23 November 1995
Supreme Court
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SMT. SHAKUNTALABAI & ORS. Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Bench: RAMASWAMY,K.
Case number: Appeal (civil) 3557 of 1984


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PETITIONER: SMT. SHAKUNTALABAI & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/11/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (2) 152        JT 1995 (8)   501  1995 SCALE  (6)693

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  (for short, ‘the Act’), acquiring an extent of 20 acres of  land in  Survey No.24/2 situated in Akola town for construction of  the houses  to weaker  sections and  middle income group  people, was  published in the State Gazette on August 11,  1965. The  Land Acquisition Officer in his award dated March  26, 1971  determined the  market value  of  the front portion  of land  admeasuring 4  acres 18  gunthas  at Rs.5,500/- per  acre and  for the  rest of  15 acres  and 32 gunthas at  4,500/- per  acres. Dissatisfied  therewith, the appellant sought  reference under  Section 18 of the Act and the Senior  Civil  Judge  in  his  award  and  decree  dated September 26,  1972 enhanced  the compensation in respect of the lands in the front portion at Rs.1.25 per sq. ft. and to the rest  of the land at Rs.1/- per sq. ft. He also deducted Rs.3,000/- per acre towards development charges and 30% land was left over for roads etc. On appeal by the State and also on cross  appeal by  the appellant,  by judgment  and decree dated July  28, 1980  the Division  Bench of the Bombay High Court set  aside the award and decree of the Reference Court and confirmed  that of  the Land  Acquisition Officer.  Thus this appeal by special leave.      It is  true, as  noted by  the Reference Court and also accepted by the High Court, that the lands are situated in a developing area  surrounded by  roads on three sides and the lands had  potential  value  for  development  for  building purposes.  Shri   Mohta,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the appellant, contended  that the High Court totally omitted to consider Exh.38,  a sale deed dated May 14, 1964, in respect of lands of an extent of 5392 sq. ft. for a consideration of Rs.4,000/- as  broken by  PW-6, the  son of  the vendee  and Ex.44 dated  February 8,  1964 of  an extent of 6950 sq. ft. for consideration of Rs.5,000/- as spoken by PW-8, the clerk of the  Yendee who  was formerly an advocate and also was an

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ex-M.P. These  two documents  having been executed 18 months preceding the  date of  the acquisition  and  the  Reference Court having  accepted them  to be  reflective of having had the  same  potentialities,  since  the  lands  are  situated adjacent  to   the  acquired   land,  they  would  establish comparable  value.   The  High   Court   committed   obvious illegality  in   not  considering  this  material  evidence. Therefore, the  judgment and  decree of  the High  Court  is vitiated by error of law.      Though, initially,  we  were  inclined  to  accept  the contention of  Shri Mohta, on perusal of evidence on record, we find  it difficult  to give acceptance to the contention. It is an admitted fact that the claimant as PW-9 admitted in the cross-examination that in the year 1957 he purchased the very same  entire 20 acres of land for Rs.10,000/-. In other words, he  estimated the  value of  the same  land  in  1957 taking all  potentiality at  Rs.10,000/-. He  also stated in the cross-examination that the market value of the lands had increased ten  times from  1957 to  1965.  In  other  words, according to  his estimate the acquired land commands market value in 1965 for a total consideration of around Rs.1 lakh. The Land  Acquisition Officer  considered the  evidence  and ultimately determined  the market  value at  Rs.5,500/-  and Rs.4,500/- to the different portions of the land. On belting by average  it worked  out at  a total consideration of Rs.1 lakh.      The question,  therefore, is whether the High Court has committed any manifest error of law or had applied any wrong principle of law in determining the compensation and whether its  failure   to  consider  Ex.38  and  44  does  make  any difference. Having given our consideration to the contention of Shri  Mohta,  we  think  that  the  High  Court  had  not committed any  manifest error of law or omitted to apply any correct principle  of law.  It is  seen  that  if  there  is evidence or  admission on  behalf of the claimants as to the market value commanded by the acquired land itself, the need to travel  beyond the  boundary  of  the  acquired  land  is obviated. The  head of  take into consideration the value of the lands  adjacent to  the acquired  land or near about the area which  possessed same  potentiality  to  work  out  the prices fetched  therein for determination of market value of the acquired land would arise only when there is no evidence of the  value of the acquired land. In a case where evidence of the  value of  the acquired  land itself  is available on record, it is unnecessary to travel beyond that evidence and consider the  market value prevailing in the adjacent lands. As  stated  earlier,  though  Ex.38  and  44  might  command different market value to the land situated in approved lay- outs, since  the appellant  himself had  purchased the self- same acquired  lands in  1957 at Rs. 10,000/- for the entire 20 acres  of land,  the High  Court was right in its view to consider  the   very  same   evidence   to   determine   the compensation to  the acquired land. On the assessment of the increase in  the value  by 10  times,  the  High  Court  had accepted that  assessment of  the appellant  himself as PW-9 and upheld the award of the Land Acquisition Collector since it reflects  the same  price as  granted in  the award under Section 11.      It  is   seen  that   the  Reference  Court  blissfully overlooked the admission of the owner on the surmise that it is an  estimate made by the claimant and the evidence of the sale deeds  under ex.38  and 44  being prevailing prices, it acted thereon  and determined the compensation. The approach of the  Reference Court  is clearly  illegal and that of the High Court is quite correct and it was the only way in which

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the market  value could  be determined  on the  face of  the evidence on  record. The  Reference Court committed manifest error in  determining the  compensation on  the basis of sq. ft. When lands of an extent of 20 acres are offered for sale in an  open market,  no willing  and prudent purchaser would come forward to purchase that vast extent of land on sq. ft. basis. Therefore,  the Reference  Court has  to consider the valuation sitting  on the  arm chair  of a  willing  prudent hypothetical vendee  and to put a question to itself whether in given  circumstances, he would agree to purchase the land on sq.  ft. basis.  No feats  of imagination is necessary to reach the  conclusion. The  answer  is  obviously  no.  This aspect of  the matter  was totally  ignored by the Reference Court and  mechanically  accepted  the  two  sale  deeds  to enhance the  compensation at  a value  of nearly Rs.35,000/- per acre.  In State  of M.P.  vs.  Santabai  &  Ors.,  (C.A. No.2844/34)  and   Salgoankar  vs.   Union  of  India  (C.A. No.3800/89) decided  on 11.1.1990),  this Court had accepted the principle  that when the owner himself has purchased the land under  acquisition, the  consideration mentioned in the sale deed  would form  the basis  to  determine  the  market value. Though  the High  Court has  relied on the sale deeds under Ex.65  and 66 relating to the lands in Nityanand Nagar Colony, it  is also  necessary to go into that aspect of the matter in the view we have stated above.      Considered from  this perspective,  we think that it is not a fit case for our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. In  view of  the fact  that the  appellant has withdrawn the  amount deposited pursuant to the award of the Reference Court, since the award of the Collector now stands confirmed, respondent  No.2 is  entitled to recover the same from the  appellant. The appellant is given six months’ time for depositing  the same  with  the  same  interest  as  was awarded by the Reference Court.      The  appeal   is  accordingly  dismissed  but,  in  the circumstances, without cost.