10 July 1996
Supreme Court
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SMT.MAQBOOL FATMA Vs DEPUTY CUSTONDIAN GEN.EVACUEE

Bench: RAMASWAMY,K.
Case number: SLP(C) No.-014717-014717 / 1996
Diary number: 65299 / 1996


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PETITIONER: SMT. MAQBOOL FATMA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL,EVACUEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       10/07/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCALE  (5)508

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Delay condoned.      This Special Leave Petition arises against the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad made on January 28, 1991 in  C.W.P. No.4770  of 1976.  The admitted  position is that one  Ashfaq Hussain  was an  evacuee having migrated to Pakistan. His  property was  vested in  the Custodian  under U.P. Custodian  of Evacuee  Properties Act.  Thereafter  the Central Act  had taken  over the  operation of  the  evacuee properties.  The   records  disclose   that  the   Assistant Custodian, Farrukhabad  at Kanpur  had passed an order dated June 22,  1961 in  which it  was held  that the  interest of Ashfaq Hussain had been shown as evacuee interest and it was directed that  the order  be communicated  to all  the major shareholders for  information. It  was found  that the order was accordingly  communicated to all the major shareholders. Admittedly, a  revision application  came  to  be  filed  on August 16,  1975, that  is, practically after 14 years under Section 27  of the  Administration of the Evacuee Properties Act, 1950   [for short, the "Act"]. The Additional Custodian General had  declined to  interfere with the order. When the petitioner had  called that  order in  question in  the writ petition, the  High Court held that the Additional Custodian General had  properly exercised  the revisional jurisdiction and it  declined to  interfere with  the order  due  to  the inordinate delay  in filing  the revision. Thus this special leave petition.      It is sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner  that the  judgment relied  upon by  the High Court is not of any help to the view taken by the High Court and that,  therefore, the  High Court  was not  right in its conclusion. This  Court in  Purshotam Lal  Dhawan  v.  Diwan Chaman Lal  [AIR 1961  SC 1371]  has held that Section 27 of the Administration  of Evacuee Properties Act, 1950 does not prescribe  any   period  of  limitation,  but  Rule  31  (5) prescribes limitation  of 60  days for filling an appeal and

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that it would provide as guide to the revisional authorities to exercise  the revisional  power reasonable  and faily. In that case,  entertaining the  revision within  one year  was held to  be not unreasonable. In that behalf, this Court has held that  the powers of the Custodian General under Section 27 read  with Rule  31(5) are  not intended  to be exercised arbitrarily. Being  a judicial  power, he shall exercise his discretion reasonably and it is him to consider whether in a particular case  he should  entertain a  revision beyond the period of  sixty days stated in Rule 31(5). It was held that the exercise  of the  revisional powers  after one  year was held to be not unreasonable.      It is  seen that  the petitioners  had slept  over  the rights over  the property  well over  14 years by which time even the  persons in possession had perfected their title by prescription. Under  those circumstances,  a person  who was not diligent  in exercising  his rights  and  allowed  third party rights  to accrue,  cannot be permitted to agitate the right after  an inordinate  delay. The  revisional authority has rightly  declined to  interfere  with  the  order  after inordinate delay.  Though revisional  power was given to the revisional authority  without limitation,it  is settled  law that the  revisional powers  should be  exercised keeping in view the rights of the parties and the effect of exercise of the revisional  powers and  all other  relevant facts. Under these circumstances,  we cannot hold that the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition.      The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed.