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PETITIONER: SMT.   NILABATI  BEHERA  ALIAS  LALIT  BEHERA  (THROUGH  THE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/03/1993

BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) ANAND, A.S. (J) VENKATACHALA N. (J)

CITATION:  1993 AIR 1960            1993 SCR  (2) 581  1993 SCC  (2) 746        JT 1993 (2)   503  1993 SCALE  (2)309

ACT: Constitution  of India, 1950-Article 32-Letter of  a  mother informing  Supreme  Court death of her son  in  custody-Writ petition-Appreciation  of  evidence-Whether  the  death   of petitioner’s in in police custody due to police brutality. Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 32, 226-Death in police custody-Power   of   Supreme  Court/High  Court   to   award compensation for  contravention of fundamental tight to life guaranteed   under   Article  21-Purpose   of   public   law proceedings-Remedy in public law proceedings-Role of Courts- Payment of Compensation-Fixation-Directions of Supreme Court on   mode  of  payment  and  appropriate   actions   against individuals responsible for custodial death.

HEADNOTE: Petitioner’s  son,  aged about 22 years was taken  from  his home  In  police  custody at about 8 a.m.  on  1.12.1987  by respondent  No.6, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police  of  the Police  Outpost in connection with the investigation  of  an offence of theft.  He was detained at the Police outpost On  2.12.1987, at about 2 p.m. the petitioner came  to  know that the dead body of her son was found on the railway track There  were multiple injuries on the body and his death  was unnatural, caused by those injuries. The petitioner alleged in her letter dated 14.9.1988,  which was  treated  as  a writ petition under Article  32  of  the Constitution,  that it was a case of custodial  death  since her son died as a result of the multiple injuries  inflicted to  him  while he was in police custody and  thereafter  his dead body was thrown on the railway track.  It was prayed in the petition that award of compensation be made to her,  for contravention  of the fundamental right to  life  guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The  defence  of the respondents was that  petitioner’s  son managed to 582 escape from police custody at about 3 a.m. on 2.12.1987 from the Police.  Outpost, where he was detained; that thereafter he  could not be apprehended in spite of a search  and  that his  dead body was found on the railway track  on  2.12.1987

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with multiple injuries, which indicated that he was run over by  a  train.   The respondents  denied  the  allegation  of custodial  death and their responsibility for the  unnatural death of petitioner’s son. On 4.3.1991, this Court directed the District Judge to  hold an  inquiry into the matter and to submit a  report.   After hearing  the  parties  and  appreciating  the  evidence  the District Judge submitted the Inquiry Report dated  4.9.1991. The  District  Judge  found that petitioner’s  son  died  on account  of multiple injuries inflicted to him while he  was in police custody at the Police Outpost. The correctness of the finding of the District Judge in  his report was assailed in this Court. The  respondents contended that petitioner’s son managed  to escape  from  police custody at about 3 a.m.  on  2.12.1987; that  he was run over by a passing train and  sustained  the fatal  injuries; that the responsibility of the  respondents for  his  safety came to an end the moment he  escaped  from police custody; and that the factual foundation for  State’s liability  for payment of compensation for violation of  the fundamental right to life under Article 21 was absent. Allowing the petition, this Court, HELD:     (per LS.  Verma, J. on his behalf and on behalf of N. Venkatachala, J) 1.01.     There  is  no cogent independent evidence  of  any search made by the police to apprehend petitioner’s son,  if the  defence of his escape from police custody be true.   On the  contrary,  after  discovery of the  dead  body  on  the railway track in the morning by some railwaymen, it was much later  in the day that the police reached the spot  to  take charge  of  the dead body.  This conduct  of  the  concerned police officers is also a significant circumstance to assess credibility of the defence version. [591 G-H] 1.02.     The  medical evidence comprising the testimony  of the  doctor,  who  conducted the  postmortem,  excludes  the possibility of all the injuries to the deceased being caused in a train accident while indicating that all of 583 them  could result from the merciless beating given to  him. [594 H-595 A] 1.03.     An   inquiry   under  Section   176   Cr.P.C.   is contemplated  independently by a Magistrate and not  jointly with  a police officer when the role of the police  officers itself is a matter of inquiry. [595 F] 1.04.     There  was hand-cuff on the hands of the  deceased when  his  body  was found on the railway  track  with  rope around  it.   It  is  significant  that  the  Report   dated 11.3.1988  of  the  Regional  Forensic  Science   Laboratory mentions  that  the two cut ends of the two pieces  of  rope which were sent for examination do not match with each other in  respect of physical appearance.  This finding about  the rope   negatives  the  respondents’  suggestion   that   the petitioner’s  son managed to escape from police  custody  by chewing off the rope with which he was tied. 1595 G-H] 1.05.     It is a case of custodial death, and the  deceased died   as  a  result  of  the  injuries  inflicted  to   him voluntarily  while  he was In police custody at  the  Police Outpost. [596 A] 2.01.     Award  of  compensation  in  a  proceeding   under Article 32 by this Court or by the High Court under  Article 226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law, based  on strict liability for contravention of  fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply,  even  though  it may be available as  a  defence  in private  law  in  an  action  based  on  tort.   This  is  a

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distinction  between  the two remedies to be borne  in  mind which  also  indicates the basis on  which  compensation  is awarded in such proceedings. [596 G] 2.02.     Enforcement of the constitutional right and  grant of  redress  embraces award of compensation as part  of  the legal consequences of its contravention. [602 A] 2.03..    A  claim  in  public  law  for  compensation   for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms,  the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection, of  such rights,  and such a claim based on strict liability made  by resorting  to  a  constitutional  remedy  provided  for  the enforcement of a fundamental right is distinct from, and  in addition  to, the remedy in private law for damages for  the tort  resulting  from the contravention of  the  fundamental right.  The defence of sovereign immunity 584 being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental  rights,  there  can be no question  of  such  a defence being available in the constitutional remedy.  It is this   principle   which   justifies   award   of   monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guaran- teed by the Constitution, when that is the only  practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by  the State  or  its servants in the purported exercise  of  their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is  claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. [602 B-D] 2.04.     The  Court  is not helpless and  the  wide  powers given  to  this  Court  by Article 32,  which  itself  is  a fundamental  right, imposes a constitutional  obligation  on this  Court to forge such new tools, which may be  necessary for  doing  complete justice and enforcing  the  fundamental rights  guaranteed  in the Constitution,  which  enable  the award  of monetary compensation In appropriate cases,  where that is the only mode of redress available. [603 D] 2.05.     The  power available to this Court  under  Article 142  is  also  an  enabling provision  in  this  behalf  The contrary  view would not merely render the  court  powerless and  the  constitutional guarantee a mirage,  but,  may,  in certain  situations, be an incentive to extinguish life,  if for  the  extreme contravention the court  is  powerless  to grant any relief against the State, except by punishment  of the  wrongdoer  for the resulting offence, and  recovery  of damages under private law, by the ordinary process. [603  E- F] 2.06.     If  the  guarantee that deprivation  of  life  and personal  liberty cannot be made except in  accordance  with law, is to be real, the enforcement of the right in case  of every   contravention   must  also  be   possible   in   the constitutional scheme, the mode of redress being that  which is appropriate In the facts of each case. [603 F]  2.07.    This  remedy in public law has to be more  readily available when invoked by     the  havenots,  who  are   not possessed of the wherewithal for enforcement of their rights in  private law, even though its exercise is to be  tempered by judicial restraint to avoid circumvention of private  law remedies, where more appropriate. [603 G] 2.08.     The  principle  of which the Court’s  power  under Articles  32  and 226 of the Constitution  is  exercised  to award monetary compensation for 585 contravention of a fundamental right. [604 B]  Rudul  Sah v. State of Bihar and Another, [1983]  3  S.C.R.

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508;  Sebastian  M. Hongray v. Union of  India  and  Others, [1984] 1. S.C.R. 904 and [1984] 3 S.C.R. 544; Bhim Singh  v. State  of  J.  & K, [1984] Supp.  S.C.C. 504  and  [1985]  4 S.C.C. 677; Saheli, A Women’s Resources Centre and Others v. Commissioner  of  Police,  Delhi  Police  Headquarters   and Others, [1990] 1 S.C.C. 422; State of Maharashtra and Others v.  Ravikant  S.  Patil, [1991] 2  S.C.C.  373;  Maharaj  v. Attomey-General  of  Trinidad and Tobago, (No.2),  (1978)  3 All.E.R. 670;, Khatri and Others (IV) v. State of Bihar  and Others,  [1981] 2 S.C.C. 493 and Union  Carbide  Corporation and  Others v. Union India and Others, [1991] 4 S.C.C.  584, referred to. Kasturilal  Ralia  Rain Jain v. The State of  Uttar  Pradesh [1965] 1 S.C.R. 375, distinguished. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Torts, 22nd Edition, 1992,  by Justice G.P. Singh, at pages 44 to 48, referred to. 2.09.     In the present case, on the finding reached, It Is a clear case for award of compensation to the petitioner for the custodial death of her son. [604 D] 2.10.     The  deceased  was aged about 22 years and  had  a monthly income between Rs.1200 to Rs.1500. A total amount of Rs.1,50,000  would  be appropriate as  compensation,  to  be awarded to the petitioner in the present case. [604 E] 2.11.     The respondent-State of Orissa is directed to  pay the sum of Rs.1,50,000 lo the petitioner as compensation and a  further  sum  of Rs.10,000 as costs to  be  paid  to  the Supreme  Court Legal Aid Committee.  The mode of payment  of Rs.1,50,000  to  the petitioner would be, by making  a  term deposit   of  that  amount  in  a  scheduled  bank  in   the petitioner’s name for a period of three years, during  which she  would  receive only the Interest payable  thereon,  the principal amount being payable to her on expiry of the term. The Collector of the District will take the necessary  steps in  this  behalf,  and report  compliance  to  the  Register (judicial) of this Court within three months. [604 H, 605-A] 2.12.The  State of Orissa is expected to take the  necessary further  action to ascertain and fix the  responsibility  of the Individuals responsible 586 for  the custodial death of petitioner’s son and  also  take all available appropriate actions against each of them. [605 C] Per Dr. A.S. Anand, J. (Concurring) 1.01.     Convicts,   prisoners  or  under-trials  are   not denuded of their fundamental rights under Article 21 and  It is  only such restrictions, as are permitted by  law,  which can be imposed on the enjoyment of the fundamental rights by such  persons.  It is an obligation of the State, to  ensure that there is no infringement of the indefeasable rights  of a  citizen to life, except in accordance with law while  the citizen is in its custody. [607 E] 1.02.     The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution  of India cannot be denied to convicts,  under- trials  or other prisoners in custody, except  according  to procedure established by law. [607 E] 1.03.     There  is a great responsibility on the police  or prison authorities to ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his right to life.  His liberty is in the very nature of things circumscribed by the very fact of  his confinement  and  therefore  his  interest  in  the  limited liberty left to him is rather precious.  The duty of care on the part of the State is strict and admits of no exceptions. [607 F] 1.04.The   wrongdoer  is  accountable  and  the   State   is responsible  if  the  person in custody  of  the  police  is

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deprived  of  his life except according  to  the  procedure- established by law. [607 G] 1.05.The  death of petitioner’s son was caused while he  was in  custody  of the police by police torture.   A  custodial death  is  perhaps one of the worst crimes  in  a  civilised society governed by the Rule of Law. 1.06.     The  defence of ’sovereign immunity"in such  cases is not available to the  State. [607 G] 2.01.     Adverting to the grant of relief to the heirs of a victim of custodial death foe the infraction or invasion  of his  rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the  Constitution of  India,  it is not always enough to relegate him  to  the ordinary  remedy  of a civil suit to claim damages  for  the tortious  act  of the State as that remedy  in  private  law indeed is available to the aggrieved party. [608 A] 587 2.02.     The citizen complaining of the infringement of the indefeasable  right  under Article 21  of  the  Constitution cannot  be  told that for the established violation  of  the fundamental right to life, he cannot get any relief under   the public law by the courts exercising writ jurisdiction.                                                     [608-B] 2.03.     The  primary source of the public law  proceedings stems  from  the  prerogative writs  and  the  courts  have, therefore,  to evolve ’new tools’ to give relief  in  public law by moulding it according to the situation with a view to preserve and protect the Rule of Law. [608 C] 2.04.     The old doctrine of only relegating the  aggrieved to  the remedies available in civil law limits the  role  of the  courts  too  much as protector  and  guarantor  of  the indefeasable  rights of the citizens.  The courts  have  the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because  the  courts  and the law are  for  the  people  and expected to respond to their aspirations. [608 H, 609 A] 2.05.     The  public  law  proceedings  serve  a  different purpose than the private law  proceedings.   The  relief  of monetary compensation, as exemplary  damages, in  proceedings under  Article 32 by this Court or under Article 226 by  the High Courts,    for   established   infringement   of    the indefeasable  right  guaranteed  under  Article  21  of  the Constitution  is  a remedy available in public  law  and  is based  on  the  strict liability for  contravention  of  the guaranteed  basic  and indefeasable rights of  the  citizen. [609 B] 2.06.     The purpose of public law is not only to  civilize public  power but also to assure the citizen that they  live under  a legal system which aims to protect their  interests and  preserve  their  rights.  Therefore,  which  the  court moulds  the relief by granting" compensation in  proceedings under  Article  32  or  226  of  the  Constitution   seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does  so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer  and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has  failed  in its public duty to protect  the  fundamental rights of the citizen. 1609 C] 2.07.     The  payment of compensation in such cases is  not to  be understood, as it is generally understood in a  civil action for damages under the private law but in the  broader sense  of providing relief by an order of  making  ’monetary amends’  under  the  public law for the wrong  done  due  to breach  of  public duty, of not protecting  the  fundamental rights 588 of the citizen. [609 D] 2.08.The  compensation  is in the nature  of  the  exemplary

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damages’  awarded against the wrong-doer for the  breach  of its  public  law  duty  and is  independent  of  the  rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the  private law in an action based on tort, through a  suit instituted  in  a  court of  competent  jurisdiction  or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law. [609 E] 2.09.     This   Court  and  the  High  Courts,  being   the protectors  of the civil liberties of the citizen, have  not only  the power and jurisdiction but also an  obligation  to grant relief in exercise of its jurisdiction under  Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to the victim or the heir  of the victim whose fundamental rights under Article 21 of  the Constitution   of  India  are  established  to   have   been flagrantly infringed by calling upon the State to repair the damage done by its officers to the fundamental rights of the citizen,  notwithstanding  the right of the citizen  to  the remedy by way of a civil suit or criminal proceedings.  [609 F-G] 2.10.     The  State,  of  course,  has  the  right  to   be indemnified  by and take such action as may be available  to it  against the wrongdoer in accordance with law   through appropriate  proceeding.  Of course, relief in  exercise  of the power under Article 32 or 226 would be granted only once it is established that there has been an infringement of the fundamental  rights  of  the citizen and no  other  form  of appropriate  redressal  by  the  court  in  the  facts   and circumstances of the case, is possible. [609 H, 610 A] 2.11.     Law  is  in  the process of  development  and  the process   necessitates   developing  separate   public   law procedures  as  also  public  law  principles.   It  may  be necessary  to  identify  the situations  to  which  separate proceedings and principles ’apply and the courts have to act firmly  but with certain amount of circumspection  and  self restraint,  lest  proceedings under Article 32  or  226  are misused  as  a  disguised substitute  for  civil  action  in private law. [610 D-E] "Freedom under the Law.  By Lord Denning  First Hamlan Lecture, 1949, referred to. Rudul  Sah v. State of Bihar and Anr., [1983] 3 S.C.R.  508, referred to. 2.12.     In  the  facts  of the present case  the  mode  of redress which 589 commends appropriate is to make an order of monetary  amend, in  favour of the petitioner for the custodial death of  her son by ordering payment of compensation by way of  exemplary damages. [610 F] 2.13.     The   State  of  Orissa  should  pay  a   sum   of Rs.1,50,000 to the petitioner and a sum of Rs.10,000 by  way of costs to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee. [610 G]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 488 of 1988. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India). M.S. Ganesh for the Petitioner. Altaf Ahmed, Addl.  Solicitor General, A.K. Panda and Naresh Kumar Sharma for the Respondents. The Judgments of the Court were delivered by VERMA,  J.  A letter dated 14.9.1988 sent to this  Court  by Smt.  Nilabati Behera alias Lalita Behera, was treated as  a Writ  Petition  under  Article 32 of  the  Constitution  for determining   the   claim  of  compensation   made   therein consequent upon, the death of petitioner’s son Suman Behera,

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aged  about  22 years, in police custody.   The  said  Suman Behera was taken from his home in police custody at about  8 a.m.  on 1.12.1987 by respondent No.6, Sarat Chandra  Barik, Assistant  Sub-Inspector  of  Police  of  Jaraikela   Police Outpost  under Police Station Bisra, Distt.   Sundergarh  in Orissa,  in connection with the investigation of an  offence of  theft  and detained at the Police Outpost.  At  about  2 p.m. the next day on 2.12.1987, the petitioner came to  know that the dead body of her son Suman Behera was found on  the railway  track  near  a bridge at  some  distance  from  the Jaraikela railway station.  There were multiple injuries  on the body of Suman Behera when it was found and obviously his death   was  unnatural,  caused  by  those  injuries.    The allegation  made  is that it is a case  of  custodial  death since Suman Behera died as a result of the multiple injuries inflicted  to  him  while  he was  in  police  custody;  and thereafter  his dead body was thrown on the  railway  track. The prayer made in the petition is for award of compensation to   the  petitioner,  the  mother  of  Suman  Behera,   for contravention  of the fundamental right to  life  guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State of Orissa and its police officers, including Sarat Chandra 590 Barik,  Assistant  Sub-Inspector  of  Police  and  Constable No.127,  Chhabil Kujur of Police Outpost  Jeraikela,  Police Station   Bisra,  are  impleaded  as  respondents  in   this petition.   The  defence of the respondents  is  that  Suman Behera managed to escape from police custody at about 3 a.m. on the night between the 1st and 2nd December, 1987 from the Police Outpost Jeraikela, where he was detained and  guarded by   Police  Constable  Chhabil  Kujur;  he  could  not   be apprehended  thereafter in spite of a search; and  the  dead body of Suman Behera was found on the railway track the next day  with multiple injuries which indicated that he was  run over  by  a passing train after he had escaped  from  police custody.   In  short,  on  this  basis  the  allegation   of custodial death was denied and consequently the respondents’ responsibility for the unnatural death of Suman Behera. In view of the controversy relating to the cause of death of Suman  Behera,  a  direction  was given  by  this  Court  on 4.3.1991  to  the District Judge, Sundergarh in  Orissa,  to hold  an inquiry into the matter and submit a  report.   The parties  were directed to appear before the  District  Judge and  lead  the evidence on which  they  rely.   Accordingly, evidence  was led by the parties and the District Judge  has submitted  the Inquiry Report dated 4.9.1991 containing  his finding based on that evidence that Suman Behera had died on account  of multiple injuries inflicted to him while he  was in  police  custody at the Police  Outpost  Jeraikela.   The correctness  of  this  finding and Report  of  the  District Judge,  being  disputed by the respondents, the  matter  was examined afresh by us in the light of the objections  raised to the Inquiry Report. The  admitted  facts  are, that Suman Behera  was  taken  in police custody on 1.12.1987 at 8 a.m. and he was found  dead the  next day on the railway track near the  Police  Outpost Jeraikela,  without  being released from  custody,  and  his death was unnatural caused by multiple injuries sustained by him.   The burden is, therefore, clearly on the  respondents to  explain how Suman Behera sustained those injuries  which caused  his death.  Unless a plausible explanation is  given by the respondents which is consistent with their innocence, the  obvious  inference  is that  the  fatal  injuries  were inflicted to Suman Behera in police custody resulting in his

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death, for which the respondents are responsible and liable. To  avoid  this obvious and logical inference  of  custodial death,  the learned Additional Solicitor General  relied  on the respondent’s defence 591 that Suman Behera had managed to escape from police  custody at  about  3  a.m.  on the night between  the  1st  and  2nd December,  1987 and it was likely that he was run over by  a passing  train  when he sustained the fatal  injuries.   The evidence  adduced  by the respondents is relied  on  by  the learned Additional Solicitor General to support this defence and  to contend that the responsibility of  the  respondents for  the  safety of Suman Behera came to an end  the  moment Suman  Behera  escaped  from police  custody.   The  learned Additional  Solicitor  General, however,  rightly  does  not dispute   the  liability  of  the  State  for   payment   of compensation  in  this  proceeding  for  violation  of   the fundamental  right to life under Article 21, in case  it  is found  to  be a custodial death.  The argument is  that  the factual  foundation  for such a liability of  the  State  is absent.  Shri M.S. Ganesh, who appeared as amicus curiae for the petitioner, however, contended that the evidence adduced during   the  inquiry  does  not  support  the  defence   of respondents and there is no reason to reject the finding  of the learned District Judge that Suman Behera died in  police custody as a result of injuries inflicted to him. The  first  question is: Whether it is a case  of  custodial death as alleged by the petitioner?  The admitted facts are: Suman Behera was taken in police custody at about 8 a.m.  on 1.12.1987  by Sarat Chandra Barik, Asstt.  Sub-Inspector  of Police,  during investigation of an offence of theft in  the village and was detained at Police Outpost Jeraikela;  Suman Behera  and  Mahi Sethi, another accused,  were  handcuffed, tied  together  and kept in custody at the  police  station; Suman Behera’s mother, the petitioner, and grand-mother went to  the Police Outpost at about 8 p.m. with food  for  Suman Behera  which  he ate and thereafter these women  came  away while  Suman Behera continued to remain in police  custody-, Police  Constable Chhabil Kujur and some other persons  were present at the Police Outpost that night; and the dead  body of  Suman Behera with a handcuff and multiple  injuries  was found  lying  on the railway track  at  Kilometer  No.385/29 between  Jeraikela  and Bhalulata  railway-stations  on  the morning  of  2.12.1987. It is significant that there  is  no cogent independent evidence of any search made by the police to apprehend Suman Behera, if the defence of his escape from police custody be true.  On the contrary, after discovery of the  dead body on the railway track in the morning  by  some railwaymen,  it  was much later in the day that  the  police reached  the  spot to take charge of the  dead  body.   This conduct of the concerned police 592 officers  is  also  a  significant  circumstance  to  assess credibility of the defence version. Before discussing the other evidence adduced by the  parties during  the. inquiry, reference may be made to the  injuries found  on the dead body of Suman Behera  during  postmortem. These injuries were the following:-               "Extemal injuries               (1)   Laceration  over with margin of  damaged               face.               (2)   Laceration  of size  3" x 2"  over  the               left temporal region upto bone.               (3)   Laceration  2’ above mastoid process  on               the  right-side  of size 1 1/2"  x  1/4"  bone

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             exposed.               (4)   Laceration on the forehead left side  of               size  1 1/2" x 1/4" upto bone in the  mid-line               on  the forehead 1/2" x 1/4" bone deep on  the               left lateral to it 1" x 1/4" bone exposed.               (5)   Laceration  1"  x 1/2" on  the  anterior               aspect  of middle of left arm, fractured  bone               protruding.               (6)   Laceration  1"  x 1/2" x V2"  on  medial               aspect of left thigh 4" above the knee joint.               (7)   Laceration 1/2" x 1/2" x 1/2" over  left               knee joint.               (8)   Laceration  1"  x  1/2" x  1/2"  on  the               medial aspect of right knee joint.               (9)   Laceration  1"  x  1/2" x  1/2"  on  the               posterior  aspect of left leg, 4"  below  knee               joint.               (10)  Laceration  1"’  x 1/4" x  1/2"  on  the               plantar  aspect  of 3rd and 4th toe  of  right               side.               (11)  Laceration  of 1" x 1/4" x 1/2"  on  the               dorsum of left foot.               Injury on the neck               593               (1)   Bruises  of  size  3"  x  1"   obliquely               alongwith sternocleidomastoid muscle 1"  above               the clavical left side (2) lateral to this  2"               x 1" bruise (3) and 1" x 1" above the  clavial               left side (4) posterial aspect of the neck  1"               x 1’ obliquely placed right to mid line.               Right shoulder               (a)   Bruise  2"  x  2", 1"  above  the  right               scapula.               (b)   Bruise  1"  x  1’ on the  tip  of  right               shoulder.               (c)   Bruise on the dorsum of right palm 2"  x               1".               (d)   Bruise extenses surface of forearm  left               side               (e)   Bruise on right elbow 4" x 1"               (f)   Bruise  on the dorsum of left palm 2"  x               1".               (g)   Bruise over left patela 2" x 1".               (h)   Bruise 1" above left patel 1" x 1".               (i)   Bruise  on the right illiac spine  1"  x               1/2".               (j)   Bruise over left scapula 4" x 1".               (k)   Bruise 1" below right scapula 5" x 1".               (l)   Bruise  3" medial to inferior  angle  of               right scapula 2"x 1".               (m) Bruise 2" below left scapula of size 4"  x               2".               (n)   Bruise 2" x 6" below 12th rib left side.               (o)   Bruise  4"  x  2"  on  the  left  lumber               region.               (p)   Bruise on the buttock of left side 3"  x               2".               (q)   On dissection found               (l)   Fracture of skull on right side parietal               and occipital bone 6" length.               594               (2)   Fracture    of   frontal   bone    below               laceration 2" depressed fracture.               (3)   Fracture  of  left temporal bone  2"  in               length   below  external  injury   No.2   i.e.

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             laceration 2" above left mastoid process.               (4)   Membrane   ruptured   below    depressed               fracture, brain matter protruding through  the               membrane.               (5)   Intracraneal haemorrhage present.               (6)   Brain  lacerated below  external  injury               No.3, 1" x 1/2" x  1/2".               (7)   Bone  chips present on temporal  surface               of both sides.               (8)   Fracture  of  left  humerous  3’   above               elbow.               (9)   Fracture  of  left femur 3"  above  knee               joint.               (10)  Fracture   of  mendible  at  the   angle               mendible both sides.               (11) Fracture of maxillary. The  face  was completely damaged, eye  ball  present,  nose lips,  cheeks  absent.   Maxila and a  portion  of  mendible absent. No  injury  was  present on the front side  of  body  trunk. There is rupture and laceration of brain." The doctor deposed that all the injuries were caused by hard and blunt object the injuries on the face and left temporal region were postmortem while the rest were ante-mortem.  The doctor  excluded the possibility of the  injuries  resulting from dragging of the body by a running train and stated that all the ante-mortem injuries could be caused by lathi blows. It  was  further  stated by the doctor that  while  all  the injuries  could  not be caused in a train accident,  it  was possible  to cause all the injuries by lathi  blows.   Thus, the medical evidence comprising the testimony of the doctor, who  conducted the postmortem, excludes the  possibility  of all the injuries 595 to  Suman  Behera  being caused in a  train  accident  while indicating that all of them could result form the  merciless beating  given  to him.  The  learned  Additional  Solicitor General  placed strong reliance ore the written  opinion  of Dr.  K.K.  Mishra,  Professor & Head of  the  Department  of Forensic  Medicine,  Medical  College,  Cuttack,  given   on 15.2.1988  on a reference made to him wherein he  stated  on the  basis of the documents that the injuries found  on  the dead body of Suman Behera could have been caused by  rolling on the railway track in-between the rail and by coming  into forceful   contact  with  projecting  part  of  the   moving train/engine.   While adding that it did not appear to be  a case of suicide, he indicated that there was more likelihood of  accidental  fall on the railway track  followed  by  the running engine/train.  In our view, the opinion of Dr.  K.K. Mishra, not examined as a witness, is not of much assistance and  does  not  reduce the weight of the  testimony  of  the doctor who conducted the postmortem and deposed as a witness during  the  inquiry.   The opinion of Dr.  K.K.  Mishra  is cryptic,  based on conjectures for which there is no  basis, and  says nothing about the injuries being both  anti-mortem and  post- mortem.  We have no hesitation in  reaching  this conclusion  and preferring the testimony of the  doctor  who conducted the postmortem. We may also refer to the Report dated 19.12.1988  containing the  findings in a joint inquiry conducted by the  Executive Magistrate and the Circle Inspector of Police.  This  Report is  stated to have been made under Section 176  Cr.P.C.  and was  strongly relied on by the learned Additional  Solicitor General  as  a  statutory report relating to  the  cause  of death.   In  the first place, an inquiry under  Section  176

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Cr.P.C.  is contemplated independently by a  Magistrate  and not  jointly  with  a police officer when the  role  of  the police  officers itself is a matter of inquiry.   The  joint finding  recorded is that Suman Behera escaped  from  police custody  at  about 3 a.m. on 2.12.1987 and died in  a  train accident  as a result of injuries sustained therein.   There was hand-cuff on the hands of the deceased when his body was found  on  the  railway track with rope around  it.   It  is significant that the Report dated 11.3.1988 of the  Regional Forensic  Science Laboratory (Annexure ’R-8’, at p.  108  of the  paper book) mentions that the two cut ends of  the  two pieces of rope which were sent for examination do not  match with  each  other in respect of physical  appearance.   This finding about the rope negatives the respondents’ suggestion that  Suman Behera managed to escape from police custody  by chewing  off  the  rope with which he was tied.   It  is  no necessary for us to refer to the other evidence including 596 the oral evidence adduced during the inquiry, from which the learned  District Judge reached the conclusion that it is  a case of custodial death and Suman Behera died as a result of the  injuries inflicted to him voluntarily while he  was  in police  custody  at the Police Outpost Jeraikela.   We  have reached the same conclusion on a reappraisal of the evidence adduced   at   the   inquiry   taking   into   account   the circumstances, which also support that conclusion.  This was done  in  view  of  the vehemence  with  which  the  learned Additional Solicitor General urged that it is not a case  of custodial  death  but  of death of Suman  Behera  caused  by injuries sustained by him in a train accident, after he  had managed  to  escape from police custody by chewing  off  the rope  with which he had been tied for being detained at  the Police Outpost.  On this conclusion, the question now is  of the  liability of the respondents for compensation to  Suman Behera’s   mother,  the  petitioner,  for   Suman   Behera’s custodial death. In view of the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah v. State of  Bihar  and Another, [1983] 3 S.C.R.  508,  Sebastian  M. Hongray  v. Union of India and Others, [1984] 1  S.C.R.  904 and  [1984] 3 S.C.R. 544, Bhim Singh v. State of J&K  [1984] Supp.  S.C.C. 504 and [1985] 4 S.C.C. 677, Saheli, A Women’s Resources Centre and Others v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police  Headquarters  and Others, [1990] 1  S.C.C.  422  and State of Maharashtra and Others v. Ravikant S.Patil,  [1991] 2  S.C.C. 373, the liability of the State of Orissa  in  the present  case to pay the compensation cannot be doubted  and was rightly not disputed by the learned Additional Solicitor General.   It ,would, however, be appropriate to  spell  out clearly  the principle on which the liability of  the  State arises  in  such cases for payment of compensation  and  the distinction  between  this liability and  the  liability  in private  law  for payment of compensation in  an  action  on tort.   It  may  be mentioned  straightaway  that  award  of compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 by this  court or  by the High Court under Article 226 of the  Constitution is  a  remedy  available  in public  law,  based  on  strict liability  for contravention of fundamental rights to  which the  principle  of sovereign immunity does not  apply,  even though it may be available as a defence in private law in an action based on tort.  This is a distinction between the two remedies to be borne in mind which also indicates the  basis on  which compensation is awarded in such  proceedings.   We shall  now refer to the earlier decisions of this  Court  as well  as some other decisions before further  discussion  of this principle.

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597 In  Rudul Sah (supra), it was held that in a petition  under Article  32  of  the  Constitution,  this  Court  can  grant compensation  for deprivation of a fundamental right.   That was  a  case  of  violation of  the  petitioner’s  right  to personal  liberty  under  Article 21  of  the  Constitution. Chandrachud,  C.J.,  dealing  with this  aspect,  stated  as under:-               "It is true that Article 32 cannot be used  as               a substitute for the enforcement of rights and               obligations    which    can    be     enforced               effecaciously  through the ordinary  processes               of  Courts, Civil and Criminal A  money  claim               has   therefore   to  be   agitated   in   and               adjudicated  upon  in a suit instituted  in  a               court  of  lowest grade competent to  try  it.               But    the   important   question   for    our               consideration  is whether in the  exercise  of               its jurisdiction under article 32, this  Court               can pass an order for the payment of money  if               such an order is in the nature of compensation               consequential   upon  the  deprivation  of   a               fundamental   right.   The  instant  case   is               illustrative of such cases........               ordinary  remedy  of a suit if  his  claim  to               compensation  was factually controversial,  in               the  sense that a civil court may or  may  not               have  upheld his claim.  But we have no  doubt               that if the petitioner files a suit to recover               damages  for his illegal detention,  a  decree               for  damages would have to be passed  in  that               suit, though it is not possible to  predicate,               in the absence of evidence, the precise amount               which  would  be decreed in his  favour.   In-               these circumstances, the refusal of this Court               to pass an order of compensation in favour  of               the petitioner will be doing mere  lip-service               to his fundamental right to liberty which  the               State  Government  has  so  grossly  violated.               Article 21’which guarantees the right to  life               and liberty will be denuded of its significant               content  if  the  power  of  this  Court  were               limited  to  passing orders  to  release  from               illegal detention.  One of the telling ways in               which   the  violation  of  that   right   can               reasonably  be  prevented and  due  compliance               with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is  to               mulct its violaters in the payment of monetary               compensation.  Administrative sclerosis lead-               598               ing  to flagrant infringements of  fundamental               rights cannot be corrected by any other method               open to the judiciary to adopt.  The right  to               compensation   is  some  palliative  for   the               unlawful  acts of instrumentalities which  act               in  the  name  of public  interest  and  which               present for their protection the powers of the               state  as shield.  If Civilisation is  not  to               perish  in this country as it has perished  in               some others too well-known to suffer  mention,               it  is  necessary to  educate  ourselves  into               accepting that, respect for the rights of  in-               dividuals  is the true bastion  of  democracy.               Therefore,  the State must repair  the  damage               done  by  its  officers  to  the  petitioner’s

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             rights.   It may have recourse  against  those               officers"                             (pp.513-14)                             (emphasis supplied)               It  does  appear from the above  extract  that               even  though  it was  held  that  compensation               could   be  awarded  under  Article   32   for               contravention  of a fundamental right, yet  it               was  also  stated that ’the  petitioner  could               have been relegated to the ordinary remedy  of               a  suit  if  his  claim  to  compensation  was               factually   controversial’  and  ’Article   32               cannot  be  used  as  a  substitute  for   the               enforcement  of rights and  obligations  which               can  be  enforced  efficaciously  through  the               ordinary  processes’.  These  observation  may               tend  to raise a doubt that the  remedy  under               Article  32 could be denied ’if the  claim  to               compensation was factually controversial’ and,               therefore,  optional  not  being  a   distinct               remedy available to the petitioner in addition               to   the   ordinary  processes.    The   later               decisions   of  this  Court  proceed  on   the               assumption  that monetary compensation can  be               awarded for violation of constitutional rights               under  Article  32  or  Article  226  of   the               Constitution,  but  this aspect has  not  been               adverted  to.  It is, therefore, necessary  to               clear  this doubt and to indicate the  precise               nature of this remedy which is distinct and in               addition to the available ordinary  processes,               in  case  of  violation  of  the   fundamental               rights.               Reference  may  also  be  made  to  the  other               decisions  of this Court after Rudul Sah.   In Sebastian  M.  Hongray v. Union of India  and  Others,  (1), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 904, it was indicated that in a petition for writ of habeas               599               corpus,  the  burden  was  obviously  on   the               respondents to make good the positive stand of               the  respondents  in response  to  the  notice               issued  by the court by offering proof of  the               stand taken, when it is shown that the  person               detained   was  last  seen  alive  under   the               surveillance,  control,  and  command  of  the               detaining authority.  In Sebastian M.  Hongray               v.  Union  of  India & Ors.,  (11),  [1984]  3               S.C.R. 544, in such a writ petition, exemplary               costs were awarded on failure of the detaining               authority  to produce the missing persons,  on               the  conclusion that they were not  alive  and               had  met  an unnatural death.  The  award  was               made  in  Sebastian M.  Hongray-II  apparently               following  Rudul Sah, but  without  indicating               anything more.  In Bhim Singh v. State of  J&K               and  Others,  [1985]  4  S.C.C.  677,  illegal               detention in police custody of the  petitioner Bhim  Singh was held to constitute violation of  his  rights under  Articles 21 and 22(2) and this Court  exercising  its power  to award compensation under Article 32  directed  the State  to  pay monetary compensation to the  petitioner  for violation  of his constitutional right by way  of  exemplary costs  or otherwise, taking this power to be settled by  the decisions in Rudul Sah and Sebastian M. Hongray.  In Saheli,

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[1990]  1  S.C.C.  422, the State was  held  liable  to  pay compensation payable to the mother of the deceased who  died as a result of beating and assault by the police.   However, the  principle  indicated  therein was  that  the  State  is responsible  for  the tortious acts of  its  employees.   In State of Maharashtra and Others v. Ravikant S. Patil, [1991] 2  S.C.C. 373, the award of compensation by the  High  Court for  violation of the fundamental right under Article 21  of an undertrial prisoner, who was handcuffed and taken through the   streets   in  a  procession  by  the   police   during investigation, was upheld.  However, in none of these cases, except  Rudul  Sah,  anything more  was  said.   In  Saheli, reference  was  made to the State’s liability  for  tortious acts of its servants without any reference being made to the decision  of this Court in Kasturilal Ralia Ram fain v.  The State  of  Uttar  Pradesh,  [1965]  1  S.C.R.  375,  wherein sovereign  immunity  was  upheld in the  case  of  vicarious liability  of the State for the tort of its employees.   The decision  in Saheli is, therefore, more in accord  with  the principle indicated in Rudul Sah.               In this context, it is sufficient to say  that               the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Kasturilal               upholding   the  State’s  plea  of   sovereign               immunity for tortious acts of its servants  is               confined  to the sphere of liability in  tort,               which  is distinct from the State’s  liability               for contravention of fundamental rights to               600               which  the doctrine of sovereign immunity  has               no  application in the constitutional  scheme,               and is no defence to the constitutional remedy               under Articles 32 and 226 of the  Constitution               which   enables  award  of  compensation   for               contravention of fundamental rights, when  the               only  practicable mode of enforcement  of  the               fundamental   rights  can  be  the  award   of               compensation.  The decisions of this Court  in               Rudul  Sah and others in that line  relate  to               award  of  compensation for  contravention  of               fundamental  rights,  in  the   constitutional               remedy  under  Articles  32  and  226  of  the               Constitution.   On the other hand,  Kasturilal               related  to  value  of goods  seized  and  not               returned  to -he owner due to the  fault  of               Government   servants,  the  claim  being   of               damages  for the tort of conversion under  the               ordinary   process,  and  not  a   claim   for               compensation  for  violation  of   fundamental               rights.      Kasturilal     is,     therefore,               inapplicable     in    this    context     and distinguishable The decision of Privy Council in Maharaj  v.’Attomey-General of  Trinidad  and Tobago, (No.2), [1978] 3 All  ER  670,  is useful  in this context.  That case related to Section 6  of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago 1962, in the chapter pertaining to human rights and fundamental freedoms, wherein Section 6 provided for an application to the High Court  for redress.  The question was, whether the provision  permitted an  order for monetary compensation.  The contention of  the Attorney-General  therein,  that  an order  for  payment  of compensation did not amount to the enforcement of the rights that  had been contravened, was expressly rejected.  It  was held,  that  an order for payment of  compensation,  when  a right  protected had been contravened, is clearly a form  of ’redress’ which a person is entitled to claim under  Section

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6,  and may well be the ’only practicable form of  redress’. Lord  Diplock  who delivered the majority opinion,  at  page 679, stated.:-               "It  was  argued on behalf  of  the  Attorney-               General  that  s.6(2) does not  permit  of  an               order  for monetary compensation  despite  the               fact that this kind of redress was ordered  in               Jaundoo v. Attorney-General of Guyana,  [1971]               SC 972.  Reliance was placed on the  reference               in  the subsection to ’enforcing, or  securing               the  enforcement of, any of the provisions  of               the  said foregoing sections’ as  the  purpose               for which orders etc. could be made.  An order               for payment of compensation, it was submitted,               did not          601               amount  to the enforcement of the rights  that               had  been  contravened.  In  their  Lordships’               view an order for payment of compensation when               a   right  protected  under  s.1  ’has   been’               contravened  is  dearly a  form  of  ’redress’               which  a person is entitled to claim under  s.               6(1) and may well be the only practicable form               of  redress,  as by now it is in  the  instant               case.  The jurisdiction to make such an  order               is conferred on the High Court by para (a)  of               s.6(2),   viz.  jurisdiction  ’to   hear   and               determine  any application made by any  person               in  pursuance  of  sub-section  (1)  of   this               section.  The very wide powers to make orders,               issue writs and give directions are  to this.’               Lord  Diplock further stated at page  680,  as               under:-                "Finally, their Lordships would say something               about  the  measure of  monetary  compensation               recoverable under s.6 where the  contravention               of   the  claimant’s   constitutional   rights               consists  of deprivation of liberty  otherwise               than by due process of law.  The claim is  not               a  claim  in private law for damages  for  the               tort  of  false imprisonment under  which  the               damages  recoverable  are  at  would   include               damages for loss of reputation.  It is a claim               in public law for compensation for deprivation               of liberty alone . ...... .               (emphasis supplied) Lord  Hailsham while dissenting from the majority  regarding the liability for compensation in that case, concurred  with the  majority opinion on this principle and stated  at  page 687, thus:-               expression  ’redress’ in sub-s(1) of  s.6  and               the  expression  ’enforcement’  in   sub-s(2),               although  capable of embracing  damages  where               damages  are  available as part of  the  legal               consequences  of contravention, do not  confer               and  are not in the context capable  of  being               construed  so as to confer a right of  damages               where  they have not hitherto been  available,               in  this  case  against  the  state  for   the               judicial errors of a judge. ..."               602 Thus,  on  this  principle, the  view  was  unanimous,  that enforcement of the constitutional right and grant of redress embraces  award  of  compensation  as  part  of  the   legal consequences of its contravention.

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It follows that ’a claim in public law for compensation’ for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms,  the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged  remedy for enforcement and protection of  such rights,  and such a claim based on strict liability made  by resorting  to  a  constitutional  remedy  provided  for  the enforcement of a fundamental right is ’distinct from, and in addition  to, the remedy in private law for damages for  the tort’  resulting from the contravention of  the  fundamental right.   The  defence  of  sovereign  immunity  being  inap- plicable,   and  alien  to  the  concept  of  guarantee   of fundamental  rights,  there  can be no question  of  such  a defence being available in the constitutional remedy.  It is this   principle   which   justifies   award   of   monetary compensation   for  contravention  of   fundamental   rights guaranteed  by  the  Constitution, when  that  is  the  only practicable mode of redress available for the  contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported  exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed  by  resort to the remedy in public  law  under  the Constitution  by  recourse  to Articles 32 and  226  of  the Constitution.   This is what was indicated in Rudul Sah  and is   the  basis  of  the  subsequent  decisions   in   which compensation  was awarded under Articles 32 and 226  of  the Constitution, for contravention of fundamental rights. A  useful  discussion  on this topic which  brings  out  the distinction between the remedy in public law based on strict liability  for  violation of a  fundamental  right  enabling award  of  compensation, to which the defence  of  sovereign immunity  is  inapplicable,  and  the  private  law  remedy, wherein vicarious liability of the State in tort may  arise, is to be found in Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Torts,  22nd Edition, 1992, by Justice G.P. Singh, at pages 44 to 48. This view finds support from the, decisions of this Court in the  Bhagalpur  blinding cases: Kharti and  Others  (II)  v. State  of Bihar and Others, [1981] 1 S.C.C. 627  and  Kharti and Other (TV) v. State of Bihar and Others, [1981] 2 S.C.C. 493,  wherein it was said that the court is not helpless  to grant relief in a case of violation of the right to life and personal  liberty,  and it should be prepared to  forge  new tools and devise new remedies’ for  603 the  purpose  of  vindicating  these  precious   fundamental rights.   It was also indicated that the procedure  suitable in the facts of the case must be adopted for conducting  the inquiry,  needed  to  ascertain-the  necessary  facts,   for granting  the relief, as the available mode of redress,  for enforcement  of  the guaranteed  fundamental  rights.   More recently in Union Carbide Corporation and Others v. Union of India  and Others, [1991] 4 S.C.C. 584, Misra,  C.J.  stated that ’we have to develop our own law and if we find that  it is  necessary to construct a new principle of  liability  to deal with an unusual situation which has arisen and which is likely  to arise in future...... there is no reason  why  we should hesitate to evolve such principle of liability .... . To  the same effect are the observations of  Venkatachaliah, J.  (as he then was), who rendered the leading  judgment  in the  Bhopal  gas case, with regard to the court’s  power  to grant relief. We respectfully concur with the view that. the court is  not helpless and the wide powers given to this Court by  Article 32,   which  itself  is  a  fundamental  right,  imposes   a constitutional  obligation on this Court to forge  such  new tools, which may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing   the   fundamental  rights  guaranteed   in   the

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Constitution,   which   enable   the   award   of   monetary compensation  in appropriate cases, where that is  the  only mode  of  redress available.  The power  available  to  this Court  under  Article 142 is also an enabling  provision  in this  behalf The contrary view would not merely  render  the court  powerless and the constitutional guarantee  a  mirage but   may,  in  certain  situations,  be  an  incentive   to extinguish life, if for the extreme contravention the  court is  powerless to grant any relief against the State,  except by  punishment of the wrongdoer for the  resulting  offence, and  recovery of damages under private law, by the  ordinary process.   It  the guarantee that deprivation  of  life  and personal  liberty cannot be made except in  accordance  with law, is to be real, the enforcement of the right in case  of every   contravention   must  also  be   possible   in   the constitutional scheme, the mode of redress being that  which is  appropriate in the facts of each case.  This  remedy  in public law has to be more readily available when invoked  by the  have not, who are not possessed of the wherewithal  for enforcement of their rights in private law, even though  its exercise  is to be tempered by judicial restraint  to  avoid circumvention   of   private  law   remedies,   where   more appropriate. We  may  also  refer to Article 9(5)  of  the  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 which indicates that an enforceable right to 604 compensation is not alien to the concept of enforcement of a guaranteed right.  Article 9(5) reads as under:-               "Anyone  who has been the victim  of  unlawful               arrest or detention shall have an  enforceable               right to compensation." The  above discussion indicates the principles on which  the Court’s power under Articles 32 and 226 of the  Constitution is   exercised   to   award   monetary   compensation    for contravention of a fundamental right.  This was indicated in Rudul Sah and certain further observations therein  adverted to  earlier,  which may tend to minimise the effect  of  the principle indicated therein, do not really detract from that principle.  This is how the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah  and  others  in that line have  to  be  understood  and Kasturilal distinguished therefrom.  We have considered this question  at  some length in view of the  doubt  raised,  at times, about the propriety of awarding compensation in  such proceedings, instead of directing the claimant to resort  to the  ordinary process of recovery of damages by recourse  to an  action  in tort.  In the present case,  on  the  finding reached, it is a clear case for award of compensation to the petitioner for the custodial death of her son. The  question now, is of the quantum of  compensation.   The deceased  Suman  Behera was aged about 22 years  and  had  a monthly  income  between  Rs.1200 to Rs.1500.  This  is  the finding  based on evidence recorded by the  District  Judge, and  there  is no reason to doubt its correctness.   In  our opinion, a total amount of Rs.1,50,000 would be  appropriate as  compensation,  to be awarded to the  petitioner  in  the present  case.  We may, however, observe that the  award  of compensation in this proceeding would be taken into  account for  adjustment, in the event of any other proceeding  taken by  the petitioner for recovery of compensation on the  same ground,  so that the amount to this extent is not  recovered by the petitioner twice over.  Apart from the fact that such an  order  is  just,  it is  also  in  consonance  with  the statutory  recognition  of  this  principle  of   adjustment provided in Section 357(5) Cr.P.C. and Section 141(3) of the

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Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Accordingly, we direct the respondent-State of Orissa to pay the  sum of Rs.1,50,000 to the petitioner and a further  sum of  Rs.10,000 as to be paid to the Supreme Court  Legal  Aid Committee.   The  mode  of payment  of  Rs.1,50,000  to  the petitioner would be, by making a term 605 deposit   of  that  amount  in  a  scheduled  bank  in   the petitioner’s name for a period of three years, during  which she  would  receive only the interest payable  thereon,  the principal amount being payable to her on expiry of the term. The Collector of the District will take the necessary  steps in  this  behalf, and report compliance  to.  the  Registrar (Judicial) of this Court within three months. We  clarify that the award of this compensation, apart  from the  direction  for adjustment of the amount  as  indicated, will  not affect any other liability of the  respondents  or any  other  person  flowing  from  the  custodial  death  of petitioner’s  son  Suman Behera.  We also  expect  that  the State  of Orissa would take the necessary further action  in this behalf, to ascertain and fix the responsibility of  the individuals  responsible  for the custodial death  of  Suman Behera,  and  also take all  available  appropriate  actions against  each of them, including their prosecution  for  the offence committed thereby. The writ petition is allowed in these terms. DR. ANAND, J. (CONCURRING) The  lucid  and elaborate judgment recorded  by  my  learned brother Verma J. obviates the necessity of noticing facts or reviewing  the  case  law  referred to  by  him.   I  would, however,  like to record a few observations of my own  while concurring with his Lordship’s judgment. This  Court  was  bestirred by  the  unfortunate  mother  of deceased  Suman  Behera through a  letter  dated  14.9.1988, bringing  to  the notice of the Court the death of  her  son while in police custody.  The letter was treated as a  Writ- Petition  under Article 32 of the Constitution.  As  noticed by  Brother Verma J., an inquiry was got conducted  by  this Court  through  the  District Judge  Sundergarh  who,  after recording   the  evidence,  submitted  his  inquiry   report containing  the finding that the deceased Suman  Behera  had died on account of multiple injuries inflicted on him  while in police custody.  Considering, that it was alleged to be a case  of  custodial  death, at the hands of  those  who  are supposed to protect the life and liberty of the citizen, and which  if  established  was  enough to  lower  the  flag  of civilization  to fly half-mast, the report of  the  District Judge was scrutinized and analysed by us with the assistance of Mr. M.S. Ganesh, appearing amicus 606 curiae  for  the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee  and  Mr. Altaf  Ahmad,  the  learned  Additional  Solicitor   General carefully. Verma J., while dealing with the first question i.e. whether it  was  a  case of custodial death,  has  referred  to  the evidence and the circumstances of the case as also the stand taken  by the State about the manner in which injuries  were caused  and has come to the conclusion that the case put  up by  the  police of the alleged escape of Suman  Behera  from police  custody and his sustaining the injuries in  a  train accident   was  not  acceptable.   I  respectfully   agree.A strenuous   effort  was  made  by  the  learned   Additional Solicitor  General by reference to the injuries on the  head and  the  face of the deceased to urge that  those  injuries could not be possible by the alleged police torture and  the

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finding recorded by the District Judge in his report to  the contrary was erroneous.  It was urged on behalf of the State that  the medical evidence did establish that  the  injuries had  been caused to the deceased by lathi blows but  it  was asserted  that the nature of injuries on the face  and  left temporal  region  could not have been caused by  the  lathis and,  therefore,  the  death  had  occurred  in  the  manner suggested by the police in a train accident and that it  was not  caused  by the police while the deceased was  in  their custody.   In  this connection, it would suffice  to  notice that  the Doctor, who conducted the postmortem  examination, excluded  the  possibility of the injuries to  Suman  Behera being caused in a train accident.  The injuries on the  face and  the left temporal region were found to  be  post-mortem injuries  while the rest were ante-mortem.  This  aspect  of the medical evidence would go to show that after  inflicting other injuries, which resulted in the death of Suman Behera, the  police  with a view to cover up their crime  threw  the body on the rail-track and the injuries on the face and left temporal  region were received by the deceased after he  had died.   This  aspect further exposes not only  the  barbaric attitude  of  the  police  but also  its  crude  attempt  to fabricate false clues and create false evidence with a  view to  screen its offence.  The falsity of the claim of  escape stands also exposed by the report from the Regional Forensic Science  Laboratory  dated 11.3.1988  (Annexure  R-8)  which mentions that the two pieces of rope sent for examination to it, did not tally in respect of physical appearance, thereby belying  the police case that the deceased escaped from  the police  custody by chewing the rope.  The theory  of  escape has,  thus,  been rightly disbelieved and I agree  with  the view of Brother Verma J. that the death of Suman Behera  was caused  while  he  was in custody of the  police  by  police torture.  A custodial death is perhaps one of the worst 607 crimes  in a civilised society governed by the Rule of  Law. It  is not our concern at this stage, however, to  determine as to which police officer or officers were responsible  for the torture and ultimately the death of Suman Behera.   That is a matter which shall have to be decided by the  competent court.   I respectfully agree with the directions  given  to the State by Brother Verma, J. in this behalf. On  basis  of the above conclusion, we have now  to  examine whether  to seek the right of redressal under Article 32  of the  Constitution, which is without prejudice to  any  other action with respect to the same matter which way be lawfully available,  extends merely to a declaration that  there  has been  contravention  and  infringement  of  the   guaranteed fundamental  rights and rest content at that  by  relegating the  party  to  seek  relief  through  civil  and   criminal proceedings  or can it go further and grant redress also  by the  only practicable form of redress  by awarding  monetary damages for the infraction of the right to life. It is exiomatic that convicts, prisoners or under-trials are not denuded of their fundamental rights under Article 21 and it is only such restrictions, as are permitted by law, which can be imposed on the enjoyment of the fundamental right  by such  persons.  It is an obligation of the State, to  ensure that there is no infringement of the indefeasible rights  of a  citizen to life, except in accordance with law while  the citizen is in its custody.  The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be denied  to convicts, under trials or other prisoners in custody, except according to procedure established by law.  There is a great responsibility on the police or prison authorities to ensure

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that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his right to  life.   His  liberty is in the  very  nature  of  things circumscribed  by  the  very fact  of  his  confinement  and therefore his interest in the limited liberty left to him is rather precious.  The duty of care on the part of the  State is  strict  and admits of no exceptions.  The  wrongdoer  is accountable  and the State is responsible if the  person  in custody  of  the  police  is deprived  of  his  life  except according to the procedure established by law.  I agree with Brother  Verma, J. that the defence of "sovereign  immunity’ in such cases is not available to the State and in  fairness to Mr. Altaf Ahmed it may be recorded that he raised no such defence either. 608 Adverting to the grant of relief to the heirs of a victim of custodial death for-the infraction or invasion of his rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it is not always enough to relegate him to .the ordinary remedy of a civil suit to claim damages for the tortuous act of the State  as that remedy in private law indeed is available  to the  aggrieved  party.   The  citizen  complaining  of   the infringement  of the indefeasible right under Article 21  of the  Constitution  cannot be told that for  the  established violation  of the fundamental right to fife, he  cannot  get any  relief  under the public law by the  courts  exercising writ  jurisdiction.   The primary source of the  public  law proceedings stems from the prerogative writs and the  courts have,  therefore,  to evolve ’new tools’ to give  relief  in public  law by molding it according to the situation with  a view  to  preserve  and  protect the  Rule  of  Law.   While concluding his first Hamlyn Lecture in 1949 under the  title ’Freedom  under  the  Law’ Lord Denning  in  his  own  style warned:               "No  one can suppose that the  executive  will               never be guilty of the sins that are common to               all  of  us.  You may be sure that  they  will               sometimes  do things which they ought  not  to               do: and will not do things that they ought  to               do.   But  if  and  when  wrongs  are  thereby               suffered by any of us what is the remedy?  Our               procedure for securing our personal freedom is               efficient,  our procedure for  preventing  the               abuse  of power is not.  Just as the pick  and               shovel  is no longer suitable for the  winning               of  coal, so also the procedure  of  mandamus,               certiorari,  and actions on the case  are  not               suitable for the winning of freedom in the new               age.   They must be replaced by new and up  to               date  machinery, by declarations,  injunctions               and actions for negligence... This is not  the               task  for Parliament..... the courts  must  do               this.   Of all the great tasks that lie  ahead               this is the greatest.  Properly exercised  the               new  powers  of  the  executive  lead  to  the               welfare  state;  but  abused they  lead  to  a               totalitarian  state.  None such must  ever  be               allowed in this Country." The  old  doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved  to  the remedies  available  in  civil law limits the  role  of  the courts   too  much  as  protector  and  guarantor   of   the indefeasible  Fights of the citizens.  The courts  have  the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts 609 and  the law are for the people and expected to  respond  to

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their aspirations. The  public law proceedings serve a different  purpose  than the  private  law  proceedings.   The  relief  of   monetary compensation,  as  exemplary damages, in  proceedings  under Article  32 by this Court or under Article 226 by  the  High Courts,  for  established infringement of  the  indefeasible right  guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is  a remedy  available in public law and is based on  the  strict liability  for  contravention of the  guaranteed  basic  and indefeasible  rights of the citizen.  The purpose of  public law is not only to civilize public power but also to  assure the  citizen that they live under a legal system which  aims to  protect  their  interests  and  preserve  their  rights. Therefore,  when  the  court molds the  relief  by  granting "compensation" in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution   seeking   enforcement   or   protection    of fundamental  rights, it does so under the public law by  way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public  wrong  on the State which has failed in  its  public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen.   The payment  of  compensation  in  such  cases  is  not  to   be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil  action for  damages under the private law but in the broader  sense of providing relief by an order of making ’monetary  amends’ under  the  public law for the wrong done due to  breach  of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen.   The compensation is in the nature of  exempellary damages’  awarded against the wrong doer for the  breach  of its  public  law  duty  and is  independent  of  the  rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the  private law in an action based on tort, through a  suit instituted  in  a  court of  competent  jurisdiction  or/and persecute the offender under the penal law. This Court and the High Courts, being the protectors of  the civil liberties of the citizen, have not only the power  and jurisdiction  but  also  an obligation to  grant  relief  in exercise  of its jurisdiction under Articles 32 and  226  of the  Constitution  to the victim or the heir of  the  victim whose   fundamental   rights  under  Article   21   of   the Constitution   of  India  are  established  to   have   been flagrantly infringed by calling upon the State to repair the damage done by its officers.to the fundamental rights of the citizen,  notwithstanding  the right of the citizen  to  the remedy by way of a civil suit or criminal proceedings.   The State, of course has the right to be indemnified by and take such action as may be available to it against the  wrongdoer in accordance with law  through appropriate proceedings.  Of 610 course, relief in exercise of the power under Article 32  or 226 would be granted only once it is established that  there has  been an infringement of the fundamental rights  of  the citizen  and no other form of appropriate redressal  by  the court  in  the  facts  and circumstances  of  the  case,  is possible.  The decisions of this Court in the line of  cases starting with Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Anr., [1983] 3 SCR   508  granted  monetary  relief  to  the  victims   for deprivation  of  their  fundamental  rights  in  proceedings through  petitions  filed  under Article 32 or  226  of  the Constitution of India, notwithstanding the rights  available under the civil law to the aggrieved party where the  courts found  that  grant of such relief was warranted.   It  is  a sound  policy  to  punish the wrongdoer and it  is  in  that spirit  that the Courts have molded the relief  by  granting compensation  to  the  victims in  exercise  of  their  writ jurisdiction.  In doing so the courts take into account  not

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only  the interest of the applicant and the  respondent  but also  the interests of the public as a whole with a view  to ensure that public bodies or officials do not act unlawfully and  do  perform their public duties  properly  particularly where  the fundamental rights of a citizen under Article  21 is concerned.  Law is in the process of development and  the process   necessitates   developing  separate   public   law procedures  as  also  public  law  principles.   It  may  be necessary  to  identify  the situations  to  which  separate proceedings and principles apply And the courts have to  act firmly  but with certain amount of circumspection  and  self restraint,  lest  proceedings under Article 32  or  226  are misused  as  a  disguised substitute  for  civil  action  in private law.  Some of those situations have been  identified by this Court in the cases referred to by Brother Verma, J. In  the  facts of the present case on the  findings  already recorded, the mode of redress which commends appropriate  is to  make  an  order  of monetary  amend  in  favour  of  the petitioner  for the custodial death of her son  by  ordering payment  of compensation by way of exemplary  damages.   For the reasons recorded by Brother Verma, J., I agree that  the State  of  Orissa  should pay a sum of  Rs.1,50,000  to  the petitioner  and  a sum of Rs.10,000 by way of costs  to  the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Board.  I concur with  the view expressed by Brother Verma, J. and the directions given by him in the judgment in all respects. V.P.R. Petition allowed. 611