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PETITIONER: MRS. NEERA MATHUR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT31/10/1991

BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J)

CITATION:  1992 AIR  392            1991 SCR  Supl. (2) 146  1992 SCC  (1) 286        JT 1991 (4)   468  1991 SCALE  (2)1139

ACT:     Life     Insurance    Corporation     Service     Rules: Appellant--Appointed  assistant in Life  Insurance  Corpora- tion--Discharged   during   probation   period--No   reasons given--Later Life Insurance Corporation revealed that appel- lant  withheld factum of being in family way in the  medical declaration-Court  held the information required to be  fur- nished  in medical declaration affect modesty and  self  re- spect of women.

HEADNOTE:     The petitioner applied for the post of assistant in  the Life  Insurance  Corporation of India. She  was  called  for written  test and also for interview and was  successful  in both the tests. She had to file a declaration form which she submitted  to the corporation on May 25, 1989. On  the  same day  she was also examined by a lady doctor who was  on  the panel  of  the corporation and found medically fit  for  the job.Thereafter she underwent a short-term training programme and given a letter of appointment dated September 25,  1989. She was put on probation for a period of six months and  was entitled  to be confirmed in the service, subject to  satis- factory work report.     The  petitioner  took leave from December 9,  1989  till March  8, 1990. She applied for maternity leave on  December 27,  1989 followed by medical certificate dated  January  6, 1990. She delivered a full term baby on January 11, 1990  in Dr. Hira Lal’s Nursing Home and was discharged from there on January 19, 1990.     On February 13, 1990 the petitioner was discharged  from the  service during her period of probation. No  ground  was assigned and the order seemed to be a discharge simplicitor.     The petitioner moved the High Court, and the High Court, refused  to interfere with the termination since  the  peti- tioner’s  work during the period of probation. was found  to be not satisfactory.     Thereafter the petitioner appealed to this Court.  After preliminary  hearing  the court issued an  interim  mandamus directing 147 the respondent to put the petitioner back to service  within

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15 days from the date of receipt of the court order and also issued notice for final hearing.     The corporation upon service of notice, filed the  coun- ter  seeking  to  justify the  termination  of  petitioner’s services on two grounds: (1) that the petitioner had  delib- erately withheld to mention the fact of being in the  family way  at the time of filling up the declaration  form  before medical examination for fitness. The same was revealed  only when  she informed the corporation that she had given  birth to  a  daughter. (2) Her work during the probation  was  not satisfactory.  So it was an order of discharge  simplicitor. The Corporation further made reference to Instruction  No.16 as  to the medical examination for recruitment of class  1II and IV staff, wherein for the purpose of appointment, if  at the time of medical examination any lady applicant is  preg- nant, her appointment shall be considered three months after the delivery. Granting the appeal, the Court,     HELD: While we arc moving forward to achieve the consti- tutional  guarantee  of  equal rights for  women,  the  Life Insurance Corporation of India seems to be not moving beyond the  status  quo. In the instant case there  is  nothing  on record  to  indicate that the petitioner’s work  during  the probation  was not satisfactory. The reason for  termination was only the declaration given by her at the stage of enter- ing  the service, though the petitioner was medically  exam- ined by the lady doctor and found her medically fit to  join the post. [148 D, E, 151 C]     The real mischief though unintended is the nature of the declaration  required  from a lady candidate  specially  the particulars required to be furnished under columns (iii)  to (viii) which are indeed embarrassing if not humilating.  The modesty and self respect may perhaps preclude the disclosure of such  personal problems. The corporation would do well to delete  such columns in the declaration. If the  purpose  of the declaration is to deny the maternity leave and  benefits to a lady candidate who is pregnant at the time of  entering the  service, the Corporation could subject her  to  medical examination including the pregnancy test. [151 D-F]      The interim order already given is made absolute though the appellant is not entitled to the salary from the date of discharge till her reinstatement. [151 G] 148

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4488 of 1991.     From  the Judgment and Order dated 8.4.91 of  the  Delhi High Court in C.W.P. No. 749 of 1990. R. Mohan for the Appellant.     F.S.Nanman,  Kailash  Vasudev,  Ms.  Alpana  Kitpal  and M.J.Paul for the Respondents. The following order of the Court was delivered: K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. Leave granted.     When we are moving forward to achieve the constitutional guarantee  of  equal  rights for women  the  life  Insurance Corporation  of  India  seems to be not  moving  beyond  the status quo. The case on hand illustrates this typical  atti- tude of the Corporation.     The petitioner applied for the post of Assistant in  the Life Insurance Corporation of India ("the Corporation"). She was called for written test and also for interview. She  was successful in both the tests. She was asked to fill a decla-

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ration  form which she did and submitted to the  Corporation on 25 May 1989. On the same day, she was also examined by  a lady doctor and found medically fit for the job. The  Doctor who examined the petitioner was in the approved panel of the Corporation.     The  petitioner  was directed to  undergo  a  short-term training  programme.  After  successful  completion  of  the training she was given an appointment letter dated 25,  Sep- tember 1989. She was appointed as Assistant in the  Corpora- tion. She was put on probation for a period of 6 months. She was  entitled  to  be confirmed in the  service  subject  to satisfactory work report.     The  petitioner took leave from 9 December 1989  till  8 March  1990. In fact, she applied for maternity leave on  27 December 1989 followed by medical certificate dated 6  Janu- ary. 1990. She was admitted to the Nursing Home of Dr.  Hira Lal on 10 January 1990. She delivered a full-term baby on 11 January  1990.  She was discharged from Nursing Home  on  19 January  1990. On 13 February 1990, the petitioner was discharged from  the serv- 149 ice.  It  was during the period of her probation.  It  would appear  from the order of discharge that no ground  was  as- signed in it and it seems to be a discharge simplicitor. The petitioner  moved  the High Court under Article 226  of  the Constitution  challenging that order on the ground  that  it was not a discharge simplicitor but based on some discrepan- cy  in the declaration made by her before joining the  serv- ice. The Corporation in the counter resisted the case  stat- ing  that the petitioner’s work was not satisfactory and  as such  under the terms of the appointment she was  discharged without  notice and without assigning any reason.  The  High Court  refused to interfere with the termination.  The  High Court observed that the Petitioner’s work during the  period of probation was found to be not satisfactory.     The petitioner has now appealed to this Court. When  the appeal was listed for preliminary hearing this Court  issued notice for final disposal and made an order as follows:               "The  facts of the case compel us to issue  an               interim mandamus directing the respondents  to               put  the  petitioner back to  service  and  we               accordingly issue a direction to the  respond-               ent to reinstate the petitioner within 15 days               from the date of receipt of this order."     The  Corporation  upon  service has  filed  the  counter seeking  to  justify  the termination  of  the  petitioner’s services. It has been stated that the Corporation discharged the  service of the petitioner while she was still a  proba- tioner.  At  the  time of discontinuing her  services  as  a probationer,  no reasons were given and it was an  order  of discharge  simplicitor. No stigma was imputed to  the  peti- tioner.  The  petitioner was on leave from 9  December  1989 till 8 March 1990. The petitioner had deliberately  withheld to  mention the fact of being in the family way at the  time of  filling up the declaration form before medical  examina- tion  for fitness. The petitioner concealed the fact of  her being  in the family way. this was revealed later  when  she informed  the  Corporation  that she had given  birth  to  a daughter.     The Corporation also made reference to the terms of  the declaration as filled in by the petitioner on 25 May 1989:   "6.  To  be  filled in by female candidates  only  in  the presence of the Medical examiner:   a) Are you married--                    Yes.

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 b) If so, please state: 150      i) Your Husband’s Name in full & occupation     Mr.  PRADEEP  MATHUR,  Law  Officer,  Central  Pollution Control Board, Nehru Place, New Delhi.   ii)    State  the number of children, if  any,  and  their present ages: One         daughter: 1 year and 6 months.   iii)   Have the menstrual periods always been regular  and painless,         and are they so now?  ....  Yes.   iv)   How many conceptions have taken place?         How many have gone full-term? One.   v)     State  the  date of last  menstruation:   ...  29th April, 1989.   vi) Are you pregnant now? ... No.   vii) State the date of last delivery: 14th November, 1987.   viii) Have you had any abortion or miscarriage? ...No."     It was further alleged in the counter affidavit that the declaration given by the petitioner was false to the  knowl- edge of the petitioner inasmuch as, as per her own  averment she  had delivered a full-term baby on 11 January 1990.  The petitioner  to her own knowledge, could not have had a  men- struation  cycle  on 29 April 1989 as stated by her  in  the declaration on 25 May 1989. Dr. S.K. Gupta, MD, of Dr.  Hira Lal Child & Maternity Home, where the petitioner was  admit- ted  for delivery has certified that the petitioner had  LMP on  3 April 1989. A copy of the certificate of Dr. Hira  Lal has also been produced as Annexure to the Counter Affidavit. It  was asserted that the petitioner had deliberately  given in her declaration to the Corporation wrong date of menstru- ation as 29 April 1989 and she had given her correct date of LMP as 3 April 1989 to Dr. S.K. Gupta. If she had  mentioned the correct date of her menstruation in her declaration  her appointment  would have been deferred as per rules.  It  was also contended that the decision to discharge the petitioner from  the service of the Corporation was on 2  grounds:  (1) because  of  a false declaration given by her  at  the  very initial  stage of her service; and (2) her work  during  the period of probation was not satisfactory.     Reference was also made to the Instruction 16 issued  by the  Corporation as to the Medical examination for  recruit- ment  of  Class  1II and Class IV staff. Clause  16  of  the Instructions reads as trader:               "16. MEDICAL EXAMINATION.’               No  person shall be appointed to the  services               of  the  Corporation unless  he/she  has  been               certified to be of sound constitu-               151               tion and medically fit for discharging his/her               duties. The certificates in the form given  in               Annexure  IX  should be from  a  doctor,  duly               authorized  for the purpose by the  Appointing               Authority. If at the time of medical  examina-               tion, any lady applicant is found to be  preg-               nant, her appointment to the Corporation shall               be considered three months after the delivery.               This  would  be subject to a  further  medical               examination  at the candidate’s cost and  sub-               ject  to  the ranking list  continuing  to  be               valid."     We  have examined the matter carefully. We have  nothing on record to indicate that the petitioner’s work during  the period of probation was not satisfactory. Indeed, the reason for  termination seems to be different. It was the  declara-

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tion  given by her at the stage of entering the service.  It is said that she gave a false declaration regarding the last menstruation period with a view to suppress her pregnancy.     It  seems to us that the petitioner cannot be blamed  in this case. She was medically examined by the Doctor who  was in  the  panel approved by the Corporation.  She  was  found medically  fit to join the post. The real  mischief  though, unintended  is about the nature of the declaration  required from a lady candidate. The particulars to be furnished under columns (iii) to (viii) in the declaration are indeed embar- rassing if not humilating. The modesty and self respect  may perhaps  preclude the disclosure of such  personal  problems like  whether her menstrual period is regular  or  painless, the  number of conceptions taken place; how many  have  gone full term etc. The Corporation would do well to delete  such columns  in the declaration. If the purpose of the  declara- tion  is to deny the maternity leave and benefits to a  lady candidate who is pregnant at the time of entering the  serv- ice  (the legality of which we express no opinion since  not challenged),  the Corporation could subject her  to  medical examination including the pregnancy test.     In the circumstances the interim order already issued is made  absolute.We however, direct that the appellant is  not entitled  to the salary from the date of discharge till  her reinstatement.  With this direction the appeal  stands  dis- posed of but no order as to costs. S.B.                                                  Appeal allowed. 152