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PETITIONER: SMT. ANAND KAUR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PRITAM LAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/01/1982

BENCH: KOSHAL, A.D. BENCH: KOSHAL, A.D. ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J) MISRA, R.B. (J)

CITATION:  1982 AIR  777            1982 SCR  (3)  43  1982 SCC  (1) 502        1982 SCALE  (1)2

ACT:      Delhi Rent  Control Act-Section 14(1), proviso (a) read with proviso to section 14(2)-scope of.

HEADNOTE:      When a  tenant has  neither paid nor tendered the whole of the  arrears of  rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which the notice of demand for the arrears of  rent has  been served  on him  by  the  landlord proviso (a) to section 14(1) empowers the Controller to make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises. The proviso to  section 14(2)  states that  no tenant  shall  be entitled to  the benefit  under the  sub-section  if  having obtained such  benefit once  in respect  of any  premises he again makes  a default  in the  payment  of  rent  of  those premises for three consecutive months.      On 14th  December, 1973, the land-lady-appellant issued a notice  to the  tenant stating  that he  had not  paid the damages after  May 1973  and called  upon  him  to  pay  the arrears within  two months  from the  date  of  notice.  The tenant remitted  the rent  to the  land-lady by  money-order towards the  end of  February 1974 but she refused to accept the same.      On the  land-lady’s application the Controller, and the Tribunal in  appeal, held that the notice was valid and that the expression  "damages for  the use  and occupation" meant nothing more  nor less  than rent.  But the  High  Court  on appeal held  that the  term "rent"  and "damages for use and occupation" could  not be  taken to  be synonymous terms and that the  notice issued by the land-lady did not satisfy the requirements of  clause (a)  of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act in that it did not demand rent from the tenant.      Allowing the appeal and remitting the case to the Court below ^      HELD: The  notice issued by the land-lady satisfies the requirements of  clause (a) of the proviso to section 14(1). [46 D]      The   High    Court   has    taken   an   unnecessarily hypertechnical view  of the  contents of  the  notice  which specifically stated  that on  account of  the termination of

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the tenancy  by an  earlier notice  the tenant  had become a statutory tenant and it was in this context that a claim was made for damages for use and occupation at a rate equivalent to the  agreed  rent.  The  demand  so  made  could  not  be construed as anything but a demand for rent. [46 B-C] 44

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 966 of 1976.      (Appeal by  special leave  from the  judgment and order dated the  6th February,  1976 of  the Delhi  High Court  in S.A.O. No. 148 of 1975)      Vinoo Bhagat for the Appellant.      G. D. Gupta for the Respondent (Not Present)      The Order of the Court was delivered by      KOSHAL, J. The short point arising for determination in this appeal  concerns the validity of a notice served by the landlady appellant  on the  tenant-respondent and purporting to be one issued in accordance with the provisions contained in clause  (a) of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act), and we may at the very  outset reproduce  the relevant  provisions of that section:           "14(1) Notwithstanding  anything to  the  contrary      contained in  any other  law or  contract, no  order or      decree for  the recovery  of possession of any premises      shall be  made by  any court or Controller in favour of      the landlord against a tenant:           Provided  that   the   Controller   may,   on   an      application made  to him in the prescribed manner, make      an order for the recovery of possession of the premises      on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:                (a) that  the tenant  has  neither  paid  nor           tendered the  whole of  the arrears  of  the  rent           legally recoverable  from him within two months of           the date  on which  a notice  of  demand  for  the           arrears of  rent has  been served  on him  by  the           landlord in  the manner provided in section 106 of           the Transfer of Property Act, 1882;           14(2) No  order for  the recovery of possession of      any premises  shall be  made on the ground specified in      clause 45      (a) of  the proviso  to sub-section  (1), if the tenant      makes payment or deposit as required by section 15:           Provided that  no tenant  shall be entitled to the      benefit under this sub-section, if having obtained such      benefit once in respect of any premises, he again makes      a default  in the payment of rent of those premises for      three consecutive months."      2.  The  tenant  respondent  has  remained  absent  and unrepresented at  the hearing  and we have had the advantage of being  addressed by Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, learned counsel for the appellant only.      3. It was not disputed before the High Court that in an earlier proceeding  the tenant  had taken  advantage of  the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act, that  he committed  another default  in the  payment of rent which  covered the  period from  1.6.1973 to 30.11.1973 and that  it was  then that  a notice  dated 14.12.1973  was served on him. The notice stated:           "Your contractual  tenancy in respect of House No.

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    A-54 (double-storey)  Kalkaji, New Delhi-19 had already      been terminated  whereafter you  are a statutory tenant      liable to  pay damages  for use  and occupation  at the      rate of Rs. 15/- (Rupees fifteen per month) to me. That      you have  not paid the said damages after May, 1973. In      case you  do not clear the arrears upto date within two      months from  the  date  of  this  notice,  I  shall  be      compelled to  issue instructions to my legal adviser to      file an application for your eviction .........."      No attempt  to pay  the rent  was made  inspite of  the notice till  the end  of February, 1974. Although thereafter rent was  remitted to  the landlady through money orders but she refused  to accept  the same  and made an application to the Controller for eviction of the tenant on the sole ground of a  second default  in  the  payment  of  rent.  Both  the Controller and  the Tribunal  in the  appeal held  that  the notice was  a valid one and that the expression "damages for use and  occupation" contained therein meant nothing more or less than  rent. In  a second appeal, a learned Single Judge differed from  the Courts  below and was of the opinion that the word  ’rent’ and  the said expression could not be taken to be 46 synonymous and  that there  was no  demand of  rent  in  the notice in  question which  did not,  therefore, satisfy  the requirements of the provisions contained in clause (a) above extracted. It  is the  judgment of  the learned Single Judge which is assailed in the present appeal.      4. After  hearing Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, learned counsel for the appellant, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge has  taken an unnecessarily hypertechnical view of the contents of  the notice.  It is  significant that the notice specifically stated  that on  account of  the termination of the tenancy  by an earlier notice the tenant had become what is popularly  known as a statutory tenant and it was in this context that  a claim  was made  for  damages  for  use  and occupation at  a rate  equivalent to the agreed rent. We are of the  opinion that  in the  circumstances of  the case the demand so  made could  not be  construed as  anything but  a demand for  rent. Consequently  the notice  must be  held to satisfy the requirements of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act.      5. For  the reasons stated above, we accept the appeal, set aside  the impugned  judgment and  restore the orders of the Controller  and the  Tribunal. The  case is remitted for further proceedings  to the  Controller who shall dispose of it within three months from the receipt of records from this Court. No costs. P.B.R.    Appeal allowed. 47