  filed in  the Tribunal.  The Tribunal reviewed its order. When that order came to be challenged, this Court held thus:      "4.  But in  this  case,  when  the      self-same main  order was confirmed      by this  Court the  question arises      whether the  Tribunal has had power      under Order  47, Rule  1 CPC or any      other appropriate  provision  under      the Tribunals  Act  to  review  the      orders passed  by it  and confirmed      by this  Court by refusing to grant      leave. We find that the exercise of      the review  power is deleterious to      the judicial  discipline. Once this      Court  has   confirmed  the   order      passed  by   the   Tribunal,   that      becomes   final.   Therefore,   the      Tribunal cannot   have any power to      review  the  previous  order  which      stands  merged   with   the   order      passed by this Court.      5.   It is  next contended  by  the      learned  counsel for the respondent      that  though   the   Tribunal   was      communicated with the order of this      Court  dated   25.8.1995,  it   has      thereafter  passed  the  order.  it      would mean  that thought it had the      knowledge of dismissal of the order      passed by  this Court, the Tribunal      has exercised  the power  of review      and that,  therefore, it  cannot be      said to  be illegal.  We are wholly      unable to appreciate the contention      of the  learned counsel.  We  could      appreciate that  if   the  Tribunal      had no  knowledge of  dismissal  of      the  SLP   it  might,   in  certain      circumstances, review  its  earlier      order, e.g.,  if it  was found that      the  order   was  vitiated  by  any      manifest error  of law  apparent on      the face  of the record. But having      received  the   communication  that      this Court  has already  upheld its      order, the  Tribunal’s exercise  of      power can  be said  to be audacious      and    without     any     judicial      discipline.       Under       those      circumstances, we do not think that      the  Tribunal   is   justified   in      reviewing its  own order  when this      Court  had   confirmed  the   order      passed earlier."

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    Therefore, once  this Court  has passed  an order,  the order passed  by the High Court stands merged with the order passed by this Court. Thereafter, the High Court/Tribunal is devoid of  the jurisdiction  to a  review  the  order.  This question also  was reiterated  in Yogendra Narayan choudhary V. Union of India [(1996) 7 SSC 1] thus:      "It is  settled law  that even  the      dismissal of special leave petition      in.   limine    without   assigning      reasons does  not  operate  as  res      judicata.        Under        these      circumstances, we  are of  the view      that the  view or  the latter Bench      of the  CAT, Calcutta  and  of  the      Cuttack    Bench     are    clearly      consistent    with     the    above      reasoning. Therefore we do not find      that there are fit cases warranting      interferences.      Thus it  is settled  law that  even  the  dismissal  of special leave  petition in  limine operates as a final order between the  parties and  any order passed by the High Court Tribunal subsequently  operates as  a res judicata as far as the parties  thereto. are  concerned. It  is  true  that  in Indian Oil  Corpn. Ltd.  v. State  of Bihar [(1386) 3 SCR at 558] this  Court had pointed out that when the writ petition was dismissed  by this  Court in limine, the jurisdiction of the High  Court under  Article 226  is  not  precluded.  The dismissal of  the writ  Petition under  Article 32  does not operate  as   res  judicata.   That  principle  is  entirely different from the review of an order under Order 47 Rule 1. Under these  circumstances. we are of the view that the High Court is  well justified  in refusing  to review  the  order passed in the revision. However, since the records have been called by  the High  Court and  the matter  is pending,  the trial Court could  not dispose of the matter within the time limit, specified  earlier, by  this  Court.’  Therefore,  we cannot find  fault with  the trial Court for non-disposal of the matter.  However, the civil court is directed to dispose of the suit as indicated earlier within six months from now.      The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.