REPORTABLE   

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3465   OF 2009  (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 17402 OF 2008)

Smruti Pahariya  .....Appellant(s)

- Versus -

Sanjay Pahariya ....Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The wife, who is the appellant before this  

Court, filed this appeal seeking to impugn  

the  judgment  and  order  dated  5.6.2008  

passed by the High Court of judicature at  1

Bombay, which in a detailed judgment, was  

pleased  to  set  aside  the  judgment  and  

decree  dated  5.12.2007  passed  by  the  

Family Court, Mumbai, in which the Family  

Court, dissolved the marriage between the  

appellant and the respondent by a decree  

of divorce on mutual consent under Section  

13B  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955  

(hereinafter “the said Act”).  

3. Admittedly,  the  parties  are  Hindu  and  

governed by the provisions of the said Act  

and  they  were  married  on  5.3.1993  at  

Mumbai  following  the  Hindu  Vedic  rites.  

Marriage  was  also  registered.   After  

marriage, the parties resided together in  

Flat No. 601, 2nd Floor, Dinath Court, Sir  

Pochkhanwala  Road,  Worli,  Mumbai.   Two  

sons were born to them, one on 1.2.1995  

and  the  other  one  on  3.4.1997.   A  few  

years after that, serious differences and  

incompatibility surfaced between them and  

2

all  attempts  of  settlement  failed.   The  

parties  stopped  living  together  from  

January  2005  and  decided  to  file  a  

petition seeking divorce by mutual consent  

under  Section  13B  of  the  said  Act.   A  

joint  petition  to  that  effect  was  filed  

before the Family Court at Bandra, Mumbai  

and the same was registered on 19.5.2007.  

It  was  averred  therein  that  

incompatibility  with  each  other  made  it  

difficult  for  them  to  co-exist  and  they  

stopped  cohabiting  as  husband  and  wife  

from January 2005 (para 6).  In paragraph  

13,  it  was  stated  that  there  was  no  

collusion  between  the  parties  in  filing  

the petition for divorce by mutual consent  

and  in  paragraph  17  it  was  pointed  out  

that there is no force or coercion between  

the parties in filing the petition.  Along  

with  the  said  petition,  certain  consent  

terms were also filed but with those terms  

we are not concerned in this proceeding.   

3

4. Under the provisions of Section 13B (2) of  

the  said  Act,  a  minimum  period  of  six  

month has to elapse before such petition  

can  be  taken  up  for  hearing.   In  the  

instant case, the said period expired on  

or  about  19.11.2007.   In  between,  two  

dates  were  given,  namely,  14.6.2007  and  

23.8.2007  when  the  parties  were  given  a  

chance  for  counselling  but  on  both  the  

days  parties  were  absent  and  no  

counselling took place.   

5. On 19.11.2007, after the mandatory period  

of six months, the matter came up before  

the  Family  Court.   It  appears  from  the  

affidavit  filed  by  the  wife  in  this  

proceeding  before  the  Bombay  High  Court  

that on 3.11.2007, advocate of the parties  

informed the husband that the matter will  

be  listed  on  19.11.2007  and  a  draft  

affidavit  of  deposition  was  sent  to  him  

4

through E-mail.  It is not in dispute that  

both  the  parties  had  the  same  advocate.  

It also appears from the affidavit of the  

wife  that  on  18.11.2007  the  advocate  

received a text SMS in his mobile from the  

respondent-husband  that  he  is  unable  to  

attend  the  court  on  19.11.2007.  

Therefore, on 19.11.2007, when the matter  

appeared  for  the  first  time  before  the  

Court,  the  husband  was  absent  and  the  

Family Court asked the advocate to inform  

the husband of the next date of hearing of  

the matter, which was fixed on 1.12.2007.

6. On 19.11.2007 itself, an application was  

made  by  the  wife  to  summon  the  husband  

directing him to be present in the Family  

court  on  the  next  date.   Accordingly,  

summons  were  sent  by  the  Court  on  

23.11.2007  by  courier  and  the  courier  

returned with the remark “not accepting”.  

In  this  connection,  the  order  which  was  

passed by the Family Court, on 1.12.2007,  

5

on  perusal  of  the  service  report  is  of  

some importance.  The following order was  

passed on the service return:

“Perused  the  first  summons  and  subsequent  orders  thereto.   I  have  seen  service  affidavit  also,  states  that  servant was present.  Hence I am not able  to accept it as a proper one.  The courier  endorsement  is  also  vague.  Considering  the  contents  in  affidavit,  I  allow  petitioner  No.1  to  serve  the  notice  by  pasting  on  the  address  given  in  cause  title to petitioner No.2.  EPSB allowed.  It is made returnable on 4.12.2007.”

7. The petition was thus made returnable on  

4.12.2007.   It  appears  that  the  bailiff  

pasted  the  summons  on  3.12.2007  outside  

the  door  of  the  husband’s  residence  and  

the matter came up before the Family Court  

on 4.12.2007 and on that day the husband  

was  absent.   The  Family  Court  adjourned  

the  matter  to  10.12.2007.   But  on  

5.12.2007,  the  wife,  filed  a  petition  

before the Family Court with a prayer that  

the hearing of the matter may be pre-poned  

6

and be taken up on the very same day i.e.  

5.12.2007.  On the aforesaid prayer of the  

wife,  though  the  matter  was  not  on  the  

board, it was taken on the board by the  

Family Court on 5.12.2007 and the decree  

of  divorce  was  passed  ex-parte  on  that  

date itself.   

8. It  may  be  mentioned  in  this  connection  

that  the  Family  Court  pre-poned  the  

hearing on wife’s application and in the  

absence of the husband.  Admittedly, the  

pre-ponement was done ex-parte.   

9. In  the  background  of  these  facts,  

basically  four  questions  fall  for  our  

consideration:

I.   Whether impugned decree of divorce  

passed by the Family Court on 5.12.2007  

is vitiated by procedural irregularity?

7

II. Whether  by  conducting  the  

proceeding,  in  the  manner  it  did,  the  

Family Court acted contrary to the avowed  

object of the Family Courts Act, 1984?  

III.   Whether  from  the  absence  of  the  

husband  before  the  Family  Court  on  

19.11.2007,  1.12.2007  and  4.12.2007  it  

can  be  inferred  that  his  consent  for  

grant of divorce on a petition on mutual  

consent subsists, even though he has not  

withdrawn  the  petition  for  divorce  on  

mutual consent?

IV.  Whether on a proper construction of  

Section 13B (2) of the said Act, which  

speaks  of  ‘the  motion  of  both  the  

parties’,  this  Court  can  hold  that  the  

Family Court can dissolve a marriage and  

grant a decree of divorce in the absence  

of  one  of  the  parties  and  without  

actually ascertaining the consent of that  

8

party who filed the petition for divorce  

on mutual consent jointly with the other  

party?

10. This  fourth  question  assumes  general  

importance  since  it  turns  on  the  

interpretation of the section.  Apart from  

that,  this  question  is  relevant  here  in  

view of various recitals in the judgment  

and  decree  of  the  learned  Judge  of  the  

Family Court.  It appears that the Family  

Court  granted  the  decree  of  divorce  by  

proceeding  on  the  presumption  of  

continuing consent of the husband.  

11. While  dealing  with  the  first  question  

about  procedural  irregularity  in  the  

matter, this Court finds that the Family  

Court did not act properly even if it is  

held that it was correct in presuming the  

continuing  consent  of  the  respondent-

husband.   

9

12. From  the  sequence  of  events,  it  appears  

that on 19.11.2007 when the matter came up  

before the Court, the first day after the  

mandatory  period  of  six  months,  the  

husband  was  absent.   The  Court  directed  

service of summons on the husband on the  

request of the wife.  The service return  

was  before  the  Court  on  1.12.2007.  

Looking at the service return, the Court  

found that service was not a proper one  

and the Court was also not satisfied with  

the  endorsement  of  the  courier.   Under  

such circumstances, the Court’s direction  

on the prayer of the appellant-wife, for  

substituted service under Order 5 Rule 20  

of  the  Civil  Procedure  Code  is  not  a  

proper  one.   Direction  for  substituted  

service  under  Order  5  Rule  20  can  be  

passed only when Court is satisfied “that  

there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  

defendant is keeping out of the way for  

the  purpose  of  evading  service,  or  that  

10

for any other reason the summons cannot be  

served in the ordinary way”.   

13. In the facts of this case, the Court did  

not, and rather could not, have any such  

satisfaction as the Court found that the  

service was not proper.  If the service is  

not proper, the Court should have directed  

another service in the normal manner and  

should not have accepted the plea of the  

appellant-wife  for  effecting  substituted  

service.  From wife’s affidavit asking for  

substituted service, it is clear that the  

servant  of  the  respondent-husband  

intimated  her  advocate’s  clerk  that  

respondent-husband was out of Bombay and  

will  be  away  for  about  two  weeks.  

However, the appellant-wife asserted that  

the respondent-husband was in town and was  

evading.   But  the  Court  on  seeing  the  

service  return  did  not  come  to  the  

conclusion  that  the  husband  was  evading  

11

service.  Therefore, the Court cannot, in  

absence of its own satisfaction that the  

husband  is  evading  service,  direct  

substituted service under Order 5 Rule 20  

of the Code.   

14. Apart from the aforesaid irregularity, the  

Court, after ordering substituted service  

and perusing service return on 4.12.2007,  

fixed the matter for 10.12.2007.  Then, on  

the application of the wife on 5.12.2007,  

pre-poned the proceeding to 5.12.2007 and  

on  that  very  day  granted  the  decree  of  

divorce even though the matter was not on  

the list.  

15. This  Court  strongly  disapproves  of  the  

aforesaid manner in which the proceeding  

was  conducted  in  this  case.   A  Court’s  

proceeding  must  have  a  sanctity  and  

fairness.  It cannot be conducted for the  

convenience of one party alone.  In any  

12

event, when the Court fixed the matter for  

10.12.2007,  it  could  not  pre-pone  the  

matter on an ex-parte prayer made by the  

appellant-wife on 5.12.2007 and grant the  

decree of divorce on that day itself by  

treating the matter on the board in the  

absence  of  the  husband.   This,  in  our  

opinion,  is  a  flagrant  abuse  of  the  

judicial process and on this ground alone,  

the decree dated 5.12.2007 has to be set  

aside.

16. On  this  aspect,  this  Court  endorses  the  

dissatisfaction  expressed  by  the  Bombay  

High Court in paragraph 34 of its judgment  

under appeal about the manner in which the  

date of final hearing was pre-poned and an  

ex-parte decree was passed.  

17. While dealing with the second question it  

appears  that  the  Family  Court  has  not  

acted in a manner which is required of it  

13

having regard to the jurisdiction vested  

on it under the Family Courts Act.   

18. The Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter,  

Act 66 of 1984) was enacted for adopting a  

human approach to the settlement of family  

disputes and achieving socially desirable  

results.  The need for such a law was felt  

as early as in 1974 and Chief Justice P.B.  

Gajendragadhkar,  as  the  Chairman  of  Law  

Commission,  in  the  59th report  on  Hindu  

Marriage  Act,  1955  and  Special  Marriage  

Act, 1954, opined:-

“In our Report on the Code of Civil  Procedure, we have had occasion to emphasis  that  in  dealing  with  disputes  concerning  the  family,  the  court  ought  to  adopt  a  human  approach  –  an  approach  radically  different  from  that  adopted  in  ordinary  civil  proceedings,  and  that  the  court  should  make  reasonable  efforts  at  settlement  before  commencement  of  the  trial.  In our view, it is essential that  such  an  approach  should  be  adopted  in  dealing  with  matrimonial  disputes.   We  would suggest that in due course, States  should think of establishing family courts,  with presiding officers who will be well  qualified in law, no doubt, but who will be  trained  to  deal  with  such  dispute  in  a  

14

human way, and to such courts all disputes  concerning the family should be referred.”

19. Almost 10 years thereafter when the said  

Act 66 of 1984 was enacted, the words of  

the Chief Justice were virtually quoted in  

its  statement  of  objects  and  reasons.  

Consistent  with  the  said  human  approach  

which is expected to be taken by a Family  

Court Judge, Section 9 of the Act casts a  

duty upon the Family Court Judge to assist  

and  persuade  the  parties  to  come  to  a  

settlement.

20. In the instant case by responding to the  

illegal and unjust demand of the wife of  

pre-poning  the  proceeding  ex-parte  and  

granting  an  ex-parte  decree  of  divorce,  

the  Family  Court  did  not  discharge  its  

statutory obligation under Section 13B (2)  

of the said Act of hearing the  parties.  

When  a  proceeding  is  pre-poned  in  the  

absence of a party and a final order is  15

passed  immediately,  the  statutory  duty  

cast on the Court to hear the party, who  

is absent, is not discharged.   Therefore,  

the Family Court has not at all shown a  

human and a radically different approach  

which it is expected to have while dealing  

with cases of divorce on mutual consent.

21. Marriage is an institution of great social  

relevance  and  with  social  changes,  this  

institution  has  also  changed  

correspondingly.  However, the  institution  

of  marriage  is  subject  to  human  frailty  

and  error.  Marriage  is  certainly  not  a  

mere “reciprocal possession” of the sexual  

organs  as  was  philosophized  by  I.  Kant  

[The Philosophy of Law page 110, W. Hastie  

translation  1887]   nor  can  it  be  

romanticized  as  a  relationship  which  

Tennyson  fancied  as  “made  in  Heaven”  

[Alymer’s  Field,  in  Complete  Works  191,  

193 (1878)].

16

22. In many cases, marriages simply fail for  

no fault of the parties but as a result of  

discord  and  disharmony  between  them.  In  

such  situations,  putting  an  end  to  this  

relationship is the only way out of this  

social  bondage.  But  unfortunately,  

initially  the  marriage  laws  in  every  

country were ‘fault oriented’. Under such  

laws marriage can be dissolved only by a  

Court’s  decree  within  certain  limited  

grounds  which  are  to  be  proved  in  an  

adversarial  proceeding.   Such  ‘fault’  

oriented divorce laws have been criticized  

as  ‘obsolete, unrealistic,  discriminatory  

and  sometimes  immoral’  (Foster,  Divorce  

Law Reform; the choices before State page  

112).  

23. As early as in 1920 possibly for the first  

time  in  New  Zealand,  Section  4  of  the  

Divorce  and  Matrimonial  Causes  Amendment  

17

Act, 1920 gave the Court the discretion to  

grant a decree of divorce to parties when  

they had separated for three years under a  

decree  of  judicial  separation  or  

separation  order  by  the  Magistrate  or  

under  a  deed  of  separation  or  “even  by  

mutual  consent”.  Till  such  amendment,  

divorce  after  separation  by  parties  on  

“mutual consent” was unknown.  

24. Considering the said amendment of 1920 and  

exercising the discretion the amended law  

conferred on the Judge, Justice Salmond in  

Lodder Vs. Lodder, [1921, New Zealand Law  Reports, 876], came to the conclusion that  

it is not necessary to enquire into the  

merits of the disputes between the parties  

since the man and the wife had put an end  

to their relationship 13 years ago and the  

learned Judge found that their alienation  

is  “permanent  and  irredeemable”.   The  

learned  Judge  also  felt  that  in  the  

18

circumstances  of  the  case  “no  public  or  

private interest is to be served by the  

further continuance of the marriage bond”  

and  a  decree  for  its  dissolution  was  

passed. (See page 881).

25. This seems to be the first decision of a  

Court  granting  divorce  on  a  ‘no-fault’  

basis  and  because  of  the  fact  that  a  

marriage had broken down for all practical  

purposes  as  parties  were  staying  

separately for a very long time.  

26. The British society was very conservative  

as not to accept divorce on such a ground  

but  in  1943,  Viscount  Simon,  Lord  

Chancellor,  in  the  case  of  Blunt Vs.  Blunt, [1943, 2 All ER 76], speaking for  the House of Lords, while categorizing the  

heads  of  discretion  which  should  weigh  

with the courts in granting the decree of  

divorce, summed up four categories but at  

19

page 78 of the Report, the Lord Chancellor  

added a fifth one and the views of His  

Lordship were expressed in such matchless  

words  as  they  deserve  to  be  extracted  

herein below:-

“To these four considerations I would  add a fifth of a more general character,  which  must  indeed  be  regarded  as  of  primary importance, viz., the interest of  the community at large, to be judged by  maintaining a true balance between respect  for the binding sanctity of marriage and  the  social  considerations  which  make  it  contrary to public policy to insist on the  maintenance of a union which has utterly  broken  down.   It  is  noteworthy  that  in  recent years this last consideration has  operated to induce the court to exercise a  favourable  discretion  in  many  instances  where in an earlier time a decree would  certainly have been refused”.

27. In India also, prior to the amendment in  

our laws by insertion of Section 13B in  

the  said  Act,  the  Courts  felt  the  

necessity for an amendment in the divorce  

law.  The Full Bench of the Delhi High  

Court  in  the  judgment  of  Ram  Kali  Vs.  

20

Gopal Dass – ILR (1971) 1 Delhi 6, felt  the  inadequacy  of  the  existing  divorce  

law.   Chief  Justice  Khanna  (as  His  

Lordship then was) speaking for the Full  

Bench came to the following conclusion:-  

“...It would not be a practical and  realistic  approach,  indeed  it  would  be  unreasonable  and  inhuman,  to  compel  the  parties to keep up the façade of marriage  even  though  the  rift  between  them  is  complete  and  there  are  no  prospects  of  their ever living together as husband and  wife.” [See page 12].

28. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, the  

learned  Chief  Justice  relied  on  the  

observation  of  the  Viscount  Simon,  Lord  

Chancellor, in the case of Blunt Vs. Blunt  (Supra).

29. Within a year thereafter, Hon’ble Justice  

Krishna  Iyer,  in  the  case  of  Aboobacker  Haji Vs. Mamu  Koya -  1971  K.L.T.  663,  while dealing with Mohammedan Law relating  

21

to  divorce  correctly  traced  the  modern  

trend in legal system on the principle of  

breakdown  of  marriage  in  the  following  

words:-

“When  an  intolerable  situation  has  been reached, the partners living separate  and  apart  for  a  substantial  time,  an  inference may be drawn that the marriage  has broken down in fact and so should be  ended by law. This trend in the field of  matrimonial law is manifesting itself in  the  Commonwealth  countries  these  days.”(See page 668)

30. In coming to the said finding the learned  

Judge relied on the principles laid down  

by  Justice  Salmond  in  Lodder Vs.  Lodder  (supra).

31. After the said amendment in 1976 by way of  

insertion of Section 13B in the said Act  

in the 74th Report of the Law Commission of  

India ( April, 1978), Justice H.R. Khanna,  

as its Chairman, expressed the following  

views on the newly amended Section 13B:

22

“Marriage  is  viewed  in  a  number  of  countries  as  a  contractual  relationship  between freely consenting individuals.  

A  modified  version  of  the  basis  of  consent is to be found in the theory of  divorce by mutual consent.

The  basis  in  this  case  is  also  consent,  but  the  revocation  of  the  relationship itself must be consensual, as  was  the  original  formation  of  the  relationship. The Hindu Marriage Act, as  amended in 1976, recognizes this theory in  section 13B.”

32. On  the  question  of  how  to  ascertain  

continuing consent in a proceeding under  

Section 13B of the said Act, the decision  

in the case of  Smt. Sureshta Devi Vs.  Om  Prakash –  (1991)  2  SCC  25,   gives  considerable guidance.  

33. In Paragraph 8 of the said judgment, this  

Court summed up the requirement of Section  

13B (1) as follows:  

“8. There are three other requirements in  sub-section (1).  They are:-

(i) They have been living separately for a  period of one year.

23

(ii) They  have  not  been  able  to  live  together, and

(iii) They have mutually agreed that marriage  should be dissolved.”

34. In paragraph 10, the learned Judges dealt  

with  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  13B.  In  

paragraphs 11 and 12, the learned Judges  

recorded the divergent views of the Bombay  

High  Court  [Jayashree  Ramesh  Londhe  v.  Ramesh Bhikaji Londhe – AIR 1982 Bom 302:  86 Bom LR 184], Delhi High Court [Chander  Kanta v. Hans Kumar  – AIR 1989 Del 73],  Madhya Pradesh High Court [Meena Dutta v.  Anirudh Dutta  – (1984) 2 DMC 388 (MP)],  and  the  views  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  

[K.I. Mohanan v. Jeejabai  – AIR 1988 Ker  28:  (1986)  2  HLR  467:  1986  KLT  990],  

Punjab and Haryana High Court [Harcharan  Kaur v. Nachhattar Singh – AIR 1988 P & H  27: (1987) 2 HLR 184: (1987) 92 Punj LR  

321]  and  Rajasthan  High  Court  [Santosh  Kumari v. Virendra Kumar  – AIR 1986 Raj  

24

128: (1986) 1 HLR 620: 1986 Raj LR 441]  

respectively on Section 13B.

35. In paragraphs 13 and 14 of the  Sureshta  Devi (supra), the learned Judges gave an  interpretation to Section 13B (2) and in  

doing so the learned Judges made it clear  

that the reasons given by the High Court  

of Bombay and Delhi are untenable inasmuch  

as both the High Courts held that once the  

consent  is  given  by  the  parties  at  the  

time  of  filing  the  petition,  it  is  

impossible for them to withdraw the same  

to nullify the petition.  

36. We also find that the interpretation given  

by  Delhi  and  Bombay  High  Courts  is  

contrary  to  the  very  wording  of  Section  

13B (2) which recognizes the possibility  

of  withdrawing  the  petition  filed  on  

consent during the time when such petition  

has to be kept pending.  

25

37. In paragraph 13 of Sureshta Devi (supra),  the learned Judges made the position clear  

by holding as follows:  

“At  the  time  of  the  petition  by  mutual  consent,  the  parties  are  not  unaware that their petition does not by  itself snap marital ties. They know that  they have to take a further step to snap  marital ties. Sub-Section (2) of Section  13-B is clear on this point. It provides  that “on the motion of both the parties,…. if the petition is not withdrawn in the  meantime, the court shall….pass a decree  of divorce…”. What is significant in this  provision  is  that  there  should  also  be  mutual consent when they move the court  with  a  request  to  pass  a  decree  of  divorce.  Secondly,  the  court  shall  be  satisfied  about  the  bona  fides  and  the  consent of the parties. If there is no  mutual consent at the time of the enquiry,  the court gets no jurisdiction to make a  decree  for  divorce.  If  the  view  is  otherwise, the court could make an enquiry  and  pass  a  divorce  decree  even  at  the  instance of one of the parties and against  the consent of the other. Such a decree  cannot  be  regarded  as  decree  by  mutual  consent.”

38. Therefore, it was made clear in  Sureshta  Devi (supra) that under Section 13B (2),  the requirement is the ‘motion of both the  

26

parties’  and  interpreting  the  same,  the  

learned  Judges  made  it  clear  that  there  

should  be  mutual  consent  when  they  move  

the Court with a request to pass a decree  

of  divorce  and  there  should  be  consent  

also at the time when the Court is called  

upon to make an enquiry, if the petition  

is not withdrawn and then pass the final  

decree.  

39. Interpreting the said Section, it was held  

in  Sureshta  Devi (supra)  that  if  the  petition is not withdrawn in the meantime,  

the  Court,  at  the  time  of  making  the  

enquiry, does not have any jurisdiction to  

pass  a  decree,  unless  there  is  mutual  

consent.

40. Learned Judges made it further clear that  

if the Court makes an enquiry and passes a  

divorce decree even at the instance of one  

of the parties and against the consent of  

27

the  other,  such  a  decree  cannot  be  

regarded as a decree by mutual consent.

41. In  paragraph  14  of  the  said  judgment,  

learned  Judges  made  it  further  clear  as  

follows:-

“If  the  Court  is  held  to  have  the  power to make a decree solely based on the  initial  petition,  it  negates  the  whole  idea of mutuality and consent for divorce.  Mutual consent to the divorce is a sine  qua non for passing a decree for divorce  under Section 13-B.  Mutual consent should  continue  till  the  divorce  decree  is  passed. It is a positive requirement for  the  court  to  pass  a  decree  of  divorce.  “The consent must continue to decree nisi  and must be valid subsisting consent when  the  case  is  heard.”  {See  (i)  Halsbury’s  Laws of England, 4th edn. Vol. 13 para 645;  (ii) Rayden on Divorce, 12th edn., Vol. 1,  P. 291; and (iii) Beales V. Beales}.”

42. In  paragraph  15  of  the  judgment,  this  

Court held that the decisions of the High  

Courts of Bombay, Delhi and Madhya Pradesh  

cannot be said to have laid down the law  

correctly  and  those  judgments  were  

overruled. We also hold accordingly. 28

43. The decision in  Sureshta Devi (supra) was  rendered by a Bench of two learned Judges  

of this Court. In a subsequent decision of  

two learned Judges of this Court in the  

case of Ashok Hurra Vs. Rupa Bipin Zaveri  –  (1997)  4  SCC  226,  the  judgment  in  

Sureshta  Devi  (supra)  was  doubted  as  according  to  the  learned  Judges  some  of  

the observations in  Sureshta Devi  (supra)  appear  to  be  too  wide  and  require  

reconsideration in an appropriate case.

44. Learned Judges in Ashok Hurra (supra) made  it clear that they were passing the order  

in  that  case  on  the  peculiar  fact  

situation.  This Court also held that in  

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article  

142  of  the  Constitution,  a  decree  of  

divorce  by  mutual  consent  under  Section  

13B  of  the  Act  was  granted  between  the  

29

parties. (See paragraph 16 and 22 of the  

report).  

45. It  appears  that  those  observations  were  

made  by  the  learned  Judges  without  

considering the provisions of the Family  

Courts Act. In any event, the decision in  

Ashok  Hurra (supra)  was  considered  by  a  larger Bench of this Court in  Rupa Ashok  Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr. – (2002) 4  SCC 388.  No doubt was expressed by the  

larger Bench on the principles laid down  

in  Sureshta Devi (supra). It appears that  a  petition  for  review  was  filed  against  

the  two  judge  decision  in  Ashok  Hurra  (supra)  and  the  same  was  dismissed.  

Thereafter,  the  question  before  the  

Constitution  Bench  in  Rupa  Ashok  Hurra  (supra) was as follows:-

“Whether  the  judgment  of  this  Court  dated 10.3.1997 in Civil Appeal No.1843 of  1997 [1997 (4) SCC 226] can be regarded as  a  nullity  and  whether  a  writ  petition  under Article 32 of the Constitution can  

30

be maintained to question the validity of  a  judgment  of  this  Court  after  the  petition for review of the said judgment  has  been  dismissed  are,  in  our  opinion,  questions which need to be considered by a  Constitution Bench of this Court.”

46. In the Constitution Bench decision of this  

Court  in  Rupa  Ashok  Hurra  (supra),  this  Court did not express any view contrary to  

the views of this Court in  Sureshta Devi  (supra).

47. We endorse the views taken by this Court  

in  Sureshta Devi (supra) as we find that  on a proper construction of the provision  

in Section 13B (1) and 13B (2), there is  

no scope of doubting the views taken in  

Shreshta  Devi (supra).  In  fact  the  decision  which  was  rendered  by  the  two  

learned  Judges  of  this  Court  in  Ashok  Hurra (supra) has to be treated to be one  rendered in the facts of that case and it  

is also clear by the observations of the  

learned Judges in that case.

31

48. None of the counsel for the parties argued  

for  reconsideration  of  the  ratio  in  

Sureshta Devi (supra).

49. We are of the view that it is only on the  

continued  mutual  consent  of  the  parties  

that decree for divorce under Section 13B  

of  the  said  Act  can  be  passed  by  the  

Court.   If  petition  for  divorce  is  not  

formally  withdrawn  and  is  kept  pending  

then on the date when the Court grants the  

decree,  the  Court  has  a  statutory  

obligation  to  hear  the  parties  to  

ascertain their consent.  From the absence  

of one of the parties for two to three  

days,  the  Court  cannot  presume  his/her  

consent as has been done by the learned  

Family Court Judge in the instant case and  

especially  in  its  facts  situation,  

discussed above.  

50. In our view it is only the mutual consent  

of the parties which gives the Court the  

32

jurisdiction to pass a decree for divorce  

under  Section  13B.  So  in  cases  under  

Section 13B, mutual consent of the parties  

is a jurisdictional fact.  The Court while  

passing its decree under Section 13B would  

be  slow  and  circumspect  before  it  can  

infer the existence of such jurisdictional  

fact.  The Court has to be satisfied about  

the  existence  of  mutual  consent  between  

the  parties  on  some  tangible  materials  

which demonstrably disclose such consent.  

In  the  facts  of  the  case,  the  impugned  

decree was passed within about three weeks  

from the expiry of the mandatory period of  

six  months  without  actually  ascertaining  

the consent of the husband, the respondent  

herein.  

51. It is nobody’s case that a long period has  

elapsed  between  the  expiry  of  period  of  

six months and the date of final decree.

33

52. For the reasons aforesaid, we affirm the  

view taken by the learned Judges of the  

Bombay  High  Court  in  the  order  under  

appeal.  

53. The appeal is disposed of as follows:-

(i) On  receipt  of  the  copy  of  this  

judgment,  the  Family  Court  is  

directed to issue notice to both the  

parties to appear in the Court on a  

particular  day  for  taking  further  

steps in the case.

(ii) On  that  day,  the  parties  are  at  

liberty to engage their own counsel  

and  they  may  be  personally  present  

before the Court and inform the Court  

as  to  whether  they  have  consent  to  

the  passing  of  the  decree  under  

Section 13B of the Act.  If both the  

parties  give  their  consent  for  

passing of the decree under Section  

34

13B, the Court may pass appropriate  

orders.

(iii) If  any  of  the  parties  makes  a  

representation  that  he/she  does  not  

have  consent  to  the  passing  of  the  

decree, the Court may dispose of the  

proceedings  in  the  light  of  the  

observations made by us.

There shall be no order as to costs.

...................C.J.I. (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN)

.......................J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

.......................J. New Delhi (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) May 11, 2009

35