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PETITIONER: SITA RAM & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/01/1979

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SHINGAL, P.N. KAILASAM, P.S. DESAI, D.A. KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1979 AIR  745            1979 SCR  (2)1085  1979 SCC  (3) 656  CITATOR INFO :  R          1980 SC 470  (10)  RF         1980 SC1707  (4)  R          1981 SC1218  (1)  R          1986 SC 180  (39)  RF         1992 SC 891  (23)

ACT:      Supreme Court  Rules, 1966,  Order XXI,  Rule 15(1)(c), Constitutional India, 1950. Articles 134, 136, 145, Criminal Procedure Code,  1898, s. 384 and Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal  Appellate Jurisdiction)  Act, 1970,  J,   2(a)- Procedure of  the Supreme  Court hearing appeals in criminal matters  at   the  admission  stage  ex-parte-Whether  ultra vires.      Words & Phrases-’Appeal’ and procedure-Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:      Rule 15(1)(c)  of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 envisages  that the petition of appeal under sub-clause (a) or  sub-clause (b)  of clause  (1) of  Art. 134  of  the Constitution or  under the  Supreme  Court  (Enlargement  of Criminal Appellate  Jurisdiction) Act,  1970 or under s. 379 of the  Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, on being Registered shall be  put up for hearing ex-parte before the court which may either dismiss it summarily or direct issue of notice to all  necessary   parties  or   make  such   orders,  as  the circumstances of the case may require.      The appellants  in the appeal who were acquitted by the Sessions Court  had been convicted and sentenced by the High Court and  awarded life  imprisonment under s. 302 read with s. 149 IPC.      When their  appeal under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 was listed for preliminary hearing  under Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 it was contended (1) that the said provision  empowering   the  court  to  dismiss  the  appeal summarily was ultra vires the Enlargement Act, 1970, (2) the power of  the Supreme Court to frame rules under Art. 145 of the Constitution  can   not be  extended to annul the rights

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conferred under  an Act of Parliament and (3) that an appeal under  the   Enlargement  Act,   1970  cannot  be  dismissed summarily without  calling for  the records, ordering notice to the State and without giving reasons. ^      HELD:      (Per Krishna Iyer, Shinghal & Desai, JJ.)      1. Article  134(1)(c) spells  a measure  of seriousness because the  High Court  which has  heard the case certifies that it  involves questions  of such moment that the Supreme Court itself  must resolve them. To dispose of such a matter by a preliminary healing is to cast a reflection on the High Court’s  capacity   to  understand   the  seriousness  of  a certification. [1095 D-E]      2. Article  136  vests  a  plenary  discretion  in  the Supreme Court  to deign  or decline to grant leave to appeal against any conviction or sentence. Before deciding to grant or reject such Leave the court accords an oral hearing after 1086 perusing all the papers produced. Once leave is granted, the appeal is heard, after notice to the state, in full panoply. After leave,  the  appeal  is  born.  Then  it  ripens  into fullness and  is disposed of when both sides are present. No appeal after  leave, is  dismissed summarily or ex-parte. If Art. 136  gives a  discretionary power  to  grant  leave  to appeal or  to dismiss  in limine,  after an ex-parte hearing (or after issue of notice if the court so chooses), Art. 134 which gives  a constitutional  right to  appeal as  it were, must stand  on a higher footing lest the Constitution makers be held to have essayed in supererogation. [1095G-1096A]      3. There  is much more ’hearing’ content in an absolute appellate right than in a precarious ’special leave’ motion. Jurisprudentially, a  right is  large than a permission. Art 134 puts  the momentous  class of cases covered by it beyond the  discretionary  compass  of  Art.  136  and  within  the compulsory area  of full  hearing such  as would follow upon leave being  granted under  Art. 136(1).  A full hearing may not obligate  dragging the  opposite side to court involving expense and  delay. Fullness  of hearing of the proponent is not incompatible with non-hearing of the opponent when after appreciating all that could be urged in support of the cause there is  no need felt to call upon the other side, as where the proposition  is groundless, frivolous or not prima facie statable. [1096B-D]      4. Article  134(2) empowers  Parliament to  expand  the jurisdiction of  the Supreme  Court  to  entertain  criminal appeals. In  exercise of  this power, Parliament enacted the Supreme   Court    (Enlargement   of    Criminal   Appellate Jurisdiction) Act,  1970  in  its  grave  concern  for  long incarceration being subject to great scrutiny at the highest level if  first inflicted,  by the  High Court.  A right  of appeal to  the Supreme Court was granted when the High Court has, for  the  first  time  sentenced  an  accused  to  life imprisonment or  to a term of or above ten years of rigorous imprisonment and  equated it  with that  granted under  Art. 134(1)(a) and (b). [1097G-1098D]      5. The nature of the appeal process cannot be cast in a rigid mould  as it  varies with  jurisdiction and systems of jurisprudence. Whatever  the  protean  forms  the  appellate process may  take, the goal is justice so that a disgruntled litigant cannot  convert his  right of  appeal into breaking down  the   court  system   by  sufferance  of  interminable submission after  several tribunals  have screened  his case and found  it fruitless.  The signification  of the right of appeal under Art. 134 is a part of the procedure established

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by law  for the  protection of  life and  personal  liberty. Nothing which will render this right illusory or its fortune chancy can  square with  the mandate  of Art.  21. [  1100H- 1101A, 1102F, 1103D, 1104H-1105A]      6. When the High Court trying a case sentences a man to death a higher court must examine the merits to satisfy that human life  shall  not  be  haltered  without  an  appellate review. A single right of appeal is more or less a universal requirement of  the guarantee  of life and liberty rooted in the conception  that men  are fallible,  that Judges are men and that  making assurance  doubly sure  before  irrevocable deprivation of  life or  liberty comes  to pass,  full-scale re-examination of  the facts and the law is made an integral part of fundamental! fairness or procedure. [1105C, E]       7. The life of the law is not perfection of theory but realisation of  justice in the concrete situation of a given system. It is common knowledge that 1087 a jail  appeal or  an appeal  filed through an advocate does not  contain   an  exhaustive   accompaniment  of   all  the evidentiary material  or record  of proceedings  laying bare legal errors in the judicial steps. It is not unusual that a fatal flaw  has been  discovered  by  the  appellate  judges leading to a total acquittal. Such a high jurisdiction as is vested by  Art. 134  calls for  an active examination by the judges and  such a  process will  be an ineffectual essay in the absence  of the  whole record.  A preliminary hearing is hardly of  any use  bearing in mind that what is being dealt with is an affirmation of death sentence for the first time. Section 366  of the Code requires the Court of Session which passes a  sentence of death to submit the proceedings to the High Court  and rulings  insist on  an independent appellate consideration of  the  matter  and  an  examination  of  all relevant material  evidence. The Supreme Court’s position is analogous,  and  independent  examination  of  materials  is impossible without the entire records being available. So it is reasonable that before hearing the appeal under Rule 15(1 ) (c)  of Order XXI, ordinarily the records are sent for and are available. Counsel’s assistance apart, the court it self must apply  its mind, the stakes being grave enough. [1105F- 1106B]      8. The  recording of  reasons is  usually regarded as a necessary requirement  of fair  decision. The  obligation to give reasons for decision when consequence of wrong Judgment is forfeiture  of life  or personal liberty for long periods needs no  emphasis, especially  when it  is a  first  appeal following upon  a heavy sentence imposed for the first time. The constraint  to record reasons secures in black and white what the Judge has in mind and gives satisfaction to him who is condemned  that what  he has had to say has not only been ’heard’ but  considered and  recorded. Art.  21 is a binding mandate against  blind justice.  In the narrow categories of cases covered  by Art.  134(1)(a) and (b) and s. 2(a) of the Enlargement Act, the subject matter is of sufficient gravity as to  justify the  recording of  reasons  in  the  ultimate order. [1160F-G, 1106H-1107A]      9. Protection  at the  third deck  by calling  for  the records or  launching on  long ratiocination  is a  waste of judicial time.  Our Rules  of Criminal Procedure provide for dismissal at  the  third  level  without  assigning  written reasons, not  because there  are no reasons, but because the tardy need  to document them hampers the hearing of the many cases in  the queue that press upon the time of the court at that level. [1107F]      10. Order  XXI,  Rule  15(1)(c)  of  the  Rules  in  an

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enabling  provision   not  a   compulsive  one.   Harmonious construction  of  Art.  134  and  Art.  145  ’leads  to  the conclusion that  the contemplated  rules are  mere machinery provisions. The  sequence is  simple.  The  formalities  for entertaining certain  types of  appeal ale  covered by  Art. 145(1)(d) the  manner of hearing and disposal is governed by Art. 145(1)(b)  and the substantive sweep of the appeal as a method of  redressal is  found in Art. 134. [1107G-H, 1108D, 1109A].      11. It  is daily  experience to  see judges on the high bench differ,  and a  fortiori so  in the field of sentence, This reality is projected in the context of full freedom for the first  appellate decider  of  facts  to  reach  his  own finding on  offence and  sentence,  only  to  highlight  how momentous  it   is-for  the   appellant  to  have  his  case considered by  the highest  court when  the Constitution and Parliament have  conferred a  full right  of appeal  Summary dismissal, save  in glaring  cases, may spell grave jeopardy to life-giving justice 1088 That is  why Order  XXI Rule  15(1)(c) while  it survives to weed out  worthless appeals, shall remain sheathed in extra- ordinary cases  where facts  on guilt  or the wider range of considerations on sentence are involved. [1109G-1110B]      12. Rule  15(1)(c) of  Order XXI  is general and covers all conceivable  cases under  Art. 134(1).  It  operates  in certain situations,  not in  every appeal. It merely removes an  apprehended   disability  of   the  court  in  summarily dismissing a  glaring case where its compulsive continuance, dragging the  opposite party,  calling up prolix records and expanding on  the reasons  for the  decision, will stall the work of  the court  (which is  an  institutional  injury  to social justice)  with  no  gain  to  anyone,  including  the appellant to  keep whom  in agonising  suspense for  long is itself an injustice. [1111C-D]      13. If every appeal under Art. 134(1) (a) and (b) or s. 2(a) of  the enlargement Act, where questions of law or fact are raised,  is set down for preliminary hearing and summary disposal, the  meaningful difference  between Art.  134  and Art. 136 may be judicially eroded and Parliament stultified. The minimum processual price of deprivation of precious life or prolonged  loss of  liberty  is  a  single  comprehensive appeal. To  be peevel  by this need is to offend against the fair play of the constitution. [1111H-1112B]      14. Upholding  the vires  of Order XXI Rule 15(1)(c) of the Supreme  Court Rules  and also  s. 384  of the  Criminal Procedure Code  the majority  however  held  that  in  their application both  the provisions  shall be restricted by the criteria set  out hereunder  ns a  permissible  exercise  in constitutionalisation of the provisions. [1112H]      15. Order  XXI Rules  15(1)(c) in  action does not mean that all  appeals falling within its fold shall be routinely disposed  of.  Such  a  course  obliterates  the  difference between Articles  134 and  136, between right and leave. The rule in cases of appeals under Art. 134(1)(a) and (b) and s. 2(a) is  notice, records  and reasons,  but the exception is preliminary hearing  on all  such materials as may be placed by the  appellant and  brief  grounds  for  dismissal.  This exceptional category  is where,  in all conscience, there is no point at all. In cases of real doubt the benefit of doubt goes to  the appellant and notice goes to the adversary even if the  chances of  allowance of  the appeal  be not bright. [113A-C]      [With a  view to  invest clarity  and avoid  ambiguity, Order XXI Rule 15(1)(c) may be suitably modified.]

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    Maneka Gandhi  v. Union  of India,  [1978] 1  SCC  248; Presidential Ref. No. 1 of 1978 [1979] 2 SCR 476; Wiseman v. Barneman, [1971] AC 297; Russel v. Duke of Norfolk, 11949] 1 All. ER  109, Ponnamma  v. Arumogam,  [1905] AC  at p.  390; Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, [1905] AC 369; Newman v. Klausner, [1922] 1 KB 228; referred to.      Black’s Law  Dictionary  4th  Edn.  p.  1368,  Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary,  3rd Edn.  Vol. 1, pp. 160-161; Current Legal Problems  1958 Vol.  11 p.  194, Law  Quarterly Review Vol. 71,  1955 p.  410-11. The  Judicial Process by Henry J. Abraham, 1962 pp. 159-160; referred to. 1089      Per Kailasam & Koshal, JJ. (dissenting)      1. Article 145 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court  subject   to  the  provisions  of  any  law  made  by Parliament with  the approval of the President to make rules from time  to time for regulating generally the practice and procedure of the court. [1116B]      2. Article  134 confers  appellate jurisdiction  on the Supreme Court  in regard  to criminal  matters, and while an unrestricted right  of appeal  is provided  to  the  Supreme Court under  clauses (a) and (b) an appeal under such clause (c) is  provided only when the case is certified by the High Court as a fit one for appeal. Further, an appeal under sub- clause (c)  shall lie  subject to  such provisions as may be made in that behalf under clause (1) of Art. 145 and to such conditions as  the  High  Court  may  establish  or  require [1116D-1117B]      3. The Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) . Act, 1970 has conferred on the Supreme Court further power  to entertain  and hear appeals than conferred on it  under Art.  134(1)(a) and (b) as provided for in Art. 134(2) of the Constitution. [1117C]      4. Article 145(1)(b) enables the Supreme Court to frame rules as  to procedure for hearing appeals. Rule 15 of under XXI provides  for the  procedure for  hearing appeals and is valid so far as to the procedure of hearing appeals. [1117D- E, 1118C]      5. While  s. 374  confers a right of appeal, s. 375 and s. 376  restrict such  a right.  Section 384  prescribes the procedure for  hearing appeals enabling the court to dismiss certain appeals  summarily and  to deal with others under s. 385 if they are not summarily dismissed. The right of appeal conferred can  be curtailed  by procedure as envisaged in s. 384 Cr.  P.C. Or  Rule 15  order XXI  of the  Supreme  Court Rules. [1120D]      6. An appeal to the Supreme Court under s. 374 Cr. P.C. is restricted  by the  provisions of  s. 375  and s. 376 and could be  dealt with  summarily under  s. 384  Cr.  P.C.  An appeal to  the Supreme  Court  is  subject  to  the  several provisions of the Cr. P.C. including the provisions relating to summary disposal of the appeals. [1120E-F, G]      7. The  powers and  the jurisdiction  of the  appellate court as  prescribed by  the Criminal Procedure Code and the rule cannot  be said  to deny  a right  of  hearing  to  the appellant. The  right to  be heard in an appeal is regulated be statute. After a full trial the judgment is rendered by a High Judicial  Officer such  as a  Sessions Judge  or a High Court Judge.  The appellate court has before it the Judgment of the  lower court  and the  petition for  appeal.  At  the preliminary hearing  the appellant  or his  pleader is heard before the  court decides  to dismiss  the appeal summarily. The power  to summarily dismiss an appeal is conferred under the Criminal Procedure Code when the court is satisfied that there are  no sufficient  grounds for  interfering with  the

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judgment appealed  against. This  decision is  taken by  the appellate court  being the  Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court of Sessions,  the High  Court or  the Supreme  Court. In the case of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and Court of Sessions, reasons should be recorded for summarily dismissal. The High Court and  the Supreme  Court need  not record  reasons  for summarily dismissing  the appeal.  It is  necessary that the Supreme Court  or the  High Court  should be  satisfied that there  are   not  sufficient  ground  for  interfering.  The conclusion is arrived at after hear- 1090 ing the  appellant, examining  the judgment and the petition for appeal.  The appellate  court is  discharging an onerous duty in  dismissing a  case summarily. The Code provides for calling for  the records  before dismissing  an  appeal.  In cases where an appellant is sentenced to death, imprisonment for life  or long  term of  imprisonment, it  is the bounden duty of  the appellate  court to hear the appellant, examine the petition  of appeal  and copy  of the  judgment appealed against. If  it feels  necessary to  call for the records of the case,  it is  duty to  call for  the records and examine them, before  coming to  the conclusion  that there  are not sufficient grounds for interfering. It is the responsibility of the  appellate authority  to order  notice and  hear  the other  side  if  it  is  not  satisfied  that  there  be  no sufficient grounds  for interfering.  Equally it is the duty of the appellate court to dismiss the appeal summarily if it i.e satisfied  that there  are  no  sufficient  grounds  for interfering is  duty is  imposed for  regulating the work of the  courts   for   otherwise   judicial   time   would   be unnecessarily spent.  Taking into  account the fact that the duty to  decide the  question where  there are no sufficient grounds for  interfering is placed on highly placed judicial officers after  affording a due hearing, it cannot be stated that the very right of appeal bas been taken away. [1122E-F, 1122H-1123F]      8. The procedure contemplated in Rules 13, 14 and 15 of the Supreme Court Rules are almost similar to the provisions of the  Code of Criminal Procedure relating to appeal. In an appeal sent  by the  appellant from  jail he  is entitled to send any written arguments which he may desire to advance in support of his appeal. The Court in proper cases in which it considers it  desirable would  engage an advocate to present the case  of the  appellant in  jail. The mere fact that the appellant in jail is not being heard in person or through an advocate would  not mean that the appeal is not being heard. The court  peruses the  judgment, petition of appeal and the written arguments,  if any, before proceeding to take action under Rule  15. This  Court being  the highest  court is not required to  give reasons  but is  expected  to  bestow  the greatest care in exercising the power of summary dismissal under Rule 15. [1124G-1125A]      P.K. Mittra  v. State  of West  Bengal, [1959] SUPPL. I SCR 63; Shankar Kerba Yadhav v. State of Maharashtra, [1970] 2 SCR  227; Minakshi  v.  Subramanya,  14  IA  168;  Govinda Kadtuji Kadam  v. State  of Maharashtra,  [1970] 1  SCC 469; referred to.      Maneka Gandhi  v. Union  of India,  [1978] 2  SCR  621; distinguished.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal  No. 264 of 1978.

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    Appeal from  the Judgment  and Order dated 31-3-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 597/76.      A.N. Mulla and S.K. Jain for the Appellant.      O.P. Rana for the Respondent.      The Judgment of V.R. Krishna Iyer, P.N. Shinghal and D. A. Desai JJ. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J.P.S. Kailasam, J. gave  a dissenting opinion on behalf of himself and A. D. Koshal, J. 1091      KRISHNA IYER,  J.-Exordially speaking,  the  point  for decision is short but its legal import and human portent are deep,  sounding   in  constitutional   values  and  meriting incisive examination. Where the question wears a simple look but its  answer strikes  at life and liberty we must proceed on the inarticulate major premise of human law as the solemn delivery system  of human  justice.  In  formal  terms,  the problem to be resolved is the vires of Order XXI, Rule 15(1) (c) of  the Supreme  Court Rules (the Rules, for short), but in juristic  terms it  turns on  the  inflexible  stages  as against its  facultative facets of an appellate hearing when it is  a first  appear against  a  death  sentence  or  life imprisonment. More particularly, is an appeal to the Supreme Court falling  within  the  scope  of  Art.  134(1)  or  the enlarged jurisdiction  permitted by  Art. 134(2)  liable  to shorthand hearing  and peril  of  summary  dismissal?  Brevi manu, the  appellant urges that Art. 134 of the Constitution compels this  Court to  hear and dispose of criminal appeals of the  grave categories covered by it, not exparte as Order XXI Rule  15(1) (c) of the Rules permits but in extenso, and only after  notice to  the State  and with the record of the case before it. Therefore, the Rule is bad.      Any legal  issue of  profound impact,  if  regarded  by Judges literally  and not  creatively, may  be  given  short shrift,  especially   if  counsel  is  more  assertive  than explorative, produces  more heat  than light and the text to be interpreted  lends itself to one sense on the surface and another in  the deeper  layers. But when the consequences of the construction  can be  calamitous and  the subject-matter involves the-right to life and long loss of liberty, a final court, like  ours, must  reflect on the meaning of meanings, the human  values which  illumine our  legal system  and the ends of  justice the  means of law must serve. The heart and the head interact and  interpret.      A thumb-nail  sketch of  the sequence  of facts  may be necessary to  get a  hang of  the constitutional core of the case.  Several   persons,  including  the  appellants,  were accused of  murder  and  other  violent  offences  but  were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. The State carried an appeal to the  High Court  against the  acquittal  of  all  the  18 accused persons.  In an  elaborate judgment  the ‘High Court found  the  case  of  the  prosecution  proved  although  it confirmed the  acquittal  of  quite  a  few.  The  convicted accused, 12  in number, were awarded life imprisonment under s. 302  read  with  s.  149,  I.P.C.  and  lesser  terms  of imprisonment for  other offences.  Thereupon  the  convicted appellants preferred  an appeal  to this Court under s. 2(a) of the  Supreme Court  (Enlargement  of  Criminal  Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, 1092 (for short  the Enlargement Act). This appeal was listed for preliminary hearing  ex parte  under Rule  15(1)(c)  of  the Rules (as  amended in 1978). When the case was opened at the preliminary hearing  counsel for  the  appellants  contended that, as  an inalienable  - incident  of a statutory appeal, his clients  were entitled  to a  full fledged hearing after

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notice to  the State  and not an abbreviated disposal in the shape of  a preliminary  hearing, however  long that hearing might be. Thereupon, the court passed the following order:           "The appellants have challenged the constitutional      validity of  clause (c)  of sub-rule  (1) of rule 15 of      order XXI  of the Supreme Court Rules, which enables an      appeal of  the kind  with which we are concerned, to be      placed for  hearing exparte  before the  Court  for  ad      mission. In  that view  of the  matter, we  think  that      unless the  question of  the constitutional validity of      the rule  is 1  decided, we  cannot have  a preliminary      hearing of  this appeal for admission. Let the records,      therefore, be  placed  before  the  Hon’ble  the  Chief      Justice for  giving such  directions as he may deem fit      and proper." This Bench  has come  to  be  seized  of  the  case  in  the constitutional setting.  Such is  the scenario, the last and most crucial  stage of  ’ which  is the  hearing before this Constitution Bench.      A little  elucidation of  the legal  matrix  which  has given rise  to the contentions may be useful. This Court has jurisdiction over  a wide range and long reach of litigation under Art.  136 of the Constitution which includes the power to grant  leave to appeal in criminal matters. But this is a discretionary  jurisdiction   with  drastic   self   imposed limitations rarely realised by the gambling litigant and has hardly  any   semblance  of  an  absolute  right  of  appeal necessarily fol  lowed by  a full debate after notice to the adversary. But  a segment of criminal cases, standing out as a deadly category is, however, dealt with separately by Art. 134. In a short-hand form, sub-clause (1) clothes an accused person, who  has been  acquitted  by  the  trial  court  but sentenced to death at the appellate level, or has been tried by the  High Court  by withdrawal of the case from any other court subordinate  to it  and in such trial has been visited with death  sentence, or  has secured a certificate that his case is of such great moment as to qualify for pronouncement by the  Supreme  Court,  with  a  right-  shall  we  say,  a constitutional right-of  appeal to  this Court.  More  over, under clause (2) of this Article, Parliament may make law 1093 for conferring  a statutory right of appeal on other classes of convicts. A Pursuant to this power Parliament has enacted the  Supreme   Court  (Enlargement   of  Criminal  Appellate Jurisdiction) Act,  1970, whereby  persons acquitted  by the trial court  but awarded  imprisonment l‘or life, or for ten years and more, enjoy a statutory right of appeal.      The proviso  to Article  134(1) enables  this Court  to make provisions  subject to  which appeals  under sub-clause (c) of  Article 134  shall lie.  These provisions  are to be made under  clause (1) (d) of Article 145 which, in specific terms, deals  with rules  as to the entertainment of appeals under sub-clause-  (c) of  clause (1) of Article 134. We are not  concerned   with  these   rules  which  relate  to  the entertainment of  appeals or provisions subject to which the appeal may be instituted and do not trench upon the right of appeal or  the manner  of hearing.  But Article  145(1)  (b) enables the  Supreme Court to make, rules, inter alia, as to the procedure  for hearing  appeals. One  such rule is Order XXI Rule  15 which warrants preliminary hearing and disposal of all  categories of appeals covered by Article 134(2). The fate of  the present  appeal hung  in the  balance at such a preliminary hearing  and counsel challenged the vires of the rule itself. In its wake has come the present hearing.      This sets  the stage  for a more comprehensive approach

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to the  constitutional problems arising in the case. We must make i  clear that  we are  not concerned with the merits of the appeal at all but are confined to a consideration of the validity of the impugned rule. If we hold that the said rule is ultra  vires and  further hold  that  there  shall  be  a regular, full-dress  hearing of  the  appeal  a  preliminary hearing will  be obviated and notice in the appeal will have to  go   to  the  State.  It  requires  to  be  specifically mentioned, although there is no hint about its advertence at the earlier  preliminary hearing that the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973  has  a  fasciculus  of  provisions  relating  to appeals, the  manner of  their hearing and the procedure for their disposal,  which is  comprehensive enough to cover the present  category  embraced  by  Order  XXI  Rule  15(l)(c). Therefore, the effect of the Sections in the Code hearing on the issue  under discussion  may also  have  to  be  studied before we finally pronounce on the legality Or a preliminary hearing  in  a  criminal  appeal  filed  in  exercise  of  a constitutional or statutory right.      Our consideration  falls into  two chapters as it were, the first  and more  important turning on the constitutional provisions vis-a-vis  Order XXI  Rule (l)(c)  and the second turning on  the construction  and impact of s. 384, Cr. P.C. Taking up the constitutional 1094 aspects first,  we may  proceed to  state, right  away,  the complex of  provisions relevant  to the  discussion and  the perspective in which we must read their message.      Art. 134 of the Constitution confers criminal appellate jurisdiction on this Court:           134. Appellate  jurisdiction of  Supreme Court  in      regard to criminal matters.-           (1)  An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from      any judgment,  final order  or sentence  in a  criminal      proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if      the High Court-           (a)   has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal                of an  accused person  and sentenced  him  to                death; or           (b)  has withdrawn  for trial  before  itself  any                case  from   any  court  subordinate  to  its                authority and has in such trial convicted the                accused person and sentenced him to death: or           (c)  certifies that  the case  is a  fit  one  for                appeal to the Supreme Court:      Provided that  an appeal under sub-clause (c) shall lie      subject to  such provisions  as may  be  made  in  that      behalf under  clause (1)  of Article  145 and  to  such      conditions as the High Court may establish or require.           (2 ) Parliament may  by law  confer on the Supreme      Court any  further powers to entertain and hear appeals      from  any  judgment,  final  order  or  sentence  in  a      criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of      India subject to such conditions and limitations as may      be specified in such law      No argument  is needed  to realise  the gravity  of the subject cover  ed by  the first  two clauses  of the article death sentence  for the  first time  or in  reversal  of  an acquittal. Human  life is  too dear  to be  deprived of by a death sentence  without so much as a single appeal after its award. Our  founding faith  in  human  rights  is  the  only warrant for  the entrustment  of this appellate jurisdiction on the  Supreme Court  which is  far removed  from the trial court and  is intercepted  by the  High Court,  an  elevated tribunal manned  by judges  of proven  calibre. The symbolic

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meaning is obvious. Life is no matter for easy despatch even by the judicial process and a serious second 1095 look is  the minimum  that the  State owes  to  the  citizen before his  gallowed farewell.  To truncate  the fullness of appellate scrutiny  into  ex  parte  disposals  despite  the deliberate insertion  by the  framers of the Constitution of an express  provision, by  a  procedural  knife,  may  often frustrate their  profound concern. Judicial professionalism, at higher  level, is particularly conscientious and careful; but all  professionalism suffers, by custom, from scelerosis in practice.  And so, n full-scale hearing in a first appeal is the  fair insistence of the Constitution when the risk is to precious life.      We are  aware that  the disposal  of appeals  involving death penalty  receives anxious  concern and deep reflection on the  part of  judges. We  are conscious  that  the  grave stakes  forbid   judges  from   dismissing  appeals  without satisfying themselves  against error. But human limitations, perfunctoriness  of  counsel,  oversight  of  some  material hardly highlighted  in the  judgment under  appeal  and  the misfortune that  ex parte  examination dulls attention while debate at the bar sparks mental plugs-these too are realities.      Likewise,  Art.   134  (1)  (c)  spells  a  measure  of seriousness because  the High Court which has heard the case certifies solemnly that it involves questions of such moment that the  Supreme Court itself must resolve them. To dispose of such  a matter  by a  preliminary hearing  is to  cast  a reflection on  the High  Court’s capacity  to understand the seriousness of a certification.      Now it is relevant to read Art. 136(1).      136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court           (1)  Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the                Supreme Court  may, in  its discretion  grant                special leave  to appeal  from any  judgment,                decree, determination,  sentence or  order in                any cause  or matter  passed or  made by  any                court or tribunal in the territory of India.      A plenary  discretion vests  in the  Supreme  Court  to deign or  decline to  grant  leave  to  appeal  against  any conviction or  sentence. Before  deciding to grant or reject such leave  the court accords an oral hearing after perusing all the  papers produced.  Once leave  is granted, is heard, after notice to the State, in full panoply. After leave, the appeal is born. Then it ripens into fullness and is disposed of when  both sides  are present. No appeal, after leave, is dismissed summarily  or ex parte. The relevance (If Art. 136 in an  examination of  Art. 134 is this. If Art. 136 gives a discretionary power to grant 1096 leave to  appeal or  to dismiss in limine, after an ex parte hearing (or  after issue of notice if the court so chooses), Art. 134,  which gives  a constitutional right to appeal, as it  were,   must  stand   on  a   higher  footing  lest  the Constitution-makers   be    held   to    have   essayed   in supererogation. Surely, there is much more ’hearing’ content in an absolute appellate right than in a precarious ’special leave’ motion.  Jurisprudentially, a  right is larger than a permission. What  is irresistible  is that Art. 134 puts the momentous  class   of  cases   covered  by   it  beyond  the discretionary compass  of Art. 136 and within the compulsory area of  full hearing  such as would follow upon leave being granted under  Art. 136(1).  But this  is not the end of the journey. For,  a full  hearing may not obligate dragging the

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opposite side to court involving expense and delay. Fullness of hearing  of the  proponent is  not incompatible with non- hearing of  the opponent  where after  appreciating all that could be urged in support of the cause there is no need felt to call  upon the  other side,  as where  the proposition is groundless, frivolous or not prima facie statable. The ambit of  appellate  hearing  may  have  to  be  explored  in  the constitutional context to which we will advert later.      The next  step necessitates setting out, as an integral part of the comprehensive picture, Art. 145:      145. Rules of Court, etc.-           (1) Subject  to the  provisions of any law made by      Parliament, the  Supreme Court  may from  time to time,      with the  approval of  the President,  make  rules  for      regulating generally  the practice and procedure of the      Court including:           (a) ..........           (b)  rules as to the procedure for hearing appeals                and  other   matters  pertaining  to  appeals                including the  time within  which appeals  to                the Court are to l-e entered;           (c)  .......           (cc) .......           (d)  rules as  to  the  entertainment  of  appeals                under s  clause (c)  or clause (l) of article                134;           (e)  .......           (i)  .......           (g)  ....... 1097           (h)  .......           (i)  rules providing for the summary determination                of appeal  which appears  to the  Court to be                frivolous or  vexatious or  brought  for  the                purpose of delay;           (j)  .......      This Court  has framed  rules under  this article.  The pertinent rule,  which is  impugned as  ultra vires is Order XXI Rule 15(1) (c) which may usefully be read here:           15.  (1).   The  petition   of  appeal   shall  be      registered and  numbered as  soon as it is lodged. Each      of  the  following  categories  of  appeals,  on  being      registered, shall be put up for hearing ex parte before      the Court  which may  either dismiss  it  summarily  or      direct issue  of notice to all necessary parties or may      make such  orders, as the circumstances of the case may      require, namely:-           (a)  ........           (b)  .........           (c)  an appeal  under sub-clause (a) or sub clause                (b) of  clause (1)  of  article  134  of  the                Constitution,  or  under  the  Supreme  Court                (Enlargement    of     Criminal     Appellate                Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 (28 of 1970) or under                section  379   of  the   Code   of   Criminal                Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).      Plainly, this  rule clothes  the court  with  power  to shorten the  life of  an appeal  even under  Article 134  by dismissing it  ex-parte,  summarily.  Is  this  abbreviatory power absonent  with the  appellate scheme envisaged in Art. 134 and,  therefor, excessive  or offensive and void ? Or is the rule valid because it does not bear upon the substantive right of appeal but relates to the procedure for hearing and fall squarely  within Art. 145(1)(b) ? This is the main crux of the debate.

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    It  would   be  noticed   that  Art.   134(2)  empowers Parliament to  expand the  jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain  criminal appeals.  Parliament, in  exercise of this  power,  enacted  the  Supreme  Court  (Enlargement  of Criminal Appellate  Jurisdiction) Act,  1970 (for short, the Enlargement Act). The relevant section (sec. 2) states: H           2.  Enlarged  appellate  jurisdiction  of  Supreme      Court in  regard to criminal matters.-Without prejudice      to the powers 1098      conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) of Act 134      of the Constitution, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme      Court from  any judgment,  final order or sentence in a      criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of      India if the High Court-           (a)  has on  appeal reversed an order of acquittal                of an  accused person  and sentenced  him  to                imprisonment for  life or to imprisonment for                a period of not less than tell years;           (b)  has withdrawn  for trial  before  itself  any                case  from   any  Court  subordinate  to  its                authority and has in such trial convicted the                accused   person   and   sentenced   him   to                imprisonment for  life or to imprisonment for                a period of not less than ten years.      Thus a right to appeal to the Supreme Court is given to convicts whom  the  High  Court  has,  for  the  first  time sentenced to  life imprisonment or to a term of or above ten years of  rigorous imprisonment.  There  is  no  doubt  that Parliament, in  its grave  concern  for  long  incarceration being subject  to great  scrutiny at  the highest  level  if first inflicted by the High Court, granted a right of appeal in such  cases and  equated it  with that granted under Art. 134(1)(a) and  (b). So  what applies to death sentence cases applies to  life term  cases too  and this  must be borne in mind in  the interpretative process. This emphatic import is clear once  we excerpt  the relevant part of the Objects and Reasons:           "While sub-clauses  (a) and  (b) of Art. 134(1) of      the Constitution  confer upon  the accused  an absolute      right of appeal, clause (c) confers upon the High Court      a discretion  to grant, a certificate to the accused to      appeal in  cases not  falling under sub-clauses (a) and      (b). The  grant of certificate under Art. 134(1) (c) is      not a matter of course. The certificate is granted only      where there  has been  an infringement of the essential      principles of  justice or there is substantial question      of law or principle involved; in short the certificate,      would not  be granted  unless there are exceptional and      special circumstances.  The Supreme Court has also held      that the  conditions pre-requisite  for the exercise af      the discretionary  power to  grant a  certificate under      Art. 134  (1) (c) cannot be precisely formulated but it      should be  exercised sparingly  and not  to convert the      Supreme  Court  into  an  ordinary  court  of  criminal      appeal. 1099           An accused  person has no absolute right of appeal      even A  in circumstances  mentioned in  clauses (a) and      (b) of  Art. 134(1)  if the High Court sentences him to      life imprisonment  or imprisonment of 10 or more years.      In such  a case his appeal would be admitted in special      and exceptional  cir cumstances  only either under Art.      134(1) (c) or Art. 136 of the Constitution.           *              *              *         *

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         It is  therefore proposed to enlarge the appellate      jurisdiction of  the Supreme  Court  empowering  it  to      entertain and  hear appeals  also in cases mentioned in      sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (2) of the Bill." What is created is an unconditional right of appeal, nothing less and wider than is enjoyed under Art. 136.      We have  stated at  the outset  that  for  satisfactory understanding of  the  problem  and  its  solution,  certain provisions of  the Criminal  Procedure Code  which cover the same ground  need to  be dealt  with. We will advert to them briefly  here   conscious  that   the   crucial   issue   is constitutional. The  Code cannot  control or  contradict the Constitution as  the stream  cannot  rise  higher  than  the source. The provisions of the Code, invaluable as canalising the exercise of the appellate power, must be informed by and be subservient  to the  normative import  of the Supreme Lex lest they run aground and be wrecked.      Chapter XXIX  deals with  appeals. Taking cognizance of the Enlargement  Act the  Code has  enacted Sec.  374(1) and Sec.  379   which,   perhaps,   are   redundant   save   for completeness. These are new provisions not found in the Code of 1898 and may be reproduced:           374(1). Any  person convicted on a trial held by a      High Court  in  its  extra-ordinary  original  criminal      jurisdiction may appeal to the Supreme Court.           379. Where the High Court has, on appeal, reversed      an  order   of  acquittal  of  an  accused  person  and      convicted  him   and  sentenced  him  to  death  or  to      imprisonment for  life or to imprisonment for a term of      ten years or more. he may appeal to the Supreme Court.      Section 384  is significant  because it  has a decisive bearing on  the State  of appeals  like  the  present.  This Section is in part a mechanical or meaningful?) reproduction of the corresponding provision(s. 421) in the vintage Code. 1100      A casual  persual discloses  that s.  384 is an omnibus provision embracing  all appeals,  big and  small, grave and goofy, involving  a petty  fine or inflicting, for the first time, a  hanging sentence. And regardless of the stakes, the appellate court  is given the pervasive power to dismiss the appeal summarily,  and worse,  even without  calling for the record of  the case and without recording its reasons if the Court is higher than the Court of Session. At first blush, a blanket power to dismiss summarily, ex parte, sans record of the case,  sans record  of reasons,  even where an acquitted accused is sentenced to death for the first time by the High Court, is  neither  human  law  nor  human  justice  if  our jurisprudence is  sensitized by the humanity of the Preamble to the  Constitution or responsive to the vibrant commitment to civilized  values. Petrified  print processed through the legislative mint becomes living law when, and only when, its text is  tuned to  the humane  note of  the Constitution. We will dwell  on the harmonics of the Constitution first since the fundamental note must emanate from it. I)      The question  then is  whether  a  statutory  right  of appeal necessarily  spells the  full unfoldment of notice to the respondent,  sending  for  the  records  and  record  of reasons by  a speaking  judgment. If  the answer  is in  the affirmative the  survival of  Order XXI  Rule 15(1)  (c)  is perilous. Reaching  the same  result by resort to artificial respiration from  s. 384  may have  to  be  considered.  But anticipating our  conclusion to  avoid suspense,  we sustain both the  provisions by  reading down their scope, substance and intendment.      The appellants  have an undeniable right of appeal; but

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what are  the necessary  components of a hearing when such a right is exercised ?      Counsel for  the appellant  insisted that  an  absolute right of  appeal, as  he described  it, casts  an inflexible obligation on  the court to send For the record of the case, to hear  both parties,  and to  make  a  reasoned  judgment. Therefore, to  scuttle the  appeal by a summary hearing on a preliminary posting,  absent record,  ex parte  and absolved from giving reasons is to be; absolutist-a position absonant with the  mandate of the Enlargement Act and, indeed, of the Constitution in  Article 134  (1) . Counsel’s ipse dixit did not convince  us but  we have  pondered over  the  issue  in depth" being disinclined summarily to dismiss.      At the threshold, we have to delineate the amplitude of an appeal,  not   in abstract  terms  but  in  the  concrete context of  Article 134  read with Article 145 and order XXI Rule 15 and s. 384 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The nature of the appeal process cannot be cast in 1101 a rigid mould as it varies with jurisdictions and systems of jurisprudence. This  point has  been brought  out sharply in "Final Appeal. "The learned authors ask :           "But what  does ’appeal’  really mean : indeed, is      it a  meaningful term  at all  in any universal sense ?      The word  is in fact merely a term of convenient usage,      part of  a system of linguistic shorthand which accepts      the need  for a  penumbra of  uncertainty in  order  to      achieve universal comprehensibility at a very low level      of exactitude.  Thus, while  ’appeal’ is a generic term      broadly meaningful  to  all  lawyers  in  describing  a      feature common  to a  wide range  of legal  systems, it      would be  misleading to impute a precise meaning to the      term, or  to assume,  on the  grounds that the word (or      its translated  equivalent) has international currency,      that the concept of an appeal means the same thing in a      wide range of systems.      On any  orthodox definition,  an appeal  includes three basic elements:  a decision (usually the judgment of a court or the  ruling of  an administrative  body)  from  which  an appeal is  made;  a  person  or  persons  aggrieved  by  the decision (who is often, though by no means necessarily party to the  original proceedings) and a reviewing body ready and willing to entertain the appeal."      The elasticity  of the idea is illumined by yet another passage which bears quotation:           "’Appeals’ can  be arranged  along a  continuum of      increasingly  formalised   procedure,  ranging  from  a      concerned man  in supplication  before his tribal chief      to  something  as  jurisprudentially  sophisticated  as      appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United      States. Like  Aneurin Bevan’s  elephant an  appeal  can      only be  described when it walks through the court room      door..... The nature of a particular appellate process-      indeed the  character of an entire legal system-depends      upon a  multiplicity  of  interrelated  though  largely      imponderable) factors  operating within the system. The      structure of  the courts;  the status  and  rule  (both      objectively and  subjectively perceived)  of judges and      lawyers, the form of law itself-whether, for example it      is derived from a code or 1102      from  judicial   precedent  modified  by  statute;  the      attitude of  the courts  to the  authority  of  decided      cases; the  political and  administrative structure  of      the country  concerned-whether for example its internal

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    sovereignty  is   limited  by   its  allegience   to  a      colonizing power.  The  list  of  possible  factors  is      endless, and  their weight  and function  in the social      equation defy precise analysis." In short,  we agree  in principle  with the  sum-up  of  the concept made by the author:           "Appeal, as  we have  stressed, covers a multitude      of jurisprudential  ideas. The  layman’s expectation of      an appeal  is very  often quite  different from that of      the lawyer  and many  an aggrieved plaintiff denied his      ’just’ remedy  by judge  or  jury  has  come  upon  the      disturbing reality  that in  England a  finding of fact      can seldom,  if ever,  form the  basis  of  an  appeal.      Similarly,  a   Frenchman  accustomed   to  a  narrowly      legalistic appeal  in cessation,  subject to subsequent      reargument  in   a  court   below,  would  find  little      familiarity in  the ponderous  finality of the judgment      of the House of Lords. And a seventeenth-century lawyer      accustomed to a painstaking search for trivial mistakes      in the  court record,  which formed  the basis  of  the      appeal by  writ of  error, would  be bewildered  by the      great flexibility  and increased  sophistication  of  a      jurisprudential’ argument  which characterize  a modern      appeal."      Whatever the  protean forms  the appellate  process may take, the  goal is  justice so  that a  disgruntled litigant cannot convert  his right  of appeal  into a bull in a china shop  breaking  down  the  court  system  by  sufferance  of interminable  submissions   after  several   tribunals  have screened his case and found it fruitless.      This throws us back to a definitional evaluation of the precise content  of ’appeal’  in the specific constitutional perspective  and  statutory  setting.  Once  we  accept  the liquidity of the appellate concept we are logically led into a study of the imperatives of ’appeal’ within the meaning of Art. 134.  Since the  right conferred by the Enlargement Act has its source in Art. 134(2) it is fair to attribute common features to  the  constitutional  and  statutory  rights  of appeal in  the criminal  specialities covered  by Order  XXI Rule 15(1)  (c). The  key question  is whether  a  right  of appeal casts  an inexorable  obligation on the Supreme Court not merely  to hear the appellant at a preliminary stage but proceed invariably  to issue notice to the opposite side and hear him  too. Another  bone  of  contention  turns  on  the compulsion to consider the appeal only 1103 after receiving  the records  in the  case  from  the  court below.  The  core  controversy  involves  a  third  element, namely, the  inevitable necessity  to state  reasons for the conclusions, as distinguished from the extinguishment of the proceedings with  the utmost  verbal economy by the use of a single word  ’dismissed’.  These  triune  facets  cannot  be judged  in   vacuo  but   informed  by  the  grim  realities surrounding the  disposal.  Human  jurisprudence  is  not  a brooding omnipotence in the sky, but a normative science and technology dealing  with the  work, wealth  and happiness of mankind as  well as  its blood,  toils, tears and sweat. The higher   the    consciousness   of   the   law,   especially constitutional law,  the deeper the concern for the worth of the human person that our legal culture, since Independence, has manifested;  and the  gravity of the consequences of the decision in  appeal on  life itself invests the concept with some essential features.      It is just as well that we remind ourselves of a value- setter here.  Life and  liberty have  been the  cynosure  of

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special constitutional  attention in  Art.  21,  the  fuller implications whereof have been unrevelled in Maneka Gandhi’s case(1). When  we read  the signification  of the  right  of appeal under  Art. 134 we must remember that it is a part of the procedure  established by law for the protection of life and personal  liberty. Surely,  law, in  this setting,  is a pregnant expression.  Bhagwati, J.  in Maneka Gandhi (supra) stated the  position emphatically  and since then this Court has followed  that prescription  and even  developed  it  in humane directions  a striking example of which is the recent judgment in Presidention Reference No. 1 of 1978.(2) "Is the prescription of  some sort  of procedure  enough or must the procedure comply  with any  particular requirements ?"  asks Bhagwati,  J.   in  the   leading  opinion,   and   answers: "Obviously, the  procedure cannot  be arbitrary,  unfair  or unreasonable"...."The  principle  of  reasonableness,  which legally as  well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality  or non-arbitrariness  pervades Art.  14 like  a brooding omnipresence  and  the  procedure  contemplated  by Article 21  must answer  the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Art. 14. It must be "right and just and  fair"   and  not  arbitrary,  fanciful  or  oppressive; otherwise,  it   would  be  no  procedure  at  all  and  the requirement of Art. 21 would not be satisfied." Holding that natural  justice   was   part   of   Indian   Constitutional jurisprudence the learned Judge quoted Lord Morris of Borth- y-Gest in Wiseman v. Barneman : (3) 1104           "....  that  the  conception  of  natural  justice      should at all stages guide those who discharge judicial      functions  is  not  merely  an  acceptable  but  is  an      essential part of the philosophy of the law."      Bhagwati, J,  brought out the essence of the concept of natural justice  as part  of reasonable  procedure  when  he observed:           "The core  of it  must, however,  remain,  namely,      that  the   person  affected  must  have  a  reasonable      opportunity of  being heard  and the  hearing must be a      genuine hearing  and  not  an  empty  public  relations      exercise. That  is  why  Tucker.  L.J.,  emphasised  in      Russel v. Duke of Norfolk(1) that "whatever standard of      natural justice  is adopted,  one essential is that the      person concerned  should have  a reasonable opportunity      of  presenting  his  case."  What  opportunity  may  be      regarded as  reasonable would necessarily depend on the      practical necessities  of the  situation. It  may be  a      sophisticated full-fledged  hearing  or  it  may  be  a      hearing which is very brief and minimal." One of  us (Krishna  Iyer,  J)  emphasised  the  fundamental fairness required  by Article  21 in every law that abridges life or liberty:           "Procedure established  by law,  with  its  lethal      potentiality,  will   reduce  life  and  liberty  to  a      precarious plaything  if we do not ex necessiate import      into those  weighty words  an adjectival  rule of  law,      civilised in  its soul,  fair in  its heart  and fixing      those imperatives of procedural protection absent which      the processual  tail will wag the substantive head ....      An enacted  apparition is  a  constitutional  illusion.      Processual justice is writ patently on Art. 21."      We have  set out  the sweep  of Article  21 because the rule framed  by this  Court, namely Order XXI Rule 15(1)(c), cannot transcend  this obligation,  nor indeed can s. 384 of the Code.  On the  contrary, as Bhagwati, J. has observed in Maneka Gandhi’s case: (supra)

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         "It   is   a   basic   constitutional   assumption      underlying every  statutory grant  of  power  that  the      authority on  which the  power is  conferred should act      constitutionally  and   not   in   violation   of   any      fundamental rights."      We  have   made  these   general  remarks  to  set  the interpretative  tone  when  translating  the  sense  of  the expression "appeal  shall lie to the Supreme Court". Nothing which will render this right illusory or 1105 its fortune  chancy can  square with  the mandate of Article 21. What applies to the right of appeal under s. 2(a) of the Enlargement Act must apply to an appeal under Art. 134(1)(a) and (b)  and therefore,  it is  wiser to  be assured of what comports with  reasonableness and  fairplay in cases covered by the latter category.      When an  accused is  acquitted by  the trial court, the initial presumption of innocence in his favour is reinforced by the  factum of acquittal. If this reinforced innocence is not only reversed in appeal but the extreme penalty of death is imposed  on him  by the  High Court,  it stands to reason that it  requires thorough examination by the Supreme Court. A similar  reasoning applies  to cases  falling  under  Art. 134(1)(b). When the High Court trying a case sentences a man to death  a higher  court must examine the merits to satisfy that a human life shall not be haltered without an appellate review. The  next step  is whether  3 hearing  that is to be extended or  the review  that has  to be made by the Supreme Court in  such circumstances  can  be  narrowed  down  to  a consideration, in  a summary  fashion,  of  the  necessarily limited record  then available  before the  Court and  total dismissal of the appeal if on such a prima facie examination nothing flawsome  is brought  out by  the appellant  to  the satisfaction of  the Court. A single right of appeal is more or less a universal requirement of the guarantee of life and liberty rooted in the conception that men are fallible, that Judges are men and that making assurance doubly sure, before irrevocable deprivation  of life or liberty comes to pass, a full-scale re-examination  of the  facts and the law is made an integral part of fundamental fairness or procedure.      A  logical   follow-up  takes   us  to  the  reasonable insistence on  the full  record being made available for the activist play  of the  appellate judicial  mind. The life of the law  is not  perfection of  theory  but  realisation  of justice  in  the  concrete  situation  of  a  given  system. Considered this  way, it  is common  knowledge that  a  jail appeal or  an appeal  filed through  an  advocate  does  not contain an  exhaustive accompaniment  of all the evidentiary material or  record of  proceedings laying bare legal errors in the  judicial steps.  It is not unusual in the history of this  or   other  countries  that  a  fatal  flaw  has  been discovered by appellate judges leading to a total acquittal, although even  counsel might  not have suspected any lurking lethal illegality.  Such a high jurisdiction as is vested by Article 134  calls for  an active  examination by the judges and such  a process  will be  an ineffectual  essay  in  the absence of  the whole  record. We,  therefore, think  that a preliminary hearing  is hardly  of any  use bearing  in mind that what  is being  dealt with  is an  affirmation of death sentence for  the first  time. In  this connection,  we  may notice that s. 366 of the Code 1106 requires the  Court of  Session which  passes a  sentence of death to  submit the  proceedings  to  the  High  Court  and rulings insist  on an independent appellate consideration of

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the matter  and an  examination  of  all  relevant  material evidence. The  Supreme Court’s  position is  analogous,  and independent  examination  of  the  materials  is  impossible without  the  entire  records  being  available.  So  it  is reasonable to hold that before hearing the appeal under Rule 15(1)(c) of  Order XXI,  ordinarily the records are sent for and are  available. Counsel’s  assistance apart,  the  court itself must apply its mind, the stakes being grave enough.      The next ingredient contended for is the hearing of the opposite party  and notice to him in that behalf. That is to say, the  appeal shall not be dismissed summarily or after a mere preliminary  hearing even  with the records on hand but only after notice and debate at the bar. Speaking generally, our  adversary  system  finds  fulfilment  when  both  sides present rival  points of  view, unearth embedded infirmities and activate  the proceeding  with the sparks emanating from the clash  of arms.  Such considerations  may not loom large but for  the fact  that it  is a first appeal we are dealing with and the risk is to life itself. Therefore, we hold that in the  common run  of cases  the Court must issue notice to the opposite  party, namely,  the State and afford a hearing in the presence of both and with the records on hand.      The  vital   aspects  of   natural  justice  have  been carefully incorporated  in our  criminal jurisprudence.  The recording of  reasons is  usually regarded  as  a  necessary requirement of fair decision. The obligation to give reasons for  decision   when  consequence   of  wrong   judgment  is forfeiture of  life or  personal liberty  for  long  periods needs no  emphasis, especially  when it  is a  first  appeal following upon  a heavy sentence imposed for the first time. The constraint  to record reasons secures in black and white what the Judge has in mind and given satisfaction to him who is condemned  that what  he had had to say has not only been ’heard’ but  considered and  recorded. Art.  21 is a binding mandate against blind justice.      It is  interesting that in Maneka Gandhi’s case (supra) which dealt  with a  matter of  much less  significance  the denial or  impounding of  a passport  affecting  freedom  of movement was  required to  be  decided  after  recording  of reasons save  in exceptional  cases. Far  more  serious  and indeed fatal  is the  outcome of  an  appeal  under  Article 134(1)(a) and  (b) of the Constitution and the insistence on recording of reasons is a funadmental requisite of fairness. In this  view, in  the narrow  category of  cases covered by Article 134(1)(a) and (b) and s.2(a) of the Enlargement Act, the subject-matter  is of  sufficient gravity  as to justify the 1107 recording of  reasons in the ultimate order. The inscrutable face of the sphinx and the unspeaking rejection by the judge are incompatible  with fundamental  fairness in the critical circumstances of  death sentence and life sentence cases for the first time imposed by the court next below.      It is  true that  Judges of  the Supreme Court act with utmost caution,  consideration and  consciousness  and  with full realisation  that life  and personal  liberty cannot be forfeited without at least the trial tribunal and one higher have fully  applied their minds. It is unusual for judges at the highest  level to  be tempted  into  affirmance  of  the judgment under  appeal merely because, on the surface, there is copious  evidence attractive  reasoning  and  absence  of injustice. There  is often  more than meets the eye which is best left  unsaid. All  in all,  the necessity  to put  down reasons for  decisions, in  the special  situations  we  are considering,   is    interlaced   with    the   element   of

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reasonableness emphasised in Maneka Gandhi’s case (supra).      We hasten  to  obviate  a  misapprehension.  Where  the subject matter  is less  momentous, where  two  courts  have already assessed  the evidence and given reasoned decisions, pragmatism and  humanism legitimate,  in appropriate  cases, the passing  of judgment  at the  third tier  without giving reasons where  the conclusion  is one of affirmance. Natural justice cannot  be fixed  on a  rigid frame  and fundamental fairness is not unresponsive to circumstances. The very fact that the  subject matter is not fraught with loss of life or long incarceration  and that  the appellate  or  revisionary authority  is   a  high  tribunal  which  has  examined  the materials are  an assurance  of competent  and conscientious consideration of  the facts  and the law. Further protection at the third deck by calling for the records or launching on long ratiocination is a waste of judicial time. Our rules of criminal proceedure and those of other countries with mature systems of  justice provide for dismissal at the third level without assigning  written reasons, not because there are no reasons, but because the tardy need to document them hampers the hearing  of the  many cases in the queue that press upon the time of the court at that level.      We uphold  Order XXI,  Rule  15(1)  (c)  of  the  Rules because it does not have play in certain situations. It must be noted  that that provision does not make it obligatory to dispose of  all cases summarily or at a preliminary hearing. It is  an enabling  provision, not  a  compulsive  one.  The question is  whether there  is any  situation where  it  can apply at  all in  the context of Art. 134(1) (a) and (b) and s. 2(a)  of the  Enlargement Act.  If there  is a  room  for operation, the  provision can be sustained although confined to such  limited situations  as a  rule of prudence ripening into a rule of law. 1108      Before discussing  the categories  where the  rule will apply, let  us get  out of our way the view that the rule is valid because Art. 145(1) (b) authorises      Procedural   invasion    of   substantive   rights   is impermissible, Art.  145 authorises  only rules of procedure and procedure is      "....that which regulates the formal steps in an action      or other judicial proceeding; a form, manner, and order      of conducting suits or prosecutions...... "           "This term is commonly opposed to the sum of legal      principles constituting  the substance  of the law, and      denotes the  body of  rules, whether  of practice or of      pleading, whereby  rights are  effectuated through  the      successful application of the proper remedies."(1) To go  beyond and  cut into the flesh of the right itself is ultra vires  Art. 145.  Likewise, harmonious construction of Art. 134  and Art. 145 also leads to the conclusion that the contemplated  rules   are  mere  machinery  provisions,  not manacles on the right handcuffing its exercise.      Going to  the  basics,  an  appeal  "is  the  right  of entering  a   superior  court   and  invoking  its  aid  and interposition to redress the error of the court below.... An appeal, strictly  so called,  is one  "in which the question is, whether  the order of the court from which the appeal is brought was  right on  the materials  which that  court  had before it"  (per Lord  Davey, Ponnamma  v. Arumogam,  (1905) A.C. at p.390) .... A right of appeal, where it exists, is a matter of  substance, and  not of  procedure (Colonial Sugar Refining Co.  v. Irving,  (1905) AC 369; Newman v. Klausner, (1922) 1  K.B. 228."(2)-  Thus, the  right of appeal is para mount,  the   procedure  for   hearing  canalises   so  that

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extravagant prolixity or abuse of process can be avoided and a fair  workability provided.  Amputation is  not  procedure while pruning may be.      Of course,  procedure is  within the  Court’s power but where it  pares down  prejudicially the  very right, carving the kernal  out, it  violates  the  provision  creating  the right. Appeal  is a  remedial right  and if  the  remedy  is reduced to  a husk  by procedural excess, the right became a casualty. That cannot be.      So we  cannot out down but may canalise the basic right by invoking Article 145(1)(b). 1109      Harmoniously  read,   the  sequence   is  simple.   The formalities for  entertaining certain  types of  appeal  are covered by  Art. 145(1)  (d),  the  manner  of  hearing  and disposal is governed by Art. 145 (1) (b) and the substantive sweep of  the appeal  as a  method of  redressal is found in Art. 134.  Amputation of  this anatomy by procedural surgery is doing violence to the constitutional scheme.      An appeal  is a  re-hearing, and  as Viscount Cave laid down,           "It was the duty of a court of appeal in an appeal      from a judge sitting alone to make up its own mind, not      disregarding the  judgment  appealed  from  and  giving      special weight  to that  judgment where the credibility      of witnesses comes into question, but with full liberty      to draw  its own  inferences from  the facts  proved or      admitted, and to decide accordingly."(1) Prof. A.  L. Goodhart,  dealing with appeals on questions of fact in the English Law, wrote:           "....it may  be suggested,  with all respect, that      when the  appellate judges  are in  agreement with  the      trial judge,  they take the view that they are bound by      his conclusions  of fact,  but when  they disagree with      his conclusions  then they  do not hesitate to overrule      them....if an  appellate court has full liberty to draw      its own  inferences from the facts proved, then appeals      on so-called  questions of fact will have a far greater      chance of  success. The  most highly trained judges may      differ concerning  the evaluation  of  facts,  just  as      ordinary persons  may. It  is  here  that  conflict  of      opinion is  most frequently  found. What is regarded as      reasonable by  one man, whether judge or layman, may be      regarded as  unreasonable by another. If, therefore, an      appeal can  be taken  on the  evaluation of facts, then      there  is  always  a  chance  that  the  appellant  may      succeed, even  though the  initial duty of showing that      the judge below was in error may fall on him."(2) Ridding  ourselves   of  finer   nuances   and   philosophic speculations and  taking a  realistic approach  to a problem beset with  human variables,  it is  daily experience to see judges on  the high  bench differ, and a fortiori so, in the field of sentence. We project this reality in the context of full freedom  for the  first appellate  decider of  facts to reach his  own finding  on offence  and  sentence,  only  to highlight how  momentous it  is-to be  or not  to be-for the appellant to have his case considered by 1110 the highest  court when the Constitution and Parliament have conferred a full right of appeal. Summary dismissal, save in glaring cases,  may  spell  grave  jeopardy  to  life-giving justice. That  is why  Order  XXI  Rule  15(1)(c)  while  it survives  to   weed  out  worthless  appeals,  shall  remain sheathed in extra-ordinary cases where facts on guilt or the wider range of considerations on sentence are involved.

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    We must  clarify that  very right  of appeal  does  not carry with  it all the length of getting the record, hearing both sides  and giving  full reasons for decisions. Then the institutions of  justice will come to a grinding halt. Those who feel  otherwise may  read with  profit, et al, Order 41, Rule 11,  Civil Procedure Code and the practice of so august a tribunal  as the Supreme Court of the United States. Henry J. Abraham writes:           "Appeal. In  the instance of a writ of appeal, the      aggrieved party  has an  absolute, statutorily  granted      right to  carry a  case to  the United  States  Supreme      Court, which  in theory  must review  it. However,  the      High Tribunal retains the very considerable loophole of      being empowered to reject such an appeal on the grounds      that the federal question, otherwise validly raised, is      "substantial". This  highly  significant  discretionary      element in the area of the Court’s so-called compulsory      appellate jurisdiction  caused it to dismiss 70 appeals      in the  1955-56 term,  for example.  Of these  40  were      rejected "for  want of a substantial federal question",      the balance on other jurisdictional grounds. In the 59-      60 term, 63 of a total of 113 appeals were dismissed on      the insubostalltiality  ground ! As a rule, fully 50 to      60 per  cent of  the writs of appeal are thus dismissed      or the  judgment below  affirmed without  printing  the      record or  oral argument  .... In effect, the appeel is      hence used but sparingly-to date in approximately 9 per      cent of  all cases  or controversies  presented to  the      Court."(1)      Nor are  we charmed by some counsel sometimes asscrting the importance  of Oral  Arguments Unlimited forgetting that prolixity   is    counter-productive   and   expensive   and obstructive of case-flow.(2) We 1111 never deny  the brightening of obscure points and the cross- pollination of  creative views promoted by an active process of oral argument.      The decision  we  make  is  confined  to  the  criminal jurisdiction covered  by Art.  134 and Art. 145(1)(b) and s. 384 Criminal  Procedure Code.  The compelling  thought which has pressured  our judgment in a matter of life and death in a first  appeal to a final court is best expressed by Edmund Cahn:           "For what  gives  justice  its  special  savor  of      nobility ?  Only the  divine wrath  that arises  in us,      girds us,  and drives us to action whenever an instance      of injustice affronts our sight."(1)      Having stressed  the appellant’s right at great length, we still  sustain rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI. This provision is general  and covers  all  conceivable  cases  under  Art. 134(1). It  enables, not  obligates. It  operates in certain situations, not  in  every  appeal.  It  merely  removes  an apprehended disability  of the court in summarily dismissing a glaring  case where  its compulsive  continuance, dragging the opposite  party, calling up prolix records and expanding on the  reasons for the decision, will stall the work of the court (which  is an  institutional injury to social justice) with no gain to anyone, including the appellant to keep whom in agonising suspense for long is itself an injustice.      What are  those cases  where a preliminary hearing is a worthwhile exercise  ?  Without  being  exhaustive,  we  may instance some. Where the only ground urged is a point of law which has been squarely covered by a ruling of this Court to keep the  appeal lingering  longer is  survival after death. Where the  accused has pleaded guilty of murder and the High

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Court, on  the evidence, is satisfied with the pleas and has awarded the  lesser penalty a mere appeal ex misericordin is an  exercise   in  futility.   Where  a   minor   procedural irregularity, clearly  curable under  the Code,  is all that the appellant  has to  urge the full panoply of an appellate bearing is  an act  of supererogation.  Where  the  grounds, taken  at   their  face  value,  are  frivolous,  vexatious, malicious  wholly  dilatory  or  blatantly  mendacious,  the prolongation of  an appeal  is a  premium on  abuse  of  the process of court. Maybe, other cases can be conceived of but we merely  illustrate the  functional relevance of Order XXI Rule 15(1)(c).      Ordinarily, save  where nothing  is  served  by  fuller hearing notice  must go. If every appeal under Art.134(1)(a) and (b) or s.2(a) 1112 of the  Enlargement Act,  where questions of law or fact are raised, is  set down  for preliminary  hearing  and  summary disposal, the  meaningful difference  between Art.  134  and Art. 136 may be judicially eroded and Parliament stultified. Maybe, many  of the appeals after fuller examination by this Court  may   fail.  But  the  minimum  processual  price  of deprivation of precious life or prolonged loss of liberty is a single  comprehensive appeal. To be peeved by this need is to offend  against the  fair play  of the  Constitution. The horizon of  human rights jurisprudence after Maneka Gandhi’s case (supra) has many hues.      The relevant  provision of  the Criminal Procedure Code have already  been quoted.  Counsel for  the  appellant  had obvious difficulty  in overcoming  the obstacle  of s.  384. That  section   is  sweeping.  Any  appellate  court  (which includes the  Supreme Court  under Art.  134) may  hear  and dispose of  an appeal  summarily, without  the  records  and recording no  reasons for  dismissal if it is the High Court or the  Supreme Court.  Literally read, it sounds arbitrary, where death  sentence, at  the  first  appeal  is  involved. Article 21,  in its expansive incarnation, may fatally knock down any summary power of fatally knocking down an appellant facing death penalty in first appeal by an unspeaking order. But the  generality of  the provision if read down, may well be valid  and rightly  so. If the appeal is at the second or third tier, there is no reason to grumble. If the punishment is  not   of  the   dreadful  species,   there  can   be  no constitutional consternation.  After all,  to have a giant’s strength is  not wrong ’but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant’ and judges do know this judicious caution. So we hold that the  restrictions already  indicated in  applying Order XXI rule  15(1) (c)  may legitimately be read into s. 384 of the  Code.   Words  of   wide  import   and  expressions  of expansionist  potential   may  always   be   canalised   and constitutionalised-a proposition  too well established to be propped by precedents.      The common  embankments applicable  to Order  XXI  Rule 15(1) (c) and s. 384 of the Code to prevent unconstitutional overflow may  now be  concretised, not as rigid manacles but as guidelines  for safe  exercise. We  are hopeful  that the Supreme Court  will, if  found necessary, make clarificatory rules in this behalf.      To conclude,  we uphold  the vires  of Order  XXI  Rule 15(1)(c) of  the Supreme  Court Rules and also s. 384 of the Criminal Procedure  Code but  hold that in their application both the  provisions shall be restricted by certain criteria as a permissible exercise in constitutionalisation. 1113      Order XXI  Rule 15(1)(c)  in action  does not mean that

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all appeals  falling within  its  fold  shall  be  routinely disposed of,  as far  as possible, on a preliminary hearing. Such  a   course,  as  earlier  mentioned,  obliterates  the difference between  Articles 134  and 136, between right and leave. The  rule, in cases of appeals under Art. 134 (1) (a) and (b)  and s. 2(a) is notice, records and reasons, but the exception is  preliminary hearing  on all  such materials as may be  placed  by  the  appellant  and  brief  grounds  for dismissal.  This  exceptional  category  is  where,  in  all conscience, there is no point at all. In cases of real doubt the benefit  of doubt  goes to the appellant and notice goes to the  adversary-even if  the chances  of allowance  of the appeal be  not bright.  We think  it proper  to suggest that with a view to invest clarity and avoid ambiguity, Order XXI Rule 15(1)(c)  may be  suitably modified  in conformity with this ruling.      Before we  part with this case, it is right to register our view  that too  many appeals and revisions are a bane of the Indian  Judicial System,  involving as  it does  sterile expense and  delay and  fruitless chase  of perfection.  The Evershed Committee,  a quarter  of a  century ago, expressed dissatisfaction with  the system  of multiple  appeals  what with the  social cost  of litigative prolongation, burden of precedents and  heavy outlay-a  luxury which  a Third  World country  can   illafford.  Too  many  appeals  are  counter- productive as  A.P. Herbert  in ’Uncommon  Law’ has  wittily driven home:           "The people  may be taught to believe in one court      of appeal;  but where  there are  two  they  cannot  be      blamed if they believe in neither. When a man keeps two      clocks which  tell the  time differently,  his  fellows      will   receive    with   suspicion    his    weightiest      pronouncements upon the hour of the day, even if one of      them happens to be right."      Way back in 1832 it has been pointed out that-           "The only  ground upon  which a suitor ought to be      allowed  to   bring  the  judgment  of  one  court  for      examination  before  the  members  of  another  is  the      certainty or  extreme probability  of  finding  in  the      latter tribunal more wisdom and learning, more maturity      of  deliberation,  and  a  greater  capacity  of  sound      decisions than  existed in  the court  from  which  the      appeal is  to  proceed.  But  as  every  appeal  is  of      necessity attended  with the  two  great  and  positive      evils of  expense and  delay, it is the bounden duty of      every wise  and good  government to  take all  possible      care that  the court  of appellate  jurisdiction  shall      possess those  advantages, and  that superior  capacity      for wise and impartial adjudication, 1114      upon the  presumption of  possessing which,  the public      support and  the confidence  of individual  suitors  is      given to the institution." (1)      What is  important is  the choice  of mature  minds for dispensation of  justice according  to law  and not wasteful multiplication of hierarchical tribunals.      KAILASAM, J.-I had the benefit of perusing the judgment prepared by  Krishna Iyer  J. I  regret I am unable to agree with it.      This appeal  is preferred  by the  12 appellants  under section 379  of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure,  1973 read with section 1 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 against the judgment dated 31st  March,  1978  of  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at Allahabad, at  Lucknow Bench  in Criminal  Appeal No. 597 of

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1976.      The appellants  were acquitted  by  the  1st  Temporary Sessions Judge,  Pratapgarh in  Sessions Case No. 16 of 1969 of all  the charges and on an appeal preferred by the State, the order  of acquittal  was set aside by the High Court and the appellants  found guilty and convicted under section 302 read  with   s.  149,   I.P.C.,  and   sentenced   to   life imprisonment.      The appeal  was listed  for preliminary  hearing  under Rule 15  (1) (c)  of Order  XXI of  the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. The  appellants  filed  an  application  for  adducing additional grounds  in Crl.  Misc. Petition No. 1862 of 1978 wherein it  was pleaded  that the provision under clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 15 of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules empowering  the Court  to dismiss the appeal summarily is ultra vires being inconsistent with the provisions of the Supreme   Court    (Enlargement   of    Criminal   Appellate Jurisdiction) Act,  1970. It was submitted that the power of the Supreme  Court to  frame rules  under Art.  145  of  the Constitution canot be extended to annul the rights conferred under an  Act of  Parliament. It was further pleaded that an appeal under  the Supreme  Court  (Enlargement  of  Criminal Appellate  Jurisdiction)  Act,  1970,  cannot  be  dismissed summarily without calling for the records ordering notice to the State  and without  giving reasons.  When the Crl. Misc. Petition No.  1862 of  1978 came up before this Court it was ordered:-           "The appellants have challenged the constitutional      validity of  cl. (c)  of sub-rule  (1) of rule 15 of O.      XXI of the Supreme Court Rules, which enables an appeal      of the 1115      kind with  which we  are concerned,  to be  placed  for      hearing ex  parte before  the Court  for admission.  In      that view  of the  matter, we  think  that  unless  the      question of  the constitutional validity of the rule is      decided, we  cannot have  a preliminary hearing of this      appeal for  admission. Let  the records,  therefore, be      placed before  the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for giving      such directions as he may deem fit and proper."      As the constitutional validity of cl. (c) of rule 15(1) of Order  XXI of the Supreme Court Rules was challenged, the matter was  placed  before  the  Full  Bench  by  the  Chief Justice.      Rule 15  of Order  XXI of  the Supreme Court Rules 1966 runs as follows:-           "15.  (1)   The  petition   of  appeal   shall  be      registered and  numbered as  soon as it is lodged. Each      of  the  following  categories  of  appeals,  on  being      registered, shall be put up for hearing ex parte before      the Court  which may  either dismiss  it  summarily  or      direct issue of notice to all necessary parties, or may      make such  orders, as the circumstances of the case may      require, namely:-           (a)  an appeal  from any  judgment, final order or                sentence in  a criminal  proceeding of a High                Court summarily  dismissing the appeal or the                matter, as the case may be before it;           (b)  an appeal  on a  certificate granted  by  the                High  Court  under  Article  132  (1)  and/or                134(1) (c)  of the Constitution, or under any                other provision  of law if the High Court has                not recorded  the reasons  or the grounds for                granting the certificate.           (c)  an appeal  under sub-clause (a) or sub-clause

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              (b) of  clause (1)  of  Article  134  of  the                Constitution,  or  under  the  Supreme  Court                (Enlargement    of     Criminal     Appellate                Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 (28 of 1970) or under                section  379   of  the   Code   of   Criminal                Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974);           (d)  an appeal  under section 476 B of the Code of                Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898).           (e)  an appeal under clause (b) of sub-section (1)                of section  19 of the Contempt of Courts Act,                1971 (70 of 1971)." 1116      We are  concerned with  sub-rule (c) in rule 15(1). The Supreme Court  Rules were  framed in  exercise of the powers conferred under  Art. 145  of the Constitution and all other powers enabling the Supreme Court to make rules. Art. 145 of the Constitution  empowers the  Supreme Court subject to the provisions of  any law  made by Parliament with the approval of the  President to  make  rules  from  time  to  time  for regulating generally  the  practice  and  procedure  of  the Court. Two  sub-articles are  relevant  and  they  are  sub- articles (b)  and (d).  While sub-article  (b) empowers  the Supreme Court  to make rules as to the procedure for hearing appeals and  other matters  pertaining to  appeals including the time  within which  appeals  to  the  Court  are  to  be entered, Sub-article  (d) enables the Supreme Court to frame rules as  to the  entertainment of  appeals under sub-clause (c) of  clause (1)  of  article  134.  Article  134  confers appellate jurisdiction  on the  Supreme Court  in regard  to criminal matters:-           "134. (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court      from  any  judgment,  final  order  or  sentence  in  a      criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of      India if the High Court-           (a)   has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal                of an  accused person  and sentenced  him  to                death; or           (b)  has withdrawn  for trial  before  itself  any                case  from   any  court  subordinate  to  its                authority and has in such trial convicted the                accused person and sentenced him to death; or           (c)  certifies that  the case  is a  fit  one  for                appeal to the Supreme Court.      Provided that  an appeal under sub-clause (c) shall lie subject to  such provisions  as may  be made  in that behalf under clause  (1) of  article 145  and to such conditions as the High Court may establish or require.      (2) Parliament  may by  law confer on the Supreme Court any further  powers to  entertain an  hear appeals  from any judgment, final  order of  sentence in a criminal proceeding of a  High Court  in the  territory of India subject to such conditions and limitations as may be specified in such law."      While an  unrestricted right  of appeal  is provided to the Supreme  Court under  clauses (a)  and (b) i.e. where on appeal an  order of  acquittal is reversed by the High Court and an accused person is sentenced to death or when the High Court has withdrawn for trial 1117 before itself  any case  from any  court subordinate  to its authority and has in such trial convicted the accused person and sentenced  him to  death, an appeal under article 134(1) (c) is subject to certain restrictions. An appeal under sub- clause (c)  is provided  only when  the case is certified by the High Court as a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. Further an  appeal under sub-clause (c) shall lie subject to

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such provisions  as may  be made in that behalf under clause (1) of  article 145 and to such conditions as the High Court may establish  or require. The Supreme Court is empowered to prescribe rules  regarding entertainment  of  appeals  under article 134(1) (c) by Art. 145 (1), sub-article (d).      So far as procedure for hearing appeals generally rules can be  framed by the Supreme Court under sub-article (b) of article 145(1).  The Supreme  Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate  Jurisdiction)  Act  1970  has  conferred  on  the Supreme Court  further power  to entertain  and hear appeals than conferred  on it  under  Art  134(1)  (a)  and  (b)  as provided for  in Art  134(2) of  the Constitution.  As  Art. 145(1) (b)  enables the  Supreme Court  to frame rules as to procedure for  hearing appeals the procedure thus prescribed will apply  to appeals  under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal  Appellate Jurisdiction)  Act 1970.  Rule 15  of Order XXI  is framed  under article 145(1), sub-article (b). The rules can provide for the procedure for hearing appeals.      Mr. Mulla, the learned counsel, submitted that the rule making power  of the  Supreme Court  is confined only to the rules as to entertainment of appeals under sub-clause (c) of clause (1)  of article  134 and would not enable the Supreme Court to  frame rules  regarding  appeals  under  any  other provision.  The   Supreme  Court  (Enlargement  of  Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)  Act, 1970,  confers right of appeal to the  Supreme Court  from any  judgment,  final  order  of sentence in  a criminal  proceeding of  a High  Court in the territory of India if the High Court:           (a)  has on  appeal reversed an order of acquittal                of an  accused person  and sentenced  him  to                imprisonment for  life or to imprisonment for                a period of not less than ten years;           (b)  has withdrawn  for trial  before  itself  any                case  from   any  court  subordinate  to  its                authority and has in such trial convicted the                accused   person   and   sentenced   him   to                imprisonment for  life or to imprisonment for                a period of not less than ten years. 1118      The result  is that  in addition to the right of appeal under Article  134 (1)  (a) and  (b) an  appellant under the Supreme   Court    (Enlargement   of    Criminal   Appellate Jurisdiction)  Act,   1970  has   also  a  right  to  appeal unrestricted by any of the provisions of Article 134 (1) (c) or the  rules framed  by the Supreme Court under article 145 (1) (d).  The submission  of learned  counsel fails  to take note of Article 145 (1) (b) which empowers the Supreme Court to frame rules as to the procedure for hearing appeals which would include  hearing of  appeals under article 134 (1) (a) and (b)  of the  Constitution as  well as  appeals under the Supreme   Court    (Enlargement   of    Criminal   Appellate Jurisdiction) Act,  1970. The  rules therefore  are properly made under  Art. 145 (1) (b) and would be valid so far as to the procedure for hearing appeals.      The submission  of the  learned counsel  is that when a right of appeal is conferred on a person the appeal can only be disposed  of by the Supreme Court after full hearing i.e. after calling  for the  records, issuing notice to the other side and hearing both the parties and giving reasons for its conclusion.  It  was  submitted  that  a  summary  dismissal affects the  substantive right of appeal and is not confined to procedure  and is  contrary to  the provisions of the law made by Parliament and as such beyond the rule making powers conferred under  article 145  (1) (b).  As the Supreme Court (Enlargement of  Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970,

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conferred a  right of appeal any provision under the Supreme Court Rules  restricting such  appeal  is  submitted  to  be outside the  scope of  the rule-making powers of the Supreme Court.      The Supreme  Court (Enlargement  of Criminal  Appellate Jurisdiction) Act,  1970 confers  a right  of appeal but the procedure as  to the  hearing of  appeal is  not  prescribed under the  Supreme Court  (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act,  1970. Before referring to the provisions of the  Supreme Court  Rules relating to the procedure as to hearing of  appeals it  is useful to refer to the provisions of the  law made by Parliament regulating the hearing of the appeal by  all courts  including the  Supreme Court. Chapter XXIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Act 2 of 1974, deals with appeals. Section 374 (1) provides that any person convicted  on   a  trial   held  by  a  High  Court  in  its extraordinary original  criminal jurisdiction  may appeal to the Supreme  Court. This  section confers  a right of appeal against all  convictions whatever  the sentence  may be on a trial held  by the  High Court in its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction,  and is  thus wider than the right of appeal conferred  under art. 134(1) (a) and (b) or under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal 1119 Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970. Section 375 provides that there will  be no appeal where an accused person has pleaded guilty and  convicted on  such plea  by the High Court. This section thus  excludes the  appeal obviously  to the Supreme Court against  the conviction  on a  trial held  by the High Court in its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction if the accused has pleaded gulity. Section 376 excludes appeals in petty  cases, where the High Court passes only a sentence of imprisonment  for a  term not  exceeding six  months or a fine not  exceeding one thousand rupees. Thus though section 374 confers  a right  of appeal on any person convicted on a trial held  by the  High Court in its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction  to the  Supreme Court,  this right is restricted under  sections 375  and 376 in that a person who pleads guilty  and has  been convicted  on such  plea by the High Court  is barred  from  preferring  an  appeal  to  the Supreme Court.  So also  an appeal  against  a  sentence  of imprisonment for  a term not exceeding six months or of fine not exceeding  one thousand  rupees or of both is taken away under s.  376. Section  379 confers a right of appeal to the Supreme Court  where the High Court has, on appeal, reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and convicted him and sentenced him to death or to imprisonment for life or to imprisonment for  a term  of ten  years or more. Section 379 gives effect to the provision of Art. 134 (1) (a) and (b) of the  Constitution   and  section  2  of  the  Supreme  Court (Enlargement of  Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970. The result  of the passing of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal  Appellate Jurisdiction)  Act, 1970  and section 379 of  the Criminal  Procedure Code is that they provide an appeal to  the Supreme  Court in  addition to  the right  of appeal conferred  under Article  134 (1)  (a) and (b) of the Constitution.      The contention  of Mr.  Mulla, the  learned counsel for the appellant,  is that  rule 15  (1) (c)  of Order  XXI not merely relates  to  the  procedure  but  also  deprives  the substantive right  of appeal  conferred on the accused under article  134   (1)  (a)   and  (b)  and  the  Supreme  Court (Enlargement of  Criminal Appellate  Jurisdiction)  Act,1970 and under  s. 379  of the Code of Criminal Procedure. By the impugned rule  the appeal  on being registered is put up for

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hearing ex parte before the court and the court is empowered either to  dismiss it summarily or direct issue of notice to all  necessary   parties  or   make  such   orders  as   the circumstances may  require. Section  384 of the Code of Crl. Procedure 1973  confers a  right on  the appellate  court to dismiss the appeal summarily when it considers that there is no sufficient  ground for  interfering. The  proviso to  the section requires  that no appeal presented under section 382 by the appellant or his pleader 1120 shall be  dismissed unless  the appellant or his pleader has had a  reasonable opportunity  of being  heard in support of his case.  An appeal  from the appellant from jail cannot be dismissed except  after giving  the appellant  a  reasonable opportunity of  being heard  in support  of the same, unless the Appellate  Court considers  that the appeal is frivolous or that  the production of the accused in custody before the Court  would   involve  such   inconvenience  as   would  be disproportionate in  the circumstances  of the case. Section 384 (2) provides that before dismissing an appeal under this section, the  Court may  call for  the record  of the  case. Under sub-section  (3) where  the Appellate Court dismissing an appeal  under sec.  384 is  a Court of Sessions or of the Chief Judicial  Magistrate, it  shall record its reasons for doing so.  Sec. 385  prescribes the  procedure  for  hearing appeals not  dismissed summarily.  While sec.  374 confers a right of  appeal, sec.  375 and  sec. 376  restricts such  a right. Section  384 prescribes  the  procedure  for  hearing appeals  enabling  the  Court  to  dismiss  certain  appeals summarily and to deal with others under sec. 385 if they are not summarily  dismissed. The  right of appeal conferred can be curtailed  by procedure  as envisaged  in sec.  384  Crl. Procedure Code  or rule  15 Order  XXI of  the Supreme Court Rules.      We are  unable to accept the contention that a right of appeal would  mean that  before an appeal is disposed of the records should  be called  for, notice  ordered to the other side, the  other  side  heard  and  reasons  given  for  the disposal of  the appeal.  The  provisions  of  the  Criminal Procedure Code  which have  been referred  to show  that all appeal to  the  Supreme  Court  under  section  374  of  the Criminal Procedure  Code is  restricted by the provisions of sec. 375  and sec.  376 and  could be  dealt with  summarily under sec.  384 of  the Criminal  Procedure Code. Mr. Mulla, the learned  counsel submitted  that the  provisions of  the Criminal Procedure  Code are  not applicable  to the Supreme Court. But  this plea  does not bear scrutiny in view of the specific provisions  making the  procedure applicable to the Supreme Court.  An appeal to the Supreme Court is subject to the several provisions of the Crl. Procedure Code, including the provisions  relating to summary disposal of the appeals. The plea  of the  learned counsel that the provisions of the impugned rule  are contrary to any law made by Parliament is not maintainable.  The impugned  rule 15 (1) (c), Order XXI, more or  less incorporates  the provisions found in the Crl. Procedure Code.  The contention  of the learned counsel that the right conferred on him under article 134 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution and under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal  Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, is curtailed is therefore without substance. 1121      In the  result, we  find that  the  contention  of  the learned counsel, namely that the impugned rule is beyond the rule-making power  of the Supreme Court under article 145 of the Constitution  cannot be  accepted as  article 145(1) (b)

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specifically enables  the Supreme Court to frame rules as to the procedure  for hearing appeals. The contention, that the Rule is opposed to the provisions of laws made by Parliament and is  thus beyond  the scope  of rule-making  powers under article 145 cannot also be upheld for the reasons stated.      Neither  in  the  Memorandum  of  Grounds  nor  in  his arguments the  learned  counsel  contended  that  a  summary dismissal of  an appeal  under the  provisions of  the  Crl. Procedure Code  would offend the provisions of Article 21 of the  Constitution.   In  the  course  of  arguments  it  was submitted  that   if  the  impugned  rule  is  construed  as empowering the  Court to  dismiss an  appeal  summarily,  it would  offend   Art.  21   of  the  Constitution.  When  the provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code enabling the Court to  dismiss  an  appeal  summarily  is  not  challenged  the impugned rule is equally unassailable.      We will now consider whether the impugned rule would in any way offend Article 21 of the Constitution. Article 21 of the Constitution reads as follows:-           "No person  shall be  deprived  of  his  right  or      personal liberty  except  according  to  the  procedure      established by law."      The words  ’Procedure established  by  law’  have  been construed by  various decisions  of this  Court.  In  A.  K. Gopalan’s case  (1950 SCR  page 88)  it has  been held  by a majority that  the word ’law’ in Article 21 had been used in the sense  of ’State  made’ law  and not in the sense of law embodying  the  principles  of  natural  justice.  Procedure established by  law means "a law made by Union Parliament or Legislature or  State." According to Patanjali Sastri J, law in Article  21 did  not mean jus naturale but means positive or state  made law.  Procedure established by law, according to the  learned Judge,  did not  however mean  any procedure which may  be prescribed by a competent legislature, but the ordinary well-established  criminal procedure that is, those settled usages  and normal  modes of procedure sanctioned by the Criminal  Procedure Code  which are  the general  law of criminal procedure  in our country. If this test is applied, the  procedure,  that  is  challeged,  being  the  procedure prescribed under  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  cannot  be assailed. Later  decisions have pointed out that even though the procedure  is prescribed  by a competent legislature, it may fail  to satisfy  the requirements of the article if the proce 1122 dure prescribed is no procedure at all. We cannot accept the plea that the procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code is no procedure at all.      The main  objection to  the invoking  of Article 21 for challenging the  validity of  the impugned  rule is  that  a person convicted of an offence has no right of appeal unless such a  right is  conferred by  the statute.  If the statute does not  confer a right of appeal the person has no remedy. If P. K. Mittra v. State of West Bengal. (1) this Court held that a right of appeal is a statutory right which has got to be recognised  by the Courts, and the right of appeal, where one  exists,   cannot  be   denied  in   exercise   of   the discretionary power  even of  the High Court. An appeal is a creature of  the statute and the powers and the jurisdiction of the appellate court must be circumscribed by the words of the  statute   vide  Shankar   Kerba  Yadhav   v.  State  of Maharashtra.(2) A  right of  appeal must be given by statute or by some authority equivalent to a statute or rules framed under a statute vide Minakshi v. Subramanya.(3)      The powers  and the jurisdiction of the appellate Court

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as prescribed  by the  Criminal Procedure  Code and the rule cannot be  said to deny a right of hearing to the appellant. The plea  that audialteram partem has been violated has also no substance.  The  right  to  be  heard  in  an  appeal  is regulated by  statute. In  the  appeal  with  which  we  are concerned, the  accused persons  had the  benefit of  a full trial before  a Sessions  Court at  the  first  instance  or before the  High Court  After a  full trial  the judgment is rendered by  a High Judicial Officer such as a Session Judge or a High Court Judge. The appellate court has before it the judgment of  the lower court and the petition for appeal. At the preliminary  hearing the  appellant or  his  pleader  is heard  before  the  court  decides  to  dismiss  the  appeal summarily.      The impugned  rule prescribes the procedure for hearing of the  appeals. The  Criminal Procedure  Code provides that there shall be no right of appeal in cases where the accused is convicted  by the  High Court on a plea of guilty or when the High  Court passed a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding  six months.  The appellate court is empowered to dismiss the appeal summarily when there are no sufficient grounds for  interfering. The  power to summarily dismiss an appeal is  conferred under  the Criminal Procedure Code when the court  is satisfied that there are no sufficient grounds for interfering  with the  judgment appealed  against.  This decision is  taken by  the appellate  court being  the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court 1123 of Session, the High Court or the Supreme Court. In the case of the  Chief Judicial  Magistrate  and  Court  of  Session, reasons should  be recorded  for summary dismissal. The High Court and  the Supreme  Court need  not record  reasons  for summarily dismissing  the appeal.  It is  necessary that the Supreme Court  or the  High Court  should be  satisfied that there  are   no  sufficient  grounds  for  interfering.  The conclusion  that   there  are   no  sufficient  grounds  for interfering is  arrived by  the High  Court or  the  Supreme Court after  hearing the  appellant, examining  the judgment and the  petition for appeal. There can be no doubt that the appellate court is discharging an onerous duty in dismissing a case summarily. It may be noted that the Code provides for calling for  the records  before dismissing  an  appeal.  In cases  where   the  appellant   is   sentenced   to   death, imprisonment for  life or  long term  of imprisonment, it is the  bounden  duty  of  the  appellate  court  to  hear  the appellant, examine  the petition  of appeal  and copy of the judgment appealed against. If it feels necessary to call for the records  of the  case, it  is its  duty to  call for the records and  examine them,  before coming  to the conclusion that there  are no sufficient grounds for interfering. It is the responsibility  of  the  appellate  authority  to  order notice and  hear the  other side if it is not satisfied that there are  no sufficient grounds for interfering. Equally it is the  duty of  the appellate  court to  dismiss the appeal summarily if  it satisfied  that  there  are  no  sufficient grounds  for   interefering.  This   duty  is   imposed  for regulating the  work of  the courts  for otherwise  judicial time would  be unnecessarily  spent. Taking into account the fact that  the duty  to decide  the question where there are not sufficient  grounds for  interfering is placed on highly placed judicial  officers after  affording a due hearing, it cannot be  stated that  the very  right of  appeal has  been taken away. It is not possible to accept the contention that the procedure  prescribed is  not in accordance with the law as the  Criminal Procedure  Code and  the impugned rules are

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laws properly  made. It  cannot also be said that the law is violative of the right conferred under Article 21.      The decision  of the  Supreme Court rendered under sec. 421 of  the Crl.  Procedure Code of 1898 which is similar to section 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 may be referred to. In Govinda Kadam v. State of Maharashtra(1) the Supreme Court  held that  the appellate Court has full power under section  421 of  the Crl. Procedure Code to dismiss an appeal in  limine even without sending for the records if on perusal of the impugned order and 1124 the petition  of appeal it is satisfied with the correctness of the order appealed against. It may be emphasised that the power  of  summary  dismissal  has  to  be  exercised  after perusing the  petition of  appeal and  the copy of the order appealed against  and after  affording the appellant and his pleader a  reasonable opportunity  of being heard in support of the  appeal. The  order summarily dismissing an appeal by the, High  Court by  the word ’rejected’ is not violative of any  statutory  provision.  While  holding  that  a  summary rejection of  the appeal  by the High Court is not violative of any  statutory provision,  this Court pointed out that it is desirable  that reasons  are recorded  by the  High Court when prima  facie arguable  issues have  been raised as that would enable the Supreme Court to appreciate the reasons for rejection  of   the  appeal   by  the   High  Court.   These observations are not applicable to the Supreme Court because the order of this Court is final.      Rule 15  (1) of  the Supreme  Court Rules  enables  the Supreme Court  after putting  up the  appeal for hearing ex- parte to  dismiss it  summarily or direct issue of notice to all necessary  parties  or  may  make  such  orders  as  the circumstances of  the case  may require.  Rule 13 prescribes that a  memorandum of  appeal shall  be in  the  form  of  a petition stating  succinctly and  briefly as far as possible in  chronological   order,  the   principal  steps   in  the proceedings from its commencement till its conclusion in the High Court.  Sub-rule 2  of  rule  13  prescribes  that  the petition of  appeal shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the  judgment or  order appealed from, and in the case of an appeal  on a  certificate also of the certificate granted by the  High Court,  and of  the  order  granting  the  said certificate. Rule  14 prescribes  that when the appellant is in jail,  he may  present his  petition of    appeal and the documents  mentioned   in  rule  13  including  any  written argument which  he may  desire to advance to the Officer-in- charge of  the jail, who shall forthwith forward the same to the Registrar  of this  Court. The  petition of  appeal thus received under rule 13 and 14 is put up for hearing ex-parte before the  Court which  is empowered  either to  dismiss it summarily  or  to  direct  issue  notice  to  the  necessary parties.  Thus   it  is   to  be  seen  that  the  procedure contemplated in rules 13, 14 and 15 is almost similar to the provisions of  the Code  of Criminal  Procedure referred  to above. In  an appeal  sent by  the appellant from jail he is entitled to and any written arguments which he may desire to advance in  support of his appeal. The Court in proper cases in which  it considers it desirable would engage an advocate to present  the case of the appellant in jail. The mere fact that the  appellant in  jail is not being heard in person or through an  advocate would  not mean  that the appeal of the appellant in  jail is not being heard. The Court peruses the judgment, petition of appeal 1125 and the written arguments, if any, before proceeding to take

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action under  rule 15. This Court being the highest Court is not required  to give  reasons but is expected to bestow the greatest care  in exercising  the power of summary dismissal under Rule  15. On  a consideration of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure  Code and  the  impugned  rules,  we  are unable to  accept any  of  the  contentions  raised  by  the learned counsel.      In passing  a reference was made by the learned counsel to the  decision of  this Court  reported in [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621 (Maneka  Gandhi v.  Union of  India) in  support of  his contention that  the rights  conferred under  article 21 are also available  to the  appellants before the Supreme Court. We are unable to accept the contention for the case referred to is  one wherein  an opportunity  was not  provided  to  a person  before   the  passport  was  impounded.  It  has  no application  to  an  appeal  as  in  the  present  case  the appellant is  properly heard in a trial and is also heard by the appellate  court. We  feel that Maneka Gandhi’s case has no application to the facts of the present case.      In the result we reject all the contentions put forward by the  learned counsel  and hold  that the impugned Rule is within the rule making power of the Supreme Court and answer the reference accordingly.                            ORDER      In the  light of  the majority  judgment, we uphold the vires of  Order XXI Rule 15(1)(c) of the Supreme Court Rules and also S. 384 of the Criminal Procedure Code but hold that in their  application both  the provisions shall be governed by the criteria laid down in the majority Judgment.      In the appeal, above mentioned, we direct notice to the respondent. N.V.K. 1126