15 March 1993
Supreme Court
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SMT. ATIA MOHAMMADI BEGUM Vs STATE OF U.P. .

Bench: VERMA,JAGDISH SARAN (J)
Case number: C.A. No.-000297-000298 / 1993
Diary number: 200775 / 1993
Advocates: RAJESH PRASAD SINGH Vs ASHOK K. SRIVASTAVA


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PETITIONER: SMT. ATIA MOHAMMADI BEGUM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/03/1993

BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) KASLIWAL, N.M. (J)

CITATION:  1993 AIR 2465            1993 SCR  (2) 295  1993 SCC  (2) 546        JT 1993  Supl.    544  1993 SCALE  (2)167

ACT: Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976: Section 2(o), Explanation    (C)--Urban    Land--Determination    of--Land specified   in  master  plan  for  a  purpose   other   than agriculture--Whether  means land so specified in the  master plan which was in existence at the time of the  commencement of the Act--Vacant land entered into revenue or land records as for purpose of agriculture before commencement of the Act and prior to declaration of the masterplan--whether could be excluded from the ambir of ’urban land’.

HEADNOTE: The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, came into force  in the respondent-State on 17.2.1976.  The  appellant claimed  exclusion  of vacant land owned by  her,  from  the ambit of ’urban land’ on the ground that it was mainly  used for  the purpose of agriculture, as defined in Section  2(o) of the Act.  The land in question was entered in the revenue or  land records before the commencement of the Act  as  for the  purpose of agriculture.  At the time when the Act  came into  force there was no master plan for the city  in  which the  appellant’s land was situated.  However, a master  plan for  the  city was made on 24.2.1980, wherein  the  land  in dispute was shown. The  competent  authority declared that  the  appellant  had 19813.83  sq. mts. of vacant land in excess of  the  ceiling limit, but the District Judge reduced the area of the excess land to 6738.23 sq. mts.  Against the order of the  District Judge,  both  sides filed writ petitions.   The  High  Court dismissed  appellant’s writ petition and partly allowed  the writ  petition  of the State Government.  It held  that  the appellant’s land could not be treated as mainly used for the purpose of agriculture by virtue of Explanation (C)  because it was shown in the master plan made on 24.2.1980. In the appeals before this Court the correctness of the High Court’s view was challenged by the appellant and restoration of the District Judge’s order was sought. 296 Allowing the appeals, this Court, HELD:1.1. Explanation (C) in Section 2(o) of the Urban  Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 means that if the land  has

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been  specified in the master plan existing at the  time  of commencement   of   the  Act  for  a  purpose   other   than agriculture, then the land should not be deemed to be mainly used  for  the  purpose  of agriculture  by  virtue  of  the Explanation  and  not if the land is specified in  a  master plan  prepared after the commencement of the Act  The  plain language  of  Explanation (C) bears  this  construction  and requires it to be so construed in order to harmonise it with the other provisions and scheme of the Act, eg.  Sections  3 and 5. The master plan defined in Section 2(h) and  referred in the definition of ’urban laud’ in Section 2(o), including Explanation  (C) therein, is a master plan prepared  and  in existence  at  the time of commencement of the Act  when  by virtue of Section 3 of the Act, rights of the holder of  the land  under  the Act get ’crystallised  and  extinguish  his right  to  hold  any vacant land in excess  of  the  ceiling limit.   The proceedings for determining the vacant land  in excess  of  the  ceiling limit according  to  the  machinery provisions  in the Act is merely for quantification, and  to effectuate   the   rights   and   liabilities   which   have crystallised  at the time of commencement of the Act.   Just as  the holder of the land cannot by his subsequent  actions reduce  the area of the vacant land in excess of the  celing limit,  the authorities too cannot by any subsequent  action increase  the  area of the excess vacant land by  a  similar action. [298G-H, 299A-C] 1.2.The  construction made of these provisions by  the  High Court  cannot,  therefore, be  accepted.   Accordingly,  the order  passed by the District Judge determining the area  of 6738.23  sq. mts. only as the vacant land in excess  of  the ceiling limit is restored. [299D-E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 297 &  298 of 1993. From  the  Judgment  and  Order  dated  12.11.1984  of   the Allahabad  High Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 4018/80 and  5174 of 1980. R.K. Khanna, Ms. Abha R. Sharma, Manoj Goel and Pankaj Kalra for the Appellant. Ms. Alka Aggrawal, R.C. Verma, Ashok K. Srivastava for the  297 Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA,  J.  These appeals by special leave are  against  the judgment  and order dated 12.11.1984 of the  Allahabad  High Court  in Writ Petition Nos. 4018 of 1980 and 5174  of  1980 which  were  filed by the appellant and the State  of  Uttar Pradesh against the Judgment dated 12.2.1980 of the District Judge,  Aligarh in Land Ceiling Appeal No.24 of  1978.   The competent authority declared that the appellant had 19813.83 sq. mts. of vacant land in Aligarh in excess of the  ceiling limit but the District Judge reduced the area of the  excess land to 6738.23 sq. mts.  Against the order of the  District Judge,  both  sides filed writ petitions.   The  High  Court dismissed  appellant’s writ petition and partly allowed  the writ petition of the State Government.  This has led to  the filing of these appeals against the High Court’s order  made in these two writ petitions against the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant argued for restoration  of the  District Judge’s order whereby an area of  6738.23  sq. mts.  was declared to be in excess of the ceiling  limit  as against   19813.83  sq.  mts.  declared  by  the   competent

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authority.   The High Court set aside the  District  Judge’s order  on  the construction it made of  Explanation  (C)  in Section  2(o)  defining  ’urban  land’  in  the  Urban  Land (Ceiling  and  Regulation)  Act, 1976.   The  definition  of ’urban  land’ in Section 2(o) excludes from its ambit,  land which  is  mainly  used  for  the  purpose  of  agriculture. Thereafter,  the Explanation for the purpose of  clause  (o) defining ’urban land’ and clause (q) defining ’vacant  land’ is   given.    Clause  (A)  of   the   Explanation   defines ’agriculture’.  There is no dispute that the vacant land  of which  exclusion is claimed by the appellant on  the  ground that it is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture is  so used according to the definition of ’agriculture’.  There is also  no  dispute  that clause (B)  of  the  Explanation  is satisfied by the appellant since the land was entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed day as for  the purpose of agriculture.  The only dispute is with regard  to clause (C) of the Explanation which reads as under:- "(C)  Notwithstanding  anything contained in clause  (B)  of this Explanation, land shall not be deemed to be mainly used for  the  purpose  of  agriculture  if  the  land  has  been specified  in  the  master plan for  a  purpose  other  than agriculture;" 298 There  is  no dispute that the Act came into  force  in  the State of Uttar Pradesh on 17.2.1976 and there was no  master plan  for  that area in Aligarh at that  time.   However,  a master  plan for Aligarh was made on 24.2.1980  wherein  the land  in  dispute was shown.  The High Court has  taken  the view  that  the  appellant’s land could not  be  treated  as mainly  used  for the purpose of agriculture  by  virtue  of Explanation (C) because it was shown in the master plan made on  24.2.1980.  The  correctness  of  this  view  has   been challenged in these appeals. Some  other  provisions of the Act which  are  material  for deciding  this  question  may now be  referred.   Section  2 enacts that except as otherwise provided in the Act, on  and from  the  commencement  of  the Act,  no  person  shall  be entitled  to hold any vacant land in excess of  the  ceiling limit.   Accordingly,  the right of the person to  hold  any vacant  land  in excess of the ceiling limit ceased  on  the date of commencement of the Act even though determination of the  excess  area  had  to  be  made  under  the   machinery provisions,  thereafter, in accordance with  the  prescribed procedure.   The  area  of vancant land  in  excess  of  the ceiling  limit held by the appellant has, therefore,  to  be determined  as on 17.2.1976 when the Act came into force  in the State of Uttar Pradesh.  Clause (a) of Section 2 defines ’appointed day’ to mean the date of introduction of the Bill in  Parliament  in relation to any State to which  this  Act applies  in  the  first instance like  the  State  of  Uttar Pradesh  and  that date to 28.1.1976. Section 5 of  the  Act provides that any transfer made of vacant land in excess  of the  ceiling limit at any time during the period  commencing on  the  appointed day and ending with the  commencement  of this  Act shall be ineffective and the land  so  transferred shall  be  taken into account in calculating the  extent  of vacant  land  held  by  such  person.   This  is  a  further indication that determination of the area of vacant land  in excess of the ceiling limit under the Act is to be made with reference  to  the date of commencement of the Act  and  the right  and  liability  of the holder of the  land  for  this purpose under the Act crystallises on the date of  commence- ment  of the Act unaffected by any subsequent  events.   The scheme  of  the  Act  supports  the  construction  that  the

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aforesaid  Explanation (C) means that if the land  has  been specified  in  the  master  plan existing  at  the  time  of commencement  of  the  the  Act for  a  purpose  other  than agriculture, then the land shall not be deemed to be  mainly used  for  the  purpose  of agriculture  by  virtue  of  the Explanation  and not if the land is specified in   a  master plan prepared after the commencement of the Act.  The plain  299 language  of  Explanation (C) bears  this  construction  and requires it to be so construed in order to harmonise it with the  other  provisions and scheme of the Act.  Just  as  the holder  of the land cannot by his subsequent actions  reduce the  area of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling  limit the authorities too cannot by any subsequent action increase the area of the excess vacant land by a similar action.  The ’master  plan’ defined in Section 2(h) and referred  in  the definition  of  ’urban  land’  in  Section  2(o),  including Explanation (C) therin, is obviously a master plan  prepared and in existence at the time of commencement of the Act when by  virtue of Section 2 of the Act, rights of the holder  of the land under the Act get ’crystallised and extinguish  his right  to  hold  any vacant land in excess  of  the  ceiling limit.   The proceedings for determining the vacant land  in excess  of  the  ceiling limit according  to  the  machinery provisions  in the Act is merely for quantification, and  to effectuate  the  rights  and liabilities  which  have  crys- tallised  at  the  time of commencement  of  the  Act.   The contrary  view  taken  on the  construction  made  of  these provisions by the High Court cannot, therefore, be accepted. On the above conclution, there is no dispute that the  order made   by   the   District  Judge  has   to   be   restored. Consequently, the impugned orders made by the High Court  in the two writ petitions before it are set aside and the order dated  12.2.1980 passed by the District Judge determing  the area  of 6738.23 sq. mts. only as the vacant land in  excess of  the  ceiling  limit  is  restored.   The  appeals   are, accordingly,  allowed  in this manner, to this  extent.   No costs. N.P.V.                              Appeals allowed. 300