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PETITIONER: M/S SIEL LTD. & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       11/09/1998

BENCH: M.M.PUNCHHI, SUJATA V.MANOHAR

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:  JUDGMENT Mrs. Sujata V.Manohar, J. Civil Appeal Nos. 4726-4741/98 (A SLP(C)Nos.4162-4177/96) Leave granted. The appellants in these appeals have challenged  the constitutional   validity   of   the  Uttar  Pradesh  Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam 1964 being  U.P.Act  24  of  1964  which received  the assent of the President on 17th Oct. 1964. The occasion for  this  challenge  appears  to  have  arisen  on account    of   orders   passed   by   the   Controller   of No1asses/Excise Commissioner, U.P. under Section  8  of  the said  Act  read with Rule 22, and dated 13th of August 1983, 22nd of October, 1993 and  1st of January, 1994. Under Section 8 to the said Act the Controller may by  order require the occupier of any sugar factory to sell and supply in  the  prescribed manner such quantity of molasses to such person, as may be specified in the order, and  the  occupier shall,  notwithstanding any contract, comply with the order. Under Section 10 the occupier of a sugar factory shall  sell molasses  in  respect  of which an order under Section 8 has been made at a price not exceeding that  prescribed  in  the Schedule.   Under  sub-section  (2)  of Section 10 the State Government may, by notification in the  Gazette,  amend  the Schedule  if such amendment is necessitated by reason of any variation in the cost of storage of molasses or  loading  or shunting  charges  of molasses in tank wagons or in order to bring the prices of molasses in conformity with the  prices, if any, fixed by the Government of India. Under  the  said  orders  of  the  Controller  dated 13.8.1993, 22.10.1993 and 1.1.1994, different percentages of graded  molasses  were   reserved   for   distilleries   and industries  based  no  molasses and alcohol, in the State of U.P.  The  reserved  quantity  under  the  said  orders  was required  to be sold at prices fixed by the State Government under the  notification  issued  under  sub-section  (2)  of Section 10 at the relevant time. The appellants have challenged the  constitutional  validity of the  U.P.  Sheera Niyartaran Adhiniyam 1964 on the ground that the State Legislature lacked  competence  to  pass  the Act.   They have also challenged the restrictions imposed on

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the sale of molasses under the said Act and the said  orders made  thereunder  as  unreasonable restrictions violative of Article 19 (1)(g) as also Article  301,  being  restrictions which affect in the state, freedom of trade.  All these writ petitions  which  were  filed in 1993 have been dismissed by the Allahabad High Court.  Hence the  present  appeals  have been preferred before us. The  Industries  (Development  and  Regulation) Act, 1951 was enacted by Parliament and came into  force  on  the 8th  of  May, 1952. Section 2 of the Act declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should  take under  its  control  the  industries  specified in the First Schedule. Item 25 in the First Schedule was sugar  industry. Thus  control  over the sugar industry was taken over by the Union  Government  as  being  in  public  interest.  By   an amendment  of  1953,  Section  18G  was  introduced  in  the Industries  (Development  and  Regulation)  Act   of   1961. Sub-section (1) of Section 18G is as follows:-            "Section 18G:     Power  to  control  supply,            distribution, price etc.  of certain articles-            (1)The  Central Government, so far as it appears            to be necessary or  expedient  for  securing  the            equitable  distribution  and availability at fair            prices  of  any  article  or  class  of  articles            relatable   to   any   scheduled   industry  may,            notwithstanding anything contained in  any  other            provision of this Act, by notified order, provide            for   regulating   the  supply  and  distribution            thereof and trade and commerce therein.            (2) ............            (3) ............            (4) ............            (5) ............. In  1961  the  Central  Government  promulgated  the Molasses  Control  Order under Section 18G of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 imposing restrictions on the sale of molasses and  fixing  the  maximum  price  of molasses.   A  similar Ethy1 Alcohol price control order was issued in 1971 relating to Ethy1 Alcohol which is a  product of molasses.    Sub-clause  (2)  of Clause 1 of the Molasses Control Order, 1961 provided that it shall come  into  force in a  State  on  such  date  as  the  Central  Govt.  may by notification in the official Gazette, appoint in this behalf for such State, and different dates  may  be  appointed  for different States.    It  is  an  accepted  position that the Molasses Control Order,  1961  was  never  extended  to  the States of U.P.  and Bihar. In 1984,  the  U.P.    Legislature  enacted  the  U.P.Sheera Niyantaran  Adhiniyam,  (Molasses Control Act) 1964 which is impugned in the present appeals.  It  is  the  case  of  the respondents that although the Central Molasses Control Order of 1961  was  never extended to the State of U.P.  the State Government would notify the maximum price of molasses  under Section 10  of  the U.P.  Act of 1964 in consonance with the maximum price prescribed by the Central Government under the Molasses Control Order of  1961.    Identical  notifications were   issued  by  the  Central  Government  and  the  State Government relating to the price of molasses every year. On 10.6.1993 the Molasses Control  Order,  1961  and the  Ethy1 Alcohol Price Control Order were rescinded by the Central Government by two separate notifications of the same date.  In the State of U.P.    however,  the  U.P.    Sheera Niyantaran  Adhiniyam, 1963 continued to operate despite the repeal of the Central Molasses Control  Order,  1961.    The State  Government  thereafter  issued three notifications of

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13.8.1993, 22.10.1993  and  1.1.1994  under  the  U.P.Sheera Niyantaran Adhiniyam,  1964.   This gave rise to the present litigation. According  to  the  appellants,  by  reason  of  the Industries  (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 and Entry 25 in the First Schedule to the said  Act,  all  legislation pertaining  to sugar industry is within the exclusive domain of the union Government, being covered entirely by Entry  52 of List I.  Therefore, the State of U.P.  had no legislative competence to enact the U.P.Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam, 1964 or the  orders  thereunder.    It  is  this contention which requires to be examined. In this connection, the Entries in the Seventh  Schedule  to the  Constitution  of  India which require consideration are the following: List I - Union List : Entry 7:  Industries declared by Parliament  by  law  to  be necessary  for the purpose of defence or for the prosecution of was. Entry 52 :  Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared  by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. List II - State List: Entry 24 :Industries  subject  to  the   provisions   of entries 7 and 52 of List I. Entry 26 :Trade and commerce within the State subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III> Entry 2y:Production,  supply  and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III. List III - Concurrent List: Entry 33 :Trade and commerce  in,  and  the  production, supply and distribution of         (a)the products of any industry where the control         of  such  industry  by  the  Union  is  declared  by         Parliament  by  law  to  be  expedient in the public         interest, and imported goods of  the  same  kind  as         sluch products;         (b)............         (c)............         (d)............         (e)............ Before  construing  these entries, it is necessary to bear in mind the principle laid down in several decisions  of this  Court  relating to the interpretation of these entries. In the case of Calcutta Gas Company  (Proprietary)  Ltd.    V State of  West Bengal and Ors.  (AIR 1962 SC 1044) this Court has held that when some of the entries in the different Lists or in the same List may overlap or may appear to be in direct conflict with each other, it is the  duty  of  the  Court  to reconcile  the  entries and bring about harmony between them. This Court observed, (at page 1050), "It may,  therefore,  be taken  as  a  well  settled  rule  of construction that every attempt  should  be  made   to   harmonize   the   apparently conflicting  entries  not only of different Lists but also of the same List and to reject that construction which will  rob one  of  the  entries  of  its  entire  content  and  make it nugatory." While dealing with Entry 24 of List II and  Entry  52 of  List  I, this Court in the above case considered what was meant by the term "industry" which was  used  in  both  these entries. This Court held that in the first place, whatever be the  connotation of "industry", it must bear the same meaning in Entry 24 List of II as in Entry 52 of List I  because  the two  entries are interconnected, and giving different meaning to the word "industry" in the two  entries  will  snap  their

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connection.  this  Court  further  observed  that  ordinarily "industry" was in the field of  State  Legislation;  but,  if Parliament   by   law   makes   a   relevant  declaration  or declarations, the industry or industries so declared would be taken off the state field and passed on to Parliament.         This  Court  in  that   case   was   concerned   with interrelationship  between Entry 52 List I, Entry 24 List II, and Entry 25 of List II. The last entry expressly dealt  with gas  and  gas works. This Court held that if Entry 24 of List II is interpreted to include within the term "industry",  gas and  gas  works,  Entry 25 of List II would be emptied of all its contents and would become nugatory. Therefore, one should apply the principle of harmonious construction and hold  that gas  and gas works would be outside the term "industry" under Entry 24 of List II. If this was so, then gas and  gas  works could  not, by appropriate declaration by Parliament, be made the subject mater of Entry 52 of List I. If we apply the same principle of harmonious construction  to Entries  24,  26  and  27  of List II, the term "industry" in Entry 24 would not take within its ambit trade  and  commerce or production, supply and distribution of goods which are the express province of Entries 26 and 27 of List II.  Similarly, Entry  52  in List I which deals with industry also would not cover  trade  and  commerce  in  or  production,  supply  and distribution  of  the products of those industries which fall under Entry 52 of List I.   For  the  industries  falling  in Entry  52  of  List  I  these  subjects  are  carved  out and expressly put in Entry 33 of List III. In the Calcutta Gas Company case (supra) the decision of this Court in Ch.  Tika Ramji & Ors.  etc.  V.  The  state of Uttar Pradesh L& Ors.  (1956 SCR 393) was relied upon.  In Ch.   Tika  ramji’s  case  (supra)  this  Court,  inter alia, considered the interrelationship between  Entry  52  List  I, Entry  24  List II, Entry 27 List II and Entry 33 of List III as it stood prior to its amendment, and  as  amended.    This Court examined the contention that the term "industry" should be  widely  construed  to  include  all  activities including activities preceding production such as  acquisition  of  raw material  and  activities  subsequent  to  production such as disposal  of  the  finished  products   of   that   industry. Negativing  this  contention  in the light of the Legislative entries, this Court held that what would fall under Entry  24 of  List II would be the process of manufacture or production except where the industry was a controlled industry  when  it would fall  within  entry  52 of List I.  The products of the industry would be comprised in Entry 27 List II except  where these  were  the products of a controlled industry, when they would fall within Entry 33  of  List  III.    Therefore,  the subject  matter  falling within Entry 26 and Entry 27 of List II would not be covered by Entry 24 of List II; and similarly the subject matter falling under Entry 33 of List  III  would not fall under Entry 52 of List I. Another   principle   which   has  been  evolved  for determining  the  legislative   competence   to   enact   any particular  piece  of legislation is the doctrine of pith and substance.  In the case of A.S.Krishna and Ors.  V.  State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 297) this Court observed that it was  the essence  of  a  Federal  Constitution  that  there  should be distribution of legislative powers between the Centre and the States.  When the  Constitution  enumerates  elaborately  the topics on which the Centre and the States can legislate, some overlapping  over  the  fields  of legislation is inevitable. Therefore, to decide whether an impugned legislation is intra vires regard must be had to its pith and  substance.    If  a statute is found in substance to relate to a topic within the

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competence  of that Legislature it should be held to be intra vires, even though it might incidentally trench on topics not within its  legislative  competence.    The  extent  of   the encroachment  may  be  an  element in determining whether the legislation is colorable, but where that is not the position, the fact of encroachment does not affect  the  vires  of  the law.  To determine this one must have regard to the enactment as a whole, to its objects and to the scope and effect of its provisions. In the light of these entries if one looks at  Section  2  of the   Industries  (Development  and  Regulation)  Act,  1951, Section 2 clearly declares an industry which is in the  First Schedule  as  an  industry  falling under Entry 52 of List I. Section  18G,  however,  deals  with  control  over   supply, distribution, price  etc.  of certain articles or products of such industry .  Section 18G empowers the Central  Government to  provide  by  notification  for  regulating the supply and distribution of a product of  such  industry  and  trade  and commerce therein.   Section 18G is, therefore, an exercise of the powers of legislation conferred by Entry 33 of List  III. By its express language, Section 18G is clearly covered under Entry  33  of  List III and is excluded from Entry 52 List I. Any notification, therefore, issued under Section  18G  would be  an  exercise  of  a  power  conferred  by Entry 33 of the Concurrent List.  Since the exercise of power  under  Section 18G  falls  under the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule of the constitution and not under Entry 52  of  List  I,  the State  Legislature  is  equally  competent  to  legislate  in respect of the same subject matter, subject to Article 254 of the Constitution. Article 254 expressly deals with  a  situation  where any  provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision  of  law  made  by  Parliament  in respect of  one of the matters in the Concurrent List.  Under Clause  2  of  Article  254,  where  the  law  made  by   the Legislature  of  a  State  with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the  Concurrent  List  contains  any  provision repugnant  to  the  provisions  of  an  earlier  law  made by Parliament, or an existing law with respect to  that  matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if  it  has  been  reserved  for  the  consideration  of  the President and has been given his assent, prevail in the State subject to the proviso contained therein.     The contention of the appellants, therefore, that  by the   enactment  of  Section  18G  the  power  of  the  State Government to legislate under Entry 33 of List III  is  taken away, is untenable. The  respondents have also rightly contended that the enactment of Section 18G by the amending Act does not  create by   itself   any   repugnancy   between   the  Parliamentary Legislation and  the  State  Legislation,  namely,  the  U.P. Sheera Niyantaran  Adhiniyam  of  1964.    Although  Molasses Control Order of 1961 was issued by  the  Central  Government under   Section   18G  of  the  Industries  (Development  and Regulations) Act of 1951,  the  Molasses  Control  Order  was never brought  into  operation  in  the State of U.P.  or the State of Bihar.  Therefore, the power of the  State  of  U.P. under Entry 33 List III to legislate in relation to the trade and  commerce  in  or  supply and distribution of molasses in that State was not taken away, in any event, irrespective  of Article 254 of the Constitution of India. In this connection our attention  was  drawn  to  the observations of this Court in Ch.  Tika Ramji’s case (supra). The  Court  in  that  case was concerned with the legislative competence of the State Government to legislate in respect of

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sugarcane in the light  of  Section  18G  of  the  Industries (Development and  Regulation) Act, 1951.  This Court observed (at page 432)  that  even  assuming  that  sugarcane  was  an article relatable to the sugar industry within the meaning of Section  18G,  no  order  had  been  issued  by  the  Central Government in exercise of the powers vested in it under  that section.   Hence  no  question  of  repugnancy  would  arise. Repugnancy must exist in fact and  not  depend  merely  on  a possibility.  Ch.    Tika Ramji’s case (supra) has been cited with approval in the more recent  case  of  Indian  Aluminium company Ltd.  and  Anr.   V.  Karnataka Electricity Board and Ors.  (1992 3 SCC 580) where this Court again  held  that  in the  absence  of  any  notification  under Section 18G of the Industries (Development and  Regulation)  Act  there  was  no question  of  any  repugnancy  on  the  score  of  tariff  of electricity fixed by the State Amending Act.  Section 18G per se did not take away the  State’s  right  also  to  legislate under Entry  33  of  List  III.    This  Court also noted the provisions of Article 254 (2) of  the  Constitution  in  this connection. The   appellants,   however,   relied   upon  certain observations in the case of  synthetics  and  Chemicals  Ltd. and Ors.  V.   State  of  U.P.  and Ors.  (1990 1 SCC 109) to contend that by the enactment of section 18G the entire field relating to sugar industry was  an  occupied  field  and  the state could  not legislate in that connection.  This argument has been negative by the Full Bench of Allahabad  High  Court in the  present  case  by detailed and cogent reasoning.  The High Court has rightly observed that in the  said  case  this Court  had  no  occasion  to  examine Entry 33 of List III in relation to Entries 24, 26 and 27 of List II and Entry 52  of List I.    A  mere observation that Union had evinced a clear intention to occupy the whole field was  in  the  context  of exclusive privilege claimed by the State of U.P.  In fact, in the  said case this observation was not in the context of any product  of  the  controlled  industry;   and   hence   these observations cannot be considered as holding that Section 18G prevented  the State from exercising its power of legislation under Entry 33 List III.  In fact, Ch.    Tika  Ramji’s  case (supra)  has  been followed subsequently in a number of cases including Indian Aluminium case (supra).  It  has  also  been followed in lB.  Viswanathiah and Company and Ors.  V.  State of Karnataka and Ors.  (1991 3 SCC 358) where this Court held that  when  the  industry  is a controlled industry and falls under Entry 52  of  List  I  legislation  in  regard  to  the products  of  that  industry would be permissible both by the Central and the State Legislatures by virtue of Entry  33  of List III.    This  Court has relied upon Ch.Tika Ramji’s case (supra) and has cited with  approval  the  following  passage from Ch.  Tika Ramji’s case :            "Industry  in the wide sense of the term would            be capable of comprising three different aspects :            (1) raw materials which are an  integral  part  of            the   industrial   process,  (2)  the  process  of            manufacture   or   production,   and    (3)    the            distribution of the products of the industry.  The            raw  materials  would  be  goods  which  would  be            comprised in Entry 27 of List II.  The process  of            manufacture  or  production  would be comprised in            Entry 24 of List II except where the industry  was            a  controlled  industry  when it would fall within            Entry 52  of  List  I  and  the  products  of  the            industry  would  also  be comprised in Entry 27 of            List II except where they were the products of the            controlled industries when they would fall  within

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          Entry 33 List III. In  the  case  of  (third)  State of U.P. and Anr. V. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and Anr. (1991 4 SCC 139)  this Court  explained  certain  observations  made  in the earlier Synthetics and  Chemicals  case  (supra).  What  is  however, relevant for  our  present purposes is to note that  the case of Ch. Tika Ramji (supra) has been relied upon by this  Court and  this  Court  has  reaffirmed  that  the power to control industry being vested in Parliament (Entry 52 of List 1)  and the legislative power in respect of trade and commerce in the product  of  such  industry  being concurrently vested in the Union and the States (Entry 33 of List III) any  exercise  of control  by  the State by legislation under Entry 33 List III must be subject to and tin accordance with Articles  246  and 254  of  the  Constitution.  However, it is also necessary to note in this context the provisions of Article 254 (2)  under which  a  law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List of it contains any provision repugnant  to  the  provisions  of  an earlier  law  made  by  Parliament  or  an  existing law with respect to that matter, the law so made by the Legislature of such  State  shall,  if  it  has  been   reserved   for   the consideration  of  the President and has received his assent, prevail in the State provided  that  the  Parliament  is  not prevented  from  enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to  amending,  varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of a State. The  respondents  have  pointed  out  that  the  U.P. Sheera  Niyantaran  Adhiniyam,   1964   has   also   received President’s assent  under  Article  254(2).    In  any event, looking to the fact that the Molasses Control Order  of  1961 passed  by  the  Central  Government  in  exercise  of powers conferred by Section 18G was not extended  at  any  point  of time to  the  State  of  U.P.    or  the  State of Bihar, the question of repugnancy between the  Molasses  Control  Order, 1961 and the U.P.  Sheera Niyantaran Adhiniyam, 1964 does not arise.   In  fact, the present litigation has commenced after the Molasses Control Order, 1961 of  the  Central  Government has  been  rescinded and the only legislation which holds the field is the U.P.Sheera Niyantaran Adhiniyam of 1964 which is in legitimate exercise of power of legislation under Entry 33 of List III.         In the premises the U.P.Sheera  Niyantaran  Adhiniyam of  1964  is  within  the legislative competence of the State Government. It was also contended that the three notifications of 13.8.1993,  22.10.1993  and 1.1.1994 are unreasonable or they do not constitute a reasonable restriction on  the  right  to carry  on  any  occupation,  trade  or business under Article 19(1)(g).  It is contended that there is also a violation  of Article 301  of  the  Constitution.  The State Government has submitted that the provisions of the U.P.  Sheera  Niyantaran Adhiniyam, 1964 and the State notifications have to be viewed in  the context of development of sugar, alcohol and chemical industries in the State of U.P.  If looked at in a historical perspective, there has been  control  over  molasses  in  the State of   U.P.    from  the  year  1947  and  this  was  not challenged.  The State Government has  tried  the  policy  of partial  decontrol  by  the  notification  of 13.8.1993 under which the State kept control only over 30%  of  the  molasses and  the  sugar industry owners were left free to sell 70% in the open market subject  to  certain  regulatory  provisions. The  impact  of  such  partial decontrol had been watched and judged.   By  another  order  of  31.12.1993,  the  ratio  of controlled   over  uncontrolled  molasses  was  substantially

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changed.  The percentages of permissible sales in the control zone and in the free market have had to be changed  depending upon the economic impact of such decontrol. The  respondents  also  submitted that molasses is an important raw material for  the  distilleries  which  produce industrial  alcohol a raw material for chemical industries in the State.  To attract  various  industries  to  that  State, steps   were   taken   from   the   beginning  to  facilitate availability of industrial alcohol.  A policy of control over molasses is framed bearing in mind the economic  requirements of  the  State and , therefore, this policy should not be now challenged.       Respondents  have   pointed   out   that   industrial development of Uttar Pradesh is largely based on this control over  allocation  and  pricing  of  molasses,  and a sizeable revenue of the Government is dependent on the  control.  Even prior  to 1964 the control over allocation and price fixation of  molasses  in  the  State  of  U.P.  was  with  the  State Government.  Even  when  the  Government  of India issued the Molasses Control  Order  of  1961  it  left  the  control  of molasses  in U.P. in the hands of the State Govt. Neither the sugar industry or any body else objected to this  control  of the State over allocation and prices of molasses at any point of  time  till the announcement of decontrol over molasses by the Government of India. In order to keep a proper balance  over  distribution of molasses to the industries which had come up over a period of  time  when  decontrol  was announced by the Government of India, it was not possible for the State of U.P.to announce a total decontrol.  Nevertheless by the first  notification  of 13.10.1993,   70%   of  molasses  were  freed  from  control. However, it had an immediate adverse effect on  the  chemical and down  stream  industries  in  U.P.    As  a  result,  the subsequent State notifications were issued in  October,  1993 and  January,  1994  reducing substantially the percentage of molasses which were made free of control and  increasing  the percentage of controlled molasses.  Simultaneously, the price of  controlled  molasses  was  also  enhanced  by  the  State Government.  The State has followed a fair  economic  policy. In  fixing  from  time  to  time,  the percentage of free and controlled molasses and the prices for  controlled  molasses, the  overall  market position had also been borne in mind and the extent of availability, and the price of  imported  petro feed  stock  and  chemical  products  had also to be borne in mind.  In other words, the State  has  submitted  that  price fixation   of   molasses  and  the  percentage  of  free  and controlled molasses  is  essentially  a  matter  of  economic policy  and  the  same  should  not  be the subject matter of challenge under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution when the policy is fair and has been in force for a long time.    This submission has  much  force.    This  Court  has held that in examining the reasonableness  of  an  economic  measure,  the State  should  have  more  latitude  in  formulating economic policy as well as appropriate legislation  in  comparison  to legislating relating  to  fundamental  rights.   (See in this connection Delhi Science Forum & Ors.  etc.   V.    Union  of India & ’Anr.    etc.  (JT 1996 (2) SC 295) and Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd.  & Anr.  etc.  V.  Union of India & Ors.   etc. (JT 1996 (4) SC 555). It has also been pointed out by the respondents  that in  public  interest  an  industry,  in the present case, the sugar industry, can be required to make a supply  to  another industry of  their product or by-product.  Looking to all the circumstances, the U.P.  Sheera Niyantaran Adhiniyam 1964 and the State notifications of 13.8.1993, 22.10.1993 and 1.1.1994

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having been held by  the  High  Court  as  not  violative  of Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution,  we are inclined to agree with the findings so arrived at by the High Court. In the premises  these  appeals  are  dismissed  with costs. CIVIL APPEAL NOS> OF 1998 (Arising out of SLP (C)Nos.14670/95 and 16925/95)

Leave granted. These two appeals pertain  to  the  distribution  and price control  over  molasses in the State of Bihar.  In 1947 the  Bihar  State  Legislature  had  enacted  Bihar  Molasses (Control)  Act, 1947 with the assent of the Governor General. Initially the Act was intended to remain in  force  only  for one year.   But from time to time various Acts were passes by the State Legislature extending the validity of the said Act. Even after coming into force of the  Industries  (Development and  Regulation)  Act of 1951, and the Molasses Control Order of 1961 issued by the Central Government, the Bihar  Molasses Control  Act,  1947  continued  to  remain  in  force  as the Molasses Control Order of 1961 was not extended to the  State of Bihar.         The  Bihar  State  Legislature thereafter enacted the Bihar Amending Act 1 of 1964 which was passed with the assent of the President, under which the  Bihar  Molasses  (Control) Act, 1947 was made permanent instead of temporary. After  the repeal of the Molasses Control Order, 1961 by the Central Government in June, 1993 the State  Government of  the  State  of  Bihar  issued an order in the exercise of powers under Section 7 of the Bihar Molasses  (Control)  Act, 1947 on 9.6.1993 directing sugar industry to sell molasses at a  specified  controlled  rate to different distilleries. The Controller of molasses in the State  of  Bihar  also  gave  a further  clarification  that  the  central Government had not rescinded the Bihar Molases (Control) Act, 1947 and the State authorities were free to regulate  and  control  molasses  in exercise of power vested in the State under the State Act. In the  State  of  Bihar  also,  in  September 1993, a system of partial decontrol of molasses was introduced  allowing  sugar factories  to  sell  the  remaining  molasses  at free market prices after fixing a certain percentage for molasses  to  be supplied at fixed controlled rates to the distilleries. The  challenge  to  these  orders  and  the  Bihar   Molasses (Control)  Act,  1947  are  similar  to the challenges in the appeals pertaining to the State of U.P.  For reasons which we have set out in our judgment in the appeals pertaining to the State of U.P., these appeals are also dismissed with costs.