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PETITIONER: SMT. VIJAYALAKSHMI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: B. HIMANTHARAJA CHETTY & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       07/05/1996

BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. SEN, S.C. (J)

CITATION:  JT 1996 (4)   747        1996 SCALE  (4)300

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                      J U D G M E N T S Punchhi, J.      This appeal  by special  leave is  directed against the judgment and  decree dated  1-9-1978, rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in Regular First Appeal No.91 of 1973, affirming that of the Trial Court.      Shri  Batchu  Muniyappa  Chetty,  statedly  the  foster father of  Smt. Vijaya  Lakshmi, the  appellant herein,  and Shri  B.  Himantharaja  Chetty,  the  contesting  respondent herein, were brothers, being the sons of Shri Batchu Ramaiah Chetty. The  father and  sons effected  a partition of their joint family  properties, under  registered  Partition  Deed dated June  23, 1928  (Ex.P.3), as  detailed in  Schedule  A attached thereto. Thereunder the father was given properties described fully in Schedule B to the indenture valued at Rs. 20,000/-. The foster father of the appellant got properties described  fully in  Schedule B  to the indenture and valued at Rs.12,500/-. The contesting respondent got the properties described  fully in  Schedule C  to the indenture also valued  at Rs.12,500/-.  Clause 12  thereof provided  a stipulation  of   preemption,  which   being  the   bone  of contention. reads as follows:      "The second  (the foster  father of      the  appellant)   and  third   (the      contesting respondent  herein)  are      allotted the  immovable  properties      Nos.137, 138  and  139,  Jeweller’s      Street  and   No.25,  Veera  Pillay      Street   as    described   in   the      Schedules  hereunder.   Though  the      party to  whom it  is  allotted  is      entitled to dispose it of, he shall      not do  it to  any stranger without      giving   the    parties   to   this      indenture an  opportunity to buy it      by  pre-emption  at  the  valuation

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    given  in   the  schedule  to  this      indenture."      The foster  father of  the appellant  died somewhere in the year  1948 leaving his property by means of a Will dated 1-12-1948 to his widow Smt. Lakshmidevamma, who also died in the year  1956 However,  before her  death, in 1951, she, as foster mother  of the appellant executed a Will in favour of the  latter  bequeathing  to  her  properties  mentioned  in Schedule C.  The appellant  claims to  have  received  these properties as a foster child of late Batchu Muniyappa Chetty and his  late  widow  Smt.  Lakshmidevamma,  but  not  as  a stranger.      The respondent  on 11-12-1956 instituted a suit against the appellant  for possession of the aforementioned Schedule C properties  the Civil Court at Bangalore inter alia on the premise that  under the  terms of the Partition Deed, above- referred to,  the dispositions  of properties  made  in  the manner stated  above by  late Batchu  Muniyappa  Chetty  and after him  by his  widow Smt. Lakshmidevamma, were in breach of the  terms of  the Partition Deed and therefore his right to  enforce   his  claim  for  pre-emption,  on  payment  of Rs.3100/-,  the   price  fixed  therein,  had  ripened.  The appellant put  forth the  two wills  to assert  her title as legatee. She  also claimed  on a  variety  of  grounds  that neither the  plaintiff-respondent  had  any  right  of  pre- against her nor was such claim tenable in law.      Having regard  to the  multiplicity of  pleas raised by both sides,  the trial court framed as many as 11 issues but the relevant  ones for the present purpose are the following two issues:      No.3. Whether  the plaintiff proves      his right of pre-emption in respect      of  disposition  of  properties  by      bequest as well?      No.4. Whether defendants prove that      the    alleged    pre-emption    is      unenforceable   against   her   for      reasons stated  in para  4  of  the      written statement?      After   recording   evidence   of   the   parties   and entertaining documentary  evidence the  trial court recorded its findings  on those  two issues  to the  effect that  the plaintiff-respondent had  all right of preemption in respect of  the  suit  properties  even  though  they  came  to  the appellant by  bequest and that such right of pre-emption was an enforceable  right. On  holding so  and as  a  result  of findings on  other issues,  the plaintiff-respondent’s  suit was decreed,  directing the  appellant to  execute a Deed of Sale, at the cost of the plaintiff-respondent, on payment of Rs.3100/-,  and   consequently  deliver  possession  of  the properties to the plaintiff-respondent.      The appellant preferred Regular First Appeal before the High Court  of Karnataka  which was placed before a Division Bench comprising  of K. Bhimiah and K.S. Puttaswamy, JJ. for disposal. The  Hon’ble Judges of the High Court differed and rendered separate  judgments. K.  Bimiah, J.  opined for the dismissal of the appeal affirming the judgment and decree of the trial  court on  all issues  except to  very  the  price payable to  be Rs.36000/-  as determined  by the trial court for purposes  of jurisdiction and court fee. He thus ordered maintenance of  the trial  court’s judgment  and  decree  on payment of  Rs.36000/- as price. K.S. Puttaswamy, J. however in his  opinion took  the view that findings on Issues Nos.3 and 4  be  reversed  and  hence  the  appeal  allowed.  This divergence of  opinion attracted  Sub-section (2) of Section

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98 of  the C.P.C.  and therefore  the judgment and decree of the Trial  Court got  confirmed.  The  price  rise  too  got affirmed on  agreement. In  sum the plaintiff-respondent got maintained the  decree on  payment of Rs.36000/- as price of the property. Being aggrieved the appellant is before us.      We do  not propose to enlarge the canvass to enter into elaborate discussion  and analysis  as undertaken by members of the  High Court  Bench in  their respective  opinions  on Issues Nos.3 and 4 relating to the concept of pre-emption, its  historical  perspective,  related  precedents  and  its validity as of today and other ramifications. All the same a classic  judgment  of  Mohmood,  J.  in  Govinda  Dayal  vs. Inayatulla [ILR  7 A1]  775  at  page  909  (F8)]  is  worth reference, which  explained the  right of pre-emption in the following words:      "It  (right   of  pre-emption)   is      simply  a   right  of  substitution      entitling the preemptor by means of      a legal  incident to which the sale      itself was subject, to stand in the      shoes of  the vendee, in respect of      the rights  and obligations arising      from the  sale under  which he  has      derived his title. It is in effect,      as if  in a sale deed, the vendee’s      name was  rubbed out  and the  pre-      emptors’s name  was substituted  in      his place.      The concept  of substitution  from that  long and  even before has been the foundation of the law of pre-emption and has been  noticed, followed and employed, time and again, in a catena  of decisions.  The fact  that this  Court in  Atam Prakesh vs.  State of  Haryana  [1986(2) SCC 249] has struck down the  right of  pre-emption based  on consanguinity as a relic  of   the   feudal   past,   inconsistent   with   the constitutional scheme  and modern ideas, has not altered the situation that  the right  of pre-emption, wherever founded, whether in  custom, statute or contract, is still a right of being substituted  in place  of the  vendee, in a bargain of sale of  immovable property.  We therefore  need not  burden this judgment  with  other  attributes  of  the  concept  as attempted by both Hon’ble Judges of the High Court. We would rather go  to  decide  this  appeal  on  the  basis  of  the contractual term aforementioned.      It is  noteworthy that  Clause 12 of the Partition Deed not only mentions the list of the properties allotted to the two  brothers   but  their   separateness  is  complete  and evidenced, the  way these  properties  are  apportioned  and earmarked in  Schedules C  and  D.  by  allocating  specific properties to  the two  brothers, each  of them  had  become exclusive owner of those allotted. Clause 10 of the Deed and the Schedules A, C & D are reproduced hereafter:      10. The  parties two and three have      been allotted  portions in premises      137 and  138 Jeweller Street as per      their respective  schedules and the      plan annexed to this indenture. The      portions allotted to party No.2 are      marked yellow  and the  party  No.3      red. The  cost of  construction  of      wall or  walls for partitioning the      said portions,  shall be  borne  by      the parties  two and three in equal      shares."      Schedule A,  containing the  list of  involved partible

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joint family properties: DISCRlPTI0N                           VALUE -----------                           ----- (1) Property No.139            -     Rs.1400 (2) Property No.138            -     Rs.2800 (3) Property No.137            -     Rs.1500 (4) No.25, Veera Pillay Street -     Rs. 400                                  --------------                          Total -     Rs.6100                                  --------------      Schedule C  showing properties which came to the foster father of the appellant: DESCRIPTION                            VALUE -----------                            ----- (1) Total premises No.25, Veera Pillay Street, Bangalore;          -   Rs.400 (2) Portion earmarked and shown as yellow in Property No.137;         -   Rs.1400 (3) Portion earmarked and shown in yellow in Property No.138;         -   Rs.1300                                   ---------------                            Total   -   Rs.3100                                   ---------------      Schedule D  showing the  properties which  came to  the contesting respondent: DESCRIPTION                             VALUE -----------                             ----- (1) Total property No.139;          -   Rs.1400 (2) Portion in Property No.137, as shown in red;                    -   Rs. 100 (3) Portion in Property No.138 as shown in red;                    -   Rs.1500                                       -----------                         Total       -   Rs.3000                                       -----------      Walls were  intended to  be  raised  to  demarcate  and separate the  portions relating  to two  properties  as  the other two  were  individually  allotted  to  the  respective parties. This  fall out  of the  partition has unfortunately not been taken into account either by the Trial Court or the Bench of  the High  Court. The following finding recorded by the Trial  Court therefore  does not  match happily with the pattern of partition:      "The entire  building consisting of      the portion  allotted to  the share      of the  plaintiff and  to the share      of  his  brother  Batchu  Muniyappa      Chetty  forms   one  house.   If  a      stranger is inducted in any portion      of the  house, the members residing      in the  other portion  will feel it      inconvenient  to  lead  a  peaceful      life. Every  house requires privacy      from  strangers.  Apart  from  this      there  are   common   passage   and      entrances.  In  fact,  storm  water      from the roof of one of the parties      falls into the portion of the other      party. A  window belonging  to  the      plaintiff  opens   into  the  space      belonging to the other party. There      are connected  doors; the  hall  in      the first  floor is allotted to the      share of the plaintiff and the hall      just below  it is in-the possession

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    of defendants.  There  is  a  stair      case  also  leading  to  the  first      floor and  the space directly below      it has  gone to  the share  of  the      plaintiff’s  brother.   All   these      matters are  such that  it  is  not      possible to  lead a  convenient and      peaceful  life  if  a  stranger  is      inducted  to   the   property.   It      appears   in    view    of    these      circumstances clause of pre-emption      was inserted  in the partition deed      to safeguard the peace, convenience      and amity  of the  family  and  the      insertion of  such a  clause in the      partition deed  is not in violation      of the  provisions of  the transfer      of Property Act.           In  view   of  what  has  been      discussed above  it  must  be  held      that the  plaintiff has got a right      of pre-emption  in respect  of  the      suit Property  even  though  it  is      bequeathed  by   the  late   Batchu      Muniyappa Chetty  on his window and      his window  in turn  bequeathed  on      the first  defendant.  It  also  be      held that  the right  of preemption      is   an   enforceable   right.   I,      therefore, answer issues 3 and 4 in      favour of the plaintiff and against      the defendants."      And seemingly  it has  met the  approval  of  the  High Court.      Now who  is the  stranger’ meant  to be excluded in the Partition Deed?  The Trial  Court has  viewed the plaintiff- appellant to  be a  stranger, being  not a  relative and  at least to the family of the plaintiff-respondent. Bhimiah, J. affirms this view. Puttaswamy, J. held that the appellant is a stranger  in the  eye of  law to  the family of her foster father, but  not in  fact. The word ‘stranger’, in our view, had to  be understood  not in  terms of  blood  or  marriage relationship with  the family  but as  a person  unconnected with  it,  unknown  in  character  and  antecedents  to  the executants of the Deed. The word ‘stranger’ in the text has, in our  view, to  be interpreted  as that  person who has no connection whatsoever  with the  families  of  the  original executants i.e.  the father  and two sons. It has to be seen that the  plaintiff-respondent was  not an utter stranger to the family  members though  she may not have been related to them  through  blood  or  marriage  or  otherwise  by  legal adoption. In  any case,  she had  become connected  with the family which relationship required to be respected with some sanctity, legitimately  due to  human bonds,  because of her long association with her foster parents. Her status as such could by  no means be termed as a ’stranger’ for the purpose of Clause  12 of  the Partition Deed. Thus if the bequest in her favour  was not  made to  a total stranger, one need not enter the  thicket to find whether the appellant was legally a stranger to the family, when factually she was not, and in that manner not unconnected with the family.      Next we  come to  the question  whether the disposition conceived  of  in  the  Partition  Deed  should  be  a  sale attracting pre-emption  or could  it also  be a  disposition other  than   sale.  The   word  ‘pre-emption’  as  is  well

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understood is  a term  of law. lt is a right of substitution conferred on  someone either by statute, custom or contract. The  right   is  to  step  into  the  shoes  of  the  vendee preferentially, on the terms of sale already settled between the vendor  and the vendee. The courts below were put across the  irrefutable   argument  that  the  tenor  of  the  Deed suggested that  it was  written by  a professional,  knowing fully well  the attributes  of pre-emption.  The Deed itself says that the parties have to be given an opportunity to buy the property meant for disposal. The Deed provides so on the supposition that  the disposition  contemplated would  be  a sale and  none other.  Had it  been otherwise, the words "by pre-emption" could  easily have  been omitted  conveying the meaning suggested  and the  deed made to read ".... he shall not do it to any stranger without giving the parties to this indenture an  of opportunity to buy it by pre-emption at the value given  in the  Schedule to this indenture". It is thus evident that  the words  "by pre-emption"  were  consciously employed   to denote  that the opportunity to buy it by pre- emption would  only arise  when there  is a  same and  on no other disposition. It could then be said that but for these words "by pre-emption", any other disposition could have come within the grip of the Clause towards buying property, but without bringing in the word "preemption".      Thus for  the afore-expressed views we have come to the firm conclusion that on the terms of the Partition Deed, the contractual right of pre-emption conferred on the parties to buy property  before it  is disposed  of to  a stranger  was based on  the  precondition  that  the  proposed  or  actual disposal would be only-by way of sale and no other, and that too if  made to  a stranger.  None of  these conditions  are satisfied in  the facts  and circumstances  of the  case  as neither is  the disposition  a sale  nor is the transferee a stranger. Therefore,  the suit  of the  plaintiff-respondent should have  been and  is hereby  dismissed by allowing this appeal, upsetting  the judgments  and decrees  of the  trial court as  well as  that of  the High  Court, but without any order as to costs.