SIRAJUDDIN KASIM Vs M/S PARAMOUNT INVESTMENT LTD.
Bench: ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, , , ,
Case number: ARBIT.CASE(C) No.-000017-000017 / 2009
Diary number: 20102 / 2009
Advocates: Vs
NIKHIL NAYYAR
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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 17 of 2009
Sirajudeen Kasim & Another ..Petitioners(s)
Versus
M/s.Paramount Investments Limited ..Respondent(s)
O R D E R
GANGULY, J.
1. This petition has been filed under Section 11
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(hereinafter, “the said Act”) by the
Petitioner praying for appointment of an
arbitrator to adjudicate the claims and
disputes between the petitioner and the
respondent as the parties have been unable to
concur upon the arbitrator. 1
2. The first petitioner (hereinafter, P1) is
Sirajuddin Kasim, an Indian, who is the
Director, Promoter and shareholder of the
second petitioner holding 75% of issued share
capital of the second petitioner (hereinafter
P2). P2 is a company incorporated under the
laws of the Republic of Singapore and inter
alia deals and trades in cotton, timber,
logging, acquisition, operation and sale of
oil and gas assets, mining of Manganese and
other metals. The respondent on the other
hand is a company incorporated under the Laws
of Mauritius. The respondent is engaged inter
alia in the business of making investments by
way of equities in private and public
companies on a negotiated basis.
3. The petitioners’ case is that the
understanding between the parties was that
the respondent would procure farm out
transactions of oil and gas blocks for P2.
For such farm out transactions, the
respondent would be paid a commission
separately. On the date of the Shareholders’ 2
Agreement (SHA), P2 was allotted oil and gas
blocks in the Republic of Gabon. There were
proposed oil blocks to be procured by
execution of Production Sharing Contract
(“PSC”) in Brunei as well as in Tajikistan.
In their affidavit the respondent admitted
this arrangement between the petitioners and
the respondent and also admitted the receipt
in the name of Valpro, a sum of US $ 625,000,
claiming that the same was paid by the
petitioners for services rendered in relation
to the farm out contracts.
4. In March, 2006 the respondent was successful
in farming out the oil blocks of P2 through
Oil India Limited and Indian Oil Corporation
Limited for which their company Valpro
Private Limited was paid a commission of US $
625,000 i.e. 5% of the value of the farm out.
Subsequently, attempts were purported to be
made by the respondent to farm out oil and
gas blocks for P2, but the respondent could
not procure any farm out transaction. Between
March, 2006 and 23rd April, 2008 3
correspondence was exchanged between the
parties i.e. P1 and P2 and the respondent.
From that correspondence, it will appear that
disputes and differences cropped up between
the parties. Allegations were made by the
respondent that P1 was allegedly falsifying
and manipulating the accounts of P2. There
were several other allegations which are not
required to be discussed in detail.
5. The petitioners’ case is that the respondent
was deliberately postponing and delaying the
holding of the AGMs of P2 and was thereby
delaying the finalization of accounts which
was absolutely necessary for submission of
proposals to foreign Governments for
procuring oil block. The petitioners’ further
case is that the respondent through its
representatives, Anshuman Khanna, Santosh
Gadia and their company Seana Energy Pte.
Ltd. were making presentations to prospective
purchasers/operators for farming out assets
of P2 in breach of the Shareholders’
Agreement and was unjustifiably demanding 4
remittances without the desired business for
P2. The correspondence exchanged between the
petitioners and the respondent between 28th
August, 2006 and 22nd April, 2008 would show
that disputes were brewing between the
parties.
6. On 23rd April, 2008 a Settlement Agreement
(Annexure-P8 pg. 116 Vol.1) was executed
between P1 and the respondent; Clause C
thereof stipulates that there have been
disputes and differences between P1 and the
respondent in relation to SHA and the
management of the company and with a view to
amicably resolve the same, P1 agreed to
purchase the entire interest of the
respondent in P2.
7. Clause 2(c)(i) and (ii) of the Settlement
Agreement stipulates:
“2(c) An amount equal to 10% of the gross amount received by Marvis or any other company in which Siraj Kasim holds an equity interest, whether directly, indirectly or deemed (Marvis and such company being referred to herein as the Siraj Kasim Investments)
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in relation to or arising or accruing from the farm-out of part or whole of the participating interest in oil & gas assets of the Siraj Kasim Investments. The amounts payable under this clause 2(c) shall be paid within 5 business days of actual receipt of the gross amount by the Siraj Kasim Investments save and except that
(i) if, for any reason whatsoever, the farm-out does not take place on or before 23rd February 2009, or (ii) 10% of the gross receipts on account of such farm-outs as on 23rd February 2009, aggregates to less then USD 1,500,000 (USD One Million Five Hundred Thousand only) the amounts payable under this
clause 2(c) shall be USD 1,500,000 (USD One Million Five Hundred Thousand only) which shall he payable in cash by way of irrevocable wire transfer to PIL's account set out in Schedule I the wire transfer being for value on a date which is on or before 28th February, 2009.
Where full payment of any of the above amounts is not received in the due date for such payment, the amount unpaid shall bear simple interest at the rate of 12% p.a. from the due date of payment to the date of actual payment, as well after as before judgment (the interest).”
8. It is submitted by the petitioners that all
rights of P1 and the respondent under the SHA 6
were to remain operative despite the
Settlement Agreement.
9. Clause 4C of the Settlement Agreement gave an
option to the respondent to acquire 10%
participating interest of P2 in the asset
named Shakthi in Gabon.
10. Further disputes cropped up between the
parties out of the SHA between 23rd April,
2008 and 17th April, 2009. To various letters
written by the petitioners, the respondent by
its letter dated 8th May, 2009 replied to the
petitioners’ letter dated 15th April, 2009
and 17th April, 2009; and the respondent by
its letter dated 8th May, 2009 called upon
the petitioners to appoint an independent
accounting firm for a thorough investigation
of the accounts.
11. The notice invoking the arbitration clause
was given by the petitioner No.1 on 15th
April, 2009 and in the said letter, it was
contended by petitioner No.1 that the name of
Mr. Gadia be deleted as an arbitrator from 7
the SHA, as he has acted on behalf of the
respondent. Therefore, a prayer was made for
the appointment of an impartial arbitrator.
12. Another letter dated 17th April, 2009 was
written by the advocate of petitioner No.1 to
the respondent and Mr. Anshuman Khanna,
representative of the respondent. In the said
letter a further request was made for the
appointment of an independent arbitrator and
it was reiterated that petitioner No.1, by
its previous letter dated 15th April, 2009
terminated the Settlement Agreement dated
23rd April, 2008 and the Power of Attorney of
the same date.
13. Thereafter, on 14th May, 2009 the respondent
filed a suit against P1 before the High Court
of Republic of Singapore, claiming damages to
the extent of USD 4,850,000/- and interest at
the rate of 12% and prayed for specific
performance of the Settlement Agreement dated
23rd April, 2008.
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14. The case of the Respondent is that the
Settlement Agreement has no arbitration
clause. On the other hand, Clause 10 of the
said agreement provides as follows:
“This Agreement shall be governed by the Singapore law. Notwithstanding any provision in the Shareholders Agreement, the parties agree that in relation to any legal action or proceedings arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, each of the parties hereby irrevocably submits to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Singapore and any party who is not resident or in the case of a corporation, not incorporated, in Singapore hereby consents to service of process by post or in other manner permitted by the relevant law.”
15. It may be noted that the said Settlement
Agreement is between petitioner No.1 and
respondent and petitioner No.2 is not a party
to this Agreement.
16. The respondent’s case is that only after the
Singapore Court decreed the suit and the same
was confirmed in appeal, the petitioner
sought to invoke the arbitration clause under
the SHA. 9
17. In the conspectus of these facts, the
question is whether the arbitration clause in
the SHA still survives. The arbitration
clause in SHA runs as under:
“If any dispute, difference or question shall, at any time hereinafter arise between the parties in respect of the construction of this Agreement, or concerning anything contained or arising out of these presents as to rights, liabilities or duties of the said parties hereunder, which cannot be mutually resolved by the parties within a period of thirty days, the same shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with … … shall be resolved by a sole arbitrator in accordance with the provisions of the Model Law of Arbitration adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Laws. The sole arbitrator shall be Mr. Santosh Gadia, Chartered Accountant having address at F-45, Bhagat Singh Market, New Delhi- 110001, India or in case of his inability to act as such, such sole arbitrator shall be appointed jointly by the parties. The seat of arbitration shall be New Delhi. The arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in English.”
18. From a perusal of clause 10 of the Settlement
Agreement and the Arbitration Clause in SHA,
both set out hereinabove, it does not appear
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prima facie that the rights of the
petitioners – both petitioner Nos.1 and 2,
under SHA have been superseded by the
settlement agreement. In any event the
question whether the rights of the
petitioners under SHA have been superseded is
an arbitrable dispute.
19. Admittedly, petitioner No.2 is not a party to
the settlement agreement. Therefore, its
rights under the arbitration clause are prima
facie not superseded by the settlement
agreement. Under Section 2 (h) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 party
means a party to an arbitration agreement.
The petitioner No.2 is a party to an
arbitration agreement within the meaning of
Section 2(h) but he is not a party to the
settlement agreement. Therefore, whether his
rights have been superseded by the settlement
agreement also may be an arbitrable dispute.
20. From the sequence of events discussed above,
prima facie, it appears that respondent filed
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a suit on 14th May 2009 before the High Court
of Republic of Singapore, inter alia,
claiming damages after receiving the letters
of the petitioner dated 15th April, 2009 and
17th April, 2009, whereunder the arbitration
clause has been invoked. It also appears that
prior to the filing of the suit, the
settlement agreement dated 23rd April, 2008,
as also the Power of Attorney dated 23rd
April, 2008, were revoked by the letters
dated 15th and 17th April, 2009 and the
request to appoint an impartial arbitrator in
terms of clause 8.4 of SHA was made in the
letter dated 15.4.2009 and then reiterated in
the letter dated 17.04.2009.
21. The learned counsel for the respondent, in
view of the facts stated above and in view of
his subsequent suit filed by them, argued
that the rights of the petitioners under the
arbitration agreement does not survive and in
support of his contention reliance was placed
on the decision rendered in Sukanya Holdings
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(P) Ltd. vs. Jayesh H. Pandya and another reported in (2003) 5 SCC 531.
22. This Court is of the opinion that the
reliance by the respondent on Sukanya Holdings (supra) is not of much help to the respondent in the facts and circumstances of
the case. First of all in the instant case
Section 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act
is not attracted. It is nobody’s case that
matter was placed before the judicial
authority before invoking the arbitration
clause. In the instant case arbitration
clause was invoked earlier than the filing of
a suit as noted above. On the other hand the
ratio in the case of Sukanya Holdings (supra) is against the contention of the respondent
in as much as it has been held, in paragraph
16 at 536 of the report, that it would be
difficult to give an interpretation to
Section 8 of the Act for bifurcation of the
cause of action between the Civil Court and
the arbitral forum.
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23. In the case of Sukanya Holdings (supra) the dispute was over dissolution of the
partnership firm and over accounts filed by
one partner against the defendants who were
admittedly not partners in the firm.
Therefore, the Court held that the meaning of
the term “in a matter” must indicate that the
entire subject matter of the suit should be
subject to arbitration agreement.
24. In the instant case admittedly petitioner
No.2 is neither a party to the settlement
agreement nor was he impleaded in the suit.
Therefore, the ratio in Sukanya Holdings (supra) does not help the respondent.
25. In the instant case the petitioners have
alleged that there was economic duress in the
matter of execution of the settlement
agreement. Therefore, following the ratio of
this Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2009) 1 SCC 267, this Court is
of the opinion whether rights of the parties
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under SHA have been superseded by the
subsequent settlement agreement may be an
arbitrable issue and that issue can be
examined by the arbitrator.
26. In this case there are disputes between the
parties and there is a valid arbitration
clause and the clause has been invoked prior
to the filing of the suit. It is also not in
dispute that the arbitration procedure
between the parties has failed. Therefore,
this Court cannot accept the contention of
the respondent as there is valid invocation
of the arbitration clause prior to the filing
of suit by the respondent.
27. In that view of the matter, this Court
appoints Justice S.B. Sinha, a former Judge
of this Court, the sole learned arbitrator in
this case. The learned arbitrator is
requested to decide the dispute as early as
possible and preferably within a period of
four months from the date of entering upon
the reference. The remuneration of the
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learned arbitrator and all the incidental
costs are left to be decided by learned
arbitrator and are to be jointly shared by
the parties.
28. The petition for appointment of an arbitrator
is thus allowed. No order as to costs.
.......................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)
New Delhi August 02, 2010
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