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PETITIONER: SMT. MEHRUNNISA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SMT. VISHAM KUMARI & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       02/12/1997

BENCH: A.S. ANAND, K. VENKATASWAMI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                THE 2ND DAY OF DECEMBER, 1997 Present:                Honb’ble Dr.Justice A.S.Anand                Hon’ble Mr.Justice K.Venkataswami D.D. Thakur,  Sr. Adv.  and Vivek Gambhir, Adv. with him for the appellants Dr. Shankar  Ghosh, Sr.  Adv.,   S.S.Khanduja, B.K.  Satija, Y.P.Dhingra, Advs. with him for the Respondents.                       J U D G M E N T      The following Judgment of the Court was delivered; K. Venkataswami. J.      This appeal  by special leave is preferred by the legal representatives of the deceased tenant against whom an order of eviction  from the  suit premises  was passed by the High Court.      The respondent-landlady  became the  owner of  the suit premises under  a registered  sale deed  dated 31.3.1975. On 12.7.1976, the  respondent issued  a notice  to  the  tenant terminating the  tenancy stating  inter alia  that the  suit premises, a  non-residential one,  was required for using it as an  office for  her husband,  a practising lawyer. It was also stated  that the  tenant has default in payment of rent and has  sub-let the premises without written consent of the landlady. However,  no action  was  taken  pursuant  to  the notice dated  12.7.1976.  The  respondent  issued  a  second notice through  lawyer on  9.7.1977 stating  that  the  suit premises was  required for  her  cloth  business  which  she intended to  start. Even  on the basis of the second notice, no action  was taken  by the  respondent-landlady.  A  third notice  was   also  issued  by  the  respondent-landlady  on 12.10.1979 repeating  the same  allegations contained in the second notice  dated 9.7.1977. This time, the landlady filed a suit  for eviction  on the  basis of  the notice issued on 12.10.1979. The  grounds for eviction as given in the plaint were that  the landlady required the premises for starting a cloth business;  that the tenant has defaulted in payment of rent for the period from 1.4.1979 to 30.11.1979 and that the tenant has sub-let the premises unauthorisedly.      The tenant  resisted the  suit for eviction denying the requirement of  the landlady  for her  new business.  It was

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also denied by the tenant that there was default the payment of rent. The allegation of sub-tenancy was also denied.      The trial  court on  the basis  of the pleadings framed live issues.  The  plaintiff  (respondent  herein)  examined herself  and   three  other  witnesses  in  support  of  her pleadings. Likewise,  the deceased  defendant-tenant,  apart from examining  himself, examined  six  other  witnesses  in support of his pleadings.      The trial court in its detailed judgment found that the requirement of  the landlady for starting cloth business was bona fide  and that  she was  not in possession of any other vacant shop  of her  own for  the said requirement: that the landlady failed  to establish  the case  of sub-letting  and also the case of default in payment of rent. In other words, out of  three grounds put forward in support of the suit for eviction. The  trial court  deceased the  suit only  on  the ground of bona fide requirement by the landlady for starting the cloth business. We are therefore, not concerned with the other grounds for eviction.      Aggrieved by  the judgment  of  the  trial  court,  the deceased tenant  preferred an appeal to the appellate court. The  lower   appellate  court,   after  re-appreciating  the pleadings and  evidence, came  to a  conclusion on  the bona fide requirement  of  the  landlady  for  starting  a  cloth business.  According  to  the  lower  appellate  court,  the landlady failed  to establish her case of the requirement of the suit  premises for  starting a cloth business. The lower appellate court  reversed the  Judgment and  decree  of  the trial Court  mainly on the ground that the landlady issued a first notice  on 12.1.1976  giving out an entirely different ground for  eviction, namely, that she required the premises for the use of her husband as lawyer’s office. Subsequently, according to  the first appellate court, in the light of the judgment of  the High  Court that such a claim cannot be the basis for  eviction under  Section 12(1)(f)  of  the  Madhya Pradesh Accommodation  Control Act. 1961 thereinafter called the ‘Act’).  The landlady  has changed  her  stand  and  put forward an  entirely new  ground for  eviction, namely, that the premises  was required  for starting  a cloth  business. According to  the lower  appellate court,  the change in the stand of  the landlady  exposed her  intention to  evict the tenant for  some other  motive. The  lower  appellate  court dismissed the  suit for  eviction  by  allowing  the  appeal preferred by  the tenant  on the  ground that  the  landlady failed to  established  her  case  viz.  that  required  the premises bona fide for starting a cloth business.      Aggrieved by  the reversing  judgment and decree of the lower appellate  court, the  respondent-landlady preferred a Second Appeal  under Section  100, CPC,  before  the  Madhya Pradesh High  Court. The  High Court  after going  into  the judgments of the courts below after going into the judgments of the  courts below  found that  the lower appellate court, though entitled  to re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion  failed to  read the whole evidence and all the  documents  exhibited  in  the  trial  court  before reversing the  finding of  the trial  court on  the issue of bona fide  requirement of  the landlady for starting a cloth business. According  to the  High Court, the lower appellate court failed  to appreciate  the notices  issued on 9.7.1977 and 12.10.1979  taking a consistent stand regarding the bona fide requirement  for starting  a cloth  business. The  High Court has  taken note of a number of judgments to the effect that the notice issued and the circumstances which prevailed just before  the institution  of the  suit are  relevant for coming to  conclusion regarding the bona fide requirement of

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the landlady. By giving undue importance to the first notice and ignoring  the subsequent  notices.  according  the  High Court, the  conclusion reached  by the lower appellate court is  vitiated.   On  that   ground  and  also  accepting  the appreciation of  evidence by the trial court on the issue of bona fide  requirement  of  the  landlady,  the  High  Court allowed the Second Appeal and decreed the suit for eviction.      It is  under these circumstances, the present appeal by special leave has been preferred by the legal representative of the tenant who died pending the proceedings.      Mr.  D.D.Thakur,   learned  Senior   Counsel  for   the appellants, strenuously  argued  contending  that  the  High Court exceeded  its jurisdiction  under Section 100, CPC, by going into  the evidence and reversing the conclusion of the lower appellate  court on  a question  of  fact.  On    that ground,  according   to  the  learned  Senior  Counsel,  the judgment of  the High  Court is  liable to  be set aside. He also submitted  that the First Appellate Court was justified in commenting  upon the ground for eviction  as given in the first notice and the subsequent change in the stand taken by the landlady.  Another words,  the learned counsel justified the  conclusion   reached  by   the  lower  appellate  court reversing the  conclusion of  the trial court. Mr. Thakur in support of  his contention  placed reliance on two judgments of this  Court in Sarvate T.B. vs. Nemichand (1966 (MPLJ) 26 (SCC) and Mattulal vs. Radhe Lal ( 1974 (2) SCC 365).      Dr. Shankar  Ghosh learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-landlady  contending contrary  submitted that the High  Curt was  fully justified in reversing the finding of the  lower appellate  court as  the lower appellate court failed to  read the  entire evidence  and all  the documents before coming to a conclusion contrary to the one reached by the trial  court. Learned  Senior Counsel  further submitted that this  Court has consistently taken the view that if the first appellate  court while  reversing the  finding of  the trial court  failed  to  take  note  of  all  the  documents exhibited before  the trial  court and  failed to  read  the entire evidence,  the High  Court can  interfere  with  such finding while  exercising jurisdiction  under  Section  100, CPC. He  also  laid  stress  on  the  fact  that  the  lower appellate court  ought not  to have looked into the contents of first  notice issued  by the  landlady when  the relevant notice for  the purpose  was the last one issued just before the filing  of the  suit. The  landlady having not taken any steps pursuant  to first and second notices, the contents in those notices  ought to  have been  ignored. Learned  Senior Counsel submitted  that the  High Court  was right observing that the  circumstances prevailing  before the filing of the suit are  relevant and  not be  circumstances that prevailed long earlier to the filing of the suit.      We have  considered the  rival submission and carefully gone through  the judgments  of all  the three courts. It is true that  this Court  in Nemi  Chand’s case (Supra) has, in unmistakable terms,  held while  deciding a  case under  the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 23 of 1995 that the finding of  the District  Court  based  on  appreciation  of evidence was  binding upon the High Court and the High Court had no  power to  reverse that  finding. This  Court further observed as follows:-      "The criticism  made  by  the  High      Court  that  the  District  Court’s      finding was  vitiated "due  to very      imperfect  understanding   of   the      meaning    of     the    expression      ‘genuinely requires’  occurring  in

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    clauses (g) and (h) of Section 4 of      the Act,"  and  that  the  District      Court and  "arrived  at  a  finding      which is  totally unrelated  to the      legal  connotation  of  the  phrase      ‘genuinely  requires’   and  almost      borders on  perversity",  does  not      appear  to   be  merited.   In  our      judgment,   the    District   Court      committed   no    error   in    the      examination of  the evidence in the      light of the Full Bench judgment in      Damodar’s case."      Likewise in  Mattulal’s case  (supra), this court after referring to Nemi Chand case held as follows:-      " Now it is obvious that the issues      whether the respondent required the      Lohia Bazar shop for the purpose of      starting a new business as a dealer      in iron  and steel materials and if      so,  whether  his  requirement  was      bona fide  were both  questions  of      fact. Their  determination did  not      involve the  application  of  legal      principles to the facts established      in the  evidence. The  findings  of      the Additional  District  Judge  on      these   issues    were   no   doubt      inferences from  other basic facts,      but  that   did   not   alter   the      character  of  these  findings  and      they remained finding of fat. There      is, therefore,  no doubt  that  the      conclusion   of    the   Additional      District Judge  that the respondent      did not bona fide require the Lohia      Bazar  shop   for  the  purpose  of      starting business  as a  dealer  in      iron    and     steel     materials      represented a  finding of  fact and      it could  not be interfered with by      the High  Court  in  second  appeal      unless  it   was  shown   that   in      reaching it  a mistake  of law  was      committed   by    the    Additional      District Judge  or it  was based on      no  evidence  or  was  such  as  no      reasonable man  could  reach.  This      was precisely the ground on which a      Bench of  four Judges of this Court      in Sarvate  T.B. vs.  Nemichand set      aside the  judgment of  the  Madhya      Pradesh  High   Court   which   had      interfered with  the decree  passed      by the  District Court dismissing a      suit  for  eviction  filed  by  the      landlord against  the  tenant.  The      District Court,  sitting as a court      of  first  appeal,  had  taken  the      view, on  an  appreciation  of  the      evidence, that  the requirement  of      the premises  by the  landlord  for      his residence  was not genuine, but      in second appeal the Madhya Pradesh      High Court  reversed  this  finding

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    and passed  a decree  for  eviction      against the  tenant. This Court set      aside the  judgment of  the  Madhya      Pradesh High  Court on  the  ground      that the  finding  reached  by  the      District Court  on an  appreciation      of the  evidence that  the landlord      did  not   genuinely  require   the      premises for  his residence  was  a      finding  of  fact  and  the  Madhya      Pradesh   High    Court   had    no      jurisdiction in  second  appeal  to      disturb this finding".      In the  case on  hand unfortunately the lower appellate court before reversing the finding of the trial court on the issue of  bona fide requirement of the landlady for starting a cloth business failed to read the entire evidence and take into consideration all the documents placed before the trial court. Therefore,  it was  rightly contended  by Dr.  Ghosh, learned Senior  Counsel for  the respondent,  that the  High Court was  justified in  interfering with the finding of the first appellate  court. A  reading of  the judgment  of  the lower appellate  court leaves  no doubt  that it  has looked into  the  contents  of  the  first  notice  whereunder  the landlady has  stated that  she required the premises for her husband’s office  and ignored  the notice issued just before the filing  of the  suit. The lower appellate court has also failed to  give due importance to the fact that the landlady has not  taken any  steps to file suit for eviction pursuant to the  notice issued on two earlier occasion and the ground stated in the notice preceding the suit are relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue.      The judgments  cited by  the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent on the scope of Section 100.CPC, are apposite in the  circumstance of  the this  case. In  J.B. Sharma  vs State of  Madhya Pradesh  & Another  (1988 (Supp.) SCC 451), this Court  while considering the scope of Section 100, CPC, observed thus:-      " It  will thus  be seen  that  the      first   appellate    court    while      recording the  finding acted  on an      assumption  not  supported  by  any      evidence  and   further  failed  to      consider the entire document on the      basis  of  which  the  finding  was      recorded.  The   High  Court   was,      therefore, justified  under Section      100 of  the Code of Civil Procedure      to set aside the finding."      In Dilbagrai  Punjabi vs.  Sharad Chandra (1988 (Supp.) SCC 710)  again  this  Court  while  considering  the  scope Section 100, CPC, held as follows:-      "It is  true that  the  High  Court      while  hearing   the  appeal  under      Section 100  of the  Code of  Civil      Procedure has  no  jurisdiction  to      reappraise the evidence and reverse      the conclusion reached by the first      appellate court,  but at  the  same      time its  power to  interfere  with      the finding  cannot  be  denied  if      interfere with  the finding  cannot      be  denied   if  when   the   lower      appellate court decides an when the      lower appellate  court  decides  an

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    issue   of   fact   a   substantial      question of  law arises.  The Court      is under  a  duty  to  examine  the      entire relevant  evidence on record      and  if   it  refuses  to  consider      important  evidence  having  direct      bearing on  the disputed  issue and      the error  which  arises  is  of  a      magnitude that  it gives birth to a      substantial question  of  law,  the      High Court  is fully  authorised to      set aside the finding."      To the  same effect,  another judgment of this Court in Sundra Naicka  Vadiyar (Dead)  by IRs.  & Anr. vs. Ramaswami Ayyar (Dead)  by His  LRs. (1995  Supp. (4)  SCC 534),  this Court observed as follows:-      "A Perusal of the impugned judgment      of the  High Court shows that there      were good  reasons for treating the      finding   on    the   question   of      possession recorded  by  the  first      two courts  to be  vitiated.  Apart      from the  reasons given by the High      Court,  it   appears  to   us  that      ignoring  some   of  the  documents      which were  vital for  deciding the      question   of    possession    also      vitiated   the   finding   on   the      question of  possession recorded by      the trial  court  as  well  as  the      first appellate court."      Recently also in Kochukakkada Aboobacker (Dead) by LRs. and Other vs. Attah Kasim and Other (1996 (7) SCC 389), this Court again  observed on  the scope  of Section 100, CPC, as follows:-      "The  appellate   court   had   not      considered  these  documents  in  a      proper perspective  and the  effect      of those documents on the rights of      the   parties.   Accordingly,   the      learned   Judge   reluctantly   had      reconsidered the  evidence and,  in      our view, quite rightly since it is      not a mere appreciation of evidence      but  drawing  inferences  from  the      admitted  documents,  Since  proper      construction of  the documents  and      inferences have  not  legally  been      drawn by  the appellate  court, the      High  Court   gone  in  detail  and      recorded the finding".      In the  light of  the pronouncements  of this Court and for the  reasons given  by the  High Court. namely, that the lower appellate  court  has  failed  to  take  into  account document necessary for giving a finding on the issue of bona fide requirement,  we are  of the  view that  we cannot find fault with  the High Court in interfering with the reversing judgment of  the lower  appellate  court.  Accordingly,  the appeal fails  and it is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.