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PETITIONER: SMT. SARLA NARULA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SMT. RAGHBIR KAUR REHAL & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/10/1987

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) OZA, G.L. (J)

CITATION:  1988 SCR  (1) 368        JT 1987 (4)   126  1987 SCALE  (2)744

ACT:      Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Section 14(1)(e)-Eviction of tenant  on ground  of bona  fide necessity  of  landlady- Abandonment of  the premises  by original tenant-No novation of original  agreement of  tenancy-Locus Standi  of party in occupation-Whether tenancy came to) an end. C

HEADNOTE:      The premises  in question  was  taken  on  lease  at  a monthly rent  of Rs.350  by the  tenant-Company. The rent in respect of  the said  premises was  being deposited  in  the bank. Respondent No. 1-The landlady was living abroad and as she and  her husband  wanted to come back and settle down in India they required the said premises.      The landlady instituted proceedings against the tenant- Company to  which the appellant was not a party. The husband of the  appellant was  an employee of the tenant-Company and he retired  in 1973.  The appellant filed an application for being impleaded  as a  party, contending  that the  rent was deposited on  account of  the appellant’s husband, and after his death  on account  of his  heirs individually and not on account of  or on  behalf of  the erstwhile  tenant  of  the premises and the tenant did not oppose the eviction petition because  the   tenant  had   left  the   premises,  and  the appellant’s husband  had become the tenant in his own right. The application  was rejected, and the order of eviction was passed against  the tenant  under section  14(1)(e)  of  the Delhi Rent  Control Act,  1958. The appeal against the above decision was  dismissed by  the Rent  Control Tribunal.  The High Court dismissed the appeal.      Dismissing the appeal, this Court, ^      HELD:  After  the  surrender  of  the  tenancy  by  the Company, the  appellant’s husband,  or his  heirs, after his death, had no locus standi, and had no right to be joined as party. [366G ]      The tenancy  was originally  entered into  between  the landlady or  on her  behalf and  the Company  of  which  the appellant’s husband was an employee. Admittedly, the tenancy came to an end after the tenant- 364 Company abondoned the premises. The husband of the appellant

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or after his death his heirs could not continue unless there was a fresh agreement of tenancy in their favour or novation of the original agreement of tenancy. There are no cogent or available materials  to show  that there  was actually a new contract entered  into between  the husband of the appellant and the  landlady, or  novation of  the original  agreement. [366C-D]      The High  Court has  found that there was no receipt in possession of  the appellant  regarding the payment of rent, and that  there  was  genuine  evidence  to  show  that  the landlady  needed   the  premises   bona  fide.   There  were concurrent findings of facts of the two courts below. [366H]      The appellant  and her family have been residing in the premises for  quite sometime.  The landlady  herself has not yet arrived  in India.  The husband  is very  much in  India awaiting the vacancy of the house. In the circumstances, the appellant and  her family  would be  entitled to stay in the premises upto 15.6.1988. [367C]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2608 of 1984.      From the  judgment and  order dated  29.5.1984  of  the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 128 of 1984.      U.R. Lalit,  Vivek  Gambhir,  Sanjay  Sareen  and  S.K. Gambhir for the Appellant.      Mrs. Shyamla  Pappu, Mrs.  Indra Sawhney  and N.S.  Das Bahl for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SABYASACHI MUKHARJI,  J. This  is an  appeal by special leave from  the order  of the High Court of Delhi dated 29th May, 1984.  By the aforesaid order the appellant was refused the prayer  of being joined as a party in the proceedings in execution and  the order  of eviction against the tenant was passed under  section 14(1)(e)  of Delhi  Rent Control  Act, 1958.      In order  to appreciate the question it should be noted on 16.1.67  there was  a lease in favour of respondent No. 2 of a monthly rent of 365 Rs.350 p.m.  in respect  of  the  premises  in  question  in Greater Kailash,  New Delhi. The tenant was a company called M/s Bharat  Carbons &  Ribbons  Manufacturing  Company.  The husband of the appellant Late T.R. Narula was an employee of the said Company. He retired in 1973. The rent in respect of the premises had been deposited. It is, however, not certain as to  on whose  account the  rent was deposited. On the one hand, the  appellant contends that the rent was deposited on account of  the appellant’s  husband, and after the death of Shri T.R.  Narula on  account of  heirs of said T.R. Narula, deceased individually  and not on account of or on behalf of the erstwhile tenant of the premises in question. It appears from the  record that respondent No. 1 was in England at the relevant time.  The respondent  No. 1 described himself as a permanent settlee in England. The said respondent was at all relevant times  represented by  her attorney. The respondent No. 1  is the  landlady of the premises in question is still in England. Their case is that both the husband and wife are fairly well advanced in age and wish to come back and settle down in  India and  want to  live their last days of life in their own  house. They  bonafide, require  the  premises  in question. This  question of  bonafide need  has been held in their favour  and appropriate  proceedings instituted by the

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landlady against  the tenant-Company  to which the appellant was not  a party.  lndeed, the  tenant did not really oppose the  eviction   petition  because  as,  according  to  their version, the  tenant had  left the  premises and  Shri  T.R. Narula  had  become  the  tenant,  in  his  own  right.  The respondents did  not accept  that  position.  There  was  an application made  by the  widow of  Late T.R.  Narula to  be joined as  a party  in the suit. This was refused by learned Judge for  which reasons  have been given. The learned Judge of the  High Court  has  noted  that  it  was  the  admitted position that  M/s Bharat  Carbons &  Ribbons  Manufacturing Company was  the tenant  and the  appellant’s husband was an employee of  the said  company. He retired in 1973. The rent has been paid since then. However, the landlady was residing out of  India and  she closed her account when she came back to India and in respect of that the rent was being deposited according to  the appellant which appears at page 126 of the Paper Book.  The landlady  protested by  a letter written to the Bank. The High Court has noted that admittedly there was no receipt  in possession of the appellant regarding payment of rent.  Counsel for  the appellant drew our attention to a document which  is described  as a  receipt for the rent for the month  July 1973.  Counsel states that this was filed in the High  Court.  Counsel  further  states  that  there  are subsequent  receipts.  As  against  these  versions  of  the appellants herein  it is  asserted that  these receipts were not genuine  documents put  in. Subsequent receipts that had not been, according to the respondents, 366 produced before  the High  Court and  at least relied before the High  Court, were  not there.  The learned  Judge of the High Court proceeded on the basis that there was no evidence that there  was  receipt  in  possession  of  the  appellant regarding payment of rent. A strong point was made before us that if  money was  received from the appellant or on behalf of the  appellant,  it  must  be  presumed  that  there  was surrender  of  tenancy  by  M/s  Bharat  Carbons  &  Ribbons Manufacturing  Company   and  there  was  tenancy  agreement between Late  T.R. Narula  or his  wife and the landlady. No such evidence  of the acceptance of rent was advanced before the High Court or before us to sustain that ground.      The tenancy  was originally  entered into  between  the landlady or  on her  behalf and  the company  of which  T.R. Narula, since  deceased,  was  an  employee.  There  was  no evidence adduced  and no  averment made that the tenancy was for the  then tenant. Admittedly that tenancy, as it appears from the  records and the evidence, came to an end after the tenant-company abandoned  the premises,  and that  it was so done was  not seriously  disputed  and  T.R.  Narula,  since deceased or  after his  death his  heirs could  not continue unless there  was a  fresh agreement  of  tenancy  in  their favour or  novation of  the original  agreement of  tenancy. There is  no cogent,  reliable or dependable evidence of the same.      In view of the categorical finding of the High Court it is difficult  to accept  the submissions  on behalf  of  the appellant. Apart  from that  there are  no other  cogent  or available materials  to show  that there  was actually a new contract entered  into between  Late T.  R. Narula  and  the landlady. On  the other  hand the contention of the landlady and her  representative since  she was staying away has been to deny  any connection with the appellant. Furthermore, the alleged notice  of the  termination of  surrender of tenancy was sent to the landlady in rather suspicious circumstances. It is  not necessary  to dilate  in  detail  on  those.  The

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evidence on  record advanced  in support of the appellant on this aspect  cannot and  does not  inspire any  credence  or confidence. If that is the position than after the surrender of tenancy by the company, late T.R. Narula or his heirs had no locus-standi  and had no right to be joined as party. The High Court  notes that  there was  genuine evidence  to show that the  landlady needed the premises bona fide. There were concurrent findings of facts of the two courts below and the appellant did  not raise  any contentions  at  this  belated stage.      In the  aforesaid view  of the  matter and in the facts and circum- 367 stances of  the case  we find no ground under Article 136 of the Constitution to interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court.      The appeal  must, therefore,  fail and  is  accordingly dismissed, specially  in view  of the fact that the landlady needs the  premises for her family and for her own bona fide need. Parties will pay their own costs      There is,  however, another  aspect of  the matter. The appellant and  her family have been residing there for quite sometime. The  landlady herself has not yet arrived in India and is  awaiting her  arrival since  arrangements have to be made in  India. The  husband is  very much in India awaiting vacancy of  the house.  In the  circumstances we direct that the appellant  and her  family would  be entitled to stay in the premises  upto 15.6.88 upon filing the usual undertaking in this  court within  three weeks from today. The appeal is dismissed with  the aforesaid  directions. Parties  will pay their own  costs. They  will continue  to deposit cheques to the counsel for respondents for the remaining period. N.P.V.                                     Appeal dismissed. 368