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PETITIONER: SITA RAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHHOTA BHONDEY AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/10/1990

BENCH: AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) BENCH: AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) SAWANT, P.B.

CITATION:  1991 AIR  249            1990 SCR  Supl. (2) 184  1991 SCC  Supl.  (1) 556 JT 1990 (4)   339  1990 SCALE  (2)808

ACT:     U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953: Sections 4(2), 5(2)   and  49--Declaration  and  adjudication   of   tenure holders--Whether  falls within scope of  adjudicatory  func- tions of consolidation authorities.

HEADNOTE:     In  the  course of consolidation proceedings  under  the U.P.  Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953,  questions  arose amongst  the  members  of a family regarding  the  title  to certain properties. Respondent No. 1 filed objections to the original entries in respect of lands in Khata No. 72 and  73 on the basis that he was the son of Chhota, one Of the  sons of Teja, the common ancestor. Similarly, respondents Nos.  2 and 3 filed objections claiming shares in the lands in Khata No.  73  on  the ground that the said  holding  was  jointly acquired  but was recorded in the name of Nanha in a  repre- sentative  character. The appellant contested the claims  of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3.     The  objections  were considered  by  the  Consolidation Officer, who held that respondent No. 1 was the son of Heera alias Chhota, brother of Nanha, and granted him his share in certain plots of the Khata No. 73. The appellant as well  as respondents  Nos.  2 and 3 fried appeals  against  the  said order of the Consolidation Officer. The Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) allowed the appeal of the  appellant and directed that lands in Khata No. 73 will be continued in the name of the appellant alone.     The  respondents went in revision against the  order  of the  Assistant  Settlement Officer. The Deputy  Director  of Consolidation  allowed the revision of respondent No.  1  in full  in respect of share in Khata No. 72. As regards  plots in  Khata No. 73 the Deputy Director held that the  name  of Nanha was entered only in a representative capacity.     The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court to challenge the decision of the Deputy Director of  Consolida- tion which was dismissed in limine. 185     The  appellant, thereafter,’filed the civil suit  for  a declaration that the order of the Deputy Director of Consol- idation  was  without  jurisdiction.  Contesting  the  suit,

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respondent  No.  1 raised a preliminary objection  that  the suit was barred by section 49 of the Act. The Munsiff decid- ed the preliminary objection in favour of respondent No.  1. The  Additional District and Sessions Judge in  appeal,  af- firmed the order of the Munsiff. The second appeal filed  by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court in limine.     Before  this  Court, it was contended on behalf  of  the appellant  that  the bar of section 49 of the  Act  was  not applicable  to the suit of the appellant because the  orders passed by the consolidation authorities were without  juris- diction inasmuch as the consolidation authorities could  not decide  questions  as to title to the lands as well  as  the question relating to the parentage of respondent No. 1 which the civil courts alone could decide. Dismissing the appeal, this Court,     HELD:  (1) The language used in section 49 of  the  U.P. Consolidation  of Holdings Act, 1953 is wide and  comprehen- sive.  Declaration  and adjudication of  rights  of  tenure- holders in respect of land lying in the area covered by  the notification under section 4(2) of the Act and  adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation  proceedings and  in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to  have been taken under the Act, would cover adjudication of  ques- tions as to title in respect of the said lands. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the civil or revenue courts to entertain any  suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such  land or  with respect to any other matter for which a  proceeding could  or  ought to have been taken under the Act  has  been taken away. [189D-E; C]     Suba  Singh v. Mahendra Singh and Others, [1974]  1  SCC 418;  Gorakh  Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh, [1974]  1  SCR 3839, referred to.     (2)  In the instant case, respondent No. 1 was  claiming an  interest  in the land lying in the area covered  by  the notification issued under section 4(2) on the basis that  he was the son of Chhota, brother of Nanha, and that the  lands were  recorded  in  the name of Nanha  in  a  representative capacity  on behalf of himself and his other brothers.  This claim which fell within the ambit of section 5(2) had to  be adjudicated by the consolidation authorities under the  Act, and  the  jurisdiction of the Civil Court to  entertain  the suit in respect of the said 186 matter was expressly barred by section 49 of the Act and the suit of the appellant was rightly dismissed on that  ground. [194C-D]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1811  of 1975.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  18.4.1975  of  the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 734 of 1975.     R.K.  Mehta, Ms. Mona Mehta and S.K. Bagga (NP) for  the Appellant. P.K. Bajaj and Mrs. Rani Chhabra (NP) for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     S.C.  AGRAWAL,  J. This appeal by special  leave  arises from the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allaha- bad dated April 18, 1975, dismissing the Second Appeal filed by the appellant.     Teja, the common ancestor, had five sons: Nanha,  Mulle, Manna,  Chhota and Ram Sahai. All of them have died.  Appel- lant  Sita Ram is the son of Nanha. Mulle had a  son  Nokhey

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who  died in 1953 without any issue. Respondent No. 2  Soney Lal is the son of Manna. Smt. Kailasho Devi, respondent  No. 3  is the widow of Ram Sahai. Chhota Bhondey respondent  No. 1,  claims to be the son of Chhota which is disputed by  the appellant.  The  dispute in the appeal  relates  to  sirdari holdings in Khata No. 72 and 73 in village Sambhalpur Sheoli in  the State of Uttar Pradesh. Lands in Khata No.  72  were originally  entered  in the names of Nanha,  Manna  and  Ram Sahai  in the revenue records and on their deaths the  names of the appellant and respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were  entered. Respondent  No. 3 sold her shares in these lands. The  lands in Khata No. 73 were entered in the name of Nanha alone  and on his death the same were entered in the name of the appel- lant. Consolidation proceedings under the provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (U.P. Act No. 5 of 1954) hereinafter  referred to as ’the Act’ commenced  in  Village Sambhalpur  Sheoli in the year 1969. Respondent No. 1  filed objections  to the entries and claimed one fourth  share  in the holdings in both the Khatas on the basis that he is  the son of Chhota and that the said lands belonged to the  joint Hindu family consisting of the sons of Tej Ram.  Respondents Nos.  2 and 3 filed objections claiming shares in the  lands in  Khata  No. 73 on the ground that the  said  holding  was jointly 187 acquired by Nanha and his brothers, Manna and Ram Sahai, and the  name of Nanha was recorded in a representative  charac- ter.  The  appellant contested the said claims  and  claimed that  lands  in Khata No. 73 were acquired by Nanha  in  his individual  capacity  and not on behalf of his  family.  The appellant further claimed that respondent No. 1 could  claim no  interest  in the holdings as he is not a member  of  the family. The case of the appellant was that respondent No.  1 is not the son of Chhota but is the son of one Heera who was a  resident  of  a different village.  The  objections  were considered by the Consolidation Officer, who, by order dated August  31, 1970, held that respondent No. 1 is the  son  of Heera alias Chhota. He gave half share to the appellant  and one fourth share each to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in all the plots of the Khata No. 73 except plots Nos. 140, 141, 142/2, 142/3 and 143/3 which were given to the appellant exclusive- ly. The appellant as well as respondents Nos. 2 and 3  filed appeals against the said order of the Consolidation Officer. The  Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation), by  Order dated February 8, 1971, allowed the appeal of the  appellant and directed that Khata No. 73 will be continued in the name of  the  appellant alone inasmuch as the lands of  the  said Khata  were acquired by Nanha between 1927 and 193 1  before the birth of respondent No. 1 and the said land was not  the ancestral acquisition nor Nanha had acquired it in a  repre- sentative capacity. The Assistant Settlement Officer, howev- er,  agreed with the findings of the  Consolidation  Officer that  respondent No. 1 is the son of Heera alias Chhota  and belongs to the family to which the appellant and  respondent No.  2 belong. The respondents went in revision against  the said  order  of the Assistant Settlement Officer.  The  said revisions were decided by the Deputy Director of  Consolida- tion  by his Order dated May 13, 1971. The  Deputy  Director allowed  the revision of respondent No. 1 in full  and  held that  he  has  got a share in Khata No. 72  along  with  the appellant  and respondent No. 2 and since respondent  No.  3 has  already  sold her share of Khata No. 72  the  remaining three  branches namely the appellant and respondents Nos.  1 and  2  are entitled to one third share each  in  the  lands included in this Khata. As regards lands in Khata No. 73 the

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Deputy  Director disallowed the claim of the respondents  in respect of plots Nos. 140, 141,142 and 143. But with  regard to other plots of Khata No. 73 the Deputy Director held that the  name  of  Nanha was entered only  in  a  representative capacity  and  that the branches of Manna,  Chhota  and  Ram Sahai also had a share in these plots and that the  respond- ents  had acquired equal shares along with the appellant  in these  plots and their names may also be recorded  over  the same. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High  Court to  challenge  the said decision of the Deputy  Director  of Consolidation, 188 but  the said writ petition was dismissed in limine  by  the High  Court  by order dated July 23, 1971.  The  application filed  by the appellant for grant of certificate of  fitness to  appeal to this Court under Article 133 of the  Constitu- tion was also rejected by the High Court by its order  dated November 9, 1972.     The  appellant, thereafter, filed the civil suit  giving rise  to this appeal on January 25, 1973 for  a  declaration that the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated May  13,  1971, is without jurisdiction. The said  suit  was contested  by  respondent  No. 1. He  raised  a  preliminary objection that the suit was barred by Section 49 of the Act. The  Munsiff  Hawaii, Kanpur, by judgment dated  August  16, 1974  decided  the said preliminary objection in  favour  of respondent  No. 1 and dismissed the suit on the ground  that it  was barred by Section 49 of the Act. The  said  judgment and  decree of the Munsiff Hawaii was affirmed in appeal  by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur-Etawah by judgment dated January 17, 1975. The second Appeal filed  by the  appellant  against the said judgment was  dismissed  in limine by the High Court by the judgment under appeal.     The only question which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the suit filed by the appellant was barred by Section 49 of the Act. In the instant case the consolida- tion proceedings under the Act were taken during the  period 1969  to 1971 and the suit was filed in 1973. At  that  time Section 49 read as under: "49.  Bar  to  civil  jurisdiction-Notwithstanding  anything contained in any other law for the time being in force,  the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders  in respect  of land lying in an area, for which a  notification has been issued under sub-section (2) of Section 4 or  adju- dication  of  any other right arising out  of  consolidation proceedings  and  in regard to which a proceeding  could  or ought  to have been taken under this Act, shall be  done  in accordance  with the provisions of this Act and no civil  or revenue  court shall entertain any suit or  proceeding  with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any  other matters  for which a proceeding could or ought to have  been taken under this Act."     Shri R.K. Mehta, the learned counsel for the  appellant, has  urged  that  the bar of Section 49 of the  Act  is  not applicable  to the suit of the appellant because the  orders passed by the consolidation 189 authorities  were without jurisdiction inasmuch as the  con- solidation  authorities  could not decide  questions  as  to title  to the lands as well as the question relating to  the parentage  of respondent No. 1 which the Civil Courts  alone could  decide. The submission of Shri Mehta is that the  bar of  Section 49 of the Act is applicable in respect  of  only those matters which could be adjudicated upon by the consol- idation  authorities. Shri Mehta has placed reliance on  the

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decision  of this Court in Suba Singh v. Mahendra Singh  and Others, [1974] 1 SCC 418.     From a perusal of Section 49 it is evident that declara- tion and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of  land lying in an area for which a notification has  been issued  under  Section 4(2) and adjudication  of  any  other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to  which  a proceeding could or ought to  have  been  taken under the Act, had to be done in accordance with the  provi- sions  of the Act only and the jurisdiction of the civil  or revenue  courts  to entertain any suit  or  proceeding  with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any  other matter  for which a proceeding could or ought to  have  been taken under the Act, has been taken away. The language  used in  Section  49 is wide and comprehensive.  Declaration  and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of  land lying in the area covered by the notification under  Section 4(2) of the Act and adjudication of any other right  arising out  of consolidation proceedings and in regard to  which  a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the  Act, would cover adjudication of questions as to title in respect of  the  said lands. This view also finds support  from  the other  provisions  of the Act and the amendments  that  have been introduced therein.     In  the  Act,  as originally enacted,  Section  12  made provision for filing of objections against the statement  of plots  and  tenure-holders  prepared  by  the  consolidation authorities  and  in sub-section (4) of Section  12  it  was prescribed  that where the objection filed under  subsection (1)  involves a question of title and such question has  not already been determined by a competent court, the Consolida- tion  Officer shall refer the question for determination  to the arbitrator. Sub-section (5) of Section 12 laid down that all  suits or proceedings in the Court of first instance  or appeal in which a question of title in relation to some land has  been  raised shall be stayed. Under subsection  (6)  Of Section  12 finality was given to the decision of the  Arbi- trator  under  sub-section (4). Similarly  Section  20  made provision  for  filing of objections  against  statement  of proposals  prepared by the consolidation  authorities  under Section 19 of the Act. Section 22 prescribed that where  any objection filed under Section 20 involves a 190 question of title in or over land and such question has  not already  been finally determined by a competent  court,  the Consolidation  Officer shall refer it to the Arbitrator  for determination  and  all suits or proceedings  of  the  first instance or appeal in which a question of title in  relation to the same had been raised shall be stayed and the decision of the Arbitrator shall be final. There was a similar provi- sion for reference to arbitrator in Section 36. These provi- sions  indicate that initially the Act envisaged that  ques- tions  of  title, if not finally determined by  a  competent court,  shall,  instead of being decided by the  Courts,  be decided by an Arbitrator and the decision of the  Arbitrator would  be final. As a result the determination of  questions of title was withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the  Courts. On  a consideration of the scheme of the Act and the  policy behind  the  legislation,  in the light  of  the  provisions referred to above, this Court has observed: "The scheme of that Act, the policy behind that  legislation and  the  language of the relevant provisions  clearly  show that  the Legislature did not want questions of title to  be decided  by the Civil Court when the consolidation  proceed- ings  were under way. It is perfectly plain that  the  frag-

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mented holdings being converted into consolidated parcels of land is a complicated operation to be conducted by  adminis- trative authorities, and if long and frequent proceedings in Civil  Courts  hold up consolidation  operations,  the  very transformation of land holdings in villages the  legislature desired  to produce .would have been indefinitely  postponed and  messed up. It is thus obvious that at this stage  Civil Courts  should not intervene even if the questions  were  of heirship or title to property. At the same time, the  Legis- lature did not want to hand over these complicated questions of title and the like to mere consolidation agencies, and so under Sections 12(4) and 22(1), it was provided that  objec- tions  relating  to  title to land, if they  cropped  up  at intermediate stages of these operations, were to be referred to arbitration." (p.420-21) Extensive  amendments  were  made in the Act by  the  U  .P. Consolidation  of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1958  (U.P.  Act No.  38  of  1958) whereby a number  of  sections  including section  36, were deleted and various provisions,  including sections 5, 7 to 12 and 22, were substituted. As a result of these amendments the provisions with 191 regard to arbitration contained in Sections 12, 22 and 36 of the  original Act were removed. In sub-clause (i) of  Clause (b)  of Section 5, as substituted, it was provided that  all proceedings for correction of the records and all suits  for declaration  of rights and interests over land, or for  pos- session of land or for partition, pending before any author- ity  or court, whether of first instance, appeal, or  refer- ence, or revision, shall stand stayed, but without prejudice to  the rights of the persons affected to agitate the  right or  interest  in  dispute in the said  proceeding  or  suits before the consolidation authorities under and in accordance with  the provisions of the Act and the Rules made  thereun- der. In sub-clause (ii) of Clause (b) it was further provid- ed  that the findings of consolidation authorities  in  pro- ceedings under the Act in respect of such right or  interest in  the land, shall be acceptable to the authority or  court before whom the proceeding or suit was pending which may, on communication thereof by the parties concerned, proceed with the proceeding or suit, as the case may be. In Section 9  as substituted,  provision was made for issuing notice  of  the statement  prepared  under Section 8 of the Act  to  tenure- holders  concerned  and to persons interested  calling  upon them  to file before him objections, if any,  disputing  the correctness  or  nature of the entries in the  extracts  and pointing out of any omission therefrom. In Section 10 of the Act provision was made for adjudication by the Consolidation Officer of the said objections in disputed cases. In Section 11  provision was made for appeal against the orders  passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer under Sections 9 and 10. Section 12, as substituted, prescribed  that all matters relating to changes and  trans- fers  affecting any of the rights or interests  recorded  in the revised records published under Section 1 1B for which a cause  of  action was non-existent  when  proceedings  under Sections  7  to 10 were started or were in progress  may  be raised  before  the Assistant Consolidation Officer  as  and when they arise but not later than the date of  notification under  Section 52 or under sub-section (1) of Section 6  and that the provisions of Sections 7 to II shall mutatis mutan- dis, apply to the hearing and decision of any matter praised under  Section (1) as if it were a matter raised  under  the aforesaid Sections. The scheme of the above-mentioned amend-

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ments introduced in the Act by the Amendment Act of 1958 was to  empower the consolidation authorities to  adjudicate  on matters  involving declaration of right and  interests  over land or for possession of land or for partition and suits or proceedings in that regard pending before any Court were  to be stayed till such determination and after such  determina- tion. the Court was to proceed with the said proceedings  in the light of the findings of the consolidation  authorities. In other words the question as to title which were 192 earlier required to be determined by arbitration were to  be adjudicated upon by the consolidation authorities under  the Act.  From  the  Statement of Objects and  Reasons  for  the Amendment Act of 1958 it appears that it become necessary to do away with the provisions for arbitration because it  used to cause great delay and in order to inspire greater  confi- dence in the people in the adjudication of rights of tenure- holders by consolidation authorities provision was made  for a  Second Appeal against orders passed by the  Consolidation officer.     Further  amendment was made in Section 5 of the  Act  by U.P.  Act No. 21 of 1966 whereby clause (b)  of  sub-section (1) of Section 5, as renumbered, was omitted and sub-section (2)  was added in Section 5. By clause (a) of the said  sub- section  (2) it has been provided that upon the  publication of the notification under sub-section (2) of Section 4 every proceeding  for the correction of the records and all  suits and  other proceedings in respect of declaration  of  rights and interests in any land lying in the area, or for declara- tion  or adjudication of any other right in regard to  which proceedings can or ought to be taken under the Act,  pending before any Court or authority whether of the first  instance or  of  appeal, reference or revision, shall,  on  an  order being passed in that behalf by the Court or authority before whom  such suit or proceeding is pending, stand  abated.  In clause  (b)  of sub-section (2) of Section 5 it  is  further provided  that such abatement shall be without prejudice  to the  rights of the persons affected to agitate the right  or interest  in dispute in the said suit or proceedings  before the  appropriate  consolidation  authorities  under  and  in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. As a result of the said amendment which has been introduced  in Section 5 the right of the Courts to  adjudi- cate in respect of declaration of rights or interest in  any land  lying in the area for which the notification has  been issued under Section 4(2) or for declaration or adjudication of  any  other right in regard to which proceedings  can  or ought  to be taken under the Act has been  completely  taken away  and the adjudication of these rights is to be done  by the  consolidation authorities under and in accordance  with the  provisions  of the Act and the Rules  made  thereunder. Section  49  of the Act which bars the jurisdiction  of  the civil  and  revenue  Courts gives effect  to  the  aforesaid provisions contained in Section 5(2) of the Act. As a result of these amendments civil and revenue Courts have no role in the  matter of determination of rights or interests  in  any land  lying  in the area for which notice  has  been  issued under  Section  4(2) of the Act or for  the  declaration  or adjudication of any other right in regard to which  proceed- ings can or ought to be taken under the Act. 193     In Ram Adhar Singh v. Ramroop Singh and Others, [1968] 2 S.C.R.  95 this Court has dealt with the question whether  a suit  for  recovery  of possession  filed  by  the-plaintiff claiming  to be ’Bhoomidar’ of the land and  asserting  that

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the defendant was a trespasser and not entitled to remain in possession  of the property was covered by Section  5(2)  of the Act as amended by U.P. Act No. 21 of 1966. After consid- ering the various provisions of the Act this Court held that "disputes of the nature which exists between the parties  in the  present litigation are all now within the  jurisdiction of the authorities, constituted under the Act, to adjudicate upon" and on that basis it was held that the suit had abated under Section 5(2).     In  Gorakh  Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh  and  Others, [1974] 1 S.C.R. 339 this Court was concerned with a suit for cancellation  of  a Sale Deed to the extent  of  half  share claimed  by the plaintiff in fixed rates tenancy  plots  and for award of possession of the plaintiff’s share. This Court held that the said suit had abated under Section 5(2) of the Act  inasmuch  as the claim made in the said suit  could  be adjudicated  upon  by  consolidation  courts.  Referring  to Section 5 of the Act this Court has observed: "The whole object of this provision of the Act was to remove from the jurisdiction of ordinary civil and revenue  courts, for  the duration of consolidation operations, all  disputes which  could be decided in the course of consolidation  pro- ceedings  before special courts governed by  special  proce- dure.  Such adjudication by consolidation  authorities  were considered  more suitable, just and efficacious  for  speedy decisions which had to be taken in order to enable  consoli- dation operations to be finalised within a reasonable time. (P.341)     This  Court  has  held that questions  relating  to  the validity  of sale deeds, gift deeds and wills could be  gone in proceedings before the consolidation authorities  because such questions naturally and necessarily arose and had to be decided in the course of adjudication on rights or interests in  land which are the subject matter of consolidation  pro- ceedings.  A  distinction has, however,  been  made  between cases  where the document is wholly or partially invalid  so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have.legal effect. With regard to cases falling in the first category it was held that such a claim can be 194 adjudicated  by  consolidation courts on the  view  that  an alienation made excess of power to transfer would be, to the extent  of the excess of power, invalid and an  adjudication on the effect of such a purported alienation would be neces- sarily  implied in the decision of a dispute involving  con- flicting  claims to rights, or interests in land  which  are the  subject  matter of consolidation  proceedings.  But  as regards cases falling in the second category where there  is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken  away by  setting it aside or its cancellation, it was  held  that the consolidation authorities would have no power to  cancel the  same and it must be held to be binding no them so  long as it is not cancelled by a court. In the instant case respondent No. 1 was claiming an  inter- est  in the land lying in the area covered  by  notification issued under section 4(2) on the basis that he is the son of Chhota, brother of Nanha and that the lands were recorded in the name of Nanha in a representative capacity on behalf  of himself and his other brothers. This claim which fell within the  ambit  of  Section 5(2) had to be  adjudicated  by  the consolidation  authorities.  Since it was a  matter  falling within  the scope of adjudicatory functions assigned to  the consolidation authorities under the Act the jurisdiction  of the Civil Court to entertain the suit in respect of the said

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matter was expressly barred by Section 49 of the Act and the suit of the appellant was rightly dismissed on that ground.   Suba  Singh v. Mahendra Singh, (Supra), on which  reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant,has no  application to the present case.  That case  related  to the  year  1956 i.e. before the Amendment Act of  1958.   At that  time provision relating to arbitration were  contained in  Sections 12(4) and 21(1) of the Act.  The provisions  of sections  of  Section 49 of the Act which were in  force  at that  time had a narrower scope and the jurisdiction of  the Civil  Court was barred "with respect of any matter  arising out  of  consolidation proceedings or with  respect  to  any other matter in regard to which a suit or application  could be  filed  under the provisions of the Act."  In  that  case after  the scheme for consolidation under Section 23 of  the Act  had  been confirmed one Jag Ram, who was held to  be  a Bhoomidar under the Scheme, had died.  Jag Ram had four sons including  Ram  Bhajan  who hadpre-deceased  Jag  Ram.   The plaintiff-appellant  claimed  himself to be the son  of  Ram Bhajan  and  had applied for mutation in  the  consolidation proceedings on that basis which was allowed.  Thereafter  he approached the Civil Court for partition of the property  of Jag Ram.  The question was whether the said suit was  barred by  Section 49 of the Act.  This Court held that it was  not so barred on the view that the 195 question  as  to  who were the heirs of Jag Ram  was  not  a matter arising out of consolidation proceedings and  further that  the said question of inheritance to the estate of  Jag Ram  arose after the consolidation operations had been  sub- stantively  completed.  In this context this Court  has  ob- served that there is no provision in the Act for any dispute of  title  which arises subsequent to  confirmation  of  the statement under Section 23 to be decided by way of  arbitra- tion or otherwise and that the consolidation authorities had no  jurisdiction to determine finally the complicated  ques- tion of title when the cause of action had arisen subsequent to the finalisation, publication and even implementation  of the  consolidation scheme so far as Jag Ram  was  concerned. This would show that in this case this Court was considering the  question  whether a dispute as to  title  which  arises subsequent to confirmation of the statement under Section 23 could be adjudicated upon by the consolidation  authorities. As  pointed out earlier the position has been changed  after the  amendments that have been introduced in the Act by  the Amendment Acts of 1958 and 1966.     For  the reasons aforesaid we find no substance in  this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. R.S.S.                                          Appeal  dis- missed. 196