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PETITIONER: SMT. SHAKUNTALA S. TIWARI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HEM CHAND M. SINGHANIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/05/1987

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 1823            1987 SCR  (3) 306  1987 SCC  (3) 211        JT 1987 (2)   433  1987 SCALE  (1)1009

ACT:     Bombay  Rents,  Hotels and Lodging House  Rates  Control Act,     1947:     Sections    12     and     13--Harmonious construction--Necessity for as provisions co exist--Suit for recovery    of    possession    by    landlord-Period     of limitation----What is.     Limitation Act 1963: Recovery of possession by  landlord under  section 13 of the Bombay Rent Act--Period of  limita- tion-Would  be  12 years under Articles 66 or 67 and  not  3 years under Article 113.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant  in  the appeals was the  tenant  of  the demised  premises who was inducted as a monthly  tenant  for the purpose of conducting the ice-cream business carried  on by  her husband. The letting was done on an agreement  dated December  29, 1975 by the landlord respondent which  was  to become effective from January 1, 1976.     The landlord alleged that in breach of the agreement and the terms of the tenancy, as also in violation of the prohi- bition  prescribed under section 13(1) of the Bombay  Rents, Hotels & Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 the  tenant had indulged in several acts of commission by which not only there  had been permanent alterations of major  nature,  but the entire structure of the demised premises was  completely changed. it was also alleged that the tenant had indulged in acts  of waste and damage to the property, and that she  had changed the user of the premises when some of the  employees started residing there.     On  the basis of the aforesaid allegations the  landlord gave  a  notice to quit dated 20th September,  1978  to  the tenant. Thereafter in 1979 the landlord fried a suit against the  tenant in the Small Causes Court for possession of  the demised  premises.  The Trial Court on 11th  November,  1982 decreed  the suit upholding the allegation that  the  tenant had made 307 alterations of permanent nature in the demised premises  and had committed acts or waste and damage.     Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the tenant filed  an appeal before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes  Court

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on  28th  September,  1985, and the  respondent’s  suit  for eviction  was  dismissed  on the ground that  the  suit  was barred by lapse of time under Article 113 of the  Limitation Act, 1973, which prescribed a period of three     The  landlord  thereafter filed a  writ  petition  under Article  227 which was allowed by the High Court which  held that  Article  66 or Article 67 was  applicable  which  pre- scribed a period of 12 years. The writ petition filed by the tenant was however dismissed.     In  the  appeals by the tenant to this  Court  the  only question  for  consideration  was: whether  Article  113  or either  of Articles 66 or 67 of the Limitation Act would  be applicable, and what would he the date of the accrual of the cause of action.     On behalf of the tenant-appellant it was contended  that on  the facts of the case Article 113 of the Limitation  Act alone would apply and that neither Article 66 nor Article 67 would have any application. Article 67 of the Limitation Act had no application inasmuch as time begins to run only  when the tenancy is determined and that determination of  tenancy which  takes  place under the Transfer of  Property  Act  is wholly  irrelevant  for cause of action in  ejectment.  That Article  66 contemplates an immediate right to recover  pos- session.  Breach of a condition only leads to  an  immediate right to possession without more, and not a determination in law.  That  Article 66 is a general article which  does  not apply to landlord or tenant, and that when a specific  Arti- cle  applied the general Article should not be applied  spe- cially when it was not free from doubt.     On  behalf  of the respondent--landlord it  was  however submitted that for any suit by a landlord against the tenant for recovery of possession under the Rent Act the Limitation Act was inherently inapplicable. Dismissing the Appeals,     HELD:  1. Recovery of possession is by a suit and  there is  no  section  in  the scheme of  the  Limitation  Act  to indicate   that   the   Limitation   Act   was    inherently inapplicable. In the scheme of the Rent Act or in 308 the  various contingencies contemplated under the Rent  Act, there is nothing to indicate or warrant that there would  be no limitation of any period. [311E-F]     2.  Sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent  Act  co-exist and  must be harmonised to effect the purpose and intent  of the  legislature for the purpose of eviction of the  tenant. In that view of the matter Article 113 of the Limitation Act has no scope of application. [316C-D]     3.  Article  67 indicates that time begins to  run  only when  the  tenancy is determined. It comprehends suit  by  a landlord and deals with the right to recover possession from the tenant. Therefore it deals with landlord and tenant. [31 IF-G]     4.  On the strict grammatical meaning Article 67 of  the Limitation  Act would be applicable. This is  indubitably  a suit  by the landlord against the tenant to recover  posses- sion  from  the tenant. Therefore, the  suit  clearly  comes within Article 67 of the Limitation Act. The suit was  flied because the tenancy was determined by the combined effect of the operation of Sections 12 and 13 of the B- ombay Rent Act. At the mast it would be within Article 66 of the Limitation Act if it is held that forfeitures have  been incurred  by  the  appellant in view of the  breach  of  the conditions  mentioned in Section 13 of the Bombay Rent  Act, and on lifting of the embargo against eviction of tenant  in terms  of section 12 of the said Act. That being so,  either

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of the two, Article 66 or Article 67 would be applicable  to the  facts  of the instant case. There is no scope  for  the application of Article 113 of the Limitation Act in any view of  the matter. The period of limitation in this case  would therefore  be 12 years. The suit was therefore  not  barred. [315H; 316A-E]     Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, [1980] 1 S.C.R.  334; Pradesh Kumar Bajpai v. Binod Behari Sarkar, [1980] 3 S.C.R. 93, Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar & Other, [1985] 2 S.C.C. 683;  Hiralal  Vallabhram v. Kastorbhai  Lalbhai  &  Others, [1967] 3 S.C.R. 343 at 349 and 350; Bahadur Singh & Anr.  v. Muni  Subrat Dass & Anr., [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432 at  436,  Kau- shaiaya  Devi & Others v. Shri K.L. Bansal, [1969] 2  S.C.R. 1048 at 1050; Ferozi LaIJain v. Man Mal and another,  A.I.R. 1970  S.C.  794 at 795 aud 796; aud Haji Suleman  Haji  Ayub Bhiwandiwala v. Narayan Sadashiv Ogale, [1967] 84 Bombay Law Report p. 122, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.  116117 of 1987. 309     From  the  Judgment and Order dated  28.11.1986  of  the Bombay High Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 5391 And 55 15 of 1985.     F.S. Nariman, R.F. Nariman, Ashok Goel, Rajan Karanjawa- la and Ejaz Mazbool for the Appellant.     H.C.  Tunara, M.N. Shroff, A.G. Parekh and  K.M.K.  Khan for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This appeal by special leave  is by the tenant from the judgment and order of the High  Court of  Bombay dated 28th of November, 1986. The  only  question involved in this appeal is what is the period of  limitation for the recovery of possession of the demised premises.  The premises in question is located on the Municipal Street  No. 16 in Fanaswadi area of Bombay. The tenant was inducted as a monthly tenant in respect of the said premises at a  monthly rent  of Rs. 105.60 for the purpose of conducting  ice-cream business  which was being carried on by her husband who  was the  holder  of  the power of attorney on  her  behalf.  The premises  consisted  of the entire structure on  the  ground floor  with a loft covering the entire area with  corrugated iron sheets. The letting was done on an agreement dated 29th of December, 1975 which was to become effective from the 1st of  January, 1976. It is the case of the landlord,  the  re- spondent  herein,  that in breach of the agreement  and  the terms  of tenancy as also in violation of.  the  prohibition prescribed under section 13(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel  & Lodging  House  Rates (Control) Act, 1947  (hereinafter  re- ferred  to  as  the Rent Act), the tenant  had  indulged  in several acts of commission by which not only there has  been permanent alterations of major nature but the entire  struc- ture was completely changed so much so that even the  height of  the structure was increased and thus, the loft lost  its initial  character and became almost as a first floor  which was  the  creation of the appellant-tenant  herein.  Several other  breaches were alleged to have been committed  in  re- spect  of  the  terms of tenancy. It was  alleged  that  the tenant  had indulged in the acts of waste and damage to  the property  and that further she had changed the user  of  the suit  premises when some of the employees  started  residing there. On the basis of those and other allied allegations on

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the 20th of September, 1978 the landlord, respondent herein, gave  a notice to quit to the tenant, the appellant  herein, on  the ground that the tenant had (1) made  alterations  of permanent  nature  in respect of the demised  premises,  (2) committed 310 acts  of  waste and damage and (3) changed the user  of  the premises.  In  1979  the  landlord  filed  R.A.E.  Suit  No. 1326/4557  of  1979 against the tenant in the  Small  Causes Court,  Bombay for possession of the demised  premises.  The Trial Court on 11th November. 1982 decreed the suit  uphold- ing,  inter  alia, that the tenant had made  alterations  of permanent  nature in the demised premises and had  committed acts  of  waste and damage. Aggrieved by the  said  decision Appeal  No. 667 of 1982 was filed by the tenant against  the decree  of  the  Trial court. The same was  allowed  by  the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court on 28th September, 1985 and the respondent’s suit for eviction was dismissed on the  ground that the suit was barred by lapse of time  under article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter  called the  Limitation  Act). The High Court of Bombay on  28th  of November, 1986 allowed the writ petition being Writ Petition No. 5391 of 1985 filed by the landlord under Article 227  of the Constitution against the judgment of the Appellate Bench of  the Small Causes Court. The High Court allowed the  said Writ  Petition filed by the landlord and dismissed the  Writ Petition  being Writ Petition No. 5515 of 1985 filed by  the tenant. In the premises the High Court’s judgment and  order dated  28th  of November, 1986 impugned in this  appeal  re- stored  the  judgment of the Trial Court decreeing  the  re- spondent’s suit for possession.     All  the three courts have held that the tenant,  appel- lant  herein, had made alterations of permanent  nature  and had committed acts of waste and damage. The Appellate  Bench of  the  Small  Causes Court and the  High  Court,  however, differed on the question of limitation. The Appellate  Bench of the Small Causes Court had held that the suit was  barred under  article 113 of the Limitation Act which prescribed  a period of 3 years while the High Court held that articles 66 or 67 was applicable which prescribed a period of 12  years. According to the landlord-respondent, the suit though  filed after  3 years was filed within 12 years of the  accrual  of the  cause of action. The only question which was argued  in this  appeal  was  the question of  limitation.  No  factual aspect  was  agitated before this Court.  This  appeal  must therefore, decide the question which article of the  Limita- tion Act would be applicable, that is to say, whether  arti- cle 113 or either of the article 66 or 67 and what would  be the date of the accrual of cause or’ action.     On  behalf  of the appellant, it was  submitted  by  Mr. Nariman  that on the facts of this case, article 113 of  the Limitation  Act would alone apply because according  to  him neither  article 66 nor article 67 would have  any  applica- tion. It may not be inappropriate to set out article 66  and article  67 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act. The  said articles 311 appear in Part V of the Schedule First Division dealing with suits relating to immovable property. The first column gives the description of suit, the second column gives the  period of  limitation  and the third column deals  with  time  from which  period  begins  to run. Articles 66 and  67  read  as follows:-       "66. For possession       Twelve   When the forfeiture       of immovable property     years    is incurred or the

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     when the plaintiff                 condition is       has become entitled                broken.       to possession by       reason of any forfeiture       or breach of condition.       67. By a landlord to    Twelve   When the       recover possession      years    tenancy is       from a tenant.                   determined."     Article 113 on the other hand which is in Part X dealing with suits provides that for any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule the  period would  be  three years from the date when the right  to  sue accrues.     It was submitted by Shri Tunara, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord that for any suit by a landlord  against a tenant for recovery of possession under the Rent Act,  the Limitation Act was inherently inapplicable. We are, however, unable to accept this argument. Recovery of possession is by a suit and there is no section in the scheme of the  Limita- tion  Act  to indicate that Limitation  Act  was  inherently inapplicable.  In the scheme of the Rent Act or in the  var- ious contingencies contemplated under the Rent Act, there is nothing to indicate or warrant that there would be no  limi- tation of any period. Article 67 of the Limitation Act which has been set out hereinbefore indicates that time begins  to run only when the tenancy is determined. It comprehends suit by  a  landlord and deals with fight to  recover  possession from  the  tenant.  Therefore, it deals  with  landlord  and tenant.  We are therefore unable to accept the  argument  of the  respondent that limitation was inapplicable  to  eject- ment.     On behalf of the appellant it was however submitted that article 67 of the Limitation Act had no application inasmuch as time begins to run only when the tenancy is determined. A determination of tenancy which takes place under the  Trans- fer of Property Act is wholly irrele- 312 vant  for cause of action in ejectment. It is an act in  law and not an act of law because under the scheme a  determina- tion  of  tenancy which takes place under  the  Transfer  of Property Act, according to the appellant, is wholly  irrele- vant for rounding a cause of action in ejectment because the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are superseded by the  provisions of the Rent Act and according to the  appel- lant a cause of action for eviction is to be rounded only on one of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Rent  Act. For  this  reliance  was placed on V.  Dhanpal  Chettiar  v. Yesodai  Ammal,  [1980] 1 S.C.R. 334 where this  Court  held that a lease between a lessor and a lessee comes into exist- ence  by  way of contract when the parties to  the  contract agree  on the rent, duration of tenancy and  other  relevant terms. Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act  provides various  methods by which a lease of immovable property  can be  determined.  Under  clause (h) of section  111  a  lease determines on the expiry of a notice to determine the  lease given  by  the landlord to the tenant. But a notice  is  not compulsory or obligatory nor must it fulfil all the  techni- cal requirements of section 106 of the Transfer of  Property Act, because as a result of the various State Rent Acts  the liability to be evicted if incurred by the tenant, he cannot turn round and say that the contractual tenancy had not been determined. It was further reiterated that the action of the landlord  in instituting a suit for eviction on  the  ground mentioned  in  the  State Rent Act would  tantamount  to  an expression of the intention of the landlord that he does not

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want  the  tenant to continue as his lessee  and  the  jural relationship between the lessor and the lessee would come to an end on the passing of an order or a decree for  eviction. Until then, under the extended definition of ’tenant’  under the  various State Rent Acts, the tenant continued to  be  a tenant  even though the contractual tenancy had been  deter- mined  by  giving a valid notice under section  106  of  the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore notice under section 106 of  the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy  is no  longer  necessary. At page 353 of the said  report,  the Court was of the view that making out a case under the  Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself was sufficient  and it was not obligatory to the proceeding on the basis of  the determination  of the lease by issue of a notice in  accord- ance with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.  This view  was also reiterated again in Pradesh Kumar  Bajpai  v. Binod  Behari  Sarkar, [1980] 3 S.C.R. 93 where  this  Court observed that once the requirements of Rent Act were  satis- fied,  the tenant could not claim the double  protection  of invoking  the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act  or the  terms  of the contract. Therefore, in the  case  before this  Court the question of termination of lease by  forfei- ture did not arise on the facts of that case 313 and  after the Rent Act came into force, the landlord  could not  avail himself of clause 12 which provided  for  forfei- ture, in that case, even if the tenant had neglected to  pay the rent for over two months and further the landlord  could not enter into possession forthwith without notice. The only remedy  for him is to seek eviction under the provisions  of the  Rent Act. See also in this connection the  observations in  Gian DeviAnandv. Jeevan Kumar & others, [1985] 2  S.C.C. 683.     It was further submitted on behalf of the appellant that columns 1 and 3 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act should be  read together and if a case does not fall within  either column  1  or  column 3 the residuary  article  must  apply. Reference  may  be made to the observations in  Kripal  Shah Sant  Singh v. Shri Harkishan Das Narsingh Das, A.I.R.  1957 Punjab 273 at 275; M/s. Swastik Agency, Madras v. The Madras Port  Trust and another, A.I.R. 1966 Madras 130 at  135  and Mulla Vittil Seeti, Kutti and others v. K.M.K. Kunhi Pathum- ma and others, A.I.R. 1919 Madras 972.     Mr. Nariman, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that  the expression "determination" appears in section  111 of  the  Transfer of Property Act. Under section 14  of  the Bombay Rent Act, the same expression was used in the context of  a sub-tenant becoming a direct tenant of  the  landlord. This expression however, according to the appellant, is  not to  be found in section 13. of the Act. This Court has  held that this expression contained in section 14 of the Rent Act is different from the expression contained in section 111 of the  Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as the  tenancy  only determines under the Rent Act for a decree only for eviction is passed, and not before. Reliance was placed in support of this  argument on the observation of this Court  in  Hiralal Vallabhram v. Kastorbhai Lalbhai & Ors., [1967] 3 S.C.R. 343 at 349 and 350. It was further urged therefore that  article 67 of the Limitation Act would not apply.     Article 66,  according to the appellant, contemplates an immediate fight to recover possession. Breach of a condition must lead to an immediate right to possession without  more. This  would not be a determination in law according  to  the appellant. Section 13 of the Rent Act contemplated, however, two conditions being fulfilled one is a ground for ejectment

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subsisting  and the other is the Court’s satisfaction  which is a condition precedent before which there is a no  immedi- ate right to possession. Reliance in support of this  propo- sition  was placed on Sharoop Dass Mondal v.  Joggessur  Roy Chowdhry, I.L.R. 26 Calcutta 564 at 568; Annamalai Pathar v. Sri-la-sri 314 Vythilinga  Pandara  Sannadhi A vergal and  another,  A.I.R. 1937  Madras 295 at 297; Mahalinga Bandappa  Lakhannavar  v. Venkatesh  Waman  Karnataki, 59 B.L.R. 227 at  233;  Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. Muni Subrat Dass & Anr., [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432 at 436; Kaushalaya Devi & Ors. v. Shri K.L. Bansal, [1969] 2 S.C.R.  1048  at  1050 and Ferozi Lal Jain v.  Man  Mal  and another, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 794 at 795 and 796. Under  section 13  of the Rent Act, possession is not recoverable only  for breach  of a condition, and it is recoverable on  fulfilment and  not  breach  of a condition precedent  to  the  Court’s satisfaction, according to counsel for the appellant. It was further  submitted on behalf of the appellant  that  section 13(1)  of  the Rent Act was to be  contrasted  with  section 12(1)--recovery  of possession under section 13(1)  was  not directly  upon  a breach of condition of tenancy,  but  only upon the Court’s satisfaction that a ground for recovery  of possession  was  made out. Under section 12(1),  however,  a landlord  is not entitled to recover possession so  long  as the  tenant  observed the "conditions of  tenancy".  It  was further submitted that section 13 is subject to sections  15 and  15A  of  the Rent Act if the landlord  and  the  tenant respectively have fulfilled (not breached) according to  the counsel,  the provisions of these two sections, no suit  for ejectment  will  lie. It was urged that  again  showed  that section 13(1) of the Rent Act contained conditions that were to be fulfilled before a landlord can recover possession for a  tenant’s  breach of condition.  Section  13(1)  contained grounds  for  eviction  of a tenant which need  not  be  for breach of any condition. According to the appellant only one article  for  recovery of possession is reserved  under  the Limitation Act by a landlord from a tenant, that is  article 139  of the Limitation Act, 1908. This article is the  exact predecessor of article 67. Article 66 is a general  article, says  the  appellant, which does not apply  to  landlord  or tenant  and  it was further submitted that when  a  specific article  applied,  a general article should not  be  applied specially when it was not free from doubt. Some  authorities were referred to in this behalf.     We accept this submission on the principle of  construc- tion. It is further reiterated that a strained  construction to give a more favourable limitation period is to be  avoid- ed--considerations of equity were out of place in construing the  articles  under the Limitation Act.  It  was  submitted before  us that section 12(1) of the Rent Act did not  apply to  the facts of the present case. The decree  for  eviction was  grounded upon section 13(i)(b) of the Rent Act and  not on  section 12(1). It was further reiterated that  the  non- obstante  clause  of section 13 made it clear that  where  a condition  of tenancy coincided with a ground for  eviction, the  ground for eviction alone is to be looked  at---and  to that 315 extent, any breach of the condition of tenancy was supersed- ed  by  the ground for eviction. Also in the  instant  case, clause  3  of  the agreement dated 29th  December,  1975  is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act inasmuch as even temporary  structures  were not allowed to  be  erected  and there  is no provision for the written consent of the  land-

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lord.  It  was further submitted without  prejudice  to  the aforesaid submission that section 12(1) of the Rent Act  was a section that was designed to afford protection to a tenant if  his lease was determined under the Transfer of  Property Act and it was thus designed to be a shield but not a  word. It was submitted that the decision in Haji Suleman Haji Ayub Bhiwandiwala v. Narayan Sadashiv Ogale, [1967] 84 Bombay LaW Report  p. 122 is against the current of modern rent  juris- prudence.     Haji Suleman Haji Ayub Bhiwandiwala v. Narayan  Sadashiv Ogale,  (supra)  which is a decision of the Bench  of  three judges and as such binding on this Court held that  sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act dealt with different topics and  have different objects. It was held that section  12(1) clothed  a  tenant with the cloak  of  statutory  protection against  eviction so long as he performs the  conditions  of tenancy.  Section  13  provides  that  notwithstanding  that protection  the  landlord can sue for eviction  provided  he established  any  one of the circumstances set out  in  that section. This Court further observed that it was  impossible to  say that it was only when circumstances set out in  sec- tion 13 arose that a landlord could evict and that  eviction on  the ground of the failure to perform the  conditions  of tenancy would not deprive the tenant of the protection under section  12(1)  of  the Rent Act. Such a  reading  would  be contrary  to the whole scheme underlying the objects of  the two sections. We accept the aforesaid legal position. It  is not against the trend of the principle behind rent  legisla- tion.  It  affords protection to the tenant inasmuch  as  it says  that  it was only on the fulfilment of  the  condition stipulated  in the two sections and on satisfaction  of  the contingencies  mentioned in section 12 which  would  deprive the tenant of the protection that the tenant can be evicted. Much  argument  was advanced to the  contrary---but  in  our opinion  to prevent unreasonable eviction, in balancing  and harmonising  the rights of the landlords and tenant  if  the sections  are  so read as done in Haji Sulernan’s  case,  it would  meet  the ends of justice and that  would  be  proper construction.     If  that  is so then on the strict  grammatical  meaning article  67 of the Limitation Act would be applicable.  This is indubitably a suit by the landlord against the tenant  to recover possession from the tenant. 316 Therefore  the suit clearly comes within article 67  of  the Limitation  Act. The suit was filed because the tenancy  was determined  by the combined effect of the operation of  sec- tions 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act. In this  connection, the  terms of sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act  may be referred to. At the most it would be within article 66 of the  Limitation  Act  if we hold that  forfeiture  has  been incurred  by  the  appellant in view of the  breach  of  the conditions  mentioned in section 13 of the Bombay  Rent  Act and on lifting on the embargo against eviction of tenant  in terms  of section 12 of the said Act. That being so,  either of the two, article 66 or article 67 would be applicable  to the facts of this case; there is no scope of the application of  article  113 of the Limitation Act in any  view  of  the matter.  Sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act  co-exist and  must be harmonised to effect the purpose and intent  of the  legislature for the purpose of eviction of the  tenant. In that view of the matter article 113 of the Limitation Act has  no  scope of application. Large number  of  authorities were cited. In the view we have taken on the construction of the  provisions of articles 67 and 66 of the Limitation  Act

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and  the nature of the cause of action in this case  in  the light  of sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act, we  are of  the opinion that the period of limitation in  this  case would be 12 years. There is no dispute that if the period of limitation be 12 years, the suit was not barred.     In  that  view of the matter, the appeals fail  and  are accordingly dismissed with costs. N.V.K.                                        Appeals   dis- missed. 317