http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

PETITIONER: SREE GAJANANA MOTOR TRANSPORT CO. LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/09/1976

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH RAY, A.N. (CJ) SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1977 AIR  418            1977 SCR  (1) 665  1977 SCC  (1)  37

ACT:              Motor  Vehicles Act, 1939, s.  43(1)---State  Government         can  direct  imposition  of fixed  rates  on  stage-carriage         operators for  carrying  mails as  condition     permit  Ss.         48(3)  and 59(3)(c), such directions do not  interfere  with         quasi    judicial    functions   of    Regional    Transport         Authority--Special provisions of s. 48 (3)(XV) do not  over-         ride general provisions of s. 43(1)(d)(1).

HEADNOTE:              The  State  Government issued a notification  u/s  43(1)         Motor  Vehicles  Act, 1939, directing  the  State  Transport         Authority  to impose the charge of certain uniform rates  of         freight  upon  the operators of stage-carriages  other  than         State  Transport  undertakings,  carrying  mails  or  postal         goods.   The  S.T.A.  then directed the  Regional  Transport         Authority,  u/s  44(1)  of the Act, to impose  the  duty  of         carrying the postal goods upon rates fixed by the Government         as a condition annexed u/s 48(3)(XV) to permits.             The appellant contended that the power of the Government         u/s  43(1) to issue directions relating to "freights",  does         not include imposition of charges for carrying postal  goods         as conditions of permits granted  by  the Regional Transport         Authority.  in exercise of its quasi judicial powers.   Dis-         missing the appeal the Court,             HELD:  The State Government has the data and  the  legal         power  under  Section 43(1) of the Act to fix  freights  for         carriage  of  postal  goods in various  types  of  carriages         mentioned there, including stage carriages. Such charges are         merely a species of freight on postal goods about which  the         State Government can issue appropriate directions. [668 E]             (2)  Section 48(3) deals with what lies past the  quasi-         judicial  stage  of decision to grant the permit.   At  that         stage, the decision to grant the permit is already there and         only  conditions  have to be attached to  the  permit.   The         Regional  Transport  Authority  has, at this  stage  to  act         mainly  mechanically after considering matters on  which  it         has, acting quasi-judicially, formed an opinion and taken  a         decision.  There is no interference with the  quasi-judicial         functions  as the annexation of a condition like. this is  a         part  of the purely executive duties of the  Regional.Trans-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

       port Authority. [668 D-E, 669 A]             S. Srikantiah & Ors. v. The Regional  Transport  Author-         ity,  Anantapur  & Ors [1971] Suppl. SCR 816 followed.             (3) There is no question of any special provision  over-         riding  the  general.  The  provisions  are   complementary.         Section  48(3)(XV) is really meant to carry out  the  direc-         tions which can legally be given under section 43( 1 )(d)(i)         of the Act. [669 B--C]

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 366 of 1976              (From  the  Judgment and Order dated 2.12.1974  of  the         Karnataka High Court in Civil Writ Appeal No. 171/73).         K.N. Bhatta and M. Rangaswamy for the Appellant         Mrs. Shyamla Pappu and Girish Chandra for Respondent No. 3         B.R.G.K. Achar for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.         666         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             BEG J.--This appeal by special leave raises the question         whether  the State Government could, by a general  direction         given  under Section 43(1) of the Motor Vehicles  Act,  1939         (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) fix the charges to be         imposed upon operators of stage carriages for carrying mails         as conditions of their permits.             Section 48 of the Act lays down the power of the Region-         al Transport Authority to grant stage carriage permits  with         conditions annexed thereto.  The first stage of exercise  of         this power is preceded by’ the quasi-judicial enquiry, under         Section  47  of  the Act, into  the  matters  affecting  the         interests  of public in general.  Section 48, sub.. s.  (1),         subjecting  the  power to grant stage  carriage  permits  to         provisions of section 47 of the. Act, includes what may  be’         correctly characterised as the "quasi-judicial" power either         to grant or refuse to grant a permit after consideration  of         matters  stated  in Section 47 of the Act.  After  that,  we         come  to the power to  attach  conditions laid down in  Sec-         tion 48(3), and we find:               "49(3) The Regional Transport Authority, if it decides         to grant a stage carriage permit, may grant the permit for a         service of stage carriages of a specified description or for         one or more particular stage carriages, and may, subject  to         any  rules that may be made under this Act, attach  to   the         permit  any   one or  more  of the   following   conditions,         namely:  .........  "         Out of a number of kinds of conditions which may be imposed,         the xvth, given below, is relevant:               "(xv) that mails shall be carried on any of the  vehi-         cles  authorised  by the permit subject to  such  conditions         (including  conditions as to the time in which mails are  to         be  carried and the charges which may be levied) as  may  be         specified".             Now,  it is contended on behalf of the appellants,  that         the power to attach conditions under. Section 48(3) is  also         quasi-judicial  with which the State Government neither  has         nor  ought to have any concern.  The conditions  of  permits         are prescribed by statute.  It  is for the authority,  exer-         cising  the power quasi-judicially to grant or not to  grant         permits,  to  decide  what conditions to attach  or  not  to         attach to each permit.  It is. not, it is submitted, for the         State  Government to dictate any conditions to be  attached.         Hence,  the challenge to the Government  notification  dated         30th May, 1968, which directed the State Transport  Authori-         ty, to impose the charge of certain uniform rates of freight

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

       upon  operators  carrying  mails or postal  goods  in  stage         carriages  owned  by operators other  than  State  Transport         Undertakings  throughout  the State.   The  State  Transport         Authority  had, in its turn, issued a direction to  the  Re-         gional   Transport  Authorities  all over  the  State  under         Section 44 (1 ) of the Act to impose,         667             duty  of carrying the postal goods upon rates  fixed  by         the  Government as a condition annexed under  Section  48(3)         (xv) to permits.                    The  relevant part of Section 43 (1) of  the  Act                  enacts:  "43 (1) A State Government  having  regard                  to-                    (a) the advantage’s offered to the public,  trade                  and  industry  by the above  development  of  motor                  transport, and                      (b) the desirability of co-ordinating road  and                  rail transport, and                      (c) the desirability of preventing the deterio-                  ration of the road system, and                      (d)  the desirability of preventing  uneconomic                  competition among motor vehicles, may, from time to                  time,   by  notification in the  Official  Gazette,                  issue directions to the State Transport Authority--                        (i)   regarding  the  fixing  of  fares   and                  freights  for stage carriages,  contract  carriages                  and public carriers;"             Learned  Counsel  for the appellant  contends  that  the         power  of  the Government to issue  directions  relating  to         "freights" does not include imposition of charges for carry-         ing  postal goods as conditions permits which  the  Regional         Transport Authority grants in exercise of its quasi-judicial         powers.  The attack on the validity of the Government direc-         tion  is thus two fold: firstly, that it falls  outside  the         scope  of Section 43(1) of the Act as charges  for  carrying         mail  are   not "freight" on goods carried;  and,  secondly,         that  no directions could be given to a  quasi-judicial  au-         thority as to how it should perform its functions.             So  far  as the first argument is concerned, we  do  not         find much substance in it. The term "charge" is a broad one.         As  used here, it is not a technical term and has  not  been         defined  by the Act.  It has, therefore, its  ordinary  dic-         tionary meaning.  It means any amount which may be  demanded         as a price for the rendering of some service or as price  of         some  goods.   The argument of the learned Counsel  for  the         appellant that the Act uses the term "freight" to.  indicate         the  charge  made  on carriage of goods,  whereas  the  term         "fare" is used for the charge made for carrying  passengers,         itself  rests  on the assumption that the term charge  is  a         wide  one. It includes both freights and fares. It  is  true         that the term "fare" is used in relation to charges made for         carriage  of  passengers and the term freight is  used   for         charges made for the carriage of goods.  Nevertheless,  both         are  charges.  It may be that stage carriages are meant  for         the  carriage of passengers.  But, as is a matter of  common         knowledge,  they also carry the luggage of  passengers.   In         other  words, they also carry some goods incidentally.   The         mail bags in which the postal goods are sent are only a type         of goods which are not so bulky as to require trucks         11--l234SCI/76         668         Or  special  vans.  It is possible to carry  them  in  stage         carriages  together with the luggage of the passengers.   In         any  case,  this is  a condition which is  probably  imposed         only  in  those areas where mail vans of the State  are  not

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

       found to be necessary or economical to run. In the  villages         in  the  interior of some rural areas, there may not  be  so         much  mail  to  carry as to justify sending  a   mail   van.         Therefore, power is given to the Regional Transport Authori-         ty  to  attach  the condition that postal  goods  should  be         carried  in stage carriages  at rates fixed by  the  Govern-         ment.  The real grievance of the operators is not that  they         have  to carry postal goods as a condition of their  permits         but that the rates fixed are too low.  The proper remedy for         such a grievance is, as the High Court rightly pointed  out,         to apply to the Government for revision of rates fixed.             Coming  to the second submission, we may  observe  that,         although, there is ample authority for the proposition  that         the  grant  of stage carriage permits  is  a  quasi-judicial         function,  with which the State Government cannot  interfere         by giving directions which may impede the due performance of         such  functions,  yet, when  Section  48(3)  speaks  of  the         power  to attach conditions after the decision to grant  the         permit, it really deals with what lies past the quasi  judi-         cial stage of decision to grant the permit.  At that  stage,         the  decision to grant the permit is already there and  only         conditions  have to be attached to the permit, such  as  the         necessity  to carry postal goods on certain routes at  rates         fixed  by  the Government.  On the face of it,  these  rates         cannot  be properly determined by  the  Regional   Transport         Authority.  They have to be uniform throughout the State.  A         decision on what they should be must rest on  considerations         of  policy and on facts which are not quite relevant to  the         grant  of  stage carriage permits.- In any case, it  is  the         State  Government  which has the data and the  legal  power,         under Section 43(1).of the Act, to fix freights for carriage         of  postal  goods in various types of  carriages,  mentioned         there,  including  stage  carriages.  We  ’think  that  such         charges   are  merely a species of freight on  postal  goods         about  which  the  State Government  can  issue  appropriate         directions  to the State Transport Authority.  The  Regional         Transport  Authority has only to. annex the condition  auto-         matically in areas where such a condition may be required to         be annexed to the permits granted.             A  reference  to Section 59, sub. s. (3)(c)  would  show         that  acceptance of the fixed rates of fares  and  freights,         after their notification under Section 43, becomes a  condi-         tion  which  has to be automatically attached to  a  permit.         The  Regional  Transport Authority has  no  option  on  this         matter.   This  is what this Court held in S.  Srikantiah  &         Ors.  v.   The  Regional Transport  Authority,  Anantapur  &         Ors.(1) In other words, the Regional Transport Authority has         to  act   mainly mechanically after considering  matters  on         which  it has to form an opinion and take a decision  quasi-         judicially.    We think that there is no scope for  argument         that there is any interference here with the  quasi-judicial         functions of the Regional Transport Authority.   The         (1) [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 816.         669         annexation of a condition like this is a part of the  purely         executive Activities of the Regional Transport Authority.             By  Civil  Miscellaneous  Petition  No.  4023  of  1976,         learned Counsel for the appellant sought to add two  further         grounds of appeal. These were: that, the special  provisions         of  Section  49(3)(xv) over-ride the general  provisions  of         Section  43(I)(d)  (i) on the principle   of  interpretation         ’generalia specialibus non derogant’ : and, that, in view of         the  special  provision of Section 48(3)(xv),  the  impugned         notification  of the State Government was ultra vires.   The         second ground is what follows if the first is good.  But  as

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

       we have already explained above, the first ground itself  is         not  sound.  There is no question of  any special  provision         over-riding the general.   The provisions are complementary.         Section 48(3)(xv) is really meant to carry out the direction         which can legally be given under section 43(1)(d)(i) of  the         Act. Therefore, although we allow the miscellaneous applica-         tion and have permitted the grounds to be argued, we  reject         them as untenable.             For  the  reasons given above, we agree with  the  views         contained  in  the  judgment of  the  Karnataka  High  Court         against which this appeal has been filed.  We hold that  the         impugned  direction and notification by the  Government  was         not  invalid and that the Regional Transport  Authority  had         not  acted illegally in attaching the required condition  to         the permit.   Consequently, we dismiss this appeal with         M.R.                                                  Appeal         dismissed.         670