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PETITIONER: SMT. KASTURI (DEAD) BY L.RS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GAON SABHA

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/07/1989

BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:  1989 SCR  (3) 591        1989 SCC  (4)  55  JT 1989 (3)   228        1989 SCALE  (2)77

ACT:     Delhi  Land Reforms Act, 1954.’ Section 3(13), 11,  154. 185 ’Land’--When  vest in gaon sabha -civil suit-Dicleartion of bhumidhari right--Whether maintainable.        Statutory Interpretation.’ External aid--Word defined in  another statute containing different meaning--Not to  be relied upon. Words & Phrases: ’Land’--’Garden’--’Grove’--Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     The appellant-plaintiff sued for declaration that inclu- sion  of  the disputed property in the land records  of  the respondent-Gaon Sabha on the basis that it had vested  under the  provisions of the Delhi Land and Reforms Act, 1954  was wrong,  void  and without jurisdiction, and  for  a  further declaration  that she was entitled to bhumidhari  rights  in the property under section 11 of the Act. In paragraph  4(d) of  the  plaint, it was pleaded that the suit land  was  not ’land’  and was not banjar (waste) and did not  come  within section 154(1)(i) to (vii) of the Act and, therefore,  there was  no  vesting in law. The proprietor,  according  to  the plaintiff,  grew fuel wood and partly used the  property  as ghatwars and used the stones for building purposes.     The  suit was decreed in the trial court, and  the  said decree  was affirmed in appeal, but at the instance  of  the respondent-defendant  No.  --Gaon Sabha, the High  Court  in second  appeal reversed the decrees of the courts below  and dismissed the suit.     The  High Court found that the property came within  the definition  of ’land’ and, therefore, was subjected  to  the legal  incidence of the statutory provisions. In  regard  to the  relief  of bhumidhari rights, it held that  the  plain- tiffs’ suit was not maintainable. Dismissing the appeal this Court,     HELD:  The definition of ’land’ in section 3(13) of  the Delhi  Land Reforms Act, 1954 is wide. A land on which  fuel wood is grown would 592 constitute groveland. In view of the inclusive definition of ’land’,  the  finding  of the High Court  that  the  dispute property  constituted  land  cannot be  said  to  be  wrong. [594C-D]

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     Nemi  Chand v. Financial Commissioner, Punjab &  Anr., AIR  1964  (51) Punjab 373; Rajinder Prashad & Anr.  v.  The Punjab State &  Ors., AIR 1966 (53) Punjab 185; Munshi Ram & Ors. v. Financial Commissioner, Haryana & Ors., [1979] 1 SCC 471; Haiti v. Sunder Singh, [1971] 2 SCR 163 referred to.       It is impermissible to rely-on definitions  containing meanings different from the definition under the Delhi  Land Reforms  Act, 1954 for a proper resolution of  the  dispute. [595A]       The  High Court therefore came to the correct  conclu- sion  when  it held that the disputed  property  Constituted ’land’ under the Act, and became liable to vest in the  Gaon Sabha under the Act. [595B]

JUDGMENT:       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 351  of 1974.       From  the  Judgment and Order dated 23.2.1973  of  the Delhi High Court in R.S.A. No. 69 of 1968. Rajinder Sachar, Sr. Ad v. and K.C. Dua for the Appellants. N.S. Das Bahal and D.N. Puri for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by       RANGANATH  MISRA, J. This appeal is by  special  leave and the sole legal representative of the original  plaintiff is in appeal.       The  plaintiff sued for declaration that inclusion  of the disputed property in the land records of the  respondent Gaon Sabha on the basis that it had vested under the  provi- sions  of  the Delhi Land Reforms  Act,  1954,  (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) was wrong, void and without juris- diction and for a further declaration that she was  entitled to bhumidhari rights in the property under section 11 of the Act.  Her suit was decreed in the trial court and  the  said decree was affirmed in appeal but at the instance of defend- ant  no.  1,  Gaon Sabha, the High Court  in  second  appeal reversed  the decrees of the courts below and dismissed  the suit. 593     The  suit was instituted on 16.8.1966. The  decision  of this  Court in the case of Hatti v. Sunder Singh,  [1971]  2 SCR  163 settled the legal position that a claim under  sec- tion  11 of the Act for declaration of bhumidhari right  was not  maintainable in the Civil Court in view of section  185 of  the Act read with Schedule I and exclusive  jurisdiction for  adjudication of such claims vested in  the  appropriate Revenue  Court. This position of law is not disputed  before us.  In regard to the relief of bhumidhari rights  the  High Court had, therefore, rightly held that the plaintiff’s suit was not maintainable.     The  only  other submission advanced on  behalf  of  the plaintiff for our consideration is that the disputed proper- ty did not constitute ’land’ as defined in section 3(13)  of the Act and, therefore, the right, title and interest of the appellant  as proprietor of the property was in no  way  af- fected by the provisions of the Act and the inclusion of the property in L.R. 2 was void, and liable to vacation.     In paragraph 4(d) of the plaint, plaintiff pleaded  that the suit land was not ’land’ and was not banjar (waste)  and did  not come within section 154(1)(i) to (vii) of  the  Act and, therefore, there was no vesting in law. The proprietor, according  to the plaintiff, grew fuel wood and partly  used the  property as ghatwars and used the stones  for  building purposes.

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   The  High Court has found that the property came  within the  definition of ’land’ and, therefore, was  subjected  to the  legal  incidence of the statutory  provisions.  Section 3(13) defines land to mean:               "land held or occupied for purposes  connected               with   agriculture,  horticulture  or   animal               husbandry  including pisciculture and  poultry               farming and includes--               (a) buildings appurtenant therto,               (b) village, abadis,               (c) grovelands,               (d) lands for village pasture or land  covered               by  water and used for growing  singharas  and               other  produce or land in the bed of  a  river               and used for casual or occasional cultivation ......" The  definition of land in the Act is wide and in  paragraph 4(d) ’ 594 the  admitted position is fuel wood was being grown  on  the property.  ’Horticulture’, ’garden’ and ’groveland’  in  the absence  of  statutory definitions, would  have  the  common parlance  meaning.  ’Horticulture’, as  the  Shorter  Oxford English Dictionary indicates means:               "the cultivation of a garden."               ’Garden’, according to the Dictionary, means--               "an area of land, usually planted with  grass,               trees, flower beds, etc.; an area of land used               for  the  cultivation  of  ornamental  plants,               herbs, fruit, vegetables, trees, etc. A  grove, as the Dictionary puts it means; "A  small  wood.; small  woodland  area or plantation". A land on  which  fuel wood is grown would constitute groveland.     In  view  of  the inclusive definition  of  ’land’,  the finding of the High Court that the disputed property consti- tuted  land cannot be said to be wrong. Reliance was  placed on  the decision of the Punjab High Court in Nemi  Chand  v. Financial Commissioner, Punjab & Anr., AIR 1964 (51)  Punjab 373  where  the meaning of land in Punjab Security  of  Land Tenures  Act was under examination and the Court was  called upon  to decide whether banjar Jadid and banjar quadim  came within the definition. For that purpose the meaning of  land occurring  in the Tenures Act and the Punjab Tenancy Act  of 1887 was examined. The Court also referred to the definition of  land  in  Punjab Alienation of Land Act,  1900.  In  the presence of a definition in the Act under consideration,  we find  no justification to refer to definitions in  different statutes  for finding out whether the disputed property  was land.     Appellant’s counsel also placed reliance on the decision of  a Full Bench of the same High Court in the case  of  Ra- jinder  Prasad & Anr. v. The Punjab State & Ors.,  AIR  1966 (53)  Punjab 185. Here again the question for  consideration was  whether  gair mumkin land was land  within  the  Punjab Security  of  Land  Tenures Act. For  the  reason  indicated above, we do not think that the appellant is entitled to any support  from the Full Bench Judgment. Lastly, reliance  was placed on :he decision of this Court in Munshi Ram & Ors. v. Financial  Commissioner, Haryana & Ors., [1979] 1  SCC  471. The  Court was considering the true meaning of  ’permissible area’ under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act and  for that purpose the meaning of land was being examined; whether banjar Jadid should be excluded with reference to 595 the meaning of land under the East Punjab Displaced  Persons

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(Land  Settlement) Act and the Punjab Tenancy Act was  being debated  before  the Court. We do not think in view  of  the statutory  definition  any  digration is  necessary.  It  is impermissible  to  rely on definitions  containing  meanings different  from  the definition under the Act for  a  proper resolution  of the dispute. The High Court, in our  opinion, came to the correct conclusion when it held that the disput- ed property constituted land under the Act and became liable to vest in the Gaon Sabha under the Act. The judgment of the High  Court,  therefore, is upheld and the  appeal  is  dis- missed. In the peculiar facts of this case, the parties  are directed to bear their respective costs in this Court. N  .V.K.                                        Appeal  dis- missed. 596