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PETITIONER: SMT. MOHINI BADHWAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAGHUNANDAN SARAN ASHOK SARAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/04/1989

BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. (CJ) BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. (CJ) VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR 1492            1989 SCR  (2) 748  1989 SCC  (3)  72        JT 1989 (2)   259  1989 SCALE  (1)1123

ACT:     Delhi     Rent     Control     Act,     1958:    Section 14(1)(h)--Tenant   obtained   vacant   possession   of   own house--Sold it four days later-Circumstance that tenant lost possession    on   the   date   of   filing   of    eviction petition--Whether      affords      protection       against eviction--’Acquired      vacant     possession     of      a residence’--Interpretation of.

HEADNOTE:     The respondent-landlord filed a petition for eviction of the  appellant-tenant  from  the  suit  premises  under   s. 14(1)(h)  of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 on the  ground that  the  appellant had acquired vacant possession  of  her house on November 20, 1973, after the suit premises had been let  out  to her on April 1, 1971. The  appellant  contended that she was not liable to be ejected.     The  Assistant  Rent  Controller and  the  Rent  Control Tribunal concurrently held that even though the house  owned by  the appellant was not in her occupation on the date  the petition  was filed, it was sufficient for the purpose  ors. 14(1)(h) that sometime before the filing of the petition she had  obtained vacant possession of the house, and  thus  had alternative accommodation during November 20-24, 1973, i.e., from the date she obtained vacant possession from her tenant till  she sold it. The High Court also held that the  ground for  ejectment had been made out when the eviction  petition was filed.     In the appeal before this Court, on behalf of the appel- lant-tenant it was contended that before the earlier  tenant had  vacated  the house, the appellant had  already  entered into an oral agreement to sell the house to another  person, which  was formalized on a written document on November  24, 1973 and as the appellant was under legal obligation to sell the house she was not entitled to enter into and to continue in  possession of the house when it was vacated, and  there- fore, the house could not be said to constitute  alternative accommodation, for the purpose ors. 14(1)(h) of the Act. Dismissing the appeal, 749     HELD:  The Rent Control Tribunal has found  against  the

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existence  of  any oral agreement for the sale of  the  suit house.  It was only after four days of obtaining  possession on  November  20,  1973 from the original  tenant  that  the appellant executed an agreement for sale. Thus, it is  clear that  the appellant came into the house belonging to her  on November 20, 1973 and it was available to her for her  occu- pation.  The  circumstance that she lost possession  on  the date  when the eviction petition was filed does not  protect the appellant against s. 14(1)(h) of the Act. [750F-G]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1842  of 1981.     From the Judgment and Order dated30.4.1981 of the  Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 418 of 1978.     Mrs.  Shyamala  Pappu, H.K. Puri and S.D.  Lal  for  the Appellant.     Dr. Y.S. Chitale, S.N. Kacker, Mukul Mudgal and N.S. Das Bahl for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     PATHAK,  CJ.  This is a tenant’s appeal arising  out  of proceedings for her ejectment.     The  respondent, as landlord of the premises let to  the appellant,  filed a petition for her eviction on the  ground set  forth  in s. 14(1)(h) of  the Delhi Rent  Control  Act, 1958,  that  is to say, that the  appellant  had   "acquired vacant  possession of  .......  a residence" after the  com- mencement  of  the Act, viz, her own  house  D-196,  Defence Colony,  New  Delhi and was therefore liable  to  hand  over possession  of  the rented premises occupied by her  to  the respondent.  It was alleged that the appellant had  acquired vacant  possession of her house on 20 November,  1973  after the premises in suit had been let out to her on April, 1971. The appellant denied that she was liable to ejectment.      The  Assistant  Rent Controller, Delhi,  and  the  Rent Control  Tribunal concurrently held that the  appellant  was owner of house D-196, Defence Colony, New Delhi, that on  20 November, 1973 the previous tenant had vacated the  premises and  handed over vacant possession and that  thereafter  she had sold it to one Smt. Leela Wati 750 on 24 November, 1973. It was observed that during the period 20 November, 1973 to 24 November, 1973 it must be taken that she  was in possession of alternative accommodation. It  was also  held  concurrently that even though on  the  date  the petition  for eviction was filed, the house, D-196,  Defence Colony,  New Delhi, was no longer in the occupation  of  the appellant  it was sufficient for the purpose of s.  14(1)(h) that some time prior to the filing of the eviction  petition the appellant had obtained possession of the house. The High Court  endorsed  the view taken by it earlier in  Hem  Chand Baid v. Smt. Prem Wati Parekh., AIR 1980 Delhi 1 and in  the view  that the ground for ejectment had been made  out  when the eviction petition was filed it dismissed the appeal.     In  this appeal it is urged on behalf of  the  appellant that before the earlier tenant of tile appellant had vacated the  house the appellant had already entered into an  agree- ment to sell the house to another person, and that therefore in  the presence of that obligation it was not  possible  to say that when the house was vacated the appellant was  enti- tled  to  enter into and to continue in  possession  of  the house.  It is contended before us that before  the  original tenant vacated the house there was an oral agreement between

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the appellant and Smt. Leela Wati to sell the house to  Smt. Leela  Wati and that the agreement was only formalized in  a written document on 24 November, 1973. It is urged that when the  original tenant vacated the house on 20 November,  1973 the appellant was under a legal obligation to sell the house to Smt. Leela Wati, and that in the circumstances, the house cannot  be said to constitute alternative accommodation  for the  purpose  of s. 14(1)(h) of the Act.  The  Rent  Control Tribunal  has found against the existence of any  such  oral agreement.  Upon that it would seem that it was  only  after obtaining possession on 20 November, 1973 from the  original tenant, that is, four days later, that the appellant execut- ed an agreement for sale with Smt. Leela Wati. It is  appar- ent  that on 20 November, 1973 the appellant came  into  the house  belonging to her and it was available to her for  her occupation.  The circumstances that she lost  possession  on the  date  when  the eviction petition was  filed  does  not protect the appellant against s. 14(1)(h) of the Act.     In  the result, the appeal fails .and is  dismissed  but there is no order as to costs. N.P.V.                                 Appeal dismissed. 751