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PETITIONER: SMT. KAUSHALYA DEVI BOGRA AND OTHERS ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, AURANGABAD AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/02/1984

BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA VARADARAJAN, A. (J)

CITATION:  1984 AIR  892            1984 SCR  (2) 900  1984 SCC  (2) 324        1984 SCALE  (1)304  CITATOR INFO :  R          1988 SC 943  (6)  R          1992 SC 666  (4)  RF         1992 SC2298  (8)

ACT:      Constitution of India 1950, Article 141.      Supreme Court  in appeal setting aside judgment of High Court-High Court  directed to  dispose of  case  afresh-High Court whether entitled to resurrect the earlier Judgment.      Land Acquisition  Act, 1894,  Section 23-Large tract of land acquired valuation of such land-Transactions in respect of small properties do not offer proper guide-lines.

HEADNOTE:      A large  tract of  land located  with in  the Municipal Limits was  notified for  acquisition under  s.3 (1)  of the Land Acquisition  Act prevailing  in the State of Hyderabad, corresponding to section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for a  public purpose.  Appeals were  filed by two groups of people  whose   lands   were   acquired   under   a   common notification, and they were disposed of by the High Court by applying a common basis.      Dissatisfied with  the compensation  awarded, the first group of  claimants  and  the  State  preferred  appeals.  A Division Bench  of the  High Court  after dividing  the land into zones  for the  purpose  of  fixation  of  compensation determined the  compensation. Being  dissatisfied  with  the results, the claimants preferred appeals to this Court.      In the appeals, it was urged on behalf of the claimants that the  decision of  the Civil  Judge in the second groups had not  become final  and that an enhanced compensation was granted by  the Civil  Judge in  that matter,  and sought to introduce additional  evidence. This  Court  set  aside  the judgments of the High Court, sent the cases back to the High Court and directed the High Court to dispose them.      In the  connected appeal  (second group),  the claimant being dissatisfied with the compensation awarded both by the Land Acquisition Collector and 901 the Civil Judge preferred an appeal to the High Court, and a Division Bench  which reassessed  the evidence, held that as

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no  acceptable   material  was  on  record  to  justify  any enhancement  of   compensation,  that   award  of  the  Land Acquisition  Officer  should  be  sustained,  The  appellant challenged this  order of  the High  Court, in his appeal to this Court.      When the appeals after remand (first group) came before the same  Division Bench,  the High  Court finding  that  no further evidence  was forthcoming  either on  behalf of  the appellants or  the State,  held that the earlier Judgment of the High Court should be treated as the substantive judgment declared it  to be  placed on  the record as the judgment of the High  Court after  remand  by  the  Supreme  Court,  and thereby confirmed  the valuation and compensation awarded by the earlier Division Bench.      Allowing the appeals by both the groups to this Court; ^      HELD :  1 (i)  The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in dealing with the first appeals. This Court in exercise of its appellate  powers vested  in it under Article 136 of the Constitution had  set aside  the Bench  decision of the High Court delivered  in 1971  and that  judgment for all intents and purposes  had become  non-existent. The present Division Bench of  the High  Court was  not entitled,  by any process known to law, to resurrect that judgment into life. [909B-C]      (ii) The direction of the appellate court is binding on all courts  subordinate thereto.  The provisions  of Article 141 of  the Constitution,  require all Courts in India to be bound to  follow  the  decisions  of  this  Court.  Judicial discipline requires  and decorum  known to law warrants that appellate  directions   should  be   taken  as  binding  and followed. [909D-E]      Broom v.  Cassell &  Co.,  [1972]  1  All.  E.R  801  ; referred to.      In the  instant case, a judgment which has already been set aside  has been brought on record and has been described as the  judgment in  the first  appeals. That  judgment is a nullity. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed itself to be  swayed away  and landed  up in  a situation which was wholly unwarranted.  Some of  its observations were uncalled for and  greater restraint  was expected. It was open to the High Court  to require  the parties  to move  this Court for modification of  the direction.  If necessary,  a  reference could have  been made to the Registry of this Court, so that this Court  could  have  even  taken  suo  motu  action.  If additional evidence was not forth coming, the Division Bench could have  applied its mind afresh to the materials already on record,  and the  appeals should have been disposed of by an independent  judgment and  not by  restoring  to  life  a judgment which  had, in exercise of appellate powers of this Court, been rendered lifeless. [910G-H; D-F]      2.  When   large  tracts  of  land  are  acquired,  the transaction in  respect of  small properties  do not offer a proper guideline.  Therefore, the  valuation in transactions in regard  to smaller  property is not taken as a real basis for  determining  the  compensation  for  larger  tracts  of property. For  determining  the  market  value  of  a  large property on  the basis  of a  sale transaction  for  smaller property a deduction should be given. A reduction of 25% was indicated in one case 902 while certain  other  cases  indicated  that  the  reduction should be to the extent of 1/3. [912F-H; 913A]      Prithvi Raj  Taneja v.  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  and Others, [1972]  2 S.C.R  633; Padma  Uppal Etc.  v. State of Punjab  and  Others,  [1977]  1  S.C.R.  329;  Special  Land

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Acquisition  Officer,  Bangalore  v.  T.  Adinarayan  Setty, [1959] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 404; referred to.      In the  instant case, the lands have been acquired in a town, which  was in a developed part of the State, and was a constituted municipality. Not far away from it are places of tourist  importance.  A  fort  and  a  place  of  historical importance are  in  the  vicinity  of  the  town.  There  is evidence that  the lands acquired are located close to these spots,  and  that  these  areas  were  developed  and  semi- developed portion  of the  town. The  town  had  become  the regional head-quarters  of a  Zone of the State and had been industrially developing. The lands in question had potential value which  had to  be kept in view in the matter of fixing the compensation  under the  Land Acquisition Act. Taking an overall picture  of the matter, compensation is fixed at the rate of  Rs. 1.50 per square yard or Rs. 7260/- per acre for all the lands acquired by the notification in question. Over and above  this amount,  the appellants shall be entitled to statutory solatium of 15% as also interest at the rate of 6% per annum  on  additional  compensation  from  the  date  of dispossession till  payment thereof.  The Collector  to work out the  compensation within  two months.  If the  amount of compensation determined  is not  paid  within  three  months thereafter interest  at 12%  per  annum  on  the  additional compensation shall be payable till payment is made. [912C-D; 913D-E]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2458- 2461 of 1981.      Appeals by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated the  16th October,  1979 of  the Bombay High Courts in Ist. Appeal  Nos. 773/67,  and 537/68,  F.A. No.  774/67 and Cross Appeal No. 702/68.                             WITH                Civil Appeal No. 2462 of 1981.      Appeal by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated the  15th October,  1979 of  the Bombay  High Court in Civil Appeal No. 628 of 1972.      Shanti  Bhushan,  C.S.  Vaidyanath,  P.  Chowdhary,  M. Mudgal, 903      Ms. Gurdip Kaur and Prasant Bhushan for the Appellants.      O.P. Rana and M.N. Shroff for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      RANGANATH MISRA,  J. All  these appeals  are by special leave and  seek to  challenge two  separate judgments of the Bombay High  Court. A large tract of land located within the municipal  limits   of  Aurangabad   within  the   State  of Maharashtra was notified for acquisition under section 3 (1) of the  Land Acquisition  Act prevailing  in  the  State  of Hyderabad (corresponding  to s.  4 of  the Land  Acquisition Act, Act  I of  1894), by  notification dated  November  28, 1957, for  the purpose  of locating a Medical College and an attached hospital.  These lands can be conveniently referred to as  Navkhanda and  Ahmadibag properties.  Four  of  these appeals are  by one  group being  Kausalya  Devi  Bogra  and others and  the other  is by  Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin. Since their  lands were acquired under a common notification and as  would be  indicated later, the appeals were disposed of by  the High  Court by  applying a common basis and these appeals at  the request  of  the  counsel  have  been  heard together, they  are being  disposed of by a common judgment.

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The total acquisition was of about 150 acres of land. Out of it, the  first group owned about 74 acres while the claim of Yusufuddin related to about 15 acres of land.      In so  far as  the lands  of Kausalya  Devi’s group are concerned,   the   Land   Acquisition   Officer   determined compensation at  4 paise  per square  yard for the Navkhanda land in the two blocks besides statutory solatium of 15%. At the instance  of the  claimants reference  was made  to  the Civil Judge  who raised  the compensation  to 15  paise  per square yard  as against  the claim  laid at  the rate of Rs. 2.50  per  square  yard.  So  far  as  Ahmadibag  lands  are concerned, the Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation at the rate of 3 paise per square yard and on a reference to the Court,  the learned  Civil Judge raised the compensation to 12  paise per  square yard besides the statutory solatium of 15% while the claimants had asked for compensation at the rate of  Rs. 1.50  per square  yard. In  both the  cases the claimants as  also the  State  preferred  appeals-the  State challenging the  enhancement and  the claimants  asking  for more. A Division 904 Bench of  the Bombay  High Court by judgment dated April 27, 1971, divided  the Ahmadibag  lands into three zones for the purpose of  fixation of  compensation; the first portion was on the  east, the  portion which  abutted the  road near the main gate up to an indicated depth was treated as the second block and  the patch  of land  which was to the north of the second portion  was treated  as the  third block.  The  High Court fixed compensation at 12 paise per square yard for the middle portion  and at  9 paise per square yard for the rest of the  land. So  far as Navkhanda lands were concerned, the same was  also divided  into three  zones and depending upon the location  of these  three blocks, compensation was fixed at 16 paise per square yard of the land in the zone abutting the road;  10 paise  per square yard for the second zone and at 8  paise per  square yard for the remaining lands forming the third zone. Being dissatisfied with the results obtained in the  first appeals  before the  High Court, the claimants came before  this Court  by certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution on the basis of valuation involved. Attempt was made  to  introduce  additional  evidence  which  mainly consisted of  material to  show that higher compensation had been given  for similarly  situated properties.  By Judgment dated March  23, 1979,  in Civil  Appeal Nos. 1035 & 1038 of 1972, this Court directed :           "We, therefore,  allow the  appeals, set aside the      judgment of  the High  Court and send the cases back to      the High Court to be restored and direct the High Court      to take  the appeals  on its  file and  dispose them of      according to  law in  the light of the directions given      above."      One of  the consideration  for remand  was reference to two judgments  of the Civil Judge where, in respect of lands covered by  the same  Notification,  compensation  had  been worked out  at Rs.  4.50  per  square  yard.  One  of  these judgments was  the case  of Yusufuddin.  As the  judgment of this Court  would show,  it  had  been  represented  by  the claimants before  this Court  that the decision of the Civil Judge in Yusufuddin’s case had not been challenged in appeal and had  become final.  That was,  however, not  a fact  and First Appeal  No. 628/72 had been taken to the High Court by the State.      In  Yusufuddin’s   case,  as   already  indicated,  the property acquired  was around  15 acres.  These  lands  were covered by  two sector;  10 acres and 16 gunthas appertained

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to Sej Nos. 3, 4 and 905 5 while  5 acres  32 gunthas related to Saj No. 167, and all these lands  were situated  close to  the road  leading from Aurangabad City  to Panchakki.  The Land Acquisition Officer had given  an award  of Rs. 5454.71 inclusive of solatium of 15% for  the first sector and a sum of Rs. 4614.11 inclusive of the solatium in respect of 5 acres 32 gunthas in Sej 167. The appellant  was aggrieved  by the Award and laid claim of Rs. 40,360  in respect  of first  block and  Rs. 2,26,512 in respect of the other. On the basis of the evidence placed on record, the  learned Civil  Judge came  to hold  that market value of  the  property  on  the  date  of  the  preliminary notification was  Rs.  4.50  per  square  yard  but  as  the claimants had  claimed a  lesser  amount,  he  confined  the compensation  to   the  amount   claimed   and   fixed   the compensation accordingly.  The decision  of the  Civil Judge was challenged  in appeal  as already  indicated.  The  High Court re-assessed  the evidence  and came  to hold  that  no acceptable material was on record to justify any enhancement of compensation  and  the  Award  of  the  Land  Acquisition Officer should  be sustained.  Accordingly, the  decision of the Civil  Judge was  vacated and  if out  of  the  enhanced compensation any  amount had  been paid,  refund thereof was directed.      This first  appeal of  the State against Yusufuddin was disposed of by a Division Bench consisting of Deshmukh, C.J. and Deshpande,  J. on  October 15,  1979.  Before  the  same Division Bench  the other  batch of  first appeals  remanded pursuant to  the direction of this Court came up for hearing on the  next day,  viz., October  16, 1976.  The High  Court referred to  these first appeals as once upon disposed of by a Division Bench of the Court and stated :           "Being  dissatisfied  with  this  common  judgment      disposing of  the four  appeals, the  claimants carried      the matter  to the  Supreme Court  on leave  from  this      Court. According  to the  provisions of  the  law  then      existing, the  leave granted  was as a matter of course      as the  claim involved  in each of the appeals was much      more than  Rs. 20,000  at all stages of the litigation.      After obtaining  a certificate  of fitness for leave to      appeal to  the Supreme Court on 17th December 1971 from      this Court,  the petition  of appeal  was filed  in the      Supreme Court on 15th February 1972. Certain statements      were made in this petition of appeal with an allegation      that steps were being taken to produce additional 906      evidence  by  a  separate  application  as  per  rules.      Accordingly, a  separate application  for production of      additional evidence  was made  on 27th  February  1972.      Presumably a copy of the appeal memo, as also a copy of      this application  was served  upon the State Government      of  Maharashtra,  who  were  the  respondents,  and  we      further presume  that those  copies were made available      to the learned counsel who were engaged by the State to      defend the  said appeals.  We are  told that before the      matter comes  up for  hearing, there  is an intervening      stage when  a statement of case is required to be filed      before the  final hearing.  The learned  counsel is not      aware whether  in these  appeals any  such statement of      case was  filed by  the parties. After a lapse of about      seven years  these appeals  were called out for hearing      before the  Supreme Court  on 23rd  March, 1979.  By  a      speaking  order,   the  Supreme  Court  set  aside  the      Judgment of  this Court  and remanded the original four

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    appeals for  being further  heard and  disposed  of  on      merits. It  is only  in this manner that we are hearing      today the said four appeals over again.           For reasons  which we  will detail  hereafter,  we      have not heard the parties on merits at all. It is true      that the  Supreme Court  has set  aside the judgment of      this Court and remanded the appeals for further hearing      and disposal  according to  law. That is what precisely      we are  doing but  for reasons  which  we  will  record      hereunder why we have not heard the parties on merits.           On  considering   in  detail  the  long  and  able      judgment delivered  by the two judges of this Court and      after reading  the Supreme  Court order  and noting the      factual position,  there is  not much  force in hearing      the appeal afresh and further there is no necessity for      the application  of mind  by another two judges of this      Court to  the same  evidence which  is on  record.  The      factual position  that has come to our notice reveals a      state of  affairs which  cannot be  described  as  very      commendable so  far as  the handling  of the Government      litigation is  concerned......... What  surprises us is      that when  copies of  original appeal, petition as well      as civil application for additional evidence are served      upon the  Government no attempt is made to file a reply      that these judgments need not be admitted as additional      evidence as the High Court is 907      already seized  of the  judgments in  appeals which are      admitted and  they have  not become final as alleged by      the appellants  in their  memo of appeal to the Supreme      Court. Even  after seven  years  when  the  matter  was      called out  for final hearing before the Supreme Court,      we are surprised to find from the Supreme Court’s order      that the  Government representative  before the Supreme      Court was  on the  defensive all  the while  and merely      wanted to  state that he should be heard further in the      matter of  additional evidence.  We do not know whether      any attempt  was made  to seek  instructions  from  the      State Government  or in  spite of  query being made the      information was  wanting from  this end.  Whatever  the      reason may  be for  the Government’s failure to provide      instructions to  the counsel appearing for the State in      the Supreme Court or whatever may be the reason for the      failure of  the Government  counsel in  Delhi  to  seek      information either  of them  is not  a very commendable      state of  affairs. The  Supreme Court  should have been      told at  once that  those judgments  were subjected  to      appeals and  the appeals  are pending  and almost ready      for hearing.  We are  sure the Supreme Court would have      adjourned the  hearing until  the decision  by the High      Court in  First Appeal Nos. 628 of 1972 and 179 and 180      of 1972.  That undoubtedly  would have  been the proper      course for the Government to adopt and we have no doubt      that  the   Supreme  Court   would  have   valued  that      suggestion."      Then followed a long paragraph censuring the conduct of counsel for  the claimants  which closed  with the following observation:           "The Supreme Court took cognizance of all this and      thinking that  Court cannot  go into  such questions in      detail as  it  may  involve  taking  of  evidence,  the      Supreme Court  passed the  order and  that is  how this      group of  appeals has  come  back  to  us  for  further      hearing."      A  set  of  first  appeals  one  of  which  related  to

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Yusufuddin’s matter being of the year 1972 first came up for hearing before the High Court. In course of hearing thereof, when the  judgment of the Division Bench of 1971 in the case of Kausalya  Devi’s group  was produced,  it was pointed out that this  Court had  already vacated  the judgment  of  the Division Bench and the matter had 908 been remanded.  The Division Bench hearing the appeals after remand, therefore, directed as stated in its order:           "We, therefore,  said that the office may find out      as to  which  are  the  group  of  appeals  which  were      remanded and  issue notice  fixing 8th October, 1979 as      the date  of hearing along with those group of appeals.      That is  how they  came to  be shown  on our Board from      that day  onwards continuously  until they  reached the      final hearing.           However, the  very next  day after  18th September      1979, Mr.  Savant came  to tell us that he would not be      in a  position to apply for additional evidence, as the      very judgments  of the  Civil Judge in respect of which      certain representations  were made  before the  Supreme      Court are  those which are the subject-matters of First      Appeals Nos.  179 and  180 of 1972 as also first appeal      no. 628  of 1972.  Since we  had already  adjourned the      matter, we decided to hear these appeals first and take      up these remanded appeals." The Division Bench continued to State:           "The first  factual position which we note here is      that neither  the appellant  has pressed for additional      evidence nor  the State could lend additional evidence,      though the wording of the Supreme Court order says that      both the  parties will  be  at  liberty  to  apply  for      additional  evidence.  None  of  the  parties  has  any      additional evidence  to offer.  In fact,  in our humble      view, remand  seems to  be a  direct result  of a  rash      statement, not  being  denied  even  at  final  hearing      stage. If  this is the position in so far as the appeal      in the  matter was  concerned where two other judges of      this Court who were seized of the matter had given full      hearing to  the parties at an earlier stage we told Mr.      Andhyarujina, Advocate, that there was no necessity for      any further  hearing in  the matter and that we are not      inclined to  do so.  Since there  is no  change in  the      record and  no additional  evidence is  offered and the      High Court  judgment was  pronounced  on  the  evidence      already recorded, we see no reason to differ in any way      with the  well  considered  earlier  judgment  of  this      Court. We,  therefore, declare  that  a  copy  of  that      judgment, which  will be  our substantive  judgment, be      placed 909      on record as the judgment of this Court after remand by      the  Supreme  Court.  We  thus  not  only  confirm  the      valuation and compensation awarded by the earlier Bench      of this  Court but  also  confirm  their  order  as  to      costs."      Having  read   the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  and considering the  manner in which the first appeals have been disposed of,  we have  no doubts  in our  mind that the High Court exceeded  its jurisdiction  in dealing  with the first appeals. This  Court in  exercise of appellate powers vested it under  Article 136  of the Constitution had set aside the Bench decision  of the High Court delivered in 1971 and that judgment for  all  intents  and  purposes  had  become  non- existent. The  present Division  Bench of the High Court was

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not entitled, by any process known to law, to resurrect that judgment into life.      The direction  of  the  appellate  court  is  certainly binding on  the courts  subordinate thereto.  That apart, in view of  the provisions  of Article  41 of the Constitution, all courts  in India  are bound  to follow  the decisions of this Court.  Judicial discipline  requires and decorum known to law warrants that appellate directions should be taken as binding and  followed. It  is appropriate to usefully recall certain observations  of the  House of  Lords  in  Broom  v. Cassell & Co.(1) Therein Lord Hailsham, L. C. observed:           "The  fact  is,  and  I  hope  it  will  never  be      necessary to  say so  again, that  in the  hierarchical      system of  courts which  exist in  this country,  it is      necessary for  each lower  tier, including the Court of      Appeal, to  accept loyally  the decisions of the higher      tier." Lord Reid added:           "It seems  to me  obvious that the Court of Appeal      failed to  understand Lord  Delvin’s speech but whether      they did  or not,  I would  have accepted  them to know      that they  had no  power to give any such direction and      to realise  the impossible  position in which they were      seeking to  put those  judges in  advising or directing      them to disregard a decision of this House." 910 Lord Diplock observed at p. 874 of the Reports:           "It is  inevitable in  a  hierarchical  system  of      courts  that   there  are   decisions  of  the  Supreme      appellate tribunal  which do  not attract the unanimous      approval of all members of the judiciary. When I sat in      the Court  of Appeal,  I sometimes thought the House of      Lords was wrong in over ruling me. Even since that time      there have  been occasions, of which the instant appeal      is one, when alone or in company. I have dissented from      a decision  of the  majority of  this  House.  But  the      judicial system  only works  if someone  is allowed  to      have the  last word and if that last word, once spoken,      is loyally accepted."      We refuse  to  accept  the  submission  of  Mr.  Shanti Bhushan for  the appellants  that the High Court intended to disobey the  direction  given  in  the  appellate  order  of remand. Nevertheless,  the Division  Bench of the High Court allowed itself  to  be  swayed  away  and  landed  up  in  a situation  which   was  wholly   unwarranted.  Some  of  the observations which  we have  extracted were uncalled for and greater restraint  was expected.  It was  open to  the  High Court  to  require  the  parties  to  move  this  Court  for modification of  the direction.  If necessary,  a  reference could have  been made  to the Registry of this Court so that this Court  could have  even taken suo motu action. Finally, if additional  evidence was  not forth  coming, the Division Bench could  have applied  its mind  afresh to the materials already on  record and the appeals should have been disposed of by  an independent  judgment and not by restoring to life judgment which  had, in exercise of appellate powers of this Court, been rendered lifeless. We hope and believe that such an unfortunate situation will never recur and, therefore, we propose to say no more on this aspect of the matter.      As already  indicated, the order of remand has not been operative on account of the High not giving effect to it. On the other  hand, a judgment which already been set aside has been brought  on  record  and  has  been  described  as  the judgment in the first appeals. In our opinion, that judgment is a  nullity. The  two options  available before the Court,

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therefore, are,  a further  remand to  the High Court asking for a  fresh disposal  of the  appeals or  to dispose of the appeals  in   exercise  of  appellate  powers  by  recording findings. Acquisition  in this  case is  of the  year  1957. Twenty-seven 911 years have  already passed.  A remand  at this  stage  would indeed be  not in  the interest of the parties nor in public interest. We  have, therefore,  decided  to  look  into  the materials ourselves and dispose of these appeals finally.      Aurangabad was in a developed part of the Nizam’s State of Hyderabad  and was  a constituted municipality. Hyderabad had become  a part  of India  by  1948.  By  the  State  Re- organisation Act  of  1956,  Aurangabad  and  certain  other tracts of  Hyderabad became  parts  of  the  then  State  of Bombay. Aurangabad  was of  historical importance.  Not  far away from  it are  the famous  caves of  Ajanta and  Ellora. Aurangabad, therefore,  had been  of tourist importance from before. A  fort and a palace of historical importance are in the vicinity  of this town. There is evidence that the lands acquired in  the instant  appeals are located close to these spots.  There   is  also  evidence  that  these  areas  were developed and semi-developed portions of the town.      The learned  Civil Judge  did take into account certain documents for fixing up the valuation of the property on the date of  the notification.  In Yusufuddin’s case a sale deed of October 18, 1957, was relied upon where the valuation was about Rs.  4.50 per  square yard.  This sale deed was of the year of  the notification though the transaction happened to be a  few months after the date. The learned Civil Judge had found that  the property  was  located  not  away  from  the acquired land.  Exhibit 36  was also the certified copy of a sale deed  of 1957  but since  it had  a construction on the property and  the separate  valuation thereof  could not  be known in  the absence  of any  substantive, no  reliance had actually been  placed on  this transaction. Exhibit 37 was a transaction of 1953 and the rate adopted there was about Rs. 5 per  square yard.  A party to the transaction was examined as a  witness. As  noticed by  the learned  Civil Judge, the property was  located at  a distance of about there furlongs from the acquired land. The learned Civil Judge stationed at Aurangabad was  certainly  in  a  better  position  to  take judicial notice  of  the  location  of  important  landmarks within Aurangabad than the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court or  even the  Judges of  this Court  sitting at a long distance from  the  place  where  the  lands  are  situated. Exhibit 42  is a  saledeed of  1960 and  keeping in view the extent of  lands sold and the consideration per square yard, the rate  worked out  at Rs.  2.25. The  purchaser had  been examined as  a witness  and the  land has  been found  to be about 912 half a  furlong away  from the  acquired land.  The  learned Civil Judge  also relied  upon a  letter of the Collector of Aurangabad  addressed  to  the  Deputy  Director  of  Excise Department wherein  it was  indicated that the price of land in the  area was  about Rs.  5 per  square yard and that was stated with reference to some land near the Railway Station. The acquired  land is  admittedly  not  far  away  from  the Railway Station.      The learned  Civil Judge did in fact state in his order that the  lands of  Yusufuddin were  situated by the side of the  road  leading  from  Panchakki  to  Bhadkal  gate.  The historical monument  of Panchakki  has  been  stated  to  be located by  the side of the acquired land. A State Hotel has

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come up  not far away from the land. The Court took judicial notice of  the  fact  that  Aurangabad  city  had  developed rapidly  following   police  action   which  brought   about accession of  the Nizam’s  State to  India.  Aurangabad  had become the regional headquarters of a zone of the State. The city had  been industrially developing. Therefore, the lands in question had potential value which had to be kept in view in the  matter of  fixing the  compensation under  the  Land Acquisition Act.      Admittedly, the  lands  of  Yusufuddin  and  the  lands belonging to  Kausalya Devi group are in one adjacent tract. Therefore, it  would not be improper to assume, particularly in the absence of any contrary evidence from the side of the State that  there was  no great  disparity in the quality of lands and that all these lands were substantially of similar type.      Two principles  relating to  the matter  of fixation of compensation relevant for the present purpose may be kept in view. When  large tracts  are acquired,  the transaction  in respect of small properties do not offer a proper guideline. Therefore,  the  valuation  in  transactions  in  regard  to smaller  property   is  not   taken  as  a  real  basis  for determining the  compensation for  larger tracts of property (see Prithvi  Raj Taneja  v. State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  and Ors(1).; Padma  Uppal etc.  v. State  of Punjab & Ors(2). In certain  other   cases  this   Court  indicated   that   for determining the  market value  of a  large property  on  the basis of a sale transaction for smaller property a deduction should  be  given.  In  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty, (3) a reduction of 25% 913 was indicated  while there are certain other cases where the view is  that the  reduction should be to the extent of 1/3. Again, in  the very  scheme  for  fixation  of  compensation provided by  the Land  Acquisition Act  there is bound to be some amount  of arbitrariness.  The acquisition is deemed to be a statutory purchase and on the basis of evidence the law requires an  assumed consideration to be determined. Keeping in view the fact that acquisition is of compulsory nature, a solatium of  15% on the valuation is provided. Bearing these considerations in view and taking into account the fact that the lands  in question  were located  in a developed part of Aurangabad and  had considerable potential value, we proceed to fix the market value of the property. One acre of land is equal to  4840 square  yards. The  learned Civil  Judge  had maintained a  distinction between  the two classes of lands. We take  note of that fact also in the matter of determining the compensation.  We, however,  do not  propose to indicate separate valuations  for the two classes of lands. Taking an overall picture  of the matter, we direct compensation to be fixed at  the rate  of Rs.  1.50 per square yard or Rs. 7260 per acre  for  all  the  lands  of  the  present  appellants acquired by  the notification  in question.  Over and  above this amount,  the appellants  shall be entitled to statutory solatium of 15% as also interest at the rate of 6% per annum on  the   additional   compensation   from   the   date   of dispossession till  payment thereof. We direct the Collector to work  out the  compensation on  the basis indicated above within two months from today. If the amount so determined is not paid within three months thereafter, the interest on the additional compensation  shall be  at the  rate of  12%  per annum till payment is made.      Ordinarily, the appellants should have been entitled to costs. Keeping  in view  the history  of the  litigation and manner in  which the  Kausalya Devi  group of appellants had

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conducted themselves  on the  earlier occasion  before  this Court, we  do not  award costs  to them. In Civil Appeal No. 2462/81 appellant  Syed Yusufuddin  Syed  Ziauddin  will  be entitled to  his costs  in this Court and hearing fee of Rs. 1,000. N.V.K.                                      Appeals allowed. 914