IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 4849-4850 of 2000

Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi                             ….Appellant

Vs.

Lt. Governor, Govt. of N.C.T.  Delhi & Ors.                  ……Respondents

J U D G M E N T

HARJIT SINGH BEDI,J.

1.  These appeals are directed against the judgment of the  

Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dated 2nd September  

1998 dismissing the writ petitions.  The facts are as under:

2. On 13th November 1959, a Notification was issued by the  

Chief Commissioner of Delhi under 4 of the Land Acquisition  

Act  (hereinafter  called  the  “Act”)  notifying  the  Government’s  

intention to  acquire  34070  acres  of  land  for  the  “Planned

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Development of Delhi”.  This notification had, within its ambit,  

agricultural  land belonging to the appellant  society,  bearing  

Khasra No. 157 in Village Lado Sarai, Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi  

measuring  8  Bighas  and  11  Biswas  or  8620  sq.  yards  

equivalent to 1.8 acres.  The appellant filed objections under  

Section 5A of the Act on the 10th December 1959 submitting  

that the land be exempted from the proposed acquisition. It  

pointed out that the appellant body was a registered trust and  

a religious body managing three temples in Pilani, Rajasthan  

and  several  gardens,  water  tanks  etc.  having  religious  

significance.    The  objections  raised  were  apparently  found  

without  merit  whereafter  the  Chief  Commissioner  issued  a  

declaration under Section 6 of the Act which was published on  

16th May  1966  pertaining  to  2153  Bighas  2  Biswas  

corresponding  to  about  448  acres.  The  Collector,  Land  

Acquisition  also  rendered  his  award  on  19th June  1980  

clarifying  that  it  pertained  only  to  1996  Bighas  18  Biswas  

leaving out an area of 156 Bighas 4 Biswas  for the time  being  

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as it was built up and that the award for this area would be  

given  later.   The  appellant’s  property  Khasra  No.157  was,  

however, included in the award of 19th June, 1980.  It appears  

that pursuant to the award possession of 1933 Bighas and 2  

Biswas was taken by the Collector, Land Acquisition on the  

20th June  1980 and further  handed over  to  the  beneficiary  

department. It was, however, observed in the proceedings of  

20th June  1980  that  the  possession  of  the  balance  area  of  

about  61  Bighas  would  be  taken  after  the  removal  of  the  

structures with the help of the demolition squad.  On the 29th  

July  1980  a  Notification  under  Section  22  (1)  of  the  Delhi  

Development  Act,  1957  was  issued  by  the  Central  

Government, placing the acquired land at the disposal of the  

Delhi Development Authority for the planned development of  

Delhi.  At this stage, the appellant filed CWP No.1068  of 1980  

in  the  Delhi  High  Court  challenging  the  validity  of  the  

Notification under Section 4 and Declaration under Section 6  

of the Act.   This petition was dismissed in limine on the 18th  

August  1980.   The  appellant  thereupon  preferred  Special  

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Leave Petition in this Court and after leave was granted the  

appeal was registered as C.A. No. 1738 of 1981.  While the  

appeal  was  still  pending,  the  appellant  filed  Writ  Petition  

No.2220/1981 under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in  

the  Supreme Court.   It  appears  that  an interim order  was  

made by the Supreme Court in these proceedings on 15th of  

July  1981  staying  dispossession  of  the  appellant  from  the  

property in dispute and the said order was confirmed on 16th  

September 1982.  Both the Civil Appeal and the Writ Petition  

aforementioned were, however, dismissed by this Court on the  

20th July 1993.  It also appears from the record that while the  

aforementioned two matters were pending in this Court, the  

appellant filed Suit No. 1226 of 1992 on the Original Side of  

the  Delhi  High Court  praying  for  an injunction  against  the  

respondents, including the Delhi Development Authority, that  

no structure be demolished and that no interference be made  

with  the  plaintiff’s  possession  and management  of  the  Suit  

land. An interim injunction was also sought and obtained in  

these proceedings.  It is the appellant’s case that though the  

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aforesaid Suit was transferred to the District Court in Delhi on  

account  of  the  revision  of  the  pecuniary  jurisdiction  of  the  

Delhi High Court, the said interim injunction still continued to  

operate, but despite the interim orders the Delhi Development  

Authority continued to impinge on the appellant’s property on  

which a Contempt Petition was filed in the High Court, which  

in  its  order  dated  19th May  1992,  directed  the  respondent  

authorities to ensure compliance with the High Court’s order  

dated 2nd April 1992 made in the civil suit.  It is further the  

case  of  the  appellant  that  some  time  later  the  Delhi  

Development  Authority  again  tried  to  interfere  with  the  

appellant’s property on which yet another Contempt Petition  

No.36 of 1993 was filed and the same is said to be pending.  

The appellant, however, continued to be persist in its efforts to  

save the acquired land and at this stage filed C.W.P.No.700 of  

1994  in  the  Delhi  High  Court  on  28th January  1994  

challenging, inter-alia, the constitutional validity of Section 22  

of the Delhi Development Act, whereunder the acquired land  

had been handed over to the DDA, and also praying for the  

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allotment of an alternative site in lieu of the acquired land.  

This writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn on September  

8,  1995  the  prayer  of  the  counsel  for  the  petitioner  (the  

present appellant) in the following terms:

“Mr.  Anand  says,  in  view  of  the  order dated 29.11.94, he would not press  this  petition  at  this  stage  and  would  apply for allotment of alternative land in  the institutional area.

Dismissed  as  withdrawn.  However,  we will make it clear that allotment of the  alternative land be made to the petitioner  as per policy.”

3. Still dissatisfied, the appellant filed W.P. No. 623 of 1995  

in the Delhi High Court challenging some facets of the alleged  

violation of the Master Plan of 2001 which had statedly made  

the entire proceedings for the planned development of Delhi  

incohate and which had rendered the acquisition without any  

authority of law .  This matter came up before the Delhi High  

Court after notice on 20th February 1995 on which the High  

Court  observed that  the petitioner  was seeking two distinct  

prayers in the Writ Petition, (1) that the land which had been  

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acquired under the Land Acquisition Act should be released  

from acquisition and (2) that the DDA should not be permitted  

to  use  the  aforesaid  land  for  a  purpose  other  than  that  

postulated in the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan  

and as the two prayers were mutually distinct and pertained  

to  different  causes  of  action,  one  writ  petition  was  not  

maintainable.  On  this,  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

appellant,  Mr.  R.K.  Anand  stated  that  he  would  file  two  

separate writ petitions for which liberty was granted and the  

papers of CWP No. 623 of 1995 were accordingly returned to  

the  counsel.   The  appellant  thereupon  moved  two  writ  

petitions  i.e.  W.  P.  Nos.  1628/1995  praying  that  the  

respondent DDA be restrained from taking over possession of  

the land and Writ Petition No. 1629/1995 seeking to challenge  

the land acquisition proceedings which had been initiated by  

the  Notification  under  Section  4  and  Declaration  under  

Section 6 of the Act in the year 1959 and 1966 respectively  

and also pleading that as the possession  had not been taken,  

the land be released under Section 48 of the Act. The Division  

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Bench while dealing with the question of possession held that  

the writ petitioner had only relied on two stray entries in two  

Khasra Girdawaris  for  the  period 13th October  1980 to 11th  

March 1981 which had recorded the land to be “Gair Mumkin  

Kotha  Pukhta  and  Char  Diwari”  and  that  this  entry  was  

meaningless in the light of  the fact that the land had been  

described as “Rosli” (agricultural) and not a built up property  

in the award No.36/80-81 dated 19.6.1980 and that in any  

case the plea appeared to be an after thought as it had not  

been taken by the petitioner  though it  was available  at  the  

time  when Writ  Petition  No.  1068/1980  (in  the  Delhi  High  

Court) and Writ Petition No.2220/1981 had been directly filed  

in this Court.  The Court further held that it was clear from  

the proceedings recorded by Shri  Lal  Singh Naib Tehsildar,  

Land Acquisition, on 20th June 1980 in the presence of a large  

number of Revenue Officials that possession had indeed been  

taken over on that day after demarcation had been made with  

respect to 1933 bighas 2 biswas, including the land belonging  

to the appellant, and that boundary pillars had been affixed  

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round  the  demarcated  land  and  that  the  possession  had  

further been handed over to Shri N.N. Seth, Tehsildar on 20th,  

21st, 23rd and 24th of June 1980.  The Court also noted that the  

proceedings  aforementioned  were  witnessed  as  to  their  

authenticity by Shri N.N.Seth, and the two DDA Officials, Shri  

Raj Bahadur and Shri Gulab Singh.  The Division Bench in  

this background observed that possession had, in fact, been  

taken  over  after  appropriate  proceedings.   The  two  writ  

petitions were accordingly dismissed by the Division Bench of  

the Delhi High Court vide the impugned judgment leading to  

the present appeals as a consequence.

4. At the very outset, Mr. Sunil Gupta, the learned senior  

counsel for the appellant has candidly stated at the Bar that  

the appellant was no longer challenging the acquisition and  

the relief claimed in W.P. 1629/1995 was, therefore, not being  

pursued in  this  appeal.   He has,  however,  prayed with the  

greatest emphasis, that in so far as the claim arising out of  

W.P.  No.1628/1995  was  concerned  it  was  clear  from  the  

record that  possession of  the  appellant’s  land i.e.  1  acre  8  

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Biswas  continued  to  remain  with  the  appellant  despite  the  

findings to the contrary recorded by the High Court, and as  

such it  was open to  the  Government  to  withdraw from the  

acquisition if it so desired, under Section 48 of the Act.

5. In  this  background,  Mr.  Gupta,  has  raised  three  

arguments before us during the course of  hearing.   He has  

first pointed out that it was the positive case of the appellant  

that the land in dispute was encircled by a boundary wall and  

as such possession thereof could be taken only after entering  

the land and not by any symbolic or paper possession.  As a  

corollary, it has been submitted, that there was no material on  

record to show that the actual physical possession had been  

taken  as  would  preclude  the  withdrawal  of  the  acquisition  

under Section 48 of the Act.  In this connection, the learned  

counsel has placed reliance on Balwant Narayan Bhagde vs.  

M.D. Bhagat & Ors.  (1976) 1 SCC 700 and  Om Prakash &  

Anr.   Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.   (1998) 6 SCC 1 which had  

been  subsequently  followed  in  P.K.Kalburqi   vs. State  of  

Karnataka & Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 489.  It has finally been  

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submitted that there was ample evidence on record to show  

that the property in dispute was, in fact, surrounded by a wall  

and had some other  structures  as well,  and in view of  the  

positive stand taken by the Land Acquisition Collector in his  

award dated 19th June 1980 that the possession of the area  

covered  by  structures  would  be  the  subject  matter  of  a  

supplementary award, the very basis of the judgment of the  

High  Court  that  the  possession  had  been  taken  on  the  

20th June 1980 was erroneous.   

6.  Mr.  Saharya  and Mr.  Wasim Quadri,  the  learned  counsel  

appearing for the DDA and the Delhi Government respectively  

have  controverted the submissions and have pointed out that  

the appellant had, for almost 30 years, been able to scuttle the  

development of the area by taking piecemeal stands in the writ  

petitions  and  civil  suits  from  the  year  1980  onwards  and  

though the aforesaid matters had been rejected with positive  

findings that possession had been taken, and that there was no  

wall  or  structure  on the land in  question.   It  has also  been  

submitted that the proper procedure had been adopted by the  

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Naib Tehsildar and that the possession had been taken over as  

per law on the 20th June 1980 and there was ample evidence to  

this effect which had been considered by the Division Bench.

7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties very  

carefully.  The Act provides a machinery for the acquisition of  

the land.   An acquisition is  set  in motion by a Notification  

under Section 4 when it is proposed to acquire any land for  

public  purpose  and  Section  5A  envisages  the  filing  of  

objections with regard to the proposed acquisition.  After the  

objections under Section 5A have been considered and been  

found without merit, a declaration under Section 6 of the Act  

is  published  that  the  land  is  indeed  required  for  a  public  

purpose.    Section  9  of  the  Act  provides  that  after  all  the  

proceedings and certain other formalities have been completed  

the  Collector  shall  give  public  notice  that  the  Government  

intends to take possession of the land and calling upon the  

persons interested to file their claims for compensation.  The  

matter is then enquired into by the Collector who renders his  

award under Section 11 of the Act and possession is taken by  

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the  Collector  under  Section  16  on  which  the  land  vests  

absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances.  It  

is the case of the respondent that all the procedures had been  

followed and that possession had been taken under Section 16  

on the 20th June 1980, and as such, the question of its release  

under Section 48 of the Act did not arise, as this provision  

gives “liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of  

which possession has not been taken”.  The question raised by  

Mr. Gupta is that as the area in question was very extensive  

i.e. about 1933 bigas and the land belonging to the appellant  

was surrounded by a boundary wall, symbolic possession was  

meaningless and some more positive action was called for.  To  

support this view he has relied on the three judgments cited  

earlier.   We find,  however,  that the aforesaid judgments,  in  

fact, help the case of the respondent rather than the other way  

around.    In  Narayan Bhagde’s case, which was heard by  

three Hon’ble Judges of this Court one of the Hon’ble Judges  

(Untwalia,J.)  held  that  the  principles  underlying  Order  21,  

Rules 35, 36, 95 and 96 of the CPC prescribing the modes of  

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delivery of possession including symbolic and actual could be  

applied to proceedings under the Act but the other two Hon’ble  

Judges (Bhagwati and Gupta,JJ.) held that the said provisions  

could not be applied to proceedings under the Act and that  

actual possession thereof was required to be taken.  In this  

background, the two Hon’ble Judges observed as under:-

“We think it is enough to state that  when  the  Government  proceeds  to  take  possession of the land acquired by it under the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894,  it  must  take  actual  possession  of  the  land,  since  all  interests in the land are sought to acquired by  it.   There  can  be  no  question  of  taking  ‘symbolical’  possession  in  the  sense  understood  by  judicial  decision  under  the  Code of Civil Procedure.  Nor would possession  merely  on  paper  be  enough.   What  the  Act  contemplates  as  a  necessary  condition  of  vesting of the land in the Government is the  taking of actual possession of the land.  How  such possession may be taken would depend  on the nature of the land.  Such possession  would have to be taken as the nature of the  land admits of.  There can be no hard and fast  rule laying down what act would be sufficient  to  constitute  taking  of  possession  of  land.  There  cannot  be  an  absolute  and  inviolable  rule that merely going on the spot and making  a  declaration  by  beat  of  drum  or  otherwise  would  be  sufficient  to  constitute  taking  of  possession of land in every case.  But here, in  

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our  opinion,  since  the  land  was  lying  fallow  and there was no crop on it  at  the  material  time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the  spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of  determining what part was waste and arable  and should, therefore, be taken possession of  and determining  its  extent,  was sufficient  to  constitute taking on possession. ”   

8. In Om Prakash’s case (supra) the basic issue was as to  

whether the land which was the subject matter of acquisition  

could be acquired in view of the State policy that Abadi land  

was  not  to  be  acquired.  It  is  in  this  connection,  the  Court  

observed that there appeared to be no conclusive evidence that  

possession  had  been  taken  from  the  land  owner,  and  the  

matter was left open for the land owner to approach the State  

Government under Section 48 of the Act to have land released.  

In  P.K.Kalburqi’s case  (supra), a reference was made to the  

judgment in Narayan Bhagde’s case (supra) and it was once  

again  reiterated  that  the  procedure  for  taking  possession  

would  depend upon the  nature  of  the  land and  the  extent  

thereof.   A  cumulative  reading  of  the  aforesaid  judgments  

would  reveal  that  while  taking  symbolic  and  notional  

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possession is  perhaps not  envisaged under  the  Act  but  the  

manner  in  which  possession  is  taken  must  of  necessity  

depend  upon  the  facts  of  each  case.  Keeping  this  broad  

principal in mind, this Court in  Tamil Nadu Housing Board  

vs. Viswam (D) by Lrs. AIR 1996 SC 3377 after considering  

the judgment in Narayan Bhagde’s case, observed that while  

taking  possession  of  a  large  area of  land (in  this  case  339  

acres)  a  pragmatic  and realistic  approach had to  be  taken.  

This  Court  then  examined  the  context  under  which  the  

judgment in Narayan Bhagde’s case  had been rendered and  

held as under:

“It  is  settled  law  by  series  of  judgments of this Court that one of the  accepted  modes  of  taking  possession  of  the  acquired  land  is  recording  of  a  memorandum  or  Panchanama  by  the  LAO in the presence of witnesses signed  by him/them and that would constitute  taking possession of the land as it would  be impossible to take physical possession  of  the  acquired  land.   It  is  common  knowledge  that  in  some  cases  the  owner/interested  person  may  not  cooperative  in  taking  possession  of  the  land.”

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In  Balmokand  Khatri  Educational  and  Industrial  Trust,  

Amritsar vs. State of Punjab & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1239 yet  

again the question was  as to the taking over of the possession  

of  agricultural land and it was observed thus:

“It  is  seen that the  entire  gamut of  the  acquisition  proceedings  stood  completed  by  April 17, 1976 by which date possession of the  land had been taken. No doubt, Shri  Parekh  has contended that the appellant still retained  their  possession.  It  is  now  well-settled  legal  position  that  it  is  difficult  to  take  physical  possession  of  the  land  under  compulsory  acquisition.   The  normal  mode  of  taking  possession is  drafting the Panchnama in the  presence  of  Panchas  and  taking  possession  and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is the  accepted  mode  of  taking  possession  of  the  land.   Subsequent  thereto,  the  retention  of  possession would tantamount only to illegal or  un lawful possession.”

9. It would, thus, be seen from a cumulative reading of the  

aforesaid judgments, that while taking possession of a large  

area  of  land  with  a  large  number  of  owners,  it  would  be  

impossible for the Collector or the Revenue Official  to enter  

each bigha or biswas and to take possession thereof and that  

a pragmatic approach has to be adopted by the Court.  It is  

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also clear that one of the methods of taking possession and  

handing it over to the beneficiary department is the recording  

of a Panchnama which can in itself constitute evidence of the  

fact that possession had been taken and the land had vested  

absolutely in the Government.

10. The question arises as to whether in the face of the  

above  observations,  the  procedure  adopted  by  the  Naib  

Tehsildar,   Land Acquisition Shri Lal Singh was the correct  

one.  The Award was rendered in the present matter on the  

19th June  1980.  As  per  the  possession  proceedings  

(Panchnama) recorded by Shri Lal Singh dated the 20th June  

1980, possession of 1933 bighas 2 biswas of land had been  

taken over and handed over to the Revenue Department on the  

21st June 1980, 23rd June 1980 and 24th June 1980.   In the  

Panchnama  it  was  also  observed  that  the  land  had  been  

demarcated and pillars had been affixed and that the physical  

possession had further been handed over to Shri N.N. Seth,  

Tehsildar,  the  representative of the beneficiary department.  

Admittedly, Khasra No.157 was covered by this document. It is  

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recorded that the possession of the land under the built up  

area of 160 bighas 6 biswas could not be handed over and the  

details of this land have also been provided in the aforesaid  

document.  Khasra  No.157  does  not  come  in  this  category.  

Mr.Gupta  has,  however,  emphasized  that  some  material  

documents which show the possession had not been taken on  

20th June, as alleged, had been ignored by the Division Bench  

which he has referred us to the Khasra Girdwaris for the years  

1980-81 and 1981-82 showing the existence of a Char Diwari.  

He has,  accordingly,  submitted that the observations in the  

award that the appellant’s land was “Rosli” was incorrect in  

the light of this record.  We find absolutely no merit in this  

plea.   A  Khasra  Girdwari  which  is  a  mere  crop  inspection  

report entered twice a year (Kharif  and Rabi crops)  has no  

presumption of truth attached to it. Even otherwise the state  

of the land as on the date of the Notification under Section 4 of  

the Act (which is 13th November 1959) would be the relevant  

date as to the nature of the land and a crop inspection report  

20 years later cannot be taken as proof of some facts said to  

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exist in the year 1959.  Mr. Gupta has also stressed that from  

the Award itself  it was clear that the wall standing on Khasra  

No.157 had been assessed to a compensation of  Rs.420/- and  

as  such  the  observations  in  the  award   that  land  was  

agricultural  was  erroneous.   Mr.  Saharya  has,  however,  

pointed out that the part of the Award to which reference has  

been  made  by  Mr.  Gupta  is  captioned  as  “Wells  and  

Structures’  and  that  a  reference  to  a  wall  in  the  body  is  

typographical error.  We reproduce the relevant portion of the  

award herein under:

Wells and Structures

“The land under acquisition has number of  wells, water channel and structures. The Assistant  Engineer (Valuation) has made the rate assessment  of each of these items to which I agree and award  accordingly subject to the verification at the time of  possession as per details given as under: -

Kh.No. Item Value  

Assessed

555/2/2 Well, Drain, Water  tank Rs.6920/-

254 Well Structure Rs.2490/- 577/430 -do- Rs.2130/- 217 Well Structure Rs.2730/- 100 Structure Rs.260/- 670/27 -do- Rs.3320/- 15 Well Rs.4030/-

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Structure/Room

29 Well, Water tank,  Room & Structures Rs.3490/-

139

Well, Structures,  Water tank, rooms &  drains 4600/-

160 Well Structures,  room & drain Rs.2750/-

394 Well Structures Rs.4690/- 399 -do- Rs.2380/- 242 Structure Rs.540/- 149 -do- Rs.260/- 580/148 Wall Rs.1264/- 157 -do- Rs.420

172 Well, Water Tank,  drain Structure Rs.7960/-

298 -do- Rs.4890/- 333 wells, Structure Rs.5350/-

20 Structure &  Compound wall Rs.3300/-

195/2 Well, Water drains,  Water tank & room Rs.7530/-

321 -do- Rs.7250/-

478 Well, Water tank  drains & rooms Rs.6665/-

321 Room, water tank,  drain Rs.1125/-

478 Drain Rs.360/-

92 Well, water tank,  drain, Khurli, rooms Rs.7260/-

155

Well, water tank,  drain khurli, rooms,  verandah Rs.6720/-

597/202/264 Well, Water tank,  Room Rs.2700/-

455

Well, Water tank,  Water Channel  room Rs.2790/-

86 Well, Water tank,  drains, rooms Rs.3320/-

No. Item Value  

assessed 514 Well Rs.1720/- 464 -do- Rs.2850/- 688/518/119/2 -do- Rs.2290/- 189 -do- Rs.1820/- 436 Well, structures Rs.1020/- 210 Well Rs.2060/- 453 -do- Rs.5650/-

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Total: Rs.1,21,189-00                      There are  water  channels  running  through  Kh.  Nos.  228,  635/251,  254,  253,  255, 250, 263, 597/262, 261, 269, 434, 435,  440,  442,  443,  444,  445 & 446.   The Naib- Tehsildar  has  made  a  detailed  valuation  to  which  I  agree  and  award  Rs.2870/-  as  compensation as these channels.”   

11.  A reading of the above extract reveals that wells, and  

structures  connected  with  wells,  and  irrigation  

facilities  have  been  referred  to  therein  and  an  

independent  wall  is  not  even  remotely  the  subject  

matter.  Mr. Gupta has, however, seriously objected  

to  this  explanation  by  submitting  that  no  plea  

doubting the accuracy of the document having been  

raised in the counter affidavit, the respondents were  

now  precluded  from  making  this  submission.  We,  

however, feel that in the light of the context in which  

the entire matter has been dealt with in the Award,  

there can be no doubt that the entry ‘wall’ should be  

read as ‘well’ vis-à-vis Khasra No.157.  There is yet  

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CA Nos.4849-4850/2000

another  circumstance,  perhaps even more relevant.  

We find that no question had ever been raised by the  

appellant with regard to the presence of a wall in the  

objections  filed  under  Section  5A  or  even  in  the  

responses filed to the notices under Section 9 of the  

Act  and  the  only  prayer  was  that  the  land  be  

exempted  from  acquisition  (Item  no.36).   These  

omissions become more significant as several other  

landowners  had  claimed  compensation  for  the  

superstructures that  were  existing on the acquired  

land.  It is also equally significant, as pointed out by  

Mr. Saharya, that no question had ever been raised  

by the appellant with regard to the existence of a wall  

or superstructure in any of the litigations prior to the  

present  set  of  Writ  Petitions.   Mr.  Gupta  has,  

however,  referred  us  to  the  objections  dated  15th  

November  1966  showing  the  existence  of  a  wall.  

These  objections  are,  to  our  mind,  meaningless  as  

they had not been filed in response to the notification  

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under  Section  4  which  had been published  in  the  

year 1959 and were filed after the declaration under  

Section  6  had  been  made  and  are,  therefore,  an  

obvious  after  thought.   It  also  bears  notice  that  

despite the claim under this document, no plea with  

regard to the existence of a wall had been raised at  

any stage till the filing of the present petitions in the  

year 1995.   

12. Mr. Gupta has, with great emphasis, pointed out  that  

from  the  affidavit  dated  30th July  1996  sworn  by  Mr.  

G.S.Meena, Under Secretary, Land and Building Department,  

it  was  clear  that  the  appellant  continued  to  remain  in  

possession on account of the stay of dispossession granted by  

the High Court on 15th July 1981 in WP No. 2220/1981 and  

the confirmation of the said order on 16th September 1982 and  

as such the stand of the appellants that possession had been  

taken was not correct.  We have, however, already observed  

that possession had been taken between 20th and 24th June  

1980, and the acquired land thus stood vested in the State  

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free from all encumbrances under Section 16 of the Act.  It is  

also  relevant  that  the  afore-referred  writ  petition  was  

dismissed  meaning  thereby  that  the  said  order  should  

automatically  be  vacated  as  well.   Even  assuming  for  a  

moment  that  the  petitioner  had  re-possessed  the  acquired  

land at some stage would be of no consequence in view of the  

provisions of section 16 ibidem.  In  Narayan Bhagde’s case  

(supra) one of the arguments raised by the land owner was  

that as per the communication of the Commissioner the land  

was still with the land owner and possession thereof had not  

been taken.  The Bench observed that the letter was based on  

a  misconception  as  the  land  owner  had  re-entered  the  

acquired land immediately after its possession had been taken  

by the government ignoring the scenario that he stood divested  

of the possession, under Section 16 of the Act.   This Court  

observed as under:

“This  was plainly  erroneous  view,  for  the  legal  position  is  clear  that  even  if  the  appellant  entered  upon  the  land  and  resumed  possession of it the very next moment after the  land  was  actually  taken  possession  of  and  

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became vested in the Government, such act on  the part of the appellant did not have the effect of  obliterating the consequences of vesting.”

To our mind, therefore, even assuming that the appellant had  

re-entered the land on account of the various interim orders  

granted by the  courts,  or  even otherwise,  it  would have no  

effect  for  two  reasons,  (1)  that  the  suits/petitions  were  

ultimately dismissed and (2) that the land once having vested  

in the Government by virtue of Section 16 of the Act, re-entry  

by the land owner would not obliterate the consequences of  

vesting.

12. We must also observe that the petitioner has been able  

to frustrate the acquisition and development of the land  

right from the 1980 onwards by taking recourse to one  

litigation after the other.  The record reveals that all the  

suits/writ petitions etc. that had been filed had failed.  

Undoubtedly, every citizen has a right to utilize all legal  

means which are open to him in a bid to vindicate and  

protect  his  rights,  but  if  the  court  comes  to  the  

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CA Nos.4849-4850/2000

conclusion that the pleas raised are frivolous and meant  

to frustrate and delay an acquisition which is in public  

interest, deterrent action is called for.  This is precisely  

the situation in the present matter.  The appeals are,  

accordingly, dismissed with costs which are determined  

at  Rupees two lacs.   The respondents,  shall,  without  

further loss of time proceed against the appellant.    

…………………………….J. (Dalveer Bhandari)

……………………………J. (Harjit Singh Bedi)

New Delhi, Dated: September 15, 2009    

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