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PETITIONER: SITA RAM GOEL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE MUNICIPAL BOARD, KANPUR ANDOTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/08/1958

BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) DAS, S.K. KAPUR, J.L. SUBBARAO, K.

CITATION:  1958 AIR 1036            1959 SCR 1148

ACT:        Limitation-Dismissal  of employee by Municipal  Board-Rejec-        tion of appeal to Government-Suit against order of dismissal        after   disposal  of  appeal-Period  of  limitation-U.    P.        Municipalities  Act,  1916 (U.  P. 2 of 1916), ss.  58,  69,        326.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  was appointed as overseer by  the  Municipal Board,  Kanpur,  on  March 5, 1937,  and  continued  in  its service up to March 19, 1951, when a copy of the  resolution passed by the Board on March 5, 1951, purporting to  dismiss him from service was handed over to him.  On April 7,  1951, he  filed an appeal to the Government against the  order  of dismissal  from  service, but he was informed  on  April  8, 1952, that his appeal was rejected.  Thereafter on  December 8,  1952,  the appellant instituted a suit  challenging  the legality  of the order of dismissal on various grounds,  and the  question arose whether the suit was within time.   Sub- section (I) Of s. 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, provided  that  no  suit  shall  be  instituted  against   a Municipal  Board  " until the expiration of the  two  months next after notice in writing has been left at the office  of the Board... explicitly stating the cause of action " ;  and sub-s.  (3) stated that " no action such as is described  in sub-s.  (1) shall...be commenced otherwise than  within  six months next after the accrual of the cause of action ".  The appellant contended that the cause of action accrued to  him on April 8, 1952, when the order of dismissal of his  appeal to  the  Government was communicated to him  and  the  suit, filed within eight months of that date, was within time, and relied on the provisions of s. 58 (1) and (2), read with  s. 69, of the Act, which gave an officer dismissed by the Board a  right of appeal to the Government within 30 days  of  the communication to him of the order dismissal : Held, that though the order passed by the Board on March  5, 1951,  was subject to a right of appeal to  the  Government, the  operation  of the order was not suspended by  the  mere filing  of the appeal, and the order became  effective  from

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March  19, 1951, when it was communicated to the  appellant. The cause of action, therefore, accrued to him on that date, and the suit filed by him on December 8, 1952, was barred by limitation under S. 326  of  the U. P.  Municipalities  Act, 1916.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 149 of 1958. 1149 Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated September  2,  1957, of the Allahabad High  Court  in  First Appeal  No.  474 of 1956, arising out of  the  judgment  and order  dated  July 30, 1956, of the First  Additional  Civil Judge, Kanpur, in Civil Suit No. 257 of 1953. Appellant in person. C.   B.  Gupta, 0. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal,  for  respondent No.1. G.   C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for respondent No. 4. 1958.   August 19.  The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by BHAGWATI J.-This appeal with special leave under Art. 136 of the   Constitution   raises  an  interesting   question   of limitation. The  appellant  was appointed an Overseer by  the  Municipal Board,  Kanpur, on March 5, 1937, with the approval  of  the Superintending Engineer, Public Health Department,  Lucknow. He  was  confirmed by the Board’s special  resolution  dated July 2, 1938, and continued in employ up to March 19,  1951, when  a copy of the resolution No. 1723 passed by the  Board on March 5, 1951, purporting to dismiss him from employ  was handed over to him.  Against the said resolution dated March 5, 1951, the appellant filed an appeal to the Uttar  Pradesh Government  on  April 7, 1951, but was informed by a  G.  0. dated  April  7, 1952, that his appeal  had  been  rejected. This  information  was  received by him on  April  8,  1952. Thereafter on December 8,1952, the appellant filed the  suit out  of which the present appeal arises, being Suit No.  257 of 1953 in the Court of the Additional Civil Judge,  Kanpur, impleading  the Municipal Board, Kanpur, Shri S.  B.  Gupta, Municipal Engineer, Shri Brahmanand Misra, the then Chairman of  the Municipal Board and the Government of Uttar  Pradesh as  defendants and challenged the legality of the  dismissal order  passed  against him on the ground that  the  previous approval  of  the  Superintending  Engineer,  Public  Health Department was not taken as required by the rules, that the 1150 appellant was denied an opportunity of being heard in person by  the  Board, that no show-cause notice for  the  proposed punishment  of dismissal was issued to him by the Board  nor were the charges framed by it, that the dismissal order  did not  specify the charges, that some of the grounds on  which he  was  dismissed did not form the  subject-matter  of  the charges  at all, that in any case, the charges  framed  were false and malicious.  The appellant prayed for a declaration that the order of his dismissal was ultra vires, illegal and void and claimed a total amount of Rs. 10,951 in respect  of damages,  allowances  for  doing  officiating  work,  bonus, arrears of salary and provident fund. The  suit was contested mainly by the Board and its  defence was  to  the  effect that the order  of  dismissal  was  not vitiated on the grounds of illegality or irregularity and in any case the suit was barred by limitation. The trial court found:-

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(a)that  the appellant’s substantive appointment was  that of  an  Overseer  and not that of  a  Drainage  Overseer  as claimed  and  the approval of the  Superintending  Engineer, Public Health Department, Lucknow, for his dismissal was not necessary; (b)that the order of dismissal of the appellant was  ultra vires on the ground that he was not given an opportunity  of being  personally heard by the Board; (c)  that  no  notice to  show cause  against  the  proposed punishment was issued by the Board; (d)that  the  order  of dismissal  was  based  on  certain grounds which were not the suubject-matter of the charge and that the Chairman of the -Board was not competent to try the appellant; but (e)that   the  suit  of  the  appellant  was   barred   by limitation.  The trial court accordingly dismissed the  suit with costs. The appellant carried an appeal. being First Appeal .No. 474 of 1956 before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and contended  that the suit filed by him against the Board  was within limitation.  The appellant relied upon the provisions of  s.  326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act (U.   P.  11  of 1916) (hereinafter 1151 referred  to as "the Act") and contended that the period  of six  months  contemplated by sub-s. (3) of s. 326  plus  the period  of two months required for giving notice for  filing the suit against the Board under sub-s. (1) of s. 326,  that is, 8 months should be computed from April 8, 1952, on which date  the order of the dismissal of his appeal by the U.  P. Government  was  communicated to him and not from  March  5, 1951,  when  the  order of his dismissal by  the  Board  was passed  or March 19,1951, when that order of  dismissal  was communicated to him by the Board. The  High  Court was of opinion that  the  Resolution  dated March  5, 1951, passed by the Board took effect  immediately as  it  was  an order which was complete  and  effective  by itself  and its operation was not postponed for any  further period  nor  was  its  effect  suspended  until  the   State Government had passed orders in appeal.  It accordingly came to  the conclusion that the appellant’s suit was  barred  by limitation  under  s. 326 of the Act.  In view of  the  said finding  the High Court did not go into any other  questions at  issue between the parties but dismissed the appeal  with costs. An application filed by the appellant for a certificate  for leave  to appeal to this Court proved infructuous, with  the result that the appellant applied for and obtained from this Court  special leave to appeal against this judgment of  the High Court. The only question that arises for our determination in  this appeal  is  whether  the  appellant’s  suit  was  barred  by limitation,  because  if  that  is  determined  against  the appellant it will be conclusive of this appeal. Section 326 of the Act runs as under: "  326(1)  No suit shall be instituted against a  Board,  or against  a member, officer or servant of a board in  respect of an act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official  capacity, until the expiration of the  two  months next  after  notice in writing has been, in the  case  of  a Board,  left  at its office, and in the case  of  a  member, officer  or servant, delivered to him or left at his  office or place of abode, 1152 explicitly  stating the cause of action, the nature  of  the

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relief  sought, the amount of compensation claimed  and  the name  and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and  the plaint  shall contain a statement that such notice has  been so delivered or left. (3)  No action such as is described in sub-section (1) shall, unless  it  is  an action for  the  recovery  of  immoveable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be commenced otherwise  than within six months next after the accrual  of the cause of action. Prima facie the period of six months provided in s.    326(3) above  would commence to run after the accrual of the  cause of  action  and the cause of action on which  the  appellant came before the Court was his wrongful dismissal from employ by  the  Board.  Even the extension of this  period  by  two months,  the requisite period of the notice under s.  326(1) would  not  save the appellant from the  bar  of  limitation because be instituted his suit more than eight months  after the  Resolution  dated March 5, 1951,  dismissing  him  from employ  was communicated to him.  The appellant,  therefore, particularly relied upon the provisions of s. 58(1) and  (2) of the Act and urged that the cause of action accrued to him on April 8, 1952, when the order of dismissal of his  appeal by the U. P. Government was communicated to him and the suit which he had filed on December 8, 1952, was therefore within time. Section 69 of the Act which applied to the appellant read as under: " A board may, by special resolution, punish or dismiss  any officer  appointed  under s. 68 subject  to  the  conditions prescribed  in  s.  58  in  respect  of  the  punishment  or dismissal of an Executive Officer," and Section 58(1) and (2) provide: "  S.  58(1):  A board may punish,  dismiss  or  remove  its Executive  Officer by a special resolution supported by  not less  than 2/3rd members constituting the board, subject  to his right of appeal to the State Government 1153 within 30 days of the communication to him of the, order  of punishment or dismissal. (2):The State Government may suspend the Executive  Officer pending the decision of ail appeal under sub-section (1) and may allow, disallow or vary the order of the Board." It  was  argued by the appellant on the  strength  of  these provisions  that the special resolution passed by the  Board was  subject to his right of appeal to the State  Government within  30 days of the communication thereof to him  and  in the  event of his filing an appeal against the  same  within the  period specified, the resolution was kept  in  abeyance and  did not come into operation until the decision  of  the appeal  by  tile  State Government.  If  that  was  so,  lie contended,  his  wrongful  dismissal  by  the  Board  became operative  as from the date when the decision of  the  State Government was communicated to him and that was the date  on which  the  cause  of  action  in  regard  to  his  wrongful dismissal  accrued  to him, with the result  that  the  suit filed   by  him  within  8  months  of  such   communication (including  the period of 2 months’ notice) was well  within time.   He also supported this position by relying upon  the provisions of s. 58(2) which empowered the State  Government to  suspend an employee pending the decision of the  appeal, contending  that such power vested in the  State  Government posited  that  the order of dismissal every  though  validly passed  in  accordance with the conditions specified  in  s. 58(1)  was not to become effective until such  decision  was reached,  because  only in such event the  State  Government

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would  be  in  a position to pass  an  order  of  suspension pending  the  decision  of  the appeal.   If  the  order  of dismissal  passed  by  the Board was  to  come  into  effect immediately  on such special resolution being passed,  there would be no meaning in the State Government being  empowered to  suspend the officer who had been already  dismissed  and the  provision  in that behalf would then be  nugatory.   It was,  therefore, argued that such power vested in the  State Government  necessarily  involved the consequence  that  the order of dismissal could not be operative by its 1154 own force but would continue in abeyance until the  decision of  the  appeal, once an appeal was filed  by  the  employee against the order within the period specified. On a plain reading of the provisions of s. 58(1) and (2), we are of opinion that this contention of the appellant is  not tenable.   One  condition of the validity of  the  order  of dismissal  made by the Board is that the special  resolution in  that behalf should be supported by not less  than  2/3rd members  constituting  the Board.  Once  that  condition  is fulfilled. there is nothing more to be done by the Board and the only right which then accrues to the officer thus  dealt with  by  the  Board is to appeal to  the  State  Government within  30 days of the communication of that order  to  him. He  may choose to exercise this right of appeal  or  without adopting  that procedure he may straightaway  challenge  the validity  of the resolution on any of the grounds  available to him in law, e.g., the non-observance of the principles of natural  justice  and  the like.  There is  nothing  in  the provisions  of s. 58(1) to prevent him from doing so and  if without  exercising this right of appeal which is  given  to him  by  the statute he filed a suit in the Civil  Court  to establish  the ultra vires or the illegal character of  such resolution  it  could  not be urged that  such  a  suit  was premature, he not having exhausted the remedies given to him under  the statute.  The principle that the superior  courts may  not  in their discretion issue  the  prerogative  writs unless  the applicant has exhausted all his  remedies  under the special Act does not apply to a suit.  There is  nothing in  s. 58(1) which expressly or impliedly bars his right  of suit.  The provisions contained in s. 58(2) above would also not  help him for the simple reason that the power which  is vested  in  the State Government of suspending  an  employee pending the decision of the appeal can hardly be said to  be a  condition of the order of the Board.  In any event,  that power is given to the State Government for giving relief  to the  employee who has thus appealed, against the  rigour  of the order of dismissal passed by the Board against him.  The employee may have been dismissed by the 1155 Board, in which case on looking at the prima facie aspect of the  matter  the State Government may as well  come  to  the conclusion that the operation of the order of dismissal  may be stayed and he be suspended instead, thus entitling him to subsistence allowance during the pendency of the appeal.  If the  appeal is eventually dismissed the order of  dismmissal by the Board will stand; if the appeal is allowed he will be entitled  to  continue  in  the employ  and  enjoy  all  the benefits  and privileges of such employment, but  lie  would not  have  to starve during the period that the  appeal  was pending  before the State Government.  The provisions of  s. 58(2)  have to be read along with those of s. 58(1)  and  it cannot  be urged that the power of suspension vested in  the State Government is to be exercised in any other case except that of dismissal or removal of the  employee by the  Board.

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In  the case of any other punishment an order of  suspension passed  by the State Government pending the decision of  the appeal  would  only  mean that during the  pendency  of  the appeal  the State Government is empowered to visit on him  a higher  punishment  than  what has been  meted  out  to  him already  by the Board.  Such an absurd position could  never have been thought of by the legislature and the only way  in which s. 58(1) can be read consistently with s. 58(2) is  to construe  this  power  of suspension  vested  in  the  State Government  to  apply  only to those cases  where  a  higher punishment  than suspension has been meted out by  Board  to the  employee.  Section 58(2) merely prescribes  the  powers which the State Government may exercise in the matter of the appeal  which  has been filed by the  employee  against  the order  of the Board.  The mere filing of an appeal  has  not the effect of holding the order of the Board in abeyance  or postponing  the  effect thereof until the  decision  of  the appeal.  Such a construction would on the other hand involve that  even  though a special resolution was  passed  by  the Board dismissing or removing the employee he would  continue to function as such and draw his salary pending the decision of  his  appeal,  once  he filed an  appeal  to  the,  State Government as prescribed.  We do not see any words in 147 1156 s.   58(1)  and (2 which would suspend the operation of  the order passed by the Board or render it ineffective by reason of the filing or the pendency of the appeal. As a matter of fact the legislature in s. 61(3) of the  very same  Act  while dealing with the right of appeal  from  the order-, of the executive officer has expressly provided  for such a contingency and enacted that when an appeal was filed within the specified period the order would remain suspended until   the  appeal  was  decided.   A  comparison  of   the provisions  of  s.  58(1) and s. 61(3) of the  Act  is  thus sufficient) to show that no such consequence was intended by the legislature when it enacted s. 58(1) of the Act. A  similar provision enacted in the proviso to s. 71 of  the U.  P.  District Boards Act (U.  P. X of 1922) may  also  be referred to in this context.  While dealing with the  powers of dismissal or punishment of a Secretary or  Superintendent of education by the Board the legislature enacted a  proviso thereto   that  the  Secretary  or  the  Superintendent   of education of a Board, as the case may be, shall have a right of  appeal to the State Government against  such  resolution within  one month from the date of the communication of  the resolution  to him, and that the resolution shall  not  take effect  until the period of one month has expired  or  until the  State  Government  has  passed  orders  on  any  appeal preferred  by him.  The absence of any such provision in  s. 58 of the Act also goes to show that no such consequence was intended by the legislature. The enactment of s. 58(1) in the manner in which it has been done  giving to the employee only a right of appeal  to  the State Government within 30 days of the communication to  him of the order of the Board without anything more is enough to show  that neither was the suspension of the order  nor  the postponement of the effect thereof as a result of the filing of an appeal ever in the contemplation of the legislature. It may be noted in passing that the appellant relied upon  a decision  of  the  Allahabad  High  Court  in  Dist.  Board, Shahjahanpur  v.  Kailashi  Nath (1), which  turned  on  the construction of s. 71 of the U.P. District (1) A I.R. 1948 All. 199. 1157

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Boards Act set out above in support of his contention.   The provisions of that section, however, are quite distinct from those  of  s. 58(1) of the Act before us and this  case  was rightly  distinguished  by the High Court  in  the  judgment appealed  against inasmuch as by the express terms of s.  71 under  consideration  there, the dismissal was not  to  take effect  until the period of one month had expired  or  until the  State  Government  had  passed  orders  on  any  appeal preferred  by  the employee.  It is, therefore,  clear  that even though the order passed by the Board was subject to the right  of  appeal  given  to  the  employee  in  the  manner aforesaid, the operation of the order was not suspended  nor was its effect in any manner postponed till a later date  by the  mere filing of the appeal and it became effective  from the  date  when it was communicated to  the  employee.   The cause of action, if any, accrued to the employee on the date of such comunication and the period of limitation  commenced to run from that date. If this is the true position on a plain construction of  the provisions of s. 58(1) and (2) of the Act what is the  other principle  which the appellant can call to his aid in  order to  support his contention ? He tried to equate the  special resolution  passed  by the Board with a decree passed  by  a trial  court  and the decision of the appeal  by  the  State Government  with a decree passed by an appellate  court  and urged that in the same manner as a decree of the trial court became  merged in the decree passed by the  appellate  court and  no decree of the trial court thereafter  survived,  the decision of the appeal by the State Government replaced  the special resolution passed by the Board and such decision  if adverse to him gave him a cause of action and the period  of limitation  commenced to run against him only from the  date of such decree.  The argument was that even though the cause of action in respect of such wrongful dismissal arose on the date  when the order of the Board was communicated  to  him, once  an appeal was filed by him against that  order  within the period prescribed that cause of action was suspended and became merged in the cause of action which 1158 would  accrue  to him on the decision of his appeal  by  the State Government.  The special resolution of the Board would then  merge  into the decision of the  State  Government  on appeal  and the only thing which then survived would be  the decision of the State Government on which either there would be  a resuscitation or revival of the cause of action  which had accrued to him on the communication of the order of  the Board or the accrual of a fresh cause of action which  could be  ventilated  by  him  within  the  period  of  limitation commencing therefrom. The initial difficulty in the way of the appellant, however, is that departmental enquiries even though they culminate in decisions  on  appeals or revision cannot  be  equated  with proceedings  before  the  regular courts  of  law.   As  was observed by this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh (1): ".........  an order of dismissal passed on  a  departmental enquiry by an officer in the department and an order- passed by another officer next higher in rank dismissing an  appeal therefrom and an order rejecting an application for revision by  the head of the department (--an hardly be equated  with any  propriety with decrees made in a civil suit  under  the Code  of Civil Procedure by the court of first instance  and the  decree  dismissing the appeal therefrom  by  an  appeal court  and the order- dismissing the revision petition by  a yet  higher  court.............  because  the   departmental

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tribunals of the first instance or on appeal or revision are not regular courts manned by persons trained in law although they may have the trappings of the courts of law. The  analogy  of the decisions of the courts  of  law  would therefore be hardly available to the appellant. Our attention was drawn in this connection to cases  arising tinder s. 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure which have held that  the period of limitation is to be calculated from  the date of the original decree which gave rise to the right  of restitution  and  not from the date of the decision  of  the last appeal which was filed (1) [1958] S.C.R. 595. 1159 against   it.    Reliance  was  placed  on   the   following observations  of  B.  K. Mukherjea J. (as he  then  was)  in Bhabarajan Das v. Nibaran Chandra (1): " The question therefore that really falls for determination is  as to whether the time for such an application ought  to be  calculated  from the date of the decision  of  the  last appeal, or from the decree which for the first time gave the appellant a right to apply for restitution.  It is  conceded by  the  learned  Advocate for the appellant  that  lie  had undoubtedly  the right to pray for restitution at  the  time when the judgment was passed by the Munsif.  His  contention is  that it was not necessary for him to apply at the  first opportunity  as  there  was an  appeal  taken  against  that decision  of  the trial judge and lie could  wait  till  the judgment  of the Appellate Court was pronounced.  After  the Appellate  Court had passed its decision the decree  of  the trial court would no longer be in existence and lie would be entitled  to  base  his rights to  get  restitution  on  the Appellate  Court’s decree.  I find myself unable  to  accept this  contention  as  tenable.  If the right  to  apply  for restitution  was available to the appellant as soon  as  the first court passed its judgment, time would certainly  begin to run from that date under Art. 181 and the mere fact  that the judgment was challenged by way of an appeal which  might eventually set it aside, does not, in lily opinion,  operate to  suspend the running of  time.  Nor would  the  appellate Courts decree into which the decree of the trial Court would undoubtedly merge give the party a fresh starting point  for limitation. The analogy. of the decree of the trial court merging into a decree  of the appeal court clearly does not apply to  these cases.   The  observations of Rankin C.T. in Hari  Mohan  v. Parameshwar  Shau (1) are also in point. the  learned  Chief Justice at "  But  the  application  to be made  under  s.  144  is  an application  which  must be made to the Court of  the  first instance whether the decree varied or reversed was passed by that Court or a higher Court. (1) A.I.R. 1939 Cal. 349, 35.. (2) (1928) I.L.R 56 Cal. 61 78. 1160 That  Court  has  to  determine  whether  the  applicant  is entitled to any and what benefits, by way of restitution  or otherwise,  by reason of the decree of the  appellate  court varying  or  reversing  a  previous  decree.   We  have   to determine  this case under Art. 181, of the Limitation  Act, which directs us, in general language, to find out the  date on which the applicant’s right accrued.  In the ordinary and natural   meaning   of  the  words,  their   right   accrued immediately the -District Judge reversed the decision of the trial  court,  and  reduced the amount  of  the  plaintiff’s claim.  Unless, therefore, we are required by reason of  the

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nature of the matter to ignore the effect of that  decision, because  it  was confirmed on appeal, it seems to me  to  be wrong  to  do so.  To refuse so to do does not  involve  the proposition  that  two  decrees for the same  thing  may  be executed  simultaneously.  Nor does it involve, so far as  I can see, the affirmance of any other proposition that can be regarded as inconvenient or absurd. Further, when even if the analogy applies, where the  decree of  the  appeal court only affirms the decree of  the  trial court,  this Court has held in the State Of U. P.  v.  Mohd. Noolt  (1),  that  the original decree of  the  trial  court remains operative.  This Court has said at p. 611 :- "  In  the next place, while it is true that a decree  of  a court  of first instance may be said to merge in the  decree passed  on appeal therefrom or even in the order  passed  in revision, it does so only for certain purposes, namely,  for the  purposes  of  computing the period  of  Limitation  for execution of the decree as in Batuk, Nath v. Munni Dei  (2), or for computing the period of limitation for an application for  final decree in a mortgage suit as in Jowad Hussain  v. Gendait  Singh (3).  But as pointed by Sir Lawrence  Jenkins in  delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in  Juscurn Boid  v. Pirthichand Lal (4), whatever be the  theory  under other systems of law, under the Indian law and procedure  an original decree is not suspended (1) [1958] S.C.R. 595. (2)  41 I.A. 104. (3) 53 1. A. 197. (4)  46 I.A. 52. 1161 by  the  presentation  of an appeal  nor  is  its  operation interrupted  where  the decree on appeal is  merely  one  of dismissal.   There is nothing in the Indian law  to  warrant the  suggestion  that the decree or order of  the  court  or tribunal  of  the first instance becomes final only  on  the termination of all proceedings by way of appeal or revision. The  filing of the appeal or revision may put the decree  or order  in jeopardy but until it is reversed or  modified  it remains effective." The original decree being thus operative what we are  really concerned  with  is  the  commencement  of  the  period   of limitation as prescribed in the relevant statuite and if the statute  prescribes that it commences from the (late of  the accrual  of the cause of action there is no  getting  behind these  words in spite of the apparent iniquity  of  applying the same.  As was pointed out by Seshagiri Ayyar J. in Mathu Korakkai Chetty v. Madar Ammal (1): "    Therefore in my opinion, the true  rule  deducible from these  various decisions of the Judicial Committee is  this: that   subject  to  the  exemptions,  exclusion,   mode   of computationalid.  the  excusing of delay,  etc.,  which  are provided  in the Limitation Act, the language of  the  third column of the first schedule should be ,go interpreted as to carry  out the true intention of the legislature that is  to say,  by  dating the cause of action from a  date  when  the remedy is available to the party." The  cause  of  action in the present case  accrued  to  the appellant  the  moment  the resolution of  the  --Board  was communicated   to  him  and  that  was  the  date   of   the commencement of the limitation.  The remedy, if any, by  way of  filing  a  suit  against the Board  in  respect  of  his wrongful  dismissal was available to him from that date  and it  was open to him to pursue that remedy within the  period of limitation prescribed under s. 326 of the Act. The  result  is  no doubt  unfortunate  for  the  appellant,

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because the trial court found in his favour in regard to his plea of wrongful dismissal.  If he had only brought the suit within the period prescribed by s. 326 of the (I)  (1919) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 185, 213. 1162 Act, he might possibly have got some relief from the  Court. He  however  chose to wait till the decision  of  the  State Government  on his appeal and overstepped the limit of  time to  his own detriment.  We are unable to come to  any  other conclusion  than the one reached above and the appeal  must, therefore,   stand   dismissed;   but   in   the    peculiar circumstances of the case, we make no order " to costs. The appellant was given leave to proceed as a pauper and  he prosecuted  this  appeal  in form a pauperis .  s.  lie  has failed  in the appeal and we do order that he shall pay  the court-fee  which would have been paid by him if he  had  not been  permitted to appeal as a pauper.  The Registrar  shall send  to the AttorneyGeneral for India a memorandum  of  the court-fees payable by him as required by Or.  XIV, r. 12, of the Supreme Court Rules. Appeal dismissed.