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PETITIONER: SMT. SAIYADA MOSSARRAT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD: BHILLAI STEEL PLANT,BHILLAI (M.P.) & OR

DATE OF JUDGMENT31/10/1988

BENCH: THAKKAR, M.P. (J) BENCH: THAKKAR, M.P. (J) SINGH, K.N. (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR  406            1988 SCR  Supl. (3) 690  1989 SCC  (1) 272        JT 1988 (4)   243  1988 SCALE  (2)1208  CITATOR INFO :  E&F        1991 SC 855  (48)

ACT:   Constitution  of  India, 1950: Article  32  and  Seventh Schedule  List  I Entry 32, 43, 95 and  97--Public  Premises (Eviction    of   Unauthorized   Occupants)   Act,    1971-- Constitutional validity of--Fresh consideration on different ground. %     Public  Premises  (Eviction of  Unauthorized  Occupants) Act,  1971:  Constitutional validity of Speedy  eviction  of unauthorized occupants from property of Union Government  in the State--Necessity for.

HEADNOTE:     The  petitioner was allotted a piece of land on  licence by the respondent-company. The licence was cancelled on  the allegation   that   the  petitioner   had   illegally   made encroachment  on  further land and had  illegally  raised  a structure  on the land granted on licence. Proceedings  were initiated  against  the petitioner under the  Act,  and  the competent  authority  passed  an  order  of  eviction.   The Appellate  Authority  dismissed the appeal, the  High  Court dismissed the petitioner’s petition, and this court  refused to  grant  him special leave. The petitioner  then  filed  a Civil  Suit which was dismissed for default  of  appearance. His  special leave against this order too was  dismissed  by this Court for default of appearance.     In  the present petition under Art. 32,  the  petitioner has6  challenged the constitutional validity of the  Act  on the  ground  that Parliament does not have  the  legislative competence to legislate on the subject.     The  Solicitor-General raising a preliminary  objection. It  was contended that the Constitution Bench of this  Court had already upheld the constitutionality of the Act, in Hari Singh v. Military Estate Officer, [ 1973] l SCR 515,  relled upon.     Dismissing the writ petition, it was,     HELD:  (1)  In the present petition the  petitioner  has contended that since the subject matter falls squarely under                                                   PG NO 690

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                                                 PG NO 691 Entry 18 of List II (State List) and it does not fall  under any  Entry under List I or List III, the Parliament  has  no competence  to legislate in respect of the  subject  matter. Since  this  specific  aspect was  not  debated  before  the Constitution  Bench, it would not be proper to shut out  the petitioner from raising the plea by recourse to the argument that  the  point was concluded in Hari Singh’s  case.  [695H 696A-B]     (2)  The  Public  Premises Act  is  concerned  with  the eviction  of those persons who have no authority in  law  to remain  in possession of the land belonging to the Union  of India.  The unauthorised persons may be  squatters,  persons having  no  rights  whatsoever,  or  persons  who  were   in occupation by virtue of any agreement but whose right  under the agreement had come to an end. [699F-G]     (3)  In order to ascertain under which entry the Act  in question  would fall, it is necessary to ascertain  what  is the  subject  matter of legislation applying the ’pitch  and substance’ test. [696C]     (4) The subject matter of the legislation. as pronounced in  Hari Singh’s case, is "providing a speedy procedure  for eviction  of  persons in unauthorised occupation  of  public premises." [696D]     (5)  On an analysis of Entry 32 of List 1 it inter  alia emerges  that  while the State can legislate in  respect  of Union  property  situated in a State, with  regard  to  such legislation in respect of the Union property Parliament  can enact a legislation in respect of the property belonging  to the  Union  of India and the revenue therefrom and  in  that event the legislation enacted by Parliament will prevail  as against the law enacted by the State. 1697G-H; 698A]     (6)  Entry  32 is wide enough to cover  all  legislation pertaining  to the property of the Union of India  including the legislation for eviction of unauthorised occupants  from the  property  belonging  to the Union of  India.  Once  the conclusion is reached that the legislation falls under Entry 32  of  List 1, it is unnecessary to examine  the  scope  of Entry 18 of List III. [699B-C ]     (7) In so far as the legislation for "providing a speedy procedure for eviction of an unauthorised occupant of public premises"  is concerned, it is not shown  that there is  any legislation  enacted  by the State legislature  which  deals with this subject in so far as the property belonging to the Union  of  India  is  concerned.  Since  there  is  no  such legislation, the legislation enacted by the Centre under the                                                   PG NO 692 authority  of  entry  32 of List 1  cannot  be  successfully assailed.  Even  if there was such a  legislation,  the  Act enacted by the Parliament would prevail. [698B-D]     (8) The Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act,  1961, does not pertain to the subject-matter of providing a speedy remedy for eviction of "unauthorised occupants" from  public premises belonging to the Union of India. It only deals with eviction  of tenants from premises owned by landlords  other than the Government. Therefore, there  is no question of the Madhya  Pradesh Accommodation Control Act prevailing  vis-a- vis the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. [698G-H: 699A ]     (9)  A  legislation pertaining to a  Government  Company including  one  pertaining to eviction  of  trespassers,  or unlawful  occupants  of properties belonging  to  Government Companies  can  be  enacted by  the  Parliament.  Government Companies are governed by the Indian Companies Act which has itself   been  enacted  in  exercise  of   the   legislative

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authority  conferred by Entry 43 of the Union List (List  1) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. [701A-B]     (10)   The  need  to  speedily  evict   trespassers   or unauthorised  occupants of such properties is self  evident. The  States cannot legislate for such properties in  respect of properties situated in more than one State or  Government companies  situated  in  different states  all  over  India. Surely,  the Parliament, in obeisance of its  obligation  to protect  and  safeguard  the  national  and  overall  public interest, can legislate in this respect under the  residuary all-pervasive entry--Entry 97 of the Union List [List 1]  of the Constitution of lndia-which clothes the Parliament  with the requisite legislative authority in regard to "any  other matter  not enumerated in List II or List Ill including  any tax  not mentioned in either of these lists." The source  of authority  can thus in any case be traced to Entry  97  read with Entry 95 of List I of the Constitution of India. [701C- D; E]     L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhillai, A.l.R.  1980, Madhya Pradesh 106 concurred.     Indu Bhushan Bose v. Ram Sundarl, A.1.R. 1970 SC 228.

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTlON: Writ Petition (Civil) No.  3615 of 1978.     (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).                                                   PG NO 693     Altemesh Rein for the Petitioner.     Milon  K.  Banerjee, Solicitor  General,  V.C.  Mahajan, Amlan Ghosh, L.K. Gupta, S.R. Grover and Miss. A. Subhashini for the Respondents.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     THAKKAR, J. A Seven-Judge Constitution Bench decision in Hari  Singh  & Ors. v. The Military Estate Officer  &  Anr., [1973]  1  SCR, 515 upholding the constitutionality  of  the Public  Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized  Occupants)  Act, 1971 Act 40 of 1971 Act notwithstanding, the petitioner  has renewed the challenge by way of this petition under Art.  32 of the Constitution of India. Of course the epicentre of the present challenge has shifted and is now located in the plea that Parliament does not have the legislative competence  to legislate  on the subject of the impugned legislation  which dimension was not in focus in Hari Singh’s case.     The  petitioner was allotted a piece of land on  licence by  the  Respondents.  The  licence  was  cancelled  on  the allegation  that petitioner had illegally made  encroachment on further land and had illegally raised a structure on  the land  granted  on  licence. The  respondent  terminated  the licence.  Proceedings were initiated against the  petitioner under  the Act. The competent authority passed an  order  of eviction against the petitioner. Petitioner’s appeal to  the appellate  authority under the Act was dismissed.  The  High Court   also  dismissed  the  petition  preferred   by   the petitioner.  This Court refused to grant special  leave  and dismissed  petitioner’s Special Leave  Petition.  Petitioner even  so filed a Civil Suit which came to be  dismissed  for default   of  appearance.  Meanwhile  the   petitioner   had approached  this  court by way of a Special  Leave  Petition against  an interlocutory order passed by the  Civil  Court. The  said special leave petition also came to  be  dismissed for  default of appearance. And thereafter the present  Writ Petition   has  been  instituted  under  Art.  32   ot   the Constitution of India. In the petition as originally  framed

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the  constitutionality  of the Act was not  challenged.  The said  challenge was incorporated by amending  the  petition. When the matter came up for hearing this Court issued a Rule Nisi limited to the question of constitutionality of the Act as is evident from the relevant part of the order  extracted hereinbelow:     Application  for  amendment allowed. Rule  Nisi  on  the                                                   PG NO 694 question  of constitutional validity of the Public  Premises (Eviction  of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.  Notice  to the Attorney General and the Union of India ordered."     Thus the only question before the court presently is  as regards  the constitutional validity of the Act. The  scheme of the Act as set out in Hari Singh’s case is as under:     "The scheme of the 1971 Act is that it confers power  on Estate  Officer  to  issue  notice to  persons  who  are  in unauthorised occupation of any public premises to show cause why  an order of eviction should not be made.  ’Unauthorised occupation’ under the Act in relation to any public premises means  the occupation by any person of the  Public  premises without  authority  for such occupation,  and  includes  the continuance  in  occupation  by any  person  of  the  public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the  premises  has expired or has been  determined  for  any reason  whatsoever. ’Premises’ are defined to mean any  land or  any  building  or part of a building  and  includes  the garden, grounds and outhouses, appertaining to such building or  part of a building and fitting affixed to such  building or  part  of a building for the  more  beneficial  enjoyment thereof. Public premises means any premises belonging to  or taken  on  lease or requisitioned by, or on  behalf  of  the Central Government as enumerated in Section 2(e) of the Act. The  notice  to show cause against order of  eviction  shall specify  the  grounds  on which the  order  of  eviction  is proposed  to be made. The Estate Officers under the Act  are appointed by the Central Government. The Estate Officers are Gazetted Officers or officers of equivalent rank. ’Corporate authority’ under the Act means any company or Corporation or any committee or the Authority as mentioned in the Act.  The Estate Officer shall, for the purpose of holding any inquiry under  this  Act, have the same powers as are  vested  in  a civil  court under the Code of Civil Procedure,  1908  while trying a suit, in respect of matters mentioned in Sec. 8  of the  Act.  These  matters are summoning  and  enforcing  the attendance  of  any  person  and  examining  him  on   oath; secondly,   requiring  the  discovery  and   production   of document;  and  thirdly,  any  other  matter  which  may  be prescribed.  Sec.  10 of the Act provides  for  finality  of                                                   PG NO 695 orders  in  circumstances mentioned in Sec. tO  of  the  Act therein."     The  learned Solicitor General has raised a  preliminary objection  on  the  threshold.  It  is  contended  that  the Constitution   Bench  in  Hari  Singh’s  case  has   already pronounced   that  the  legislature  had   the   legislative competence  to  enact  the impugned Act.  Reliance  in  this context is placed-on the following passage from the Majority Judgment of Ray, J:     "Therefore, a validating law is upheld first by  finding out  whether the legislature possesses competence  over  the subject  matter,  and, secondly, whether by  validation  the legislature  has  removed the defect which  the  courts  had found in previous law.     The legislature had legislative competence to enact  the

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1971 Act. It means that it could legislate on the subject of providing  a  speedy procedure for eviction  of  persons  in unauthorised occupation of public premises."                                             (Emphasis added)     Now  a perusal of the judgment reveals that  the  debate centred  on  the  issue as to whether Sec.  15  of  the  Act provided only one procedure for ejectment of all persons  in unauthorised  occupation of the public premises  or  whether there  was  the  further  option to  make  recourse  to  the ordinary  law. This court has concluded that Sec. 15 of  the Act provides only one procedure for ejectment of persons  in unauthorised occupation of the premises for public purposes, unlike  Sec.  5  of  the Punjab  Public  Premises  and  Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 which was held to  be unconstitutional  in  Northern India Caterers Pvt.  Ltd.,  [ L967]  3  SCR 399. Debate did not at all centre  around  the issue  of legislative competence. While it is true  that  in Hari  Singh’s  case  it has in terms been  stated  that  the concerned  legislature, that is to say the  Parliament,  has legislative  competence  to  enact the impuged  Act,  as  is evident  from  the  passage  extracted  hereinabove,  it  is equally   true  that  the  legislative  competence  of   the Parliament  to  enact the Act does not appear to  have  been debated  at  all  before the court as is  evident  from  the circumstances  that there is no discussion whatsoever as  to under  which entry of which List the subject matter  of  the Act  would  fall. In the present matter the  petitioner  has contended  that the subject matter does not fall  under  any entry either in List I (union list) or List III  (Concurrent List), but it squarely falls under entry 18 of the List  Il,                                                   PG NO 696 that  is  to say, the State List. It has  been  argued  that since the subject matter falls squarely under the State List (List II) and it does not fall under any entry under List  I or  List III, the Parliament has no competence to  legislate in respect of the subject matter. Since this specific aspect was not debated before the Constitution Bench, it would  not be  proper to shut out the petitioner from raising the  plea by recourse to the argument that the point was concluded  in Hari  Singh’s  case  regardless of whether  the  matter  was debated or not. Accordingly we will deal with this point  in the light of the submissions urged before us bearing in mind that the Constitution Bench has categorically observed  that the Parliament has legislative competence to enact the  Act, albeit in the absence of any debate on this point.     Before  turning  to the entries in List I, List  Il  and List III, with a view to ascertain under which entry the Act in question would fall, it is necessary to ascertain what is the  subject  matter of legislation applying the  ’pith  and substance’  test. Now so far as this question is  concerned, the Constitution Bench in Hari Singh’s case has in clear and unequivocal terms pronounced that the subject matter of  the legislation is "providing a speedy procedure for eviction of persons  in unauthorised occupation of public premises."  As is evident from the passage extracted earlier.     Apart from the name of the Act, the preamble to the  Act itself makes it abundantly clear that the Act is designed to ’provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from the public  premises  and for certain  incidental  matters.  The scheme  of the Act also indicates that the central theme  of the legislation is to provide for speedy procedure in  order to  evict  persons  in  unauthorised  occupation  of  public premises.  The scheme of the Act shows that apart  from  the dictionary  of  terms and expressions used in the  Act,  the vital   provisions  of  the  Act  pertain  to  eviction   of

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unauthorised  occupants in exercise of powers  conferred  by Section 5 after following the procedure under Section 4. The incidental provisions are: ( 1) with regard to the  disposal of  the  property  left  in  the  public  premises  by   the unauthorised occupants and (2) recovery of arrears referable to  the  point  of time prior to  the   occupation  becoming unauthorised  and  damages  in  respect  of  the  period  of unauthorised occupation as provided in Section 7. Section  8 pertains  to  the incidental powers of  summoning  witnesses etc.  And  Section 9 provides for the  appeals.  Section  l5 excludes  the  jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.  There  are similar  provisions  in regard to incidental  and  ancillary matters.  It  is,  therefore, evident  that  the  whole  Act revolves  around  the  issue  of  eviction  of  unauthorised occupants and incidental matters. In any view of the  matter                                                   PG NO 697 it  is  not open to contend that the subject-matter  of  the legislation is other than the designing of speedy  procedure for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises and incidental matters in view of the law  declared by  the  Constitution Bench of this Court  in  Hari  Singh’s case.  It  is  in the light of  this  perspective  that  the question  as  to  under ’which entry’ of  ‘which  list’  the subject matter falls, will have to be examined.     It has to be realised that if the subject matter of  the legislation falls under List I, the Union of India will have jurisdiction  to legislate on the subject, having regard  to the mandate embodied in Article 246(1) 1 of the Constitution of  India which provides that the Parliament  has  exclusive power  to  make,  laws with respect to any  of  the  matters enumerated  in  List  I of the Seventh  Schedule.  We  must, therefore, address ourselves to the issue as to whether  the subject  matter  of  the legislation falls  in  any  of  the entries in the Union List (List I). [    "[1]  Art. 26(1)--"Notwithstanding anything  in  clauses [2]  and  (3), Parliament has exclusive power to  make  laws with  respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I  in the  Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred  to  as the Union List")." ]     A  scrutiny  of the contents of entry 32 of  List  I  is essential in this connection. The entry is in the  following terms:     "Property of the Union and the revenue therefrom, but as regards property situated in a State subject to  legislation by the State, save in so far as Parliament by law otherwise provides."     On an analysis of the entry, it emerges that:     (1) The Parliament can legislate in respect of  property of the Union and revenue therefrom regardless of whether the property is situated in Union Territory or in a State.     (2) But as regards the property situated in a State  the property  will be subject to legislation made by  the  State subject to the rider which follows.     (3)  While the State can legislate in respect  of  Union property   situated  in  a  State,  with  regard   to   such legislation in respect of the Union property Parliament  can enact a legislation in respect of the property belonging  to the  Union  of India and the revenue therefrom and  in  that                                                   PG NO  698 event the legislation enacted by the Parliament will prevail as against the law enacted by the State.     In  so  far as the legislation for "providing  a  speedy procedure for eviction of an unauthorised occupant of public premises"  is concerned, it is not shown that there  is  any legislation  enacted  by the State Legislature  which  deals

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with this subject in so far as the property belonging to the Union  of India is concerned. When the challenge to the  Act came up for scrutiny in the Madhya Pradesh High Court in  L. S.  Nair  v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., Bhilai and  Ors.,  A.l.R. 1980  Madhya  Pradesh  106  it was  not  the  basis  of  the challenge that there was any State legislation in regard  to this  subject matter. Nor has it been contended  before   us that  there is any legislation for eviction of  unauthorised occupants enacted by the State Legislature which deals  with the  aforesaid  subject  matter,  or  that  the   properties belonging  to  the Union of India are covered  of  any  such State   Act.  Since  there  is  no  such  legislation,   the legislation  enacted  by the Centre under the  authority  of Entry 32 of List I cannot be successfully assailed. What  is more. even if  there was such a legislation, the Act enacted by  the Parliament would prevail as per proposition  Nos.  2 and 3 which have emerged on the analysis of Entry 32 made  a short  while  ago. It may be mentioned that in L.S.  Nair  s case  it was contended before the Madhya Pradesh High  Court that  the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act  of  1961 would  prevail as against the Public Premises  (Eviction  of Unauthorised   Occupants)  Act  of  1971  enacted   by   the Parliament  inasmuch  as the  Madhya  Pradesh  Accommodation Control  Act  was  enacted later.  The  High  Court  rightly repulsed  the plea. In the first place, the  Madhya  Pradesh Accommodation  Control  Act  has  an  altogether   different perspective  It is an act for the Regulation and Control  of letting  on  rent  accommodation in respect  of  tenants  as revealed  by the Preamble. In the second place the Act  does not  apply  to  property  which  is  the  property  of   the Government  having  regard  to the  provision  contained  in Section  3(1)(a)1.  Since the Madhya  Pradesh  Accommodation Control   Act  does  not  apply  to  the  property  of   the Government, there is no question of the said Act  prevailing vis-a-vis  the Central Act. What is more the Madhya  Pradesh Accommodation  Control Act does not pertain to the  subject- matter  of  providing  a  speedy  remedy  for  eviction   of "unauthorised  occupants" from public premises belonging  to the Union of India. It deals merely with eviction of tenants from premises owned by landlords other than  the  Government Under the circumstances, there is no question of the  Madhya     1.  "3.  Act  not to  apply  certain  accommodation  [1] Nothing in this Act shall apply to-     [a]   accommodation  which  is  the  property   of   the Government:"                                                   PG NO  699 Pradesh  Accommodation Control Act prevailing vis-a-vis  the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. It cannot  be  gain-said  that even if  both  the  legislations pertain to the same subject-matter, the legislation  enacted by  the  Parliament in regard to the property  belonging  to Union  of India would prevail having regard to  the  mandate contained  in Entry 32 as has been discussed earlier.  Under the   circumstances  it  is  futile  to  contend  that   the Parliament  has  no legislative competence to  legislate  in respect  of  providing for a speedy remedy for  eviction  of unauthorised  occupants from the property belonging  to  the Union  of  India.  Entry  32 is wide  enough  to  cover  all legislations  pertaining  to the property of  the  Union  of India including the legislation for eviction of unauthorised occupants from the property belonging to the Union of lndia. Once  the conclusion is reached that the  legislation  falls under Entry 32, of List I, it is unnecessary to examine  the scope  of Entry 18  of List III, pertaining to land that  is to  say  rights  in  or  over  land  tenures  including  the

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relationship  of  land-lord-tenant  and  the  collection  of rents,  transfer and alienation of agricultural  land,  land improvement, agricultural lands and acquisitions. Again,  as explained by this Court in Indu Bhushan Bose v. Ram  Sundari &  Anr.,  A.l.R. 1970 SC 228 "the relation of  landlord  and tenant’  as  mentioned in this Entry, is with  reference  to land tenures which would not appropriately cover tenancy  of buildings or of house accommodation and that the  expression is only used with reference to relationship between Iandlord and tenant in respect of vacant lands.     At the cost of repetition it may be stated that the pith and substance’ of the legislation under scrutiny viz. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act of 1961 is eviction of unauthorised occupants from properties belonging to the Union of India and incidental and ancillary  matters. It  does  not pertain to any matter relating  to  rights  in relation  to  landlord and tenants for eviction  of  tenants from  lands which have been leased. The Public Premises  Act is concerned with the eviction of those persons who have  no authority law to remain in possession of the land  belonging to  the  Union  of India. The unauthorised  persons  may  be squatters.  persons having no rights whatsoever, or  persons who were in occupation by virtue of any agreement but  whose right under the agreement had come to an end Thus, there  is no  substance in the contention that the Parliament  had  no legislative competence to enact Public Premises Act.     The learned counsel for the petitioner has however urged an  argument  in the context of the  definition  of  ’Public Premises’ as embodied in Section 2(e)( I)(i) of the Act. The                                                   PG NO  700 definition envelops premises belonging to or taken on  lease by  or on behalf of any Company as defined in Section  3  of the  Companies Act of 1956 in which not less than 51 per  of the paid-up capital is held by the Central Government.  This contention  was raised before the Madhya Pradesh High  Court in L. S. Nair’s case and has been repulsed by the High Court on   the  reasoning unfolded in the passage  extracted  from paragraph 4 of the judgment:     "The first contention raised by the learned counsel  for the  petitioner is that the Act in so far as it includes  in the definition of public premises "any premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any company as  defined in  S. 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less  than 51%  of  the paid-up share capital is held  by  the  Central Government," is ultra vires and void, as to that extent  the Act is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament.  The argument of the learned counsel is that the Act was  enacted under  Entry  32,  List  I  of  the  VII  Schedule  to   the Constitution, which relates to "property of the Union and he revenue therefrom", and that this entry cannot be  construed to  include the property of a Government company which is  a different  and distinct legal entity from the Union. It  may be conceded that the expression "property of the Union",  as used in Entry 32, List 1, cannot be Construed to include the property  of  a Government Company. But if  Entry  32  gives jurisdiction  to Parliament to enact the Act in  respect  of Government premises, as contended by the learned counsel for the  petitioner,  Entry 43 which relates  to  incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading jurisdictions read with Entry  95  which relates to jurisdiction and powers  of  all courts except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of  the matters  in  List  1, can be construed to  confer  power  on Parliament to enact the Act in respect of premises belonging to a Government company. It seems however, more  appropriate that in so far as the Act deals with a lessee or licensee of

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premises  belonging  to a Government company,  the  subject- matter of the Act would be covered by Entries 6, 7 and 46 of List  III.  These  entries broadly  deal  with  transfer  of property,  contracts and jurisdiction and powers  of  Courts with  respect  to  any of the matters in  List  III.  Taking either view in our opinion it is not correct to say that the Act  in  so  far as it relates to premises  belonging  to  a Government   company  suffers  from  want   of   legislative competence."                                                   PG NO 701     Learned counsel for the Petitioner has not been able  to show  that  there is any infirmity in the reasoning  of  the High   Court.  Besides,  a  legislation  pertaining   to   a Government  Company including one pertaining to eviction  of trespassers,  or unlawful occupants of properties  belonging to  Government  Companies  speedily can be  enacted  by  the Parliament. Government Companies are governed by the  Indian Companies  Act which has itself been enacted in exercise  of the legislative authority conferred by Art. 43 of the  Union List  (List I) of the Seventh Schedule of the  Constitution. It  is  idle  to contend and it  has  accordingly  not  been contended, that a State can legislate under the authority to legislate conferred by the State List (List 11) in regard to properties of a Government Company which may have properties in  more than one State and even in Union  Territories.  The need to speedily evict trespassers or unauthorised occupants of  such  properties  is self  evident.  The  States  cannot legislate  for  such  properties in  respect  of  properties situated  in  more than one State  or  Government  companies situated  in  different states all over India.  Surely,  the Parliament,  in obeisance to its obligation to  protect  and safeguard  the  National and overall  public  interest,  can legislate in this respect under the residuary  all-pervasive entry Entry 97 of the Union List (List 1) of Constitution of India  which  clothes  the  Parliament  with  the  requisite legislative  authority  in regard to "any other  matter  not enumerated  in  List 11 or List 111 including  any  tax  not mentioned  in either of those lists". It has not been  shown that  any  of the entries in List 11 or List  111  would  be attracted  to  the  subject-matter  of  speedy  eviction  of unauthorised  occupations  from properties  belonging  to  a Government Company wherein Central Government has more  than 51%  of the paid-up share capital. The source  of  authority can  thus in any case be traced to Entry 97 read with  Entry 95 of the Constitution of India.     In  any  view of the matter therefore it  is  futile  to contend  that  Parliament had no legislative  competence  in this behalf. We therefore concur with the conclusion reached by the High Court in L.S. Nair’s case (supra) and repel  the challenge unhesitatingly.     The  petition  accordingly fails and is  dismissed.  The interim order will stand vacated. No costs. R.S.S.                                     Petition dismissed.