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PETITIONER: SMT.  PADMINI KUNWAR JU SAHIBA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH.(now Madhya Pradesh)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/02/1961

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1961 AIR 1204            1961 SCR  (3) 907

ACT: Jagir  Abolition-Jagirdar-Ijaredar,  meaning   of-Lambardari lease, if Jagir-Vindhya Predesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952(11 of 1952), S. 2(1)(C).

HEADNOTE: In  1945 the Ruler of Panna granted a " Lambardari lease  in certain villages to the appellant.  By a notification  dated January 1, 1954, issued under the Vindhya Pradesh  Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952, the respondent resumed the appellant’s right.  The appellant contended that she was not  a  jagirdar  within  the meaning of  the  Act  and  the notification   was  without  the  authority  of  law.    The respondent contended that the appellant was an " Ijaredar  " and  fell within the inclusive part of the definition  of  " jagirdar " in s. 2(1)(c). Held,  that the appellant was not a jagirdar and  her  right under  the Lambardari lease could not be resumed  under  the Abolition Act.  In the context in which the word "  Ijaredar " was used in S. 2(1)(C) it meant a person holding an  Ijara which  was  a  lease  or  farm  of  land  revenue  or  other proprietary  right  as  distinguished from  other  kinds  of leases.   The Lambardari lease granted to the appellant  was not  a mere-farm of land revenue but it conferred rights  in the land itself.  It was not a mere Ijara, the appellant was not  a  mere  "  Ijaredar  " and  was  not  covered  by  the definition of jagirdar in S. 2(1)(C). Thakur  Amar  Singhji v. State of Rajasthan  [1955]2  S.C.R. 303, applied.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :Civil Appeal No. 250 of 1956. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated January 17,  1955, of   the  former  Judicial  Commissioner’s  Court,   Vindhya Pradesh, in Misc.  Civil Writ Application No. 105 of 1954. G, S. Pathak and G. C. Mathur for the appellant. B., Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar for the respondent. 1961.  February 21.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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908 WANCHOO,  J.-This is an appeal on a, certificate granted  by the  Judicial  Commissioner of Vindhya  Pradesh.  The  brief facts   necessary  for  present  purposes  are  these:   The appellant   filed   a  petition  under  Art.  226   of   the Constitution   praying   that  the  order  of   the   Deputy Commissioner,  Panna,  issued on December 29, 1953,  to  the effect that the appellant’s rights in certain villages would be  resumed  from  January-1,  1954,  in  pursuance  of  the notification  of  the Government of  Vindhya  Pradesh  dated December  20,  1953,  under  s. 5  of  the  Vindhya  Pradesh Abolition  of  Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, No. XI  of  1952 (hereinafter  called  the Act) resuming all  jagirs  with  a gross  annual  income of Rs. 1,000/- or above,  be  quashed. The  appellant’s case was that she was granted as a  special case a Lambardari lease in certain villages by His  Highness the  Maharaja of Panna on December 7, 1945, for a period  of thirty   years  and  had  been  in  possession  thereof   in accordance  with  the  terms of the  lease.   The  appellant contended that she was not a jagirdar within the meaning  of the Act and thus the said notification did not apply to  her lands and the order issued by the Deputy Commissioner  under the said notification was therefore without the authority of law  and liable to be quashed.  She contended  further  that she was not a jagirdar under any law, rules, regulations  or orders  governing  jagirdars  in force in any  part  of  the State,  and therefore her lands could not be resumed in  the manner in which the resumption had been made. The petition was opposed on behalf of the State’ and it  was contended  that  the  appellant was a  jagirdar  within  the meaning  of  that  term in the Act.   The  learned  Judicial Commissioner  held  that the appellant was an  Ijaredar  and therefore a, jagirdar within’ the meaning of s. 2 (1) (c) of the  Act.   In consequence he dismissed  the  petition.   An application  was  then made for a certificate to  appeal  to this Court, which was granted and that is bow the appeal has come up before us. The only question that falls for our decision is whether the appellant can be said to be an Ijaredar 909 within the meaning of s. 2 (1) (c) of the Act.  A jagirdar " is defined in s. 2 (1) (c) as meaning any person  recognised as  a Jagirdar under any law, rules, regulations  or  orders governing , Jagirdars in force in any part of the State  and includes an Ilakedar, a Pawaidar, a sub-Pawaidar (in  direct relation  with the Government or otherwise an  ljaredar,  an Ubaridar,  a  Zamindar, a, Muafidar and a Grantee  of  Jagir land  from a Jagirdar.  " " Jagir land " is defined in s.  2 (1)  (d)  as meaning " any land in which or in  relation  to which  any  jagirdar has rights as such in respect  of  land revenue or any other kind of revenue." Under s. 5 of the Act it  is  provided  that  "  as  soon  as  may  be  after  the commencement  of  this  Act, the State  Government  may,  by notification  in -the Official Gazette, appoint a  date  for the  resumption  of any class of jagir lands  and  different dates may be appointed for different classes of jagir-lands. " It was under this provision that the notification resuming jagir-lands  with  a gross annual income of Re.  1,000/-  or above was issued. It is not in dispute that the lands were not granted to  the appellant by the Ruler of Panna as a jagir.  It is also  not in  dispute  that  the appellant was  not  recognized  as  a jagirdar  under  any  law,  rules,  regulations  or   orders governing jagirdars in force in any part of the State.   The contention on behalf of the State was that the appellant  is

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included in the inclusive part of the definition of the word "  jagirdar " in s. 2 (1) (c) as she was an  Ijaredar.   Now the words used in the inclusive part of the definition  have not been defined anywhere in the Act.  It appears that  some of those words are words of common use while others are not. For  example, the Rewa Land ’Revenue and Tenancy Code  deals with  a Pawaidar, a sub-Pawaidar and Ilakedar who is  a  big Pawaidar.   It is not clear whether the other words used  in the inclusive part of the definition of " jagirdar "  appear in  any  other  laws in force in the  various  States  which amalgamated to form the State of Vindhya Pradesh, though the word " Ubaridar " appears to. be somewhat uncommon and  must have some special local significance.  It will 910 therefore be not unreasonable to hold that where these words used  in the inclusive part of the definition appear in  any law  in force in any part of the State’ they must have  that meaning; but if they do not appear in any such law they must be given their ordinary meaning.  The Judicial  Commissioner in his judgment says that " an Ijaredar as such has not been defined  under any law relating to land revenue and  tenancy in  force  in any part of Vindhya Pradesh."  Therefore,  the word "ljaredar" must be given its ordinary meaning.  Now the ordinary  meaning of the word Ijara " from which the word  " ljaredar " is derived is a lease or farm of land revenue  or other  proprietary  right as distinguished from a  patta  or lease  of land for cultivation, though sometimes it is  used to indicate just a lease of land of any kind.  The  question then is what meaning should be given to the word "  ljaredar "  in  s.  2 (1) (c) of the Act.  We  are  of  opinion  that considering  the setting in which the word " Ijaredar "  has been  used in the section, it must take colour from  it  and cannot  be held to mean any lease of land of whatever  kind. In  the setting in which the word is used it should  in  our opinion be confined to a person holding an Ijara which is  a lease or farm of land revenue or other proprietary right  as distinguished from other kinds of leases of land. The  next question is whether the lease in  this  particular case  is a lease of land revenue or other proprietary  right as  distinguished  from lease of land of other  kinds.   The lease  in  the present case is called  a  Lambardari  lease, though  it appears that the system of Lambardari leases  was abolished  in  the State of Panna long ago as  appears  from paragraph  (2)  of Chap.  II of the  Revenue  Administration Manual  of  the  Panna  State  prepared  by  J.  E.  Goudge, Settlement  Officer,  Bundelkhand States, in 1907.   It  has been  stated in that paragraph that " the system of  Lambar- dari  leases has been abolished and rents will in future  be realised  by the Darbar direct from each tenant through  the zamindars of the village." Zamindar in’ that area is a petty village official for the purpose of collecting rents and has no interest in the land from which 911 he collects rent.  It does appear from this paragraph that a Lambardari  lease  originally was a kind of  lease  of  land revenue  ; but such leases were abolished in the  area  from which this case comes long ago.  It is true that this  lease is  called  a Lambardari lease but the mere  name  will  not matter  and we have to see whether this was a lease of  land revenue. This brings us to the terms of the lease.  The lease  starts by  saying that the villages given in lease have an  average annual  income -of Rs. 1,242/4/- payable in two  instalments in  the months of June and December.  The lease is  to  last for thirty years and the lessee has to pay the entire amount

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(namely,  Rs. 1,242/4/-): as lease money which  will  remain the  same for the whole period of thirty years.   The  lease also  provides  that if within this time any  settlement  is made and the revenue is increased or the Lambardar increases the income by inhabiting the villages, the Lambardar herself will be entitled to reap this additional benefit.  The lease further provides that if for any reason the rent of land  is decreased  then  the Lambardar will not be entitled  to  any decrease in the lease money.  It is clear from these  terms, that  the Lambardar stood to gain nothing by this lease  and no  part  of the land revenue was left to her  except  where there  was  an increase in revenue on account of  a  future- settlement"  The, lease further provides that if during  the period of lease the Lambardar makes any improvements,  i.e., plants, groves and orchards, makes band" and band his (i.e., large and small dams) she will be entitled at the end of the lease  to  sell  or mortgage them and the  benefit  of,  the improvements  will  go  to  her.   Lastly  and  this  is  an important term of the lease-it is provided that the lessee’s right to mortgage and sell the lands will be governed by the laws  of the State and: if the law is amended afterwards  it will  be governed by the. amended laws.  These  clauses  in- the  lease clearly show that what the appellant was  getting was not merely a lease, of land revenue but actual rights in the  lands  including the right to  cultivate  them  herself Reading  therefore the lease as a whole it does  not  appear that it is a mere lease of land revenue or other proprietary right.  It is something more and actually 912 gives  the lessee the right to all lands which were  not  in the actual cultivation of tenants at the time of the  lease. The  lessee  was  entitled to make  improvements,  to  plant groves and orchards and to make dams- large and small.   She was  also entitled to mortgage and sell the lands which  she might bring into her own cultivation in accordance with  the laws  of the State, It is difficult under the  circumstances to  hold that this was a mere Ijara and the appellant was  a mere  Ijaredar within the meaning of that word as  mentioned above.  There is a certain element of lease of land  revenue in this lease though that was not likely to bring any profit to  the  appellant; but the lease is much more than  a  mere Ijara  of  this kind and actually confers on  the  appellant rights in land not in the actual cultivation of the  tenants at  the time of the lease.  In the circumstances  we  cannot agree  with  the  learned  Judicial  Commissioner  that  the transaction  evidenced by this lease is a mere Ijara in  the sense  explained above and the appellant is a mere  Ijaredar who  comes  within the meaning of that word in  s.  2(1)(c). The lease in our opinion confers rights in lands and is much more  than  an Ijara.  In the  circumstances  the  appellant cannot  be  held  to  be a  mere  ljaredar  covered  by  the definition of that word as used, in s. 2(1)(c).  The case of the  appellant  in our opinion is similar to  the  case  put forward in Petition No. 392 of 1954 with respect to Khandela estate  (see Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of  Rajasthan(1)). There  also  was an Ijara or lease on payment of  an  annual assessment  of Rs. 80,001 and it was held that it,  was  not covered  by  the  terms of the Rajasthan  Land  Reforms  and Resumption of Jagirs Act.  The present case in. our  opinion is  similar and we are of opinion that the lease granted  in this  case cannot make the appellant a more Ijaredar  within the meaning of that word in a. 2(1)(c).  We therefore  allow the   appeal  and  set  aside  the  order  of   the   Deputy Commissioner   resuming  the  appellant’s   villages.    The appellant  will  get  her cents from  the  State  of  Madhya

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Pradesh,  which  is the successor to the  State  of  Vindhya Pradesh.                                     Appeal allowed (1) [1955] a S.C.R.  367. 913