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PETITIONER: SMT. SHANTI SHARMA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SMT. VED PRABHA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/08/1987

BENCH: OZA, G.L. (J) BENCH: OZA, G.L. (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 2028            1987 SCR  (3)1075  1987 SCC  (4) 193        JT 1987 (3)   409  1987 SCALE  (2)393

ACT:     Delhi  Rent Control Act, 1958: Section 14(1)(e)--’If  he is owner thereof’--Interpretation of--Landlord  constructing building  on land taken on lease from DDA--Whether  landlord ’owner’ and entitled to eviction--Cancellation of the  lease of  land and subsequent staying of the  cancellation--Effect of. Words and Phrases: ’Owner’--Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     An  application  was  filed  seeking  eviction  of   the tenant-appellant  by  the  landlord-respondent  on   various grounds.  The Rent Controller granted an order for  eviction only  under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent  Control  Act for  bona  fide use and occupation. The order  of  the  Rent Controller  for  eviction  was confirmed in  appeal  by  the Tribunal.     Before the High Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that as the lease of the plot on which the  build- ing stood was cancelled by the DDA, the  landlord-respondent ceased to be the owner thereof and, therefore, the  require- ment of Section 14(1)(e) was not satisfied and the  respond- ent  was not entitled to the decree for eviction.  The  High Court held that the landlord, whose lease had been terminat- ed, but was in possession, continued to be a tenant  holding over  and,  therefore,  he continued to be  the  owner,  and maintained the decree for eviction.     In  the  appeal before this Court, it was  contended  on behalf  of the appellant that in order to get a  decree  for eviction  on the ground of bona fide requirement, the  land- lord must establish that he was the owner of such  property, that where the property was built up on a plot of land taken on lease from the Delhi Development Authority, it could  not be said that the landlord was the owner of the property  and that  as the lease had been terminated, the  landlord  could not  claim to be the owner of the property, and,  therefore, the  decree for eviction on ground of bona fide  requirement could not be maintained. 1076     On  behalf of the respondent it was contended  that  al- though  notice was issued, but subsequently the  matter  re-

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mained stayed and the respondent-landlord continued to be in possession and did not cease to be the owner of the  proper- ty, that whole of the premises in question did not stand  on the  plot,  lease of which had been cancelled by DDA  and  a major  part  of. the premises stood on  another  plot  which continued  to be on lease in favour of the  respondent,  and that  the tenant was estopped from challenging the title  of the landlord, as the relationship of the landlord and tenant was  admitted and it was not open to the tenant  to  contend that the respondent-landlord had no title to the property. Dismissing the appeal, this Court     HELD: The word "owner" has not been defined in the Delhi Rent Control Act. [1081E]     The term "owner" has to be understood in the context  of the  background of the law and what is contemplated  in  the scheme  of the Act. The Act has been enacted for  protection of the tenants. But, at the same time, it has provided  that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction  and bona fide requirement is one of such  grounds. [1081G-H; 1082D]      Ordinarily,  the concept of the ownership may be  abso- lute  ownership  in  the land as well as  of  the  structure standing thereon. But in the modern context, where all lands belong  to the State, the persons who hold  properties  will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term from  the Government or the authorities constituted  by  the State. The legislature, when it used the term "owner" in  s. 14(1)(e), did not think of ownership as absolute  ownership. [1081F-G]      The meaning of the term "owner" is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant.  In cases  where the plot of land is taken on lease, the  struc- ture  is  built by the landlord and he is the owner  of  the structure.  So  far as the land is concerned, he  holds  the long lease and as against the tenant he will fail within the ambit  of  the meaning of the term "owner"  as  contemplated under s. 14(1)(e). [1082B-C]      In the instant case, although there were some  proceed- ings  for the cancellation of the lease, the lease  had  not come  to an end. No steps have been taken  for  dispossesion and  only  the formality of depositing  the  penalities  and filing  of the Indemnity Bond remained to be done,  on  ful- filling which the lease would he restored in the name of the legal 1077 representatives.  Therefore, it could not be said  that  the respondent landlord had ceased to be the owner of the  prem- ises. [1085G-H, 1086B]     T.C.  Rekhi  v. Smt. Usha Gujaral, [1971]  Rent  Control Journal Page 322 at 326, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2935  of 1981.     From the Judgment and Order dated 5.5. 1981 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 366 of 1980. Shankar Ghosh and B.P. Maheshwari for the Appellants.     A.B.  Rohtagi, C.L. Sahu, Jose Verghese and  O.P.  Verma for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     OZA,  J. This appeal has been filed after grant of  spe- cial leave in this Court by the tenant-appellant challenging a decree for eviction.

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   It appears that the respondent-landlord filed an  appli- cation  for  eviction before the Rent Controller,  Delhi  on various grounds. The Rent Controller who heard the  petition of the respondent rejected the petition on other grounds but only  granted an order for eviction under  Section  14(1)(e) i.e.   the   premises  were  bona  fide  required   by   the respondent-landlord  for  their  own residence.  It  is  not disputed that these premises are residential and the  courts below, the trial court and the appellate court both came  to the conclusion that the respondent-landlord has  established his bona fide requirement and on these findings the order of eviction  on the ground of bona fide requirement under  Sec. 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 has been  main- tained.     Before  the Tribunal a contention was advanced that  the appellant-tenant had come to know that the Delhi Development Authority  (’DDA’  for  short) has cancelled  the  lease  in favour of the respondent-landlord and therefore the respond- ent  ceased to be the owner of the property and as  such  is not  entitled to a decree for eviction under Sec.  14(1)(e). The  landlord-respondent, on the other hand, contended  that as  a  small portion of the premises in  occupation  of  the appellant-tenant  is on another plot which under the  condi- tions 1078 of  the  DDA was meant for non-residential purposes  and  in this  view  of the matter a notice for cancellation  of  the lease  was given but on representation made by the  respond- ent-landlord the DDA has stayed further action and it there- fore  could not be contended that the lease has been  termi- nated by the DDA or that the respondent has ceased to be the owner  of  the property in question.  The  learned  Tribunal therefore  repelled the contention advanced by  the  tenant- appellant  before  it and maintained the order of  the  Rent Controller for eviction.     Before the High Court the contention advanced on  behalf of the appellant was that as the lease of the plot on  which the  building  stands is cancelled by the DDA  the  landlord i.e.  the respondent ceases to be the owner thereof  and  in this view of the  matter,it was  contended that the require- ment of Sec. 14(1)(e) of the Act is not satisfied and there- fore the respondent is not entitled to the decree for  evic- tion.     The  High Court after considering circumstances and  the affidavit filed by one of the appellants that the lease  was cancelled  but  the proceedings for taking  possession  have been  stayed on a representation made by the landlord,  con- sidered the question and felt that the landlord whose  lease has  been terminated but is in possession as possession  has not been taken, he continues to be a tenant holding over and on  that basis came to the conclusion that it could  not  be held  that he ceases to be the owner and did not accept  the contention  advanced  by the appellant  and  maintained  the decree for eviction.     Before  us on the basis of language of Section  14(1)(e) the  learned  counsel for the appellant  contended  that  in order  to  get a decree for eviction on the ground  of  bona fide requirement the landlord must establish that he is  the owner  of  such property and learned  counsel  attempted  to contend  that  where the property is built up on a  plot  of land taken on lease from the Delhi Development Authority  it could  not  be said that the landlord is the  owner  of  the property  and on this basis an attempt was made  to  contend that no eviction could be sought on the ground of bona  fide requirement. Although learned counsel had to concede that in

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the Act itself the word ’owner’ has not been defined and  in the  modern  context it could not be contended  that  merely because  the  property situated on a plot of land  taken  on long  lease  that the landlord could not be said to  be  the owner. The other contention advanced on behalf of the appel- lant was that as there was a notice from the DDA  cancelling the  lease of the respondent-landlord and as the  lease  has been  cancelled  of the plot of land on which  part  of  the premises  in dispute stands the landlord-respondent  is  not entitled to this decree for eviction.   1079     It is admitted that this question was not raised in  the trial  court  and  the parties had no  opportunity  to  lead evidence.  It is only based on two papers and  an  affidavit which has been considered by the High Court. On the basis of these  papers what appears to be, is that notice was  issued to  the landlord for cancellation of the lease and later  on their  representation  the  further  proceedings  have  been stayed  and it has been further observed in  the  subsequent paper  from  the DDA that the Authority is  considering  the restoration of the lease on the basis of payment of  penalty or other dues that may ultimately be settled. It is nobody’s case that ultimately the matter has been disposed of and  it is  also not in dispute that the landlord-respondent’s  pos- session  has not been taken by the DDA. It is also.  not  in dispute  that although the land beneath the property  is  of the  DDA  given on lease to the landlord but  the  structure thereupon is of the ownership of the respondent-landlord. It is also not in dispute that the portion of the premises only stands on the plot of land the lease of which is alleged  to have been cancelled but later on the proceedings for  resto- ration  are pending and the matter has been stayed.  Nothing further has taken place.     Arguments were advanced at length on behalf of appellant that  as  the lease has been terminated  and  therefore  the landlord could not claim to be the owner of the property and therefore the decree for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement could not be maintained. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that although  some notice  appears  to have been issued  but  subsequently  the matter remains stayed and admittedly the respondent-landlord continues to be in possession and therefore it could not  be said  that  the  respondent ceases to be the  owner  of  the property. It was also contended on behalf of the  respondent that  unless and until the respondent’s possession is  taken it  could  not  be said that he ceases to be  the  owner  as possession is substantially the ownership of the property.     It  was  also contended by learned counsel for  the  re- spondent  that even if the lease of the  respondent-landlady is terminated by the DDA, DDA has to file a suit for posses- sion  and so long as she continues to be in  possession,  it could not be said that she is not the owner of the property. It  was also contended that the premises in question do  not stand on the plot the lease of which has been cancelled  but it is only a small portion of the premises standing on  that plot  as apparently the plot Nos. 34 & 35 are both  allotted to  the  respondent and the property in  dispute  stands  on these two plots, the major part of the premises in  question stands on No. 34 whereas a small portion stands 1080 on  No.  35 and it is alleged that the  proceedings  or  the notice  for termination of the lease pertain to plot No.  35 and on this basis it was contended that as the major part of the  plot  on which the premises stand continues  to  be  on lease  in favour of the respondent the contention  that  re-

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spondent  ceases  to be the owner of the property is  of  no avail to the appellant.     It  was also contended on behalf of the respondent  that the  tenant  is estopped from challenging the title  of  the landlord  and as the relationship of landlord and tenant  is admitted,  it is not open to the tenant to contend that  the respondent-landlord  has no title to the  property.  Counsel for parties also referred to some decisions on the  question of  Transfer  of  Property Act, ownership and  also  on  the question of estoppel.               Sec.  14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent  Control  Act               reads as under:               "14(1) xxx    xxx    xxx                         Provided  that the Controller,  may,               on  an  application made to him  in  the  pre-               scribed manner, make an order for the recovery               of  possession of the premises on one or  more               of the following grounds only, namely:-               (a) to (d) xxx    xxx    xxx               (e)  that  the premises  let  for  residential               purposes  are required bona fide by the  land-               lord for occupation as a residence for himself               or  for any member of his family dependent  on               him,  if he is the owner thereof, or  for  any               person for whose benefit the premises are held               and  that the landlord or such person  has  no               other reasonably suitable residential accommo-               dation;                        Explanation--For the purposes of this               clause "premises let for residential purposes"               include any premises which having been let for               use as a residence are, without the consent of               the landlord, used incidentally for commercial               or other purposes;               xx                xxx            xxx ’ ’ The  phrase  used in this provision is "if he is  the  owner thereof" and it  1081 is on the basis of these words that the present  controversy has  been raised and it appears to be the only point on  the basis  of  which the learned counsel for the  appellant  had argued this appeal.     As  regards the first contention that the  word  ’owner’ thereof  indicates  absolute ownership  and  where  property stands  on a plot of land taken on long lease from the  DDA, it could not be said that he is the owner thereof and there- fore  the  eviction on the ground of bona  fide  requirement under Section 14(1)(e) could not be granted.     Admittedly if this contention of the learned counsel for the  appellant  is accepted in Delhi more than  50%  of  the properties  stand on leasehold plots and therefore it  would not be possible for any landlord to seek an order or  decree for  eviction  on the ground of bona  fide  requirement.  It appears  that it is therefore clear that if the  Legislature had  this narrow meaning of ownership in mind. it would  not have used it, as it could not be contended that the Legisla- ture  did not keep in view that in most of the modern  town- ship  in India the properties stand on plots of land  leased out  either by the Govt. or the Development Authorities  and therefore it was not contemplated that for a11 such  proper- ties  the  landlord  or the owner of the  property  used  in common  parlance  will not be entitled to  eviction  on  the ground  of bona fide requirement and it is in  this  context that we have to examine this contention.     The  word ’owner’ has not been defined in this  Act  and

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the  word ’owner’ has also not been defined in the  Transfer of  Property Act. The contention of the learned counsel  for the appellant appears to be is that ownership means absolute ownership  in the land as well as of the structure  standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be  what is  contended  by the counsel for the appellant but  in  the modern  context where it is more or less admitted  that  all lands  belong to the State, the persons who hold  properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term  from the Govt. or the authorities constituted  by  the State and in this view of the matter it could not be thought of that the Legislature when it used the term ’owner’ in the provision of Sec. 14(1)(e) it thought of ownership as  abso- lute  ownership.  It must be presumed that  the  concept  of ownership  only will be as it is understood at  present.  It could not be doubted that the term ’owner’ has to be  under- stood  in the context of the background of the law and  what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This Act has  been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same  time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumst- 1082 ances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords  have been  permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In  this  con- text,  the phrase ’owner’ thereof has to be understood,  and it  is  clear that what is contemplated is  that  where  the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction, the only thing necessary for him to prove is bona fide requirement and that he is the owner  thereof,  In  this context, what appears  to  be  the meaning of the term ’owner’ is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner  should be something more than the tenant.  Admittedly in these cases where the plot of land is taken on lease  the structure is built by the landlord and admittedly he is  the owner  of the structure. So far as the land is concerned  he holds a long lease and in view of the matter as against  the tenant it could not be doubted that he will fall within  the ambit of the meaning of the term ’owner’ as is  contemplated under  this  Section. This term came  up  for  consideration before the Delhi High Court and it was also in reference  to Section 14(1)(e) and it was held by the Delhi High Court  in T.C. Rekhi v. Smt. Usha Gujral, [1971] Rent Control  Journal Page 322 at 326 as under:               "The word "owner" as used in this clause,  has               to  be  construed  in the  background  of  the               purpose and object of enacting it. The use  of               the word ’owner’ in this clause seems to me to               have  been inspired by the definition  of  the               word  ’landlord’ as contained in section  2(e)               of  the Act which is wide enough to include  a               person  receiving or entitled to  receive  the               rent  of  any  premises on account  of  or  on               behalf  of  or for the benefit  of  any  other               person. Construed in the context in which  the               word  "owner" is used in clause (e), it  seems               to  me to include all persons in the  position               of  Smt.  Usha Gujaral who have taken  a  long               lease  of  sites from the Government  for  the               purpose  of building houses thereon. The  con-               cept of ownership seems now to be eclipsed  by               its social and political significance and  the               idea of ownership, in case like the present is               one  of the better right to be  in  possession               and to obtain it. To accede to the  contention

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             raised  by Shri Kapur would virtually  nullify               the effect of clause (e) and would render  all               such  landlords  remedyless  against   tenants               however  badly they may need the premises  for               their  own personal residence. I do not  think               such a result was intended by the  Legislature               and  I  repel the  appellant’s  contention.  I               consider  it proper before passing on  to  the               next challenge to point out that the word               1083               "owner" as used in clause (e) in Section 14(1)               does  not postulate absolute ownership in  the               sense  that he has an absolutely  unrestricted               right  to deal with the property as he  likes.               To  describe  some one as owner,  and  perhaps               even  as an absolute owner, of property is  to               say two things: it is to assert that his title               to  the property is indisputable and  that  he               has all the rights of ownership allowed by the               legal system in question. Rights of  ownership               may,  therefore, be limited by special  provi-               sions  of law and include in those  provisions               such as are in force in New Delhi according to               which  citizens  are granted  long  leases  of               sites for constructing buildings thereon. Now,               the  words of a statute, though normally  con-               strued in their ordinary meaning, may  contain               inherent  restrictions due to  their  subject-               matter  and object and the occasion  on  which               and the circumstances with reference to  which               they  are used. They call for construction  in               the light of their context rather than in what               may be either their strict etymological  sense               or their popular meaning part from the context               (See Halsbury’s Laws of England Third  Edition               Vol. 36 Paragraph 843 P. 394). The meaning  of               the  word "owner" in clause (e) is  influenced               and  controlled by its context and the  appel-               lant’s construction is unacceptable because it               seems  to  be quite clearly  contrary  to  the               reasonable  operation of the statutory  provi-               sion."     Learned counsel for the appellant also frankly  conceded that  it  will not be possible for him to contend  that  the term  ’owner’ should be so construed that all those  persons who  have their houses standing on the leasehold plots  will be deprived of the benefit of Section 14(1)(e).     The next contention advanced on behalf of the  appellant is  that as there is a notice addressed to  the  respondent- landlord about the cancellation of the lease of a plot  over which a small portion of the premises stands he ceases to be an  owner thereof and therefore will not be entitled to  the decree for eviction.     In this connection the two documents, on which  reliance has  been  placed are: one is a notice purporting to  be  of some date in Sept. 1981 which reads as under: "DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY       Regd. A.D.                  Old Scheme Branch       Process Server              9th Floor, Vikas Minar,                                 New Delhi, the Sept. 81 1084 NOTICE          It  is  notified for information of  all  concerned that  the lease of the Plot No. 35, Block No.  15-A,  W.E.A. scheme stands cancelled since 28.8.74. The action under  PP.

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Act 197 1 is being taken for taking over physical possession of the plot and building standing thereon. The occupants  of the  plot and building are, therefore, advised not  to  deal with  any  person except the D.D.A. who is  now  the  lawful owner of the premises and not to pay rent, if anybody  deals with  any other person, he will be doing so at his own  risk and cost.                                                         Sd/-                           (S.L. JAIN) EXECUTIVE OFFICER (VI)                                                      17.9.81 To: All tenants: 1. M/S Nanik Ram and Sons,    15-A/135, W.E.A. 2. M/s Modern Centre,   15-A/35, W.E.A, Karol Bagh"     The  other document is a letter to Smt. Ved  Prabha  and purporting to have been issued by the Deputy Director,  DDA. This  document apparently is dated October 30. 1981 and  the relevant portion of this reads as under:               "I am directed to inform you that your  uncon-               ditional  request  for the  purpose  of  being               considered  and necessary penalities  for  the               past misuse and the continuing misuse till the               date  of  its vacation by the tenants  of  the               said  premises  under restoration  of  charges               etc. are being worked out and the same will be               communicated to you in due course." It  is further stated in this letter that "after the  neces- sary  dues on this account are recovered and requisite  for- malities like submission of Indemnity Bond etc. are complet- ed  and accepted by the DDA, the lease of the plot would  be restored  in the name of the legal representatives  of  late R.S. Dinanath." A perusal of these documents therefore 1085 clearly  indicates  that about plot No. 35 same  notice  was issued  which is understood to mean that the lease was  can- celled and later on on a representation made by the landlord to  the legal representatives of the original allottees  the further  proceedings are suspended and it is clearly  stated that the question of penalty and other dues is being  worked out and on them being worked out and paid and Indemnity Bond being filed, the lease will be restored. It is also apparent that nothing further has happened and therefore it could not be  said  that  the lease has come to an end  even  what  is attempted to be contended on the basis of the first document that the lease is cancelled. The second document,  reference to which has been made above, clearly goes to show that  has been suspended and at present it could not be said that  the lease has come to an end. Admittedly nothing has been start- ed  for taking possession. Under these circumstances  there- fore  it is only on these facts that all  these  contentions have been advanced by learned counsel for the appellant.     Before going into the legal questions as to whether this question  could be raised at this stage and also as  to  the question  of estoppel or whether the tenant has a  right  to challenge  the title of the landlord, as quoted  above  from the two documents which are the basis of all this controver- sy if are carefully examined, it appears to be certain  that a notice for determination of the lease appears to have been issued by the DDA sometime before 198 1. The document  which is purporting to be a notice in 1981 shows that this  notice is  issued  showing the cancellation of the  lease  and  the subsequent letter from the DDA addressed to the legal repre- sentatives  of  the original allottee i.e. the  present  re- spondents indicates that on their representation the DDA  is

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working out the penalities and details of payment which have to be recovered and on the payment being made and  Indemnity Bond  being filed the restoration of the lease will be  con- sidered  and  no further steps are being  taken  either  for dispossession  of the allottee or for any other purpose.  In view of these two documents what appears to be clear is that although there were some proceedings for the cancellation of the lease but at present it could not be contended that  the lease  has  come to an end. It is also clear that  no  steps have  been taken for dispossession and the  second  document which  has  been quoted above clearly shows  that  only  the formality  of  depositing  the penalities  which  are  being worked  out in the Office of the DDA and the filing  of  the Indemnity Bond remains thereupon the lease will be  restored in  the name of the legal representatives. Under these  cir- cumstances  at the best what could be contended is  that  so far as plot No. 35 is concerned some shadow was cast on  its title. That shadow also appears to by very thin. 1086 Apart  from it the subsequent letter from the DDA  indicates that  what  remains is only a formality  of  depositing  the penalities and the Indemnity Bond. It is also clear that  so far as the structure in the building is concerned it is  not disputed  that that is one of the ownership of the  respond- ent.  It  is also not in dispute that  the  premises  mainly stand on plot No. 34 about which there is not even a  shadow of  doubt about its title either of the property or  of  the land and in this view of the matter, on the basis of the two documents  put together in the context of the  circumstances as  they  stand it could not be said  that  the  respondent- landlord  has  ceased to be the owner thereof,  in  view  of broad  meaning  of term ’owner’ as has  been  discussed  and considered above. In our opinion, it could not be said  that the landlord is not the owner of the premises and  therefore we  see no substance in the contention advanced  by  learned counsel for the appellant.     No other question was raised. We therefore see no reason to  entertain this appeal. It is, therefore, dismissed.  The respondents shall be entitled to the costs of this appeal. N.P.V.                                         Appeal   dis- missed. 1087