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PETITIONER: SMT. RASHMI KUMAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MAHESH KUMAR BHADA

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       18/12/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, S.B. MAJUMUDAR, G.T. NANAVATI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T      K. Ramaswamy, J.      This appeal  has been placed before this Bench pursuant to an  order date  19.4.1995 passed  by a two Judge Bench in the following terms:      "A  decade   has  gone   by   since      Pratibha Rai vs. Suraj Kumar & Anr,      [(1985) 2  SCC 370] - a decision by      a majority  of 2:1 has governed the      scene. Having  regard to  its wider      ramifications   and    its   actual      working in  the last decade, we are      of the  view that  a fresh  look to      the   ratio   in   that   case   is      necessary.  We,   therefore,  order      that this  case be  placed before a      three-judge Bench."      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the Judgment of the  Allahabad High Court dated June 19, 1992 in Criminal Miscl. Case  No.44 of  1992. The admitted facts are that the appellant was  married to  the respondent on July 7, 1973 at Lucknow according  to  the  Hindu  rites  and  rituals.  The parties have  three children  from the wedlock. It is not in dispute  that   there  was   estrangement  in   the  marital relationship between  the husband  and the  wife. It  is the case of  the appellant that she was treated with cruelty and was driven  out of  the marital  home along  with the  three children. She  was  constrained  to  lay  proceedings  under Section 9  of the  Hindu Marriage  Act  for  restitution  of conjugal rights.  The appellant  was given  jewellery, i.e., gold  and   silver  ornaments   and  other  household  goods enumerated in  Annexures I  and II  and  also  cash  by  her parents,  brothers   and  other   relatives   at   different ceremonies prior  to her  marriage and after the marriage at the time  of bidai  (farewell). She  claims that  all  these articles constituted  her stridhana properties and were kept in the custody of the respondent-husband. The respondent has asked the  appellant to  entrust for  safe custody  all  the jewellery and  cash mentioned  in Annexure  I, to his father with the  promise that  on her  demand whenever  made,  they

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would be  returned. Accordingly,  she had  entrusted them to the appellant  at Lucknow  in the  presence of  three  named witnesses.  Similarly,  the  household  goods  mentioned  in Annexure-II were  entrusted by  the parents of the appellant to the respondent at the time of farewell in the presence of three named  witnesses. They  lived together in Delhi in her in-laws house.  The appellant  alleged in the complaint that she was  treated with  cruelty in  the matrimonial  home and ultimately on  July 24/25,  1978 she  and the  children were thrown out  from the  matrimonial home  at duress and at the peril of  their lives.  Accordingly, she was driven out from the matrimonial  home without getting an opportunity to take with her  Stridhana properties enumerated in Annexures I and II.      She filed  an application  under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage  Act  for  restitution  of  conjugal  rights.  Even thereafter she  went to  Cochin  where  at  the  respondent- husband was working, on October 9, 1986 and requested him to restitute her  into the  conjugal  society  along  with  the children. he  promised that  he would  do  it  provided  she withdrew her application for restitution of conjugal rights. He also promised to return the jewellery and other valuables mentioned in Annexures I and II entrusted to him. Even after her withdrawing the application, on October 21, 1986, he did not take  her into  the conjugal society. Therefore, she was again constrained to file second application on November 18, 1986 for  restitution of  conjugal rights.  She  also  filed application under  Section  125  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure, 1973  (for short,  the "Code")  for  maintenance. Since these  attempts proved unsuccessful, she made a demand on December  5, 1987  to return the jewellery as detailed in Annexure I  and household goods mentioned in Annexure II but the  respondent  flatly  refused  to  return  her  stridhana properties. Consequently,  she filed  a private complaint on September 10, 1990.      After recording  her statement under Section 200 of the Code, the  learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued  process to  the respondent. While the respondent appeared in the Court, he filed an application under Section 482 of the Code in the High Court to  quash the proceedings. As stated  earlier, the High Court in the impugned Order has quashed the  proceedings  on  two  grounds,  viz.,  (i)  the appellant did  not make  out any  case in  the complaint and (ii)  it   is  barred   by  limitation.  On  the  ground  of limitation, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that in October 1986  the appellant  had made a demand for return of the jewellery and gold but the respondent did not return the same. Therefore,  it furnished  a  cause  of  action.  Since complaint was  laid in September 1990, it was clearly barred by limitation the period prescribed being three years.      Smt. Indira  Jaising, Learned  senior counsel  for  the appellant, contended  that the  ratio in  Pratibha Rani V/s. Suraj Kumar  & Anr. [(1985) 2 SCC 370] has stood the test of time for  more  than  a  decade  though  therein  there  was difference of  opinion between the majority and the minority on certain  aspects of  the matter.  The decision  has never been doubted by any other Bench. The said ration is based on the personal  law as  elaborately discussed in the judgment. Therefore, it  requires reiteration.  Shri  Rajinder  Singh, learned senior  counsel for  the respondent,  on  the  other hand, sought  to support  the present reference to the three Judge Bench on the basis of the conduct of the appellant. He also  contends  that  a  clear  demand  for  return  of  the stridhana properties  was made  in  October  1986  when  the respondent  had  refused  to  return  the  same.  Since  the

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complaint came  to be  filed only  in September  1990, i.e., after a  delay of  11 months  from the  expiry of prescribed limitation, it  is time  barred. Since  no  application  for condonation of  delay was filed, the High Court was enjoined to dismiss the complaint as being barred by limitation. Smt. Indira Jaisingh  contended that the offence punishable under Section 406,  Indian Penal  Code [for short, the "IPC"] is a continuing offence and hence cause of action arose every day subsequent to  the refusal and, therefore, the complaint was not  barred  by  limitation.  Shri  Rajinder  Singh  further contended that  the respondent  has always  been willing  to transfer his flat in Bombay in the name of his daughters. He also states  that he has been paying every month maintenance allowance in  respect of  the children. Even if the articles which the appellant is claiming is mentioned, the respondent is prepared  to deposit  the same  in a fixed account in the name of  his daughters.  This conduct  on the  part  of  the respondent  would   militate  against  the  conduct  of  the appellant who  intends to  harass the  respondent by  filing endless complaints. These circumstances would go to indicate that there  are no justifiable reasons for interference with the order  of the  High  Court.  At  this  juncture,  it  is relevant to  not that several attempts made by this Court to have the dispute settled amicably between the parties, could not bear  any  fruit  of  success.  Therefore,  we  are  not inclined to undertake the exercise once over.      The question  that has  arisen  for  consideration  is: whether the ratio in Pratibha Rani’s case does not hold good any more?  That case also related to a complaint filed under Section 406,  IPC for  breach of  trust by  the  respondent- husband on  his refusing to return stridhana property, viz., jewellery, wearing  apparels  etc.  The  question  that  had arisen for  consideration was whether the stridhana property was exclusive  property of the appellant-wife or was a joint property owned  and held by both the spouses? Though all the three learned  Judges concurred  on the point of entrustment of the  jewellery and  wearing apparels to be stridhana, the majority view  was  that  the  stridhana  property  was  the exclusive  property   of  the   appellant-wife   and   that, therefore, the failure to return the property in the custody of the  husband to  the wife  constitutes  breach  of  trust defined under  Section 405,  IPC. Therefore,  the offence of breach of  trust punishable  under Section 406 was made out, as  per  the  averments  contained  in  the  complaint.  The minority view was that the property entrusted to the husband after the  marriage is  joining property of the wife and the husband.  The  essential  requirement  for  constituting  an offence defined  under  Section  405,  IPC  in  relation  to stridhana property,  is that  there  should  be  a  specific separate agreement between the parties, whereby the property of the  wife  or  the  husband,  as  the  case  may  be,  is entrusted. In  the absence  of such a separate agreement for specific entrustment,  it would  not be  possible to draw an inference of  entrustment of  custody or  dominion over  the property of  one spouse to the other and/or his or her close relations so  as to  attract  the  stringent  provisions  of Section  406,  IPC;  otherwise  there  would  be  disastrous effects and  consequences on  the peace  and  harmony  which ought to  prevail  in  matrimonial  homes.  The  appropriate remedy would  appear to  be by  way  of  a  civil  suit  for recovery of the stridhana property.      Fazal Ali,  J., speaking  for  himself  and  Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J.,  as he  then was, held that the possession of Saudayika or  stridhana of  a Hindu  married  female  during coverture is  absolutely clear  and unambiguous.  She is the

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absolute owner  of her  stridhana property and can deal with it in any manner she likes. She may spend the whole of it or give it away at her own pleasure by gift or will without any reference to  her husband.  Ordinarily, the  husband has  no right or  interest in  it with  the sole  exception that  in times of  extreme distress,  as in  famine, illness  or  the like, the  husband can utilise it but he is morally bound to restore it or its value when he is able to do so. This right is purely  personal to  the  husband  and  the  property  so received by him in marriage cannot be proceeded against even in execution  of  a  decree  for  debt  passed  against  the husband. If  in spite of demands for return of the articles, the husband  refuses to  return them to the wife, it amounts to an  offence of  criminal breach  of trust.  The stridhana property is  not a  joint  property  of  the  wife  and  the husband.  Section  27  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act  merely provides another  remedy of suit to recover from the husband or the persons to whom the stridhana property was entrusted. The mere  factum of the husband and the wife living together does not  entitle either  of them  to  commit  a  breach  of criminal law  and if one does, then he or she will be liable for all  the consequences  of such breach. By mere living in matrimonial  home   the  stridhana  does  not  become  joint property of  the spouses.  It  is  also  not  a  partnership property between  the wife  and the  husband. The concept of partnership is  alien to  the stridhana  property under  the personal law.  Therefore, entrustment  of stridhana, without creating any  right  in  the  husband  except,  putting  the articles in  the possession, does not entitle him to use the same to  the detriment  of his wife without her consent. The husband has  no justification  for not  returning  the  said articles as and when demanded by the wife; nor can he burden her with loss of business by using the said properties which were never  intended by  her while  entrusting possession of the stridhana.  The husband  being only  a custodian  of the stridhana of  his wife,  cannot  be  said  to  be  in  joint possession thereof  and does not acquire a joint interest in the property.  It was, therefore, concluded that the custody or entrustment  of the  stridhana with  the husband does not amount to  partnership in any sense of the term nor does the stridhana becomes  a joint  property. It was held in para 60 of the  judgment that taking all the allegations made in the complaint, by  no stretch  of imagination  it could  be said that they  do not  prima  facie  amount  to  an  offence  of criminal breach  of trust against the respondent. Thus there could be  no room for doubt that all the facts stated in the complaint constitute  an offence  under Section 406, IPC and the appellant  could not  be denied  the right  to prove her case at the trial by pre-empting it at the very inception by the order  passed by  the High  Court. Accordingly,  it  was quashed. Direction  was given to proceed with the trial from the stage  at which stay was granted by this Court. The only difference of  point was  whether there  should  be  special agreement of  entrustment. Varadarajan, J. elaborately dealt with the  special agreement and had held that in view of the fact that  wife and  husband have  dominion over  the wife’s property jointly,  proof of special agreement of entrustment is an essential ingredient.      In Mayne’s  Hindu Law  & Usage  [13th Edn.]  edited  by Justice Alladi  Kuppuswami, former  Chief Justice  of Andhra Pradesh High  Court, in  paragraph 644  at page  877  it  is stated that  "Katyayana indicates  a cross-classification of stridhana [Vivadachintamani  vide p.259; Jha HLS II, 529-31; Apararka, 21 MLJ (Jour.) 428. He further states: "that which is obtained  by a married woman or by a maiden, in the house

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of her  husband or of her father, from her brother (from her husband) or  from her  parents, is stridhana [Vide: Katyayna cited in  Mit., II,  xi, 5;  Smritichandrika, IX, ii,4-5; V. May., IV,  x,  8  etc.].  Under  the  caption  "Yautaka  and ayautake", it is stated that "Yautaka is that which is given at the nuptial fire... It includes all gifts made during the marriage ceremonies.  Ayautaka is  gift made before or after marriage. Saudayika  includes both  Yautaka and Ayautaka and received from  strangers. It  is defined  to be  gifts  from affectionate kindered".  In support  thereof, he  relied  on Venkatareddy v. Hanumant [(1993) 57 Bom 85] and Muthukaruppa v. Sellathammal  [(1916) 39  Mad. 298  at 300  and see  para No.10] At  page 881,  in paragraph  650, sub-para (4), it is stated that  "So also  gifts or  grants to her by strangers, whether made  during coverture  or when she is a widow, will be her  stridhana" [Vide Salemma v. Lutchmana [(1998) 21 Mad 100]. In  paragraph 652  on page 882, it is stated that "the absolute dominion of a woman over her saudayika property was admitted from  the earliest times". Katyayana declares: "The independence of women who have received the saudayika wealth is desirable  (in regard  to it), for it was given (by their kindered) for  their maintenance out of affection. The power of women  over saudayika  at all  times is  absolute both in respect of  gift and sale, according to their pleasure, even in (the  case of)  immovables". The  Smiritichandrika  would confine saudayika  to yautaka  or the  like, received  by  a woman from  her own  parents or persons connected with them, in the  house of  either her father or her husband, from the time of her betrothment to the completion of the ceremony to be performed  on the  occasion of  her entering  her  lord’s house. But  his view  has not  been followed.  The texts  of Katyayana  and   Vyasa  have   been   explained   by   other commentators as  including gifts  received by  her from  her husband, and  from others  after her marriage. The decisions of the courts have taken the same view. Provided the gift is made by her husband or her parents or by relatives either of her husband  or of  parents, it  is immaterial whether it is made before  marriage, at  marriage or after marriage. It is equally her  saudayika. In  other words, saudayika means all gifts and bequests from relations but not gifts and bequests from strangers.  Saudayika of  all sorts are absolutely at a woman’s own disposal. She may spend, sell, devise or give it away at  her own  pleasure. In  support of  that conclusion, footnote No.6 cites several decisions including Venkata Rama v. Venkata  Suriya [(1880)  2 Mad  333] and  Muthukaruppa v. Sellathammal  [(1916)   39  Mad   298]  etc.  It  is  stated thereafter that  her husband  can neither control her in her dealings with  it, nor use it himself. But he may take it in case of  extreme distress,  as in  a  famine,  or  for  some indispensable duty,  or during  illness, or while a creditor keeps him  in prison.  Even then he would appear to be under at least  a moral  obligation to  restore the  value of  the property when  able to  do so.  What he  has  taken  without necessity, he is bound to repay with interest. This right to take the  wife’s property  is purely  a personal  one in the husband. If  he does  not choose to avail himself of it, his creditors cannot  proceed against  her properties.  The word ‘take’ in  the  text  of  Yajanavalkya  means  ‘taking’  and ‘using’. Hence  if the husband taking his wife’s property in the exceptional circumstances mentioned in the text does not actually use  it, the  wife still  remains its owner and the husband’s creditors have no claim against the property.      A  woman’s   power  of  disposal,  independent  of  her husband’s control,  is not confined to saudavika but extends to  other  properties  as  well.  Devala  says:  "A  women’s

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maintenance (vritti),  ornaments, perquisites (sulka), gains (labha), are  her stridhana.  She herself  has the exclusive right to enjoy it. Her husband has no right to use it except in distress...".  In "N.R.  Raghavachariar’s  "Hindu  law  - Principles and  Precedents" [8th  Edn.] edited  by Prof.  S. Venkataraman, one  of the  renowned Professors  of Hindu law para 468  deals with  "Definition of Stridhana". In para 469 dealing with  "Sources of acquisition" it is stated that the sources of  acquisition of  property in a women’s possession are: gifts  before marriage, wedding gifts, gifts subsequent to marriage  etc. Para  470 deals  with "Gifts to a maiden". Para 471 deals with "Wedding gifts" and it is stated therein that properties gifted at the time of marriage to the bride, whether by  relations  or  strangers,  either  Adhiyagni  or Adhyavahanika, are  the bride’s  stridhana. In  para 481  at page 426, it is stated that ornaments presented to the bride by her  husband or father constitute her Stridhana property. In para  487 dealing  with "powers  during coverture"  it is stated that  saudayika  meaning  the  gift  of  affectionate kindered, includes  both Yautaka  or gifts  received at  the time of  marriage as  well  as  its  negative  Ayautaka.  In respect of  such property, whether given by gift or will she is the  absolute owner  and can  deal with it in any way she likes. She  may spend,  sell or  give it  away  at  her  own pleasure.      It is  thus clear  that the  properties gifted  to  her before the  marriage, at the time of marriage or at the time of  giving   farewell  or   thereafter  are   her  stridhana properties. It  is her  absolute property with all rights to dispose at  her own  pleasure. He  has no  control over  her stridhana property.  Husband may  use it  during the time of his distress  but nonetheless  he has  a moral obligation to restore the  same or  its  value  to  his  wife.  Therefore, stridhana property  does not  become a joint property of the wife and  the husband  and  the  husband  has  no  title  or independent dominion over the property as owner thereof.      In  this   backdrop,  the   question  that  arises  for consideration is:  whether the  fact of a wife’s having been driven out  from the  matrimonial home  without taking along with her  stridhana properties,  amount to  entrustment with the husband  within the meaning of Section 405, IPC? Section 405 defines "Criminal breach of trust thus:      "405. Criminal  breach of  trust. -      Whoever,  being   in   any   manner      entrusted with  property,  or  with      any   dominion    over    property,      dishonestly   misappropriates    or      converts  to   his  own   use  that      property, or  dishonestly  uses  or      disposes  of   that   property   in      violation of  any direction  of law      prescribing the  mode in which such      trust is to be discharge, or of any      legal contract, express or implied,      which he has made touching the <??>      of such  trust, or wilfully suffers      any other  person so to do, commits      "criminal breach of trust".      It is not necessary to refer to the Explanations to the said section  for the  purpose of  this case. Hence they are omitted.      Thus when the wife entrusts her stridhana property with the dominion  over that property to her husband or any other member of the family and the husband or such other member of the family  dishonestly misappropriates  or converts  to his

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own use  that property  or wilfully suffers any other person to do so, he commits criminal breach of trust. The essential ingredients for  establishing an  offence of criminal breach of trust  as defined  in Section  405 and  punishable  under Section 406, IPC with sentence for a period upto three years or with  fine or  with both,  are: [i] entrusting any person with property  or with  any dominion over property; [ii] the person entrusted  dishonestly misappropriating or converting to his  own use  that  property;  or  dishonestly  using  or disposing  of   that  property  or  wilfully  suffering  any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract made touching the discharge  of   such  trust.  The  expression  "entrustment" carries with it the implication that the person handing over any property or on whose behalf that property is handed over to another,  continues to  be its  owner. Entrustment is not necessarily  a   term  of   law.  It   may  have   different implications in  different contexts.  In  its  most  general significance, all its imports is handing over the possession for some  purpose which  may not imply the conferment of any proprietary  right  therein.  The  ownership  or  beneficial interest in the property in respect of which criminal breach of trust  is alleged to have been committed, must be in some person other than the accused and the latter must hold it on account of  some person  or in  some way for his benefit. In Pratibha  Rani’s   case,  the   majority   has   extensively considered the  words "entrustment"  of and  "dominion" over the  property.   All  the   case  law  in  that  behalf  was exhaustively considered  obviating the  necessity  to  tread once over  the same.  In order  to establish  entrustment of dominion over  the property,  both the majority and minority relied on  in particular the judgment of this Court in Velji Raghavji Patel  v. State  of Maharashtra  [(1965) 2 SCR 492] wherein it  was held  that in order to establish entrustment of dominion  over the  property to  an accused  person, mere existence of that person’s dominion over the property is not enough. It  must be  further shown that his dominion was the result of entrustment. The question therein pertained to the entrustment with  the dominion over the partnership property by  one   partner  to  the  other.  It  was  held  that  the prosecution must establish that the dominion over the assets or particular  assets of  the partnership  was by  a special agreement  between   the  parties.   The  property   of  the partnership being  a partnership  asset, every partner has a right o  or a  dominion over  it. It  was held  that special agreement was necessary to constitute an offence of criminal breach of  trust defined  under Section 405, IPS. In view of the finding  that  stridhana  property    is  the  exclusive property of  the  wife  on  proof  that  she  entrusted  the property or  dominion over  the stridhana  property  to  her husband or  any other member of the family, there is no need to establish any further special agreement to establish that the property was given to the husband or other member of the family. It  is always  a question of fact in each case as to how property  came to  be entrusted  to the  husband or  any other member  of the  family by  the wife  when she left the matrimonial home or was driven out therefrom. No absolute or fixed rule of universal application can be laid down in that behalf. It  requires to be established by the complainant or the prosecution,  depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, as to how and in what manner the entrustment of the stridhana  property or  dominion over her stridhana came to be  made to the husband or any other member of the family or the  accused person,  as the  case  may  be.  We  are  in respectful agreement  with the  majority  view  in  Pratibha

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Rani’s case and consequently requires no reconsideration.      The next  question is;  whether the  appellant has made out any  prima facie  case of  entrustment in that behalf? A reading of  the complaint clearly indicates that her parents entrusted the  property to the respondent at the time of her farewell from  her parents  house  in  Lucknow.  They  lived together in  matrimonial home  in Deli.  Three children were born from  the  wedlock  and  during  that  period  she  had retained the  custody of  the property.  When she  left  the matrimonial home  she had  not taken  the property with her. She has  specifically averred  that when she went in October 1978 to Cochin requesting the respondent-husband to take her into matrimonial  home along  with the children, he promised to take  her in  the conjugal society and also that he would return the  jewellery to  her subject  to the condition that she should withdraw her application filed under Section 9 of the Hindu  Marriage Act  for restitution  of conjugal rights and accordingly  she  had  withdrawn  the  application.  The learned Single  Judge failed  to  correctly  appreciate  her evidence recorded  under Section  200 of  the Code  that she made a  demand for  return of  the jewellery  and  household goods. On  the other  hand,  a  fair  reading  of  it  would indicate that  when she  met the  respondent in  Cochin  and requested to take her and children to home he promised to do so on  her withdrawing  the case for restitution of conjugal rights. Threat  the husband  promised to  return them but he did not  keep up  his promise.  The sequences  that followed were that she filed another case for restitution of conjugal rights and an application for maintenance and thereafter she filed the  complaint under  Section 406, IPC. A fair reading of the  averments would  clearly indicate that a prima facie case of entrustment of the jewellery and the household goods had been  made out.  The learned  Judge  was  not  right  in jumping to  the conclusion  that the  averments made  by the respondent  in   the  counter-affidavit  disclosed  that  no entrustment was  made of  the jewellery,  cash and household goods and  other movables  enumerated in  Annexures I and II details of  which are  not material  for our purpose. In the light of  the above,  we are  of the view that a prima facie case of  entrustment had  been made  out by the appellant as the stridhana  properties were  not returned  to her  by the husband.  Obviously,   therefore,  the  learned  Magistrate, having taken  cognizance of  the offence, had issued process for appearance of the respondent. It is fairly settled legal position that  at the  time  of  taking  cognisance  of  the offence, the  Court has  to consider only the averments made in the  complaint or in the charge-sheet filed under Section 173, as  the case  may be.  It was held in State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla  [(1996) 8  SCC 164]  that it is not open for the  Court to  sift or  appreciate the  evidence at that stage with  reference  to  the  material  and  come  to  the conclusion  that  no  prima  facie  case  is  made  out  for proceeding further  in the matter. It is equally settled law that it is open to the Court, before issuing the process, to record the  evidence and  on consideration  of the averments made in  the complaint  and the evidence thus adduced, it is required to  find out  whether an offence has been made out. On finding  that such an offence has been made out and after taking cognizance  thereof, process  would be  issued to the respondent to  take further steps in the matters. If it is a charge-sheet filed  under Section 173 of the Code, the facts stated by  the prosecution in the charge-sheet, on the basis of  the   evidence  collected  during  investigation,  would disclose the  offence for which cognisance would be taken by the court  to proceed  further in the matter. Thus it is not

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the province  of the  court at that stage to embark upon and sift the  evidence to come to the conclusion whether offence has been  made out or not. The learned Judge, therefore, was clearly in  error in  attempting to  sift the  evidence with reference to  the averments  made by  the respondent  in the counter-affidavit  to   find  out  whether  or  not  offence punishable under Section 406, IPC had been made out.      The next question that needs to be answered is: whether the complaint  filed by  the appellant  in September 1990 is time barred?  Section 468  of the  Code prescribes period of limitation. Under  sub-section (3)  thereof, the  period  of limitation shall be three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment  for a  term exceeding  one year  but  not exceeding three  years, Since  the offence  alleged to  have been committed by the respondent is punishable under Section 406, viz.,  criminal breach  of trust, and the punishment of imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine or with both,  the complaint  is required  to be  filed  within three years  from date  of the commission of the offence. It is seen  that the appellant has averred in paragraphs 21 and 22 of  the complaint  that she  demanded from the respondent return of  jewellery detailed  in Annexure  I and  household goods mentioned  in Annexure  II on December 5, 1987 and the respondent flatly  refused to  return the  stridhana of  the complainant-wife. In  paragraph 22  of the  complaint, it is stated  that   the  complainant  was  forced  to  leave  the matrimonial home  in the  manner described and the stridhana mentioned in Annexures I and II belonging to the complainant was entrusted  to the respondent-accused which he refused to return to  the complainant.  Thus she  has averred  that the respondent  "has  illegally,  dishonestly  and  mala  fidely retained and  converted it to his own use which is clearly a criminal  breach  of  trust  in  respect  of  the  aforesaid property". The  complaint was  admittedly filed on September 10, 1990  meaning within  three years  from the  date of the demand and  refusal by  the respondent.  The  learned  Judge relied upon  her evidence  recorded under Section 200 of the Code. The  learned counsel  for the  respondent read out the text of  the evidence  to establish  that the  appellant had demanded in  October 1986  for return  of the  jewellery and that  the  respondent  refused  to  do  the  same.  Thus  it constitutes refusal  from which  date the  limitation period began to  run and the complaint have been filed in September 1990, is time barred, i.e., beyond three years. That view of the learned  Judge is  clearly based on the evidence torn of the context without reference to the specific averments made in the complaint and the evidence recorded under section 200 of the  Code. As  stated earlier,  the sequence in which the averments came  to be  made was the voluntary promise of the respondent and  his failure  to abide  by the promise. It is incongruous to comprehend the demand for return of jewellery etc, at  the stage  when she  was persuading him to take her into  matrimonial   home.  Accordingly,  we  hold  that  the complaint was filed within the limitation.      The question,  therefore, whether  it is  a  continuing offence and  limitation began  to  run  everyday  loses  its relevance, in view of the above finding. The decisions cited in support  thereof, viz.,  Vanka  Radhamanohari  (Smt.)  v. Vanka Venkata Reddy & Ors. [(1993) 3 SCC 4] and Balram Singh vs. Sukhwant  Kaur [(1992)  Crl. L.J.  792 F.B. (P&H)] hence need not  be considered.  It is  well settled legal position that the High Court should sparingly and cautiously exercise the  power   under  Section  482  of  the  Code  to  prevent miscarriage of justice. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shri Pirthi Chand  & Anr.  [JT  1995  (9)  411]  two  of  us  [K.

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Ramaswamy and S.B. Majmudar, JJ.] composing the Bench and in State of  U.P. Vs.  O.P. Sharma  [(1996) 7 SCC 70], a three- Judge Bench  of this  Court, reviewed the entire care law on the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code  to quash  the complaint or the charge-sheet or the First Information  Report and held that the High Court would be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under Section  482 of  the Code  or under Article 226 of the Constitution. The  Court would consider whether the exercise of the  power would advance the cause of justice or it would tantamount to  abuse of  the process  of the  Court.  Social stability and  order require  to be  regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before  embarking upon  the exercise  of  the  inherent power vested  in the  Court. Same view was taken in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan lal & Ors. [(1992) Supp. 1 SCC 355] and G.L.  Didwania &  Anr. v.  Income  Tax  Officer  &  Anr. [(1995) Supp. SCC 25] etc.      Considered from this perspective, we hold that the High Court    was     wholly    wrong     in     quashing     the complaint/proceedings, under  Section 432  of the  Code. The appeal is  accordingly allowed.  The judgment  of  the  High Court  is   set  aside.  We  make  it  clear  that  all  the observations in  the judgment on merits are only to find out prima facie  case whether  the High Court would be justified in the  exercise of  its power  under Section 482. The trial Court will  have to decide the case on its own merits in the light of  the evidence  that may be led at the trial without being influenced  in any  manner by  our  observations  made hereinabove. The trial Court is directed to proceed from the stage the  complaint was pending at the time of quashing, to take further steps in accordance with law.