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PETITIONER: SMT. PUSHPA DEVI & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MILKHI RAM

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/02/1990

BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) KASLIWAL, N.M. (J)

CITATION:  1990 AIR  808            1990 SCR  (1) 278  1990 SCC  (2) 134        JT 1990 (1)   176  1990 SCALE  (1)136

ACT:     East  Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,  1949:  Section 2(h)(i)  ’Tenant’-Meaning and scope of--Whether  includes  a person claiming to be a tenant.     Section     13(2)(i)--Proviso--Tendering     of     rent arrears--Benefit  available  to a person claiming  to  be  a tenant--Existence of admitted jural relationship of landlord and tenant not necessary.     Statutory     Interpretation:     Statute-interpretation clause--Definition of a word--Governs that word used in  the Statute  unless the context requires  otherwise--’The   con- text’--’Internal  context’--’External context’--What is.

HEADNOTE:     The  respondent-landlord  filed  an  eviction   petition against  the appellants under section 13 of the East  Punjab Urban  Rent Restriction Act, 1949 on the grounds of  arrears of rent, sub-letting and making material alterations impair- ing the utility of the building. On the first date of  hear- ing  before the Rent Controller the appellants tendered  the arrears  of  rent  but the  respondent-landlord  refused  to accept  it  on the ground that the tender of  rent  was  not valid since it included rent on behalf of a disputed tenant. Accepting  the  case  of unauthorised  subletting  the  Rent Controller  allowed the eviction petition holding  that  the rent tendered was not in terms of the proviso to sub-section (2)(i)  of  section 13 because only  the  undisputed  tenant alone ought to have tendered the rent.     The  appellate  authority dismissed the  appeal  on  the preliminary point of validity of tendering of rent,  holding that  the  rent deposited by the appellants was  not  valid, since one of the appellants was a stranger.     The  High  Court confirmed the order  of  the  appellate authority by dismissing the tenant’s revision in limine.     In the appeal to this Court on the question, whether the word  ’tenant’  included a person claiming to be  a  tenant, allowing the appeal, this Court, 279     HELD: 1. When a word has been defined in the interpreta- tion  clause, prima facie that definition  governs  wherever that  word  is used in the body of the  Statute  unless  the

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context requires otherwise. The context is both internal and external.  The internal context requires the interpreter  to situate the disputed words within the section of which  they are part and in relation to the rest of the Act. The  exter- nal  context involves determining the meaning from  ordinary linguistic usage (including any special technical  meanings) from  the  purpose for which the provision was  passed,  and from  the place of the provisions within the general  scheme of statutory and common law rules and principles. [286E-G] Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 2nd ed. p. 48, referred to.     1.1  Even where the definition is exhaustive in as  much as  the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it  is possible  for the word to have a somewhat different  meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the  subject or context. [287B]     Vanguard  Fire  and General Insurance Co.  Ltd.  v.  M/s Fraser and Ross & Anr., [1960] 3 SCR 857, followed.     2.  The opening sentence in the definition of Section  2 of  the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949  states "unless  there is anything repugnant in the subject or  con- text".  In  view of this qualifications, the Court  has  not only  to look at the words but also to examine  the  context and  collocation in the light of the object of the  Act  and the purpose for which a particular provision was made by the Legislature. [286G-H]     3.  The  apparent  purpose of  the  proviso  to  Section 13(2)(i)  was  to  relieve the defaulting  tenant  from  the extreme  penalty of eviction. The provision is analogous  to Section  114  of the Transfer of Property  Act,  1882  which confers  discretion  on the Court to  grant  relief  against forfeiture  for non-payment of rent. But the proviso goes  a step further and leaves no such discretion to the controller or Court even if the tenant is a constant defaulter. If  the arrears and other amounts specified are paid or tendered  on the  first  date  of hearing, the default as  a  ground  for eviction  disappears  and the Controller is  precluded  from passing  a decree for eviction. The governing  principle  of the proviso is that the tenant could pay and stay an  action for  eviction on default. At the same time, the landlord  is ensured  payment of arrears, interest and the costs that  he has  incurred without the necessity of going to civil  court to 280 recover  it. The proviso affords a real and sanctified  pro- tection to tenant against eviction on the ground of default. It  should not be given a hypothetical or literal  construc- tion, but should be meaningfully construed. The  legislative protection  concerning  the tenants should not  be  narrowly tailored.  Indeed,  it  should be given  wider  meaning  and broader concept. [287G-H; 288A; D]     Court  should try to understand the spirit of  the  text and not be bound by letter. [288D] Mangat Rai v. Kidarnath, [1981] 1 SCR 476, followed. Hudson  County Water Co. v. Me Carter, 209 US 349,  referred to.     4. Taking into account the intention of the  legislature and  the purposes for which the proviso was enacted,  it  is clear  that  the  obligation to tender the  rent  under  the proviso  to Section 13(2)(i) on the first hearing date  does not depend upon the existence of admitted jural relationship of  landlord  and  tenant. When an action  for  eviction  is brought by the landlord or the ground of default, the provi- so  stands  attracted. The benefit of the proviso  could  be availed  of by the tenant and also by those who claim to  be the tenant. [289D-E]

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   Ram Gopal & Ors. v. Ram Prakash & Ors., [1963] RLR  1112 and  Punjab  Rajasthan Goods Carriers & Ors. v.  Onkar  Mal, [1977] RLR 1195, overruled.     5. Law as creative response should be so interpreted  to meet the different fact situations coming before the  Court. For,  Acts of Parliament were not drafted with divine  pres- cience  and  perfect  clarity. It Is not  possible  for  the legislators  to  foresee  the manifold  sets  of  facts  and controversies  which  may  arise while giving  effect  to  a particular  provision. Indeed, the legislators do  not  deal with the specific controversies. When conflicting  interests arise  or defect appears from the language of  the  Statute, the  Court by consideration of the legislative  intent  must supplement the written word with ’force and life’. [287E-F] Seaford Estate Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 KB 481, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  263  of 1983. From the Judgment and Order dated 4.1.1983 of the Punjab and 281 Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 3243 of 1982. M.K. Ramamurthi and S.K. Agarwal for the Appellants.     S.K. Mehta, Aman Vachher, Atul Nanda and K.L. Verma  for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     K.  JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. The appeal concerns the  scope and  construction of Section 13 sub-section 2(i) proviso  of the  East  Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,  1949  (called shortly  as  ’The Act’). The point at issue relates  to  the validity  of  the arrears of rent deposited  by  the  tenant under the proviso.     Milkhi Ram-the respondent in this appeal is the landlord of the premises consisting of a shop at Ludhiana. In  Febru- ary 1958 the shop was taken on rent by Amar Chand. The  rent agreed  was  Rs.45 per month. In December  1975  Amar  Chand died.  His  brother  Diwan Chand succeeded  to  the  tenancy rights.  In  November 1976 he also died leaving  behind  his widow Pushpa Devi and his minor son Yashpal. They are appel- lants 1 and 2 in this appeal. The landlord brought an action for  eviction under section 13 of the Act on the  ground  of arrears  of rent, sub-letting etc. His case was that  appel- lants  1 and 2 inducted Saligram appellant No: 3 as  a  sub- tenant and delivered exclusive possession of the shop  prem- ises.  The eviction was also sought on the ground  that  the tenant has made alterations resulting in material impairment in  the value and utility of the premises.  The  appellant’s case  was that the shop was taken on lease by Amar Chand  as partner  of  the firm M/s Amar Chand in  which  Amar  Chand, Diwan  Chand and Saligram were all partners in the  business from  the  very commencement of tenancy.  They  denied  that Saligram  was inducted as subtenant. They also  refuted  the allegations  as to material alterations affecting the  value and utility of the premises.     Before the Rent Controller the respondents on the  first date of hearing tendered the arrears of rent, with  interest and  cost determined by the Controller. The amount was  ren- dered evidently under the proviso to Section 13  sub-section (2)(i)  of the Act. Mr. Satpal Singh the common counsel  for all the respondents tendered the amount alongwith his state- ment, which reads as follows: "I tender Rs.2025 as arrears of rent from 1.12.1975 to 282

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31.8.  1979,  Rs.240 as interest and Rs.25 as costs  as  as- sessed on behalf of all the respondents, total amounting  to Rs.2290."     The  landlord  did not accept the amount  but  made  the following endorsement: "1  do  not  accept the tender as it is  neither  legal  nor valid. The respondent No. 3 Saligram, is a sub-tenent."     The Rent Controller at that stage did not state  whether the objection of the landlord was legal and justified. Since the eviction was also based on other grounds, he allowed the parties to lead evidence on all the questions. After consid- ering  the evidence adduced by the parties,  the  Controller found  no substance in the allegations that the  tenant  has made  any material alteration impairing the utility  of  the building. On the question of original tenancy agreement,  he found  that the original tenant was not in  the  partnership firm  of which Amar Chand was partner, but Amar  Chand  took the premises in his personal name and the tenancy was there- fore personal to him. He also accepted the case of  unautho- rised sub-letting and held that respondent No. 3 was a  sub- tenant  inducted  into the premises without consent  of  the landlord.  On the validity of the amount tendered on  behalf of  all respondents including Saligram it was held that  the tender  was  not legal and valid since Saligram  was  not  a tenant.  In other words, he held that the rent  tendered  by counsel  for and on behalf of all the respondents was not  a legal  tender  in  terms of Section  13  sub-section  (2)(i) proviso  and the undisputed tenant alone ought to have  ten- dered the rent. With these findings the Controller  accepted the  eviction  petition and directed the  tenant’s  eviction from the premises.     The appeal preferred by the tenant was disposed of on  a preliminary  point, that is, on the validity of  the  amount deposited by the common counsel for the parties on the first date  of hearing of the case. The appellate  authority  held that the amount deposited on behalf of the three respondents was not valid since Saligram was a stranger. On this aspect, the appellate authority had little discretion in view of the two decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court Ram Gopal & Ors.  v.  Ram Prakash and Ors., [1963] RLR 1112  and  Punjab Rajasthan  Goods Carriers & Ors. v. Onkar Mal, [1977] RLR  1 195.  In  both the cases, the High Court has held  that  the tenant as defined under the Act could deposit or tender  the amount under the proviso and not a stranger. Following those decisions, the appellate authority confirmed 283 the  eviction  and dismissed the  appeal  without  examining whether Saligram was also a tenant, or whether the  original tenancy was in favour of the partnership firm of which  Amar Chand was a partner.     The order Of the appellate authority has been  confirmed by  the  High Court by dismissing the tenant’s  revision  in limine.     The  tenant alongwith Saligram by obtaining  leave  have preferred this appeal.     Since  the  validity of the deposit made by  the  tenant under the proviso to sub-section (2)(i) of Section 13 is  in question  and which in turn depends upon the principle  laid down  by the High Court in the said two authorities,  it  is convenient at this stage to have those cases properly analy- sed. In Ram Gopal case the arrears of rent were tendered  by Chetan Ram, the tenant, his son Ram Bhagat alongwith Banarsi Das  and  Dhani Ram who were said to be the  strangers.  The landlord  refused to accept that amount on the  ground  that the  tenant was Chetan Ram alone and as the amount was  ten-

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dered by persons other than Chetan Ram as well, there was no proper  tender. The trial court accepted the  contention  of the landlord. Before the High Court it was contended for the tenant that the tender was valid since one of the  tenderers was the tenant himself and the mere fact that he has  joined the  other  persons  who are strangers would  not  make  any difference.  The tender must be deemed to be by  the  tenant and his associates should be ignored. The High Court did not accept  the  submission. By following some of  the  previous cases, it held that under the proviso the payment or  tender must  be made exclusively by or on behalf of the tenant  and on  his  account. The payment or tender made by  the  tenant alongwith  the strangers and also on their account would  be in contravention of the proviso and invalid. The High  Court accordingly affirmed the order of eviction.     Onkar Mal is also a case of eviction based on arrears of rent  as one of the grounds. The action was brought  against Gulab Chand and Bhanwar Lal, the original tenants and  Sohan Lal,  Jagan  Nath and Balkar Singh alleged to  be  the  sub- tenants  inducted into the premises without consent  of  the landlord.  The  undisputed tenant did not attend  the  court despite  due service of notice and was  proceeded  ex-parte. The  alleged sub-tenants in their written statement  claimed that  they  shared the tenancy since they had  entered  into partnership with the tenant for carrying on theft  business. They tendered the arrears of rent together with interest and costs of the proceedings on the first date of 284 hearing  of the case. The question arose whether the  tender was valid and whether the alleged sub-tenants could  deposit the arrears of rent on their own account and also on  behalf of  the undisputed tenant. The landlord however, refused  to accept the amount on the ground that those who deposited the arrears  were not his tenants and they had no  authority  to tender  the rent on behalf of Bhanwar Lal and  Gulab  Chand. The Rent Controller did not make any specific order on  that contention.  He proceeded to consider the question  of  sub- letting.  After  considering the evidence  produced  by  the parties he recorded a finding that there was sub-letting  by the tenant and consequently ordered eviction. The  appellate authority and also the High Court concurred with that  opin- ion. The High Court further held that it is only the persons who fall within the definition of ’tenant’ could tender  the rent  under the proviso and not a third party or  sub-tenant inducted into the premises without consent of the landlord.     In the instant case, the appellate authority being bound by those two authorities has rejected the amount tendered by counsel  as being invalid. The correctness of that view  has been challenged in this appeal.     We  may begin with the relevant provisions of  the  Act. The Act provides inter-alia to restrict the increase of rent of  certain  premises situated within the  limits  of  urban areas,  and  the eviction of tenants therefrom.  Section  13 sets out the grounds for eviction and prohibits eviction  of tenants  except in accordance with the provisions  contained therein. Sub-section (2) provides that a landlord who  seeks to  evict  his tenant shall apply to the  Controller  for  a direction  in  that behalf. Clause (i) to (v)  set  out  the grounds  of eviction. Clause (i) nonpayment of rent;  clause (ii)  sub-letting  without the consent of  the  landlord  or misusing  the  building for a purpose other  than  that  for which  it was leased; clause (iii) committing such  acts  as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of  the building or rented land; clause (iv) tenant has been  guilty of such acts and conduct as are a nuisance to the  occupiers

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of buildings in the neighbourhood; and clause (v) tenant not occupying  the  building  for a continuous  period  of  four months without reasonable cause where the building is  situ- ated  in a place other than a hill station. If the  landlord establishes any one of these grounds against the tenant, the Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and if the  Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an  order rejecting the application. 285     Although  the Act makes default in payment of rent as  a ground  for  eviction, yet, the efficacy of  the  ground  is different. In this context. Section 13 sub-section (2)(i) is more important and it is, therefore. fully extracted hereun- der: "13(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall  apply to  the  Controller for a direction in that behalf.  If  the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the applicant, is satisfied (i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building or rented land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement  of tenancy  with  his landlord or in the absence  of  any  such agreement, by the last day of the month next following  that for which the rent is payable. Provided that if the tenant on the first hearing of applica- tion  for  ejectment after due service pays or  tenders  the arrears  of rent and interest at six per cent per  annum  on such arrears together with the cost of application  assessed by  the Controller, the tenant shall be deemed to have  duly paid or tendered the rent within the time aforesaid."     This is a special provision made for the benefit of  the tenant who has defaulted to pay the agreed rent.     Various Rent Control Acts provide protection from  evic- tion to the tenant with provisions similar to the proviso in question.  Reference may be made to Section  13  sub-section 2(i) proviso of the Haryana Act, (ii) Section 12 Sub-section 3(b)  of  the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, (iii) Section  14  sub- section 2(j) proviso of the Himachal Pradesh Act.     Mr.  Mehta learned counsel for  the  landlord-respondent sought to justify the view taken by the High Court of Punjab in  Ram Gopal and Onkar Mal Cases. His argument went on  the literal  construction  or strict construction based  on  the word  ’tenant’ defined under section 2(h)(i) of the Act.  He urged that the word ’tenant’ referred to in the proviso must carry  the same meaning as given to it under the  definition and  ’tenant’  as defined thereunder is  alone  entitled  to avail of the benefit of the proviso and no others. 286     We recognise that Section 13 sub-section (2)(i)  proviso refers to the tenant and his obligation to pay or tender the arrears  of  rent, interest and costs if he  wants  to  save himself from eviction. We also recognise that under  section 2(h)(i) the word ’tenant’ is defined to mean "any person  by whom  or on whose account rent is payable for a building  or rented  land and includes a tenant continuing in  possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour but  does not  include a person placed in occupation of a building  or rented land by its tenant unless with the consent in writing of  the landlord  .....  But the law in the Court’s  keeping is  just  not a system of logical abstraction. Nor it  is  a bucket  of  ready  made answers determined  by  any  general formula  or  principle in advance. In a famous  passage  Mr. Justice Holmes said: "All  rights  tend to declare themselves absolute  to  their

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logical  extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the  neigh- bourhood of principles of policy which are other than  those on which the particular right is rounded, and which  becomes strong  enough  to hold their own when a  certain  point  is reached  .....  The boundary at which the conflicting inter- ests balance cannot be determined by any general formula  in advance, but points in the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side." (Hudson County Water Co.  V. MeCarter, 209 US 349,355-356). It  true when a word has been defined in the  interpretation clause,  prima facie that definition governs  wherever  that word  is  used  the body of the Statute unless  the  context requires otherwise. "The context" as pointed out in the book Cross-Statutory Interpretation (2nd ed. 48)  is both  inter- nal and external". The internal context requiers the  inter- preter  to  situate the disputed words  within  the  section of  which they are part and in relation to the rest  of  the Act.  The external context involves determining the  meaning from ordinary linguistic usage (including any special  tech- nical meanings) from the purpose for which the provision was passed,  and  from the place of the  provisions  within  the general scheme of statutory and common law rules and princi- ples. The opening sentence in the definition of the Section states unless  mere  is  anything  repugnant  in  the  subject   or context".  In view of this qualification, the Court has  not only  to look at the words but also to examine  the  context and  collocation in the light of the object of the  Act  and the purpose for which a particular provision was made by 287 the  Legislature. Reference may be made to the  observations of  Wanchoo, J., in Vanguard Five and General Insurance  Co. Ltd. v. M/s Fruser and Ross & Anr., [1960] 3 SCR 857 at  863 where the learned Judge said that even where the  definition is exhaustive in as much as the word defined is said to mean a  certain  thing,  it is possible for the word  to  have  a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the  Act depending  upon  the subject or context. In that  case,  the learned judge examined the construction of the word  ’insur- er’  as used in Section 33(1) and 2-D of the Insurance  Act, 1938,  in  the light of the definition of  that  word  under Section  2(9)  thereof. The Insurance Act  by  Section  _(9) defines an ’insurer’ as a person carrying on the business of insurance’.  The question arose whether sections  33(1)  and 2-D did not apply to an insurer who had closed his  business completely as the definition of the word insurer in  section 2(9)  postulates actual carrying on of the business. It  was pointed  out that in the context of sections 33(1)  and  2-D and  taking into account the policy of the Act and the  pur- poses  for  which the control was imposed on  insurers,  the word ’Insurer’ in the said sections also refers to  insurers who  were  carrying on the business of  insurance  but  have closed it.     Great artistry on the Bench as elsewhere is,  therefore, needed  before  we accept, reject or modify  any  theory  or principle. Law as creative response should be so interpreted to  meet  the different fact situations corning  before  the court. For, Acts of Parliament were not drafted with  divine prescience  and perfect clarity. It is not possible for  the legislators  to foresee the manifold sets of facts and  con- troversies which may arise while giving effect to a particu- lar provision. Indeed, the legislators do not deal with  the specific controversies. When conflicting interests arise  or defect  appears from the language of the statute, the  Court

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by  consideration of the legislative intent must  supplement the written word with ’force and life’. See, the observation of Lord Denning in Seaford Estate Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 KB 481 at 498.     The  apparent purpose of the proviso was to relieve  the defaulting  tenant from extreme penalty of  eviction.  There cannot be any doubt on this purpose. The provision seems  to be analogous to Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1892  which confers discretion to the Court to grant  relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent. But the  proviso goes  a  step further and leaves no such discretion  to  the controller  or  court even if the tenant is a  constant  de- faulter. If the arrears and other amounts specified are paid or  tendered on the first date of hearing, the default as  a ground  for eviction disappears and the Controller  is  pre- cluded from passing a decree for eviction. The 288 governing principle of the proviso is that the tenant  could pay  and stay in an action for eviction on default.  At  the same  time,  the  landlord is ensured  payment  of  arrears, interest  and  the costs that he has  incurred  without  the necessity of going to civil court to recover it. This  seems to be the will and intention of the legislature in the shape and scope or’ the proviso.     Against  this  backdrop, we have to  construe  the  word ’tenant used in the proviso. Mr. Ramamurthy, learned counsel for  the  appellants urged for liberal construction  of  the word  so  as to include a person claiming to  be  a  tenant. Reference  was  made  to the observation of  this  Court  in Mangat Rai v. Kidarnath, [1981] 1 SCR 4-76. There Fazal Ali, J.,  said  that the proviso in question affords a  real  and sanctified  protection  to tenant against  eviction  on  the ground of default. It should not be given a hypothetical  or literal construction, but should be meaningfully  construed. We  agree with this observation. The legislative  protection concerning  the  tenants should not  be  narrowly  tailored. Indeed,  it should be given wider meaning and  broader  con- cept. We should try to understand the spirit of the text and not be bound by letter.     The  argument of counsel for the landlord  however,  was that  the  proviso  was intended to protect  the  tenant  as defined under the statute and not a person claiming to be  a tenant.  The persons who are not tenants could  not,  there- fore,  be given the benefit of the proviso. This  submission or the interpretation suggested by counsel does not  provide a square answer for all problems coming before the court. If there  are  proceedings for eviction with  persons  claiming tenancy  along with the undisputed tenant or to  his  exclu- sion,  the acceptance of that submission may lead  to  arbi- trary  and  unjust result. Take for instance,  the  landlord brings  an  action for eviction on default against A  and  B where  A is recognised as the tenant, but not B.  B  however claims  that  he shares the tenancy with A and  joins  A  in tendering  the arrears on the first date of hearing  of  the case. A also does not dispute that claim. But if the conten- tion  of the landlord that the tenant as defined  under  the Act is alone entitled to tender the amount is accepted,  the court  could  make an order of eviction  by  discarding  the deposit. That would be repugnant to our notions of justice.     Take another hypothetical case whose occurrence is  more probable  and which often arises for decision. The  landlord brings  an  action for eviction against A on the  ground  of default  and  also on sub-letting to B. But  B  denies  sub- letting and contends that he was 289

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inducted into the premises with the consent of the landlord. A remains absent, perhaps he is not interested in the  prem- ises.  B however, tenders the rent on his own  account,  but the landlord refuses to accept it on the plea that B has  no right  to tender the rent since he is not a recognised  ten- ant. The acceptance of that view may result in ejectment  of A  and  B  before determining the  controversy  between  the parties.  Both  of them may have to be  thrown  out  without deciding the issue raised in the pleadings.     We  cannot  have "Sentence  first--verdict  afterwards". That  is  possible only by the demand of Queen  in  "Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland" (By Lewis Carroll p. 186). We must construe the proviso so as to effectuate the twin considera- tions  which  we discussed earlier. We  must  eliminate  the construction  which  is productive of  injustice.  arbitrary result and undesirable consequence.     It is time for us to be explicit. Taking into account of the intention of the legislature and the purposes for  which the  proviso  was enacted, we are of the  opinion  that  the obligation to tender the rent under the proviso on the first hearing date does not depend upon the existence of  admitted jural  relationship of landlord and tenant. When  an  action for  eviction  is brought by the landlord on the  ground  of default,  the proviso stands attracted. The benefit  of  the proviso could be availed of by the tenant and also by  those who  claim  to be the tenant. The view to the  contrary  ex- pressed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Ram Gopal and  Onkar Mal cases is likely to be of greater mischief  to the  tenants  than a protection for them  and  is  therefore overruled.     In  the result, the appeal is allowed, the  judgment  of the  appellate  authority as affirmed by the High  Court  is reversed.  The matter stands remitted to the  appellate  au- thority  for disposal in the light of the observations  made and in accordance with law. In  the  circumstances of the case, we make no order  as  to costs. N.V.K.                                                Appeal allowed. 290