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PETITIONER: SMT. DHANWANTI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: D.D. GUPTA

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/05/1986

BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR 1184            1986 SCR  (3)  18  1986 SCC  (3)   1        1986 SCALE  (1)1109  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1987 SC 986  (23)  R          1987 SC1996  (10)  R          1990 SC 325  (17)  RF         1991 SC1233  (16)  RF         1992 SC1555  (2,18)

ACT:      Constitution of  India, ,1950, Article 136-Interference by the Supreme Court with findings of fact by Courts below - Supreme Court  can interfere  when grave  injustice  results consequent upon  an order  passed by  a statutory  authority based on misconstruction of facts and circumstances.      Delhi Rent  Control Act,  section 7 ’, scope of-Whether successive letting  out of  the premises  to the  same party after obtaining on each occasion permission under section 21 tantamounts to fraud.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  land-lady is  the  owner  of,  a  single storeyed  house,   at  Vasant   Vihar,  New  Delhi.  It  was constructed in the year 1973. The premises was let out to an official  of   the  government   after  obtaining  necessary permission under  section 21  of the  Delhi Rent Control Act for a  period of  one year.  The tenant vacated the premises after six  or seven  months and thereafter the premises were let out to the respondent on April 15, 1974, after obtaining permission again  under section  21. The  respondent vacated the premises on 27.2. 1977 after settling account in respect of the  rent.  The  premises  were  again  let  out  by  the appellant  to   the  respondent  on  March  11,  1977  after obtaining permission  under section  21 of  the  Act  for  a period of  three years.  After the expiry of the said period the respondent  again vacated  the premises  and  thereafter once again at his request the appellant let out the premises for a  limited period  of  two  years  after  obtaining  the permission under section 21. The two years period expired on April  21,  1982  but  the  respondent  did  not  hand  over possession of  the premises to the appellant, forcing her to move the  Rent Controller for an order directing delivery of possession of  the premises.  In the  Execution Application, the respondent  filed his  objection  on  October  20,  1982 alleging that the permission under section 21 of the Act was

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obtained by  fraud practised  on  the  Rent  Controller.  On January 21, 1384 the First Additional Rent Controller, Delhi upheld the  objection filed  by the respondent and dismissed the execu- 19 tion application. In appeal, the Rent Control Tribunal held: (i) that  the A  allegation of  the respondent  that he  had already entered  into  possession  of  the  premises  before permission was  granted under  section 21 of the Act in 1374 was false,  and even  if it  be assumed  that he had done so there was  nothing to  prevent  him  from  surrendering  the tenancy; and  (ii) that  the respondent cannot be considered to be a tenant in possession without interruption ever since 197.1 and  that it was only the tenancy pursuant to the last permission that  he continued. Basing on a statement made by the appellant regarding the transfer of her son to Delhi and her  omission  to  mention  in  her  application  about  the additional fact of unsuitability of climate of Bangalore and her grandson’s illness, the Tribunal, however, held that the appellant had  practised fraud  on the  Rent Controller  and dismissed the appeal. The second appeal by the appellant was dismissed summarily  by the  High Court. Hence the appeal by special leave.      Allowing the appeal, the Court ^      HELD: l.  Ordinarily, the  Supreme  Court  declines  to interfere with  findings of  fact and  refuses to  entertain special leave  petitions  questioning  such  findings  under Article 136  of the  Constitution. However,  this is a case, where the  entire approach  of the statutory authorities has been vitiated  by a  gross misconstruction  of the facts and circumstances of the case, ignoring material evidence of the record, and  arriving at inferences which fly in the face of reason and  the law,  -all resulting  in  grave  injustice-, calling for necessary interference. [23 D-F]      The evidence  in this  case, does not make out that any fraud was  practised on  the Rent Controller when permission was granted  in 1980  under section  21 of  the  Delhi  Rent Control Act.  The changing  facts of social existence do not permit the  application of  unimaginative  perspectives  and inflexible assumptions.  The mutating  kaleidoscope of human life portrays  a different  reality. It  is this fundamental error into  which the  Rent Control  Tribunal has fallen and because of  that it  has unwittingly fallen further into the error of  misconstruing the  significance of  the  statement made by the appellant. [24 C-D]      2.  It  is  perfectly  possible  for  the  owner  of  a premises, on  looking to  the immediate future, to find that for certain  reasons he  is unable  to occupy  the  premises forthwith himself  but that  he may  do so  later in the not every distant  future. It  is not always that a man can plan his life  ahead with  any degree of definiteness. Prevailing uncertainty in the 20 circumstances surrounding  him may  not permit clear sighted vision into  the future.  The circumstances  may justify his envisioning his  need for  the premises  two or  three years later, and  therefore, applying for permission under section 21 of  the Act to let out the premises accordingly. And yet, thereafter, on  the expiry  of that  period he may find that the circumstances  have changed  and his use of the premises has now  to be postponed by another few years. In cases such as this  the mere  fact that  the  owner  has  let  out  the premises after  obtaining permission under section 21 of the Act for  a limited  period, and  thereafter on the expiry of

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that period  has found  it necessary to obtain permission to let out the premises again for another limited period cannot necessarily  lead  to  the  inference  that  from  the  very beginning  the  premises  were  available  for  letting  out indefinitely. [2G-H; 24A-C]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1795 of 1986:      From the  Judgment and  order dated  25.9.1984  of  the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 283 of 1984.      Mrs. Shyamla  Pappu, N.S.  Das Bahl, P.K. Bahl and P.S. Mahindra for the Appellant.      R.P.Bansal, K.C.Dua and P.O.Gupta for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      PATHAK, J. Special leave granted.      This is  a land-lady’s appeal by special leave directed against the  order of the High Court of Delhi dismissing her second appeal  in limine.  The appellant is the owner of the premises No.  F-8/ 17,  Vasant Vihar,  New Delhi.  It  is  a single storeyed  house. She  let  out  the  premises  for  a limited period  of two  years to  the respondent,  who is  a judicial officer.  She did  so after obtaining the requisite permission under  s. 21  of the  Delhi Rent  Control Act  on April 22,  1980. A  registered deed was executed between the parties in that behalf. The deed recorded the undertaking of the respondent  to vacate  the premises  at the  end of  two years. The  two years  expired on  April 21,  1982  but  the respondent did  not hand  over possession of the premises to the appellant. Accordingly the appellant prayed for an order directing delivery  of possession  of the premises to her. A warrant of possession was issued. 21      On October 20, 1982 the respondent filed his objection, alleging that  the order  granting permission under s. 21 of the  Act  was  obtained  by  fraud  practised  on  the  Rent Controller and  was a  nullity. It  was  asserted  that  the premises were  constructed in the year 1973 and were let out to an  official of the Government under s. 21 of the Act for a period  of one year. On the official vacating the premises after one  year, it  was alleged,  they were  let out to the respondent at a rent of Rs. 725 per mensem in the first week of April 1974 as a regular tenant. It was  said that  on the request  of  the  appellant  the  respondent  joined  in  an application for  permission under s. 21 of the Act. When the appellant applied for permission, it is alleged, she did not disclose to  the Rent  Controller that  earlier also she had inducted a person as tenant after obtaining such permission. On the  expiry of  three years,  the  respondent  said,  the appellant again, in the year 1977, obtained permission under s. 21 of the Act for letting out the premises at an enhanced rent of  R.S.. 825  per mensem  for a  limited period of two years to  the respondent. That period expired in April 1980. It was  thereafter that  the appellant  obtained  permission under s.  21 of  the Act for letting out the premises to the respondent for  a period  of two years. The respondent urged that he was in uninterrupted possession since April 1974 and that no  ground had  been disclosed  by the appellant in the application for  permission under  s. 21  of the Act made in the year  1980 indicating  the reason  for letting  out  the premises for  a limited  period of  two years. It is alleged that  permission   was  granted  mechanically  by  the  Rent Controller, and  that it  could not be recognised as binding

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on the respondent.      The appellant  filed her  reply to  the  objection  and vehemently denied  that the  order under  s. 21  of the  Act granting  permission  in  198()  was  nullity  or  had  been obtained by  fraud  or  that  any  material  fact  had  been withheld in  the application  for permission.  The appellant asserted that in the beginning the premises had been let out to an official of the Government for a period of three years commencing from  August 29, 1973, but the tenant vacated the premises after  6 or  7  months  and  thereafter  it  became necessary to let out the premises to the respondent on April 15, 1974  after obtaining permission under s. 21 of the Act. It was  denied that  the respondent had already occupied the premises as  a regular  tenant before permission under s. 21 of the  Act had  been granted.  lt was  maintained that  the respondent occupied  the premises on April 15, 1974 pursuant to the  permission under  s. 21  of the  Act. The  appellant stated further  that the  respondent had given notice to the appellant on February 27, 1977 expressing his intention to 22 vacate the  premises and  that in  fact he  did  vacate  the premises on  that date after settling the account in respect of the  rent. But  a few days after leaving the premises the respondent again  approached the  appellant for  taking  the premises on  rent. Accordingly, the premises were let out by the appellant  to the  respondent on  March 11,  1977  after obtaining permission  under s. 21 of the Act. It was pointed out that  in the  application under  s. 21  of the  Act. the respondent gave  his  address  as  Village  Khandsara,  near Gurgaon, Haryana  where he  was then residing in the factory premises of  his son.  The possession  of the  premises  was handed over to the respondent on March 11, 1977 in pursuance of the permission, and the rate of rent agreed to was Rs.825 per mensem.  The appellant further stated that on the expiry of the period, the respondent again vacated the premises and shifted  to  13,  Palam  Marg,  New  Delhi.  Thereafter  the respondent approached  the appellant  again to  let out  the premises  for   a  limited  period  of  two  years.  As  the appellant’s second  son, who is an officer in the Indian Air Force, was  posted at Bangalore and the appellant was not in a position  to occupy  the premises all alone, she agreed to let out  the premises  to the respondent. On April 21, 198() the appellant  and the  respondent joined in the application for obtaining permission under s.21 of the Act to enable the appellant to  let out  the premises  to the respondent for a period of  two years.  The appellant urged that the premises were now  required by  her as  her son,  an Indian Air Force officer, had  to shift  his family  to  Delhi,  and  it  was further pointed out that the premises were to be occupied by the appellant  and the  family members  of that  son as  the climate of  Bangalore did  not suit them. It was denied that the premises  were available for indefinite letting, and the periodic tenancies,  it  was  asserted,  were  entered  into because of the circumstances prevailing on each occasion.      On  January   21,  1984   the  First   Additional  Rent Controller,  Delhi   upheld  the   objection  filed  by  the respondent and  dismissed the  execution application  of the appellant made  under  s.  21  of  the  Act.  The  appellant appealed to  the Rent Control Tribunal and the Tribunal held that the  allegation of  the respondent  that he had already entered into  possession of  the premises  before permission was granted  under s.  21 of  the Act in 1974 was false, and even if  it be assumed that he had done so there was nothing to prevent  him from  surrendering  the  tenancy.  That  was evident when  he joined the appellant in the application for

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permission under  s. 21  of the Act in 1974. The case of the respondent that  he must  be considered  to be  a tenant  in possession without  interruption ever  since 1974 could not, in the opinion of the Rent Control 23 Tribunal, be  accepted on the facts and circumstances of the case. and  that it was only the tenancy pursuant to the last permission which  could  be  questioned.  The  Rent  Control Tribunal  then  addressed  itself  to  the  principal  issue whether fraud  had been  practised on the Rent Controller in obtaining permission  under s.  21 of  the Act  in 1980. The Tribunal referred to the circumstance that the appellant had let out  the premises  from time to time for limited periods on earlier  occasions and  observed that it was evident that the premises  were  available  for  being  let  out  for  an indefinite period.  It adverted  to a  statement made by the appellant regarding  the transfer  of her  son to Delhi, and deduced from the language employed by her that she wanted to convey that  her son  had been  posted earlier  in Delhi and that he  was now  being transferred  back to  Delhi. It also pointed  out  that  the  unsuitability  of  the  climate  of Bangalore in  regard to  her grandson  as the reason for the family desiring to settle in Delhi had not been mentioned at the initial  stage of  the litigation.  Upon that,  the Rent Control Tribunal held that the appellant had practised fraud on the Rent Controller when obtaining permission under s. 21 of the  Act in  198(). A  second appeal by the appellant was dismissed summarily by the High Court.      We  have   considered  the   case  with   great   care. Ordinarily, this  Court declines  to interfere with findings of fact  and refuses  to entertain  special leave  petitions questioning such  findings. But  it seems to us that in this case the  entire approach  of the  statutory authorities has been vitiated  by a  gross misconstruction  of the facts and circumstances of the case, ignoring material evidence on the record, and  arriving at inferences which fly in the face of reason  and   the  law.  All  this  has  resulted  in  grave injustice. At the outset it is apparent from the record that the finding  of the  Rent Control Tribunal that the property was  available  for  being  let  for  an  indefinite  period proceeds on the unwarranted assumption that the grant of the three leases, from 1974 through 1977 to 1980, points to that as the  only conclusion.  That assumption  would  have  been justified if  there was  positive material  to indicate that from the very beginning there was never any intention on the part of  the appellant to occupy the premises herself. There is no  such material  at all on the record. It seems to have been ignored  altogether that  it is  perfectly possible for the owner of a premises, on looking to the immediate future, to find  that for certain reasons he is unable to occupy the premises forthwith  himself but  that he  may do so later in the not very distant future. It is not always that a man can plan  his  life  ahead  with  any  degree  of  definiteness. Prevailing uncertainty  in the circumstances surrounding him may not permit clear sighted vision 24 into  the   future.  The   circumstances  may   justify  his envisioning his  need for  the premises  two or  three years later, and  therefore applying for permission under s. 21 of the Act to let out the premises accordingly. And        yet, thereafter, on  the expiry  of that  period he may find that the circumstances  have changed  and his use of the premises has now  to be postponed by another few years. In cases such as this  the mere  fact that  the  owner  has  let  out  the premises after  obtaining permission  under s.21  of the Act

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for a  limited period,  and thereafter on the expiry of that period has  found it  necessary to  obtain permission to let out the  premises again  for another  limited period  cannot necessarily  lead  to  the  inference  that  from  the  very beginning  the  premises  were  available  for  letting  out indefinitely. The  Rent  Controller  and  the  Rent  Control Tribunal should  have examined  the circumstances prevailing on each occasion when an application was made under s. 21 of the Act.  The changing  facts of  social  existence  do  not permit the  application of  unimaginative  perspectives  and inflexible assumptions.  The mutating  kaleidoscope of human life portrays  a different  reality. It  is this fundamental error into  which the  Rent  Control  Tribunal  has  fallen. Because of  that it  has unwittingly fallen further into the error of  misconstruing the  significance of  the  statement made by the appellant. A copy of her statement is before us, and all  that the appellant said was that the premises could be spared  for letting  because her  son had  been posted at Bangalore and  that after  two years  he would  be  back  in Delhi. Much  has been  made by  the Rent Control Tribunal of this minor  inconsistency, of  the circumstance that instead of stating  that her  son  would  be  posted  in  Delhi  the appellant had  stated that her son would be posted "back" in Delhi. It  seems to us wholly irrelevant to the issue in the case whether the son was being posted in Delhi for the first time or  was being  posted again  in the city. It was wholly immaterial to  the question  in 1980  whether the  premises, which had been constructed a few years before, should be let out for  a period  of two  years. What  was material was the expectation that  the son  and his  family would be in Delhi after two  years. The  central issue  in the  case has  been clouded by a circumstance which has no bearing on it.      In our  judgment, the  orders of  the First  Additional Rent Con  troller, the Rent Control Tribunal and of the High Court cannot be sustained      An  attempt   was  made  by  learned  counsel  for  the appellant to  refer to  material, now  placed on the record, establishing that  the appellant’s  son  had  in  fact  been transferred to Delhi in May 1985 and that 25 he was  compelled, with  a family of six members, to share a small accommodation  with a  friend at  Delhi. There is also clear evidence  showing that  his eldest child was suffering from bronchial  asthma and  had  been  hospitalised  in  the Command Hospital  at Bangalore three times, and that medical specialists had  advised a  change of  place immediately. We need  not  take  this  material  into  consideration.  After examining the  material already  on the  record, a  task  to which we  are compelled by the erroneous approach adopted by the statutory  authorities to  the case, we have come to the conclusion that  the evidence  does not  make out  that  any fraud was  practised on  the Rent Controller when permission was granted  in 1980  under s.  21 of  the Act, and there is nothing to  show that  the permission  can be  regarded as a nullity or  that  material  facts  were  concealed.  On  the contrary, it  seems to us that the haphazard manner in which the case  has been  dealt with  by the First Additional Rent Controller and  the Rent  Control Tribunal leaves much to be desired.      The appeal is allowed, the order dated January 21, 1984 of the First Additional Rent Controller, the order dated May 2, 1984  of the  Rent Control  Tribunal and  the order dated September 25,  1984 of  the High Court are set aside and the objection  filed   by  the  respondent  to  the  appellant’s application for  possession under  s. 21  of the  Delhi Rent

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Control Act is rejected and the said application is allowed. The appellant  will be entitled to delivery of possession of the  premises.  But  in  the  circumstances,  we  allow  the respondent a  period of  two months  from today for vacating the premises. There is no order as to costs. S.R.                                         Appeal allowed. 26