REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  2271          2010. (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.7615 of 2009)

Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre …..Appellant

Versus

State of Maharashtra and Others      …..Respondents

J U D G M E N T  

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  involves  issues  of  great  public  importance  

pertaining to the importance of individual’s personal liberty and  

the society’s interest.

3. The society has a vital interest in grant or refusal of bail  

because every criminal offence is the offence against the State.  

The order granting or refusing bail must reflect perfect balance  

between the conflicting interests, namely, sanctity of individual  

liberty and the interest of the society.  The law of bails dovetails

two  conflicting  interests  namely,  on  the  one  hand,  the  

requirements of shielding the society from the hazards of those  

committing crimes and potentiality of repeating the same crime  

while on bail and on the other hand absolute adherence of the  

fundamental  principle  of  criminal  jurisprudence  regarding  

presumption of innocence of an accused until he is found guilty  

and the sanctity of individual liberty.   

4. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this appeal are  

recapitulated as under:

The appellant, who belongs to the Indian National Congress  

party (for short ‘Congress party’) is the alleged accused in this  

case.   The  case  of  the  prosecution,  as  disclosed  in  the  First  

Information Report (for short ‘FIR’), is that Sidramappa Patil was  

contesting  election  of  the  State  assembly  on  behalf  of  the  

Bhartiya  Janata  Party  (for  short  ‘BJP’).   In  the  FIR,  it  is  

incorporated that Baburao Patil,  Prakash Patil,  Mahadev Patil,  

Mallikarjun Patil, Apparao Patil, Yeshwant Patil were supporters  

of  the  Congress  and  so  also  the  supporters  of  the  appellant  

Siddharam Mhetre and opposed to the BJP candidate.

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5. On  26.9.2009,  around  6.00  p.m.  in  the  evening,  

Sidramappa Patil  of BJP came to the village to meet his party  

workers.   At  that  juncture,  Shrimant  Ishwarappa  Kore,  

Bhimashankar  Ishwarappa  Kore,  Kallapa  Gaddi,  Sangappa  

Gaddi,  Gafur  Patil,  Layappa  Gaddi,  Mahadev  Kore,  Suresh  

Gaddi,  Suresh Zhalaki,  Ankalgi,  Sarpanch of village Shivmurti  

Vijapure met Sidramappa Patil  and thereafter went to worship  

and  pray  at  Layavva  Devi’s  temple.   After  worshipping  the  

Goddess when they came out to the assembly hall of the temple,  

these aforementioned political opponents namely, Baburao Patil,  

Prakash  Patil,  Gurunath  Patil,  Shrishail  Patil,  Mahadev  Patil,  

Mallikarjun  Patil,  Annarao  @  Pintu  Patil,  Hanumant  Patil,  

Tammarao  Bassappa  Patil,  Apparao  Patil,  Mallaya  Swami,  

Sidhappa Patil,  Shankar Mhetre,  Usman Sheikh, Jagdev Patil,  

Omsiddha Pujari, Panchappa Patil, Mahesh Hattargi, Siddhappa  

Birajdar, Santosh Arwat, Sangayya Swami, Anandappa Birajdar,  

Sharanappa Birajdar, Shailesh Chougule, Ravi Patil, Amrutling  

Koshti, Ramesh Patil and Chandrakant Hattargi suddenly came  

rushing in their  direction  and loudly  shouted,  “why have you  

come to our village? Have you come here to oppose our Mhetre  

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Saheb?  They asked them to go away and shouted Mhetre Saheb  

Ki Jai.”     

6. Baburao Patil and Prakash Patil  from the aforementioned  

group fired from their pistols in order to kill Sidramappa Patil  

and the other workers of the BJP.  Bhima Shankar Kore was hit  

by the bullet on his head and died on the spot.  Sangappa Gaddi,  

Shivmurti  Vjapure, Jagdev Patil,  Layappa Patil,  Tammaro Patil  

were  also  assaulted.   It  is  further  mentioned  in  the  FIR that  

about eight days ago, the appellant Siddharam Mhetre and his  

brother Shankar Mhetre had gone to the village and talked to the  

abovementioned party workers and told them that, “if anybody  

says anything to you, then you tell me. I will send my men within  

five minutes.  You beat anybody. Do whatever.”   

7. According to the prosecution, the appellant along with his  

brother  instigated  their  party  workers  which  led  to  killing  of  

Bhima Shanker Kora.  It may be relevant to mention that the  

alleged incident took place after eight days of the alleged incident  

of instigation.   

8. The law relating to bail is contained in sections 436 to 450  

of  chapter  XXXIII  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973.  

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Section  436  deals  with  situation,  in  what  kind  of  cases  bail  

should be granted.  Section 436 deals with the situation when  

bail may be granted in case of a bailable offence.  Section 439  

deals with the special powers of the High Court or the Court of  

Sessions regarding grant of bail.  Under sections 437 and 439  

bail is granted when the accused or the detenu is in jail or under  

detention.  

9. The provision of  anticipatory  bail  was introduced for  the  

first time in the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1973.

10. Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 reads  

as under:

“438.  Direction  for  grant  of  bail  to  person  apprehending  arrest.- (1)  Where  any  person  has  reason  to  believe  that  he  may  be  arrested  on  accusation  of  having  committed  a  non-bailable  offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court  of Session for a direction under this section that in the  event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and  that Court may, after taking into consideration,  inter   alia, the following factors, namely:-

(i)  the nature and gravity of the accusation;

(ii) the antecedents of the applicant including the  fact  as  to  whether  he  has  previously  undergone imprisonment on conviction by a  Court in respect of any cognizable offence;

(iii)  the possibility  of  the  applicant  to flee  from  justice; and

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(iv) where the accusation has been made with the  object of injuring or humiliating the applicant  by having him so arrested,

either  reject  the  application  forthwith  or  issue  an  interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail:

Provided that, where the High Court or, as the  case may be, the Court of Session, has not passed any  interim order under this sub-section or has rejected  the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be  open  to  an  officer  in-charge  of  a  police  station  to  arrest, without warrant, the applicant on the basis of  the accusation apprehended in such application.

(1-A)  Where  the  Court  grants  an interim order  under sub-section (1), it shall forthwith cause a notice  being not less than seven days notice, together with a  copy  of  such  order  to  be  served  on  the  Public  Prosecutor  and the Superintendent  of  Police,  with a  view  to  give  the  Public  Prosecutor  a  reasonable  opportunity of being heard when the application shall  be finally heard by the Court.

(1-B)  The  presence  of  the  applicant  seeking  anticipatory bail shall be obligatory at the time of final  hearing of the application and passing of final order by  the Court, if on an application made to it by the Public  Prosecutor,  the  Court  considers  such  presence  necessary in the interest of justice.

(2) When the High Court or the Court of Session  makes  a  direction  under  sub-  section  (1),  it  may  include such conditions in such directions in the light  of the facts of the particular case, as it may thinks fit,  including -

(i)  a  condition  that  the  person  shall  make  himself  available  for  interrogation  by  a  police officer as and when required;

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(ii) a  condition  that  the  person  shall  not,  directly  or  indirectly,-  make  any  inducement,  threat  or  promise  to  any  person acquainted with the facts of the case  so as to dissuade him from disclosing such  facts to the Court or to any police officer;

(iii) a condition that the person shall not leave  India without the previous permission of the  Court;

(iv) such  other  condition  as  may  be  imposed  under sub-section (3) of section 437, as if  the bail were granted under that section.

(3)  If  such  person  is  thereafter  arrested  without  warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on  such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of  arrest  or  at  any  time  while  in  the  custody  of  such  officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail, and if a  Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides  that  a  warrant  should  issue  in  the  first  instance  against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant  in  conformity  with the direction of  the  Court  under  sub-section (1).”

Why was the provision of anticipatory bail   introduced? –  Historical perspective

11. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 did not contain any  

specific provision of anticipatory bail.  Under the old Code, there  

was  a  sharp  difference  of  opinion  amongst  the  various  High  

Courts on the question as to whether the courts had an inherent  

power  to  pass  an  order  of  bail  in  anticipation  of  arrest,  the  

preponderance of view being that it did not have such power.

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12. The  Law  Commission  of  India,  in  its  41st  Report  dated  

September 24, 1969 pointed out the necessity of introducing a  

provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure enabling the High  

Court and the Court of Sessions to grant “anticipatory bail”. It  

observed in para 39.9 of its report (Volume I) and the same is set  

out as under:

“The suggestion for directing the release of a person on  bail  prior  to  his  arrest  (commonly  known  as  “anticipatory  bail”)  was  carefully  considered  by  us.  Though there is a conflict of judicial opinion about the  power  of  a  court  to  grant  anticipatory  bail,  the  majority view is that there is no such power under the  existing  provisions  of  the  Code.  The  necessity  for  granting  anticipatory  bail  arises  mainly  because  sometimes  influential  persons  try  to  implicate  their  rivals in false cases for the purpose of disgracing them  or for other purposes by getting them detained in jail  for some days. In recent times, with the accentuation  of political  rivalry, this tendency is showing signs of  steady increase. Apart from false cases, where there  are  reasonable  grounds  for  holding  that  a  person  accused  of  an  offence  is  not  likely  to  abscond,  or  otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail, there seems  no  justification  to  require  him  first  to  submit  to  custody,  remain  in  prison  for  some  days  and  then  apply for bail.”

The  Law  commission  recommended  acceptance  of  the  

suggestion.  

13. The Law Commission in para 31 of its 48th Report (July,  

1972) made the following comments on the aforesaid clause:

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“The Bill introduces a provision for the grant of  anticipatory bail.  This is substantially in accordance  with  the  recommendation  made  by  the  previous  Commission.  We  agree  that  this  would  be  a  useful  addition,  though  we  must  add  that  it  is  in  very  exceptional  cases  that  such  a  power  should  be  exercised.

We are further of the view that in order to ensure  that the provision is not put to abuse at the instance  of unscrupulous petitioners, the final order should be  made only after notice to the Public Prosecutor. The  initial order should only be an interim one. Further,  the  relevant  section  should  make  it  clear  that  the  direction  can  be  issued  only  for  reasons  to  be  recorded,  and  if  the  court  is  satisfied  that  such  a  direction is necessary in the interests of justice.

It will also be convenient to provide that notice of  the interim order as well as of the final orders will be  given to the Superintendent of Police forthwith.”

14. Police  custody  is  an  inevitable  concomitant  of  arrest  for  

non-bailable offences.  The concept of anticipatory bail is that a  

person who apprehends his arrest  in a non-bailable  case can  

apply for grant of bail to the Court of Sessions or to the High  

Court before the arrest.

Scope and ambit of Section 438 Cr.P.C.

15. It is apparent from the Statement of Objects and Reasons  

for introducing section 438 in the Code of Criminal Procedure,  

1973 that it was felt imperative to evolve a device by which an  

alleged accused is not compelled to face ignominy and disgrace  

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at the instance of influential  people who try to implicate their  

rivals in false cases.

16. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 did not contain any  

specific  provision  corresponding  to  the  present  section  438  

Cr.P.C.  The only two clear provisions of law by which  bail could  

be granted were sections 437 and 439 of the Code.  Section 438  

was incorporated in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the  

first time.   

17. It is clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons that  

the purpose of incorporating Section 438 in the Cr.P.C. was to  

recognize the importance of  personal liberty and freedom in a  

free  and democratic  country.   When we carefully  analyze  this  

section, the wisdom of the legislature becomes quite evident and  

clear  that  the  legislature  was  keen  to  ensure  respect  for  the  

personal liberty and also pressed in service  the age-old principle  

that an individual is presumed to be innocent till  he is found  

guilty by the court.

18. The High Court in the impugned judgment has declined to  

grant anticipatory bail to the appellant and aggrieved by the said  

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order,  the  appellant  has  approached  this  Court  by  filing  this  

appeal.

19. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing for  

the appellant submitted that the High Court has gravely erred in  

declining the anticipatory bail to the appellant.  He submitted  

that  section  438  Cr.P.C.  was  incorporated  because  sometime  

influential people try to implicate their rivals in false cases for  

the purpose of disgracing them or for other purposes by getting  

them detained in  jail  for  some days.   He  pointed out  that  in  

recent  times,  with  the  accentuation  of  political  rivalry,  this  

tendency is showing signs of steady increase.     

20. Mr.  Bhushan  submitted  that  the  appellant  has  been  

implicated in a false case and apart from that he has already  

joined  the  investigation  and  he  is  not  likely  to  abscond,  or  

otherwise misuse the liberty while on bail, therefore, there was  

no justification to decline anticipatory bail to the appellant.   

21. Mr. Bhushan also submitted that the FIR in this case refers  

to an incident which had taken place on the instigation of the  

appellant  about  eight  days  ago.   According  to  him,  proper  

analysis  of  the  averments  in  the  FIR  leads  to  irresistible  

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conclusion that the entire prosecution story seems to be a cock  

and  bull  story  and  no  reliance  can  be  placed  on  such  a  

concocted version.   

22. Mr.  Bhushan  contended  that  the  personal  liberty  is  the  

most  important  fundamental  right  guaranteed  by  the  

Constitution.   He  also  submitted  that  it  is  the  fundamental  

principle  of  criminal  jurisprudence  that  every  individual  is  

presumed to be innocent till he or she is found guilty.  He further  

submitted  that  on  proper  analysis  of  section  438  Cr.P.C.  the  

legislative  wisdom  becomes  quite  evident  that  the  legislature  

wanted to preserve and protect personal liberty and give impetus  

to  the  age-old  principle  that  every  person  is  presumed  to  be  

innocent till he is found guilty by the court.

23. Mr. Bhushan also submitted that an order of anticipatory  

bail does not in any way, directly or indirectly, take away from  

the police their power and right to fully investigate into charges  

made against the appellant.  He further submitted that when the  

case is under investigation, the usual anxiety of the investigating  

agency  is  to  ensure  that  the  alleged  accused  should  fully  

cooperate with them and should be available as and when they  

require him. In the instant case, when the appellant has already  

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joined  the  investigation  and  is  fully  cooperating  with  the  

investigating agency then it is difficult to comprehend why the  

respondent  is  insistent  for  custodial  interrogation  of  the  

appellant? According to the appellant, in the instant case, the  

investigating agency should not have a slightest doubt that the  

appellant would not be available to the investigating agency for  

further  investigation  particularly  when  he  has  already  joined  

investigation  and  is  fully  cooperating  with  the  investigating  

agency.

24. Mr. Bhushan also submitted that according to the General  

Clauses Act, 1897 the court which grants the bail also has the  

power to cancel it.  The grant of bail is an interim order.  The  

court can always review its decision according to the subsequent  

facts,  circumstances  and  new  material.   Mr.  Bhushan  also  

submitted that the exercise of grant, refusal and cancellation of  

bail can be undertaken by the court either at the instance of the  

accused or a public prosecutor or a complainant on finding fresh  

material and new circumstances at any point of time. Even the  

appellant’s  reluctance  in  not  fully  cooperating  with  the  

investigation could be a ground for cancellation of bail.

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25. Mr. Bhushan submitted that a plain reading of the section  

438 Cr.P.C. clearly reveals that the legislature has not placed any  

fetters  on  the  court.   In  other  words,  the  legislature  has  not  

circumscribed  court’s  discretion  in  any  manner  while  granting  

anticipatory bail,  therefore,  the court should not limit the order  

only  for  a  specified  period  till  the  charge-sheet  is  filed  and  

thereafter  compel  the accused to surrender and ask for  regular  

bail  under  section 439 Cr.P.C.,  meaning thereby the legislature  

has not envisaged that the life of the anticipatory bail would only  

last  till  the  charge-sheet  is  filed.   Mr.  Bhushan submitted  that  

when no embargo has been placed by the  legislature  then this  

court  in  some  of  its  orders  was  not  justified  in  placing  this  

embargo.   

26. Mr. Bhushan submitted that the discretion which has been  

granted by the legislature cannot and should not be curtailed by  

interpreting the provisions contrary to the legislative intention.  

The courts’ discretion in grant or refusal of the anticipatory bail  

cannot  be  diluted  by  interpreting  the  provisions  against  the  

legislative intention.   He submitted that the life is never static  

and  every  situation  has  to  be  assessed  and  evaluated  in  the  

context  of  emerging  concerns  as  and  when  it  arises.    It  is  

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difficult  to  visualize  or  anticipate  all  kinds  of  problems  and  

situations which may arise in future.   

Law has been settled by an authoritative pronouncement of  the Supreme Court

27. The Constitution Bench of this Court in  Gurbaksh Singh  

Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 had an  

occasion to comprehensively deal with the scope and ambit of  

the  concept  of  anticipatory  bail.   Section  438  Cr.P.C.  is  an  

extraordinary  provision  where  the  accused  who  apprehends  

his/her arrest on accusation of having committed a non-bailable  

offence  can  be  granted  bail  in  anticipation  of  arrest.  The  

Constitution Bench’s relevant observations are set out as under:  

“……..A wise exercise of judicial power inevitably takes  care of the evil consequences which are likely to flow  out  of  its  intemperate  use.  Every  kind  of  judicial  discretion, whatever may be the nature of the matter  in regard to which it is required to be exercised, has to  be  used  with  due  care  and  caution.  In  fact,  an  awareness  of  the  context  in  which the  discretion is  required  to  be  exercised  and  of  the  reasonably  foreseeable consequences of its use, is the hall mark  of a prudent exercise of judicial discretion. One ought  not  to  make  a  bugbear  of  the  power  to  grant  anticipatory bail”.

28. Mr. Bhushan referred to a Constitution Bench judgment in  

Sibbia’s case (supra) to strengthen his argument that no such  

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embargo  has  been  placed  by  the  said  judgment  of  the  

Constitution  Bench.   He  placed heavy  reliance  on para  15 of  

Sibbia’s case (supra), which reads as under:

“15. Judges have to decide cases as they come before  them,  mindful  of  the  need  to  keep  passions  and  prejudices out of their decisions. And it will be strange  if, by employing judicial artifices and techniques, we  cut down the discretion so wisely conferred upon the  courts,  by devising a formula which will  confine the  power to grant anticipatory bail within a strait-jacket.  While  laying  down  cast-iron  rules  in  a  matter  like  granting anticipatory bail, as the High Court has done,  it is apt to be overlooked that even judges can have  but  an  imperfect  awareness  of  the  needs  of  new  situations. Life is never static and every situation has  to be assessed in the context of emerging concerns as  and when it arises. Therefore, even if we were to frame  a ‘Code for the grant of anticipatory bail’, which really  is the business of the legislature, it can at best furnish  broad guide-lines and cannot compel blind adherence.  In which case to grant bail and in which to refuse it is,  in the very nature of  things,  a  matter  of  discretion.  But apart from the fact that the question is inherently  of  a kind which calls  for  the use of  discretion from  case  to  case,  the  legislature  has,  in  terms  express,  relegated  the  decision  of  that  question  to  the  discretion of the court, by providing that it may grant  bail  “if  it  thinks  fit”.  The  concern  of  the  courts  generally  is  to  preserve  their  discretion  without  meaning to abuse it.  It  will  be strange if  we exhibit  concern to stultify the discretion conferred upon the  courts by law.”

29. Mr.  Bhushan  submitted  that  the  Constitution  Bench  in  

Sibbia’s case (supra)  also  mentioned  that  “we  see  no  valid  

reason for rewriting Section 438 with a view, not to expanding  

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the  scope  and  ambit  of  the  discretion  conferred  on  the  High  

Court and the Court of Session but, for the purpose of limiting it.  

Accordingly, we are unable to endorse the view of the High Court  

that anticipatory bail  cannot be granted in respect of offences  

like  criminal  breach  of  trust  for  the  mere  reason  that  the  

punishment  provided  therefor  is  imprisonment  for  life.  

Circumstances  may  broadly  justify  the  grant  of  bail  in  such  

cases  too,  though  of  course,  the  court  is  free  to  refuse  

anticipatory  bail  in  any  case  if  there  is  material  before  it  

justifying such refusal”.   

30. Mr.  Bhushan submitted  that  the  court’s  orders  in  some  

cases  that  anticipatory  bail  is  granted  till  the  charge-sheet  is  

filed and thereafter the accused has to surrender and seek bail  

application under section 439 Cr.P.C. is neither envisaged by the  

provisions of the Act nor is in consonance with the law declared  

by a Constitution Bench in  Sibbia’s case  (supra)  nor it  is  in  

conformity  with  the  fundamental  principles  of  criminal  

jurisprudence that accused is considered to be innocent till he is  

found  guilty  nor  in  consonance  with  the  provisions  of  the  

Constitution where individual’s liberty in a democratic society is  

considered sacrosanct.

17

31. Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, learned senior counsel appearing  

for  respondent no. 2,  submitted that looking to the facts and  

circumstances  of  this  case,  the  High  Court  was  justified  in  

declining the anticipatory bail to the appellant.   He submitted  

that the anticipatory bail ought to be granted in rarest of rare  

cases where the nature of offence is not very serious.   He placed  

reliance on the case of Pokar Ram v. State of Rajasthan and  

Others (1985) 2 SCC 597 and submitted that in murder cases  

custodial interrogation is of paramount importance particularly  

when no eye witness account is available.     

32. Mr. Jethmalani fairly submitted that the practice of passing  

orders of anticipatory bail operative for a few days and directing  

the  accused to  surrender  before  the  Magistrate  and apply  for  

regular bail are contrary to the law laid down in Sibbia’s case  

(supra). The decisions of this Court in Salauddin Abdulsamad  

Shaikh v.  State  of  Maharashtra (1996)  1  SCC  667,  K.  L.  

Verma v. State and Another (1998) 9 SCC 348, Adri Dharan  

Das v.  State of West Bengal (2005) 4 SCC 303 and Sunita  

Devi v.  State of Bihar and Another  (2005) 1 SCC 608 are in  

conflict  with  the  above  decision  of  the  Constitution  Bench  in  

Sibbia’s case (supra).  He submitted that all these orders which  

18

are contrary to the clear legislative intention of law laid down in  

Sibbia’s case (supra) are per incuriam.  He also submitted that  

in case the conflict between the two views is irreconcilable, the  

court is bound to follow the judgment of the Constitution Bench  

over the subsequent decisions of Benches of lesser strength.    

33. He placed reliance on  N. Meera Rani v.  Government of  

Tamil  Nadu and Another  (1989)  4 SCC 418 wherein it  was  

perceived that there was a clear conflict between the judgment of  

the Constitution Bench and subsequent decisions of Benches of  

lesser  strength.   The  Court  ruled  that  the  dictum  in  the  

judgment of the Constitution Bench has to be preferred over the  

subsequent decisions of the Bench of lesser strength.  The Court  

observed thus:

“…….All subsequent decisions which are cited have to  be read in the light of the Constitution Bench decision  since  they  are  decisions  by  Benches  comprising  of  lesser number of judges.  It  is obvious that none of  these  subsequent  decisions  could  have  intended  taking  a  view  contrary  to  that  of  the  Constitution  bench in Rameshwar Shaw’s case (1964) 4 SCR 921”

34. He placed reliance on another judgment of  this Court  in  

Vijayalaxmi  Cashew  Company  and  Others v. Dy.  

19

Commercial Tax Officer and Another  (1996) 1 SCC 468.  This  

Court held as under:

“……..It is not possible to uphold the contention that  perception of the Supreme Court, as will appear from  the later judgments, has changed in this regard.  A  judgment of a Five Judge Bench, which has not been  doubted by any later judgment of the Supreme Court  cannot be treated as overruled by implication.”

35. He also placed reliance on  Union of India and Others  v.  

K. S. Subramanian (1976) 3 SCC 677 and  State of U.P.   v.  

Ram Chandra Trivedi (1976) 4 SCC 52 and submitted that in  

case of conflict, the High Court has to prefer the decision of a  

larger Bench to that of a smaller Bench.   

36. Mr.  Jethmalani  submitted  that  not  only  the  decision  in  

Sibbia’s case (supra) must be followed on account of the larger  

strength  of  the  Bench  that  delivered  it  but  the  subsequent  

decisions must be held to be per incuriam and hence not binding  

since they have not taken into account the ratio of the judgment  

of the Constitution Bench.  

37. He  further  submitted  that  as  per  the  doctrine  of  ‘per  

incuriam’, any judgment which has been passed in ignorance of  

or  without  considering  a  statutory  provision  or  a  binding  

precedent is not good law and the same ought to be ignored.  A  

20

perusal of the judgments in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v.  

State of Maharashtra,  K. L. Verma v.  State and Another,  

Adri Dharan Das v. State of West Bengal and Sunita Devi v.  

State  of  Bihar  and  Another  (supra)  indicates  that  none  of  

these  judgments  have  considered  para  42  of  Sibbia’s case  

(supra) in proper perspective.   According to Mr. Jethmalani, all  

subsequent decisions which have been cited above have to be  

read in the light of the Constitution Bench’s decision in Sibbia’s  

case (supra) since they are decisions of Benches comprised of  

lesser  number  of  judges.   According  to  him,  none  of  these  

subsequent decisions could be intended taking a view contrary to  

that of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s case (supra).

38. Thus,  the  law laid  down in para 42 by the  Constitution  

Bench that the normal rule is not to limit operation of the order  

of anticipatory bail,  was not taken into account by the courts  

passing the subsequent judgments.  The observations made by  

the  courts  in  the  subsequent  judgments  have  been  made  in  

ignorance of and without considering the law laid down in para  

42 which was binding on them.   In these  circumstances,  the  

observations  made  in  the  subsequent  judgments  to  the  effect  

that anticipatory bail should be for a limited period of time, must  

21

be  construed  to  be  per  incuriam and  the  decision  of  the  

Constitution Bench preferred.   

39. He  further  submitted  that  the  said  issue  came  up  for  

consideration  before  the  Madras  High  Court  reported  in  

Palanikumar and Another  v.  State 2007 (4)  CTC 1 wherein  

after discussing all the judgments of this court on the issue, the  

court held that the subsequent judgments were in conflict with  

the decision of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s case (supra)  

and in accordance with the law of precedents, the judgment of  

the Constitution Bench is biding on all courts and the ratio of  

that judgment has to be applicable for all judgments decided by  

the  Benches  of  same  or  smaller  combinations.   In  the  said  

judgment  of  Sibbia’s case (supra)  it  was  directed  that  the  

anticipatory bail should not be limited in period of time.   

40. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at great  

length and perused the written submissions filed by the learned  

counsel for the parties.  

Relevance and importance of personal liberty

41. All  human beings are born with some unalienable  rights  

like life,  liberty and pursuit  of  happiness.   The importance of  

22

these  natural  rights  can  be  found  in  the  fact  that  these  are  

fundamental for their proper existence and no other right can be  

enjoyed without the presence of right to life and liberty.   

42. Life bereft of liberty would be without honour and dignity  

and it would lose all significance and meaning and the life itself  

would not be worth living. That is why “liberty” is called the very  

quintessence of a civilized existence.

43. Origin  of  “liberty”’  can  be  traced  in  the  ancient  Greek  

civilization.  The Greeks distinguished between the liberty of the  

group and the liberty of the individual.  In 431 B.C., an Athenian  

statesman described that the concept of liberty was the outcome  

of  two  notions,  firstly,  protection  of  group  from  attack  and  

secondly, the ambition of the group to realize itself as fully as  

possible through the self-realization of the individual by way of  

human reason.   Greeks  assigned  the  duty  of  protecting  their  

liberties to the State.  According to Aristotle, as the state was a  

means to fulfil certain fundamental needs of human nature and  

was  a  means  for  development  of  individuals’  personality  in  

association of fellow citizens so it was natural and necessary to  

man.   Plato  found  his  “republic”  as  the  best  source  for  the  

achievement of the self-realization of the people.

23

44. Chambers’  Twentieth  Century  Dictionary  defines  “liberty”  

as “Freedom to do as one pleases, the unrestrained employment  

of  natural  rights,  power  of  free  chance,  privileges,  exemption,  

relaxation  of  restraint,  the  bounds  within  which  certain  

privileges  are  enjoyed,  freedom  of  speech  and  action  beyond  

ordinary civility”.

45. It is very difficult to define the “liberty”.  It has many facets  

and  meanings.   The  philosophers  and  moralists  have  praised  

freedom and liberty but this term is difficult to define because it  

does not resist  any interpretation.   The term “liberty”  may be  

defined as the affirmation by an individual  or group of his or its  

own  essence.   It  needs  the  presence  of  three  factors,  firstly,  

harmonious  balance  of  personality,  secondly,  the  absence  of  

restraint  upon  the  exercise  of  that  affirmation  and  thirdly,  

organization  of  opportunities  for  the  exercise  of  a  continuous  

initiative.

46. “Liberty” may be defined as a power of acting according to  

the determinations of the will.  According to Harold Laski, liberty  

was essentially an absence of restraints and John Stuard Mill  

24

viewed that “all restraint”, qua restraint is an evil”.  In the words  

of Jonathon Edwards, the meaning of “liberty” and freedom is:

“Power, opportunity or advantage that any one has to  do as he pleases,  or,  in other words,  his being free  from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or  conducting in any respect, as he wills.”

47. It  can  be  found  that  “liberty”  generally  means  the  

prevention of  restraints  and providing  such opportunities,  the  

denial  of  which  would  result  in  frustration  and  ultimately  

disorder.   Restraints on man’s liberty are laid down by power  

used  through  absolute  discretion,  which  when  used  in  this  

manner brings an end to “liberty” and freedom is lost.  At the  

same time “liberty” without restraints would mean liberty won by  

one and lost by another.  So “liberty” means doing of anything  

one desires but subject to the desire of others.

48. As John E.E.D.  in  his  monograph Action on “Essays  on  

Freedom  and  Power”  wrote  that  Liberty  is  one  of  the  most  

essential requirements of the modern man.  It is said to be the  

delicate fruit of a mature civilization.

49.  A distinguished former Attorney General  for  India,  M.C.  

Setalvad in his treatise “War and Civil Liberties” observed that  

25

the French Convention stipulates common happiness as the end  

of  the  society,  whereas  Bentham  postulates  the  greatest  

happiness of the greatest number as the end of law.  Article 19 of  

the  Indian  Constitution  averts  to  freedom  and  it  enumerates  

certain  rights  regarding  individual  freedom.   These  rights  are  

vital and most important freedoms which lie at the very root of  

liberty.

50. He  further  observed  that  the  concept  of  civil  liberty  is  

essentially rooted in the philosophy of individualism. According  

to this doctrine, the highest development of the individual and  

the enrichment of his personality are the true function and end  

of  the state.    It  is only when the individual  has reached the  

highest state of perfection and evolved what is best in him that  

society and the state can reach their goal of perfection. In brief,  

according to this doctrine, the state exists mainly, if not solely,  

for  the  purpose  of  affording  the  individual  freedom  and  

assistance for the attainment of his growth and perfection.  The  

state exists for the benefit of the individual.

51. Mr. Setalvad in the same treatise further observed that it is  

also true that the individual cannot attain the highest  in him  

26

unless  he  is  in  possession of  certain essential  liberties  which  

leave him free as it were to breathe and expand.  According to  

Justice Holmes, these liberties are the indispensable conditions  

of a free society.  The justification of the existence of such a state  

can only be the advancement of the interests of the individuals  

who  compose  it  and  who  are  its  members.   Therefore,  in  a  

properly constituted democratic state, there cannot be a conflict  

between the interests of the citizens and those of the state.  The  

harmony, if not the identity, of the interests of the state and the  

individual, is the fundamental basis of the modern Democratic  

National  State.  And,  yet  the  existence  of  the  state  and  all  

government  and  even  all  law  must  mean  in  a  measure  the  

curtailment of the liberty of the individual. But such a surrender  

and curtailment of his liberty is essential in the interests of the  

citizens of the State.   The individuals composing the state must,  

in their own interests and in order that they may be assured the  

existence  of  conditions  in  which  they  can,  with  a  reasonable  

amount of freedom, carry on their other activities, endow those  

in authority over them to make laws and regulations and adopt  

measures which impose certain restrictions on the activities of  

the individuals.

27

52. Harold J. Laski in his monumental work in “Liberty in the  

Modern State” observed that liberty always demands a limitation  

on  political  authority.  Power  as  such  when  uncontrolled  is  

always the natural enemy of freedom.   

53. Roscoe  Pound,  an  eminent  and  one  of  the  greatest  

American  Law  Professors  aptly  observed  in  his  book  “The  

Development  of  Constitutional  Guarantee  of  Liberty”  that  

whatever, ‘liberty’ may mean today, the liberty is guaranteed by  

our bills of rights, “is a reservation to the individual of certain  

fundamental reasonable expectations involved in life in civilized  

society and a freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise  

of the power and authority of those who are designated or chosen  

in  a  politically  organized  society  to  adjust  that  society  to  

individuals.”  

54. Blackstone  in  “Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of  England”,  

Vol.I, p.134 aptly observed that  “Personal liberty consists in the  

power  of  locomotion,  of  changing  situation  or  moving  one’s  

person  to  whatsoever  place  one’s  own inclination  may  direct,  

without imprisonment or restraint unless by due process of law”.  

28

55. According to Dicey, a distinguished English author of the  

Constitutional  Law  in  his  treatise  on  Constitutional  Law  

observed  that,  “Personal  liberty,  as  understood  in  England,  

means  in  substance  a  person’s  right  not  to  be  subjected  to  

imprisonment, arrest, or other physical coercion in any manner  

that  does  not  admit  of  legal  justification.”   [Dicey  on  

Constitutional Law, 9th Edn., pp.207-08]. According to him, it is  

the negative right of not being subjected to any form of physical  

restraint  or  coercion  that  constitutes  the  essence  of  personal  

liberty and not mere freedom to move to any part of the Indian  

territory.   In ordinary language  personal  liberty  means liberty  

relating to or concerning the person or body of the individual,  

and personal liberty in this sense is the antithesis of physical  

restraint or coercion.

56. Eminent English Judge Lord Alfred Denning observed:

“By  personal  freedom I  mean freedom of  every  law abiding citizen to think what he will, to say what  he will, and to go where he will on his lawful occasion  without  hindrance from any person….   It  must  be  matched,  of  course,  with  social  security  by  which  I  mean the peace and good order of the community in  which we live.”

29

57. Eminent former Judge of this Court, Justice H.R. Khanna  

in a speech as published in 2 IJIL, Vol.18 (1978), p.133 observed  

that “liberty postulates the creation of a climate wherein there is  

no suppression of the human spirits, wherein, there is no denial  

of  the  opportunity  for  the  full  growth  of  human  personality,  

wherein head is held high and there is no servility of the human  

mind or enslavement of the human body”.

Right to life and personal liberty under the Constitution

58. We deem it appropriate to deal with the concept of personal  

liberty under the Indian and other Constitutions.

59. The  Fundamental  Rights  represent  the  basic  values  

enriched by the people of this country.  The aim behind having  

elementary right of the individual such as the Right to Life and  

Liberty  is  not  fulfilled  as  desired  by  the  framers  of  the  

Constitution.  It is to preserve and protect certain basic human  

rights  against  interference  by  the  state.   The  inclusion  of  a  

Chapter  in  Constitution  is  in  accordance  with  the  trends  of  

modern  democratic  thought.  The  object  is  to  ensure  the  

inviolability  of  certain  essential  rights  against  political  

vicissitudes.

30

60. The  framers  of  the  Indian  Constitution  followed  the  

American model in adopting and incorporating the Fundamental  

Rights for the people of India.   American Constitution provides  

that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property  

without due process of law.  The due process clause not only  

protects the property but also life and liberty, similarly Article 21  

of  the Indian Constitution asserts  the importance  of   life  and  

liberty.  The said Article reads as under:-

“no person shall be deprived for his life or personal  liberty except according to procedure established by  law”  

the right secured by Article 21 is available to every citizen or  

non-citizen, according to this article, two rights are secured.

 1. Right to life

 2 Right to personal liberty.

61. Life and personal liberty are the most prized possessions of  

an  individual.  The  inner  urge  for  freedom  is  a  natural  

phenomenon of every human being. Respect for life, liberty and  

property is not merely a norm or a policy of the State but an  

essential requirement of any civilized society.   

62. This court defined the term “personal liberty” immediately  

after the Constitution came in force in India in the case of A. K.  

31

Gopalan v. The State  of  Madras,  AIR  1950  SC  27.    The  

expression ‘personal liberty’ has wider as well narrow meaning.  

In the wider sense it includes not only immunity from arrest and  

detention but also freedom of  speech, association etc.   In the  

narrow  sense,  it  means  immunity  from arrest  and  detention.  

The juristic conception of ‘personal liberty’, when used the latter  

sense, is that it consists freedom of movement and locomotion.  

63. Mukherjea, J. in the said judgment observed that ‘Personal  

Liberty’  means liberty  relating  to  or  concerning  the  person or  

body  of  the  individual  and  it  is,  in  this  sense,  antithesis  of  

physical  restraint  or  coercion.    ‘Personal  Liberty’  means  a  

personal  right  not  to  be  subjected to  imprisonment,  arrest  or  

other physical  coercion in any manner that does not admit of  

legal justification.  This negative right constitutes the essence of  

personal liberty. Patanjali Shastri, J. however, said that whatever  

may  be  the  generally  accepted  connotation  of  the  expression  

‘personal  liberty’,  it  was  used  in  Article  21  in  a  sense  which  

excludes the freedom dealt with in Article 19.   Thus, the Court  

gave  a  narrow  interpretation  to  ‘personal  liberty’.  This  court  

excluded certain varieties of rights, as separately mentioned in  

32

Article 19, from the purview of ‘personal liberty’ guaranteed by  

Art. 21.   

 64. In  Kharak Singh v.  State of U.P. and Others AIR 1963  

SC 1295, Subba Rao, J. defined ‘personal liberty, as a right of an  

individual  to be free from restrictions or encroachment on his  

person whether these are directly imposed or indirectly brought  

about  by  calculated  measure.   The  court  held  that  ‘personal  

liberty’  in  Article  21  includes  all  varieties  of  freedoms  except  

those included in Article 19.

65. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Another (1978)  

1  SCC 248,  this  court  expanded  the  scope  of  the  expression  

‘personal  liberty’  as  used  in  Article  21  of  the  Constitution  of  

India.   The  court  rejected  the  argument  that  the  expression  

‘personal liberty’ must be so interpreted as to avoid overlapping  

between Article  21  and Article  19(1).   It  was  observed:   “The  

expression  ‘personal  liberty’  in  Article  21  is  of  the  widest  

amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute  

the personal liberty of a man and some of them have been raised  

to the status of distinct fundamental rights and given additional  

protection under Article 19.” So, the phrase ‘personal liberty’ is  

33

very wide and includes all possible rights which go to constitute  

personal liberty, including those which are mentioned in Article  

19.

66. Right to life is one of the basic human right and not even  

the State has the authority to violate that right. [State of A.P. v.  

Challa Ramakrishna Reddy and Others (2000) 5 SCC 712].   

67. Article 21 is a declaration of deep faith and belief in human  

rights.  In this pattern of guarantee woven in Chapter III of this  

Constitution, personal liberty of man is at root of Article 21 and  

each expression used in  this  Article  enhances  human dignity  

and values.  It lays foundation for a society where rule of law has  

primary  and  not  arbitrary  or  capricious  exercise  of  power.  

[Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab and Others (1994) 3 SCC  

569].

68. While  examining  the  ambit,  scope  and  content  of  the  

expression “personal liberty” in the said case, it was held that  

the term is used in this Article as a compendious term to include  

within itself  all  varieties of  rights  which goes to make up the  

“personal liberties” or man other than those dealt within several  

clauses of Article 19(1).  While Article 19(1) deals with particular  

34

species or attributes of that freedom, “personal liberty” in Article  

21 takes on and comprises the residue.  

69. The early approach to Article 21 which guarantees right to  

life  and  personal  liberty  was  circumscribed  by  literal  

interpretation in A.K. Gopalan (supra).   But in course of time,  

the  scope  of  this  application  of  the  Article  against  arbitrary  

encroachment by the executives has been expanded by liberal  

interpretation of the components of the Article in tune with the  

relevant international  understanding.   Thus protection against  

arbitrary privation of “life” no longer means mere protection of  

death, or physical  injury,  but also an invasion of  the right to  

“live” with human dignity and would include all these aspects of  

life which would go to make a man’s life meaningful and worth  

living,  such  as  his  tradition,  culture  and  heritage. [Francis  

Coralie  Mullin  v.  Administrator,  Union  Territory  of  Delhi  

and Others (1981) 1 SCC 608]

70. Article  21 has received very  liberal  interpretation by this  

court.  It was held: “The right to live with human dignity and  

same does not connote continued drudging.  It takes within its  

fold some process of  civilization which makes life  worth living  

35

and expanded concept of life would mean the tradition, culture,  

and  heritage  of  the  person  concerned.”  [P.  

Rathinam/Nagbhusan  Patnaik  v. Union  of  India  and  

Another (1994) 3 SCC 394.]   

71. The object of Article 21 is to prevent encroachment upon  

personal liberty in any manner.  Article 21 is repository of all  

human rights essentially for a person or a citizen.  A fruitful and  

meaningful life presupposes full of dignity, honour, health and  

welfare. In the modern “Welfare Philosophy”, it is for the State to  

ensure these essentials of life to all its citizens, and if possible to  

non-citizens.  While invoking the provisions of Article 21, and by  

referring to the oft-quoted statement of Joseph Addision, “Better  

to die ten thousand deaths than wound my honour”, the Apex  

court in  Khedat Mazdoor Chetana Sangath v. State of M.P.  

and  Others (1994)  6  SCC 260  posed  to  itself  a  question  “If  

dignity or honour vanishes what remains of life”?  This is the  

significance of the Right to Life and Personal Liberty guaranteed  

under the Constitution of India in its third part.

72. This  court  in  Central  Inland  Water  Transport  

Corporation Ltd.  and Another  v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and  

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Another (1986) 3 SCC 156 observed that the law must respond  

and  be  responsive  to  the  felt  and  discernible  compulsions  of  

circumstances  that  would  be  equitable,  fair  and  justice,  and  

unless there is anything to the contrary in the statute,  Court  

must take cognizance of that fact and act accordingly.

73. This court remarked that an undertrial prisoner should not  

be put in fetters while he is being taken from prison to Court or  

back to  prison from Court.   Steps  other  than putting  him in  

fetters will have to be taken to prevent his escape.  

74. In Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980)  

3 SCC 526, this court has made following observations:  

“……. The Punjab Police Manual, in so far as it puts  the ordinary Indian beneath the better class breed  (para  26.21A  and  26.22  of  Chapter  XXVI)  is  untenable and arbitrary. Indian humans shall  not  be dichotomised and the common run discriminated  against regarding handcuffs. The provisions in para  26.22  that  every  under-trial  who  is  accused  of  a  non-bailable offence punishable with more than 3  years prison term shall be routinely handcuffed is  violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21. The nature of the  accusation  is  not  the  criterion.  The  clear  and  present danger of escape breaking out of the police  control is the determinant. And for this there must  be  clear  material,  not  glib  assumption,  record  of  reasons  and  judicial  oversight  and  summary  hearing and direction by the court where the victim  is  produced.  …  Handcuffs  are  not  summary  punishment vicariously imposed at police level,  at  

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once  obnoxious  and  irreversible.  Armed  escorts,  worth the salt, can overpower any unarmed under- trial  and  extra  guards  can  make  up  exceptional  needs. In very special situations, the application of  irons is not ruled out. The same reasoning applies  to  (e)  and  (f).  Why  torture  the  prisoner  because  others will demonstrate or attempt his rescue? The  plain law of under-trial custody is thus contrary to  the unedifying escort practice. (Para 31)

Even  in  cases  where,  in  extreme  circumstances,  handcuffs  have  to  be  put  on  the  prisoner,  the  escorting authority must record contemporaneously  the reason for doing so. Otherwise, under Article 21  the procedure will  be unfair  and bad in law. The  minions  of  the  police  establishment  must  make  good  their  security  recipes  by  getting  judicial  approval. And, once the court directs that handcuffs  shall  be  off,  no  escorting  authority  can  overrule  judicial direction. This is implicit in Article 21 which  insists upon fairness, reasonableness and justice in  the  very  procedure  which  authorities  stringent  deprivation of life and liberty. (Para 30)

It is implicit in Articles 14 and 19 that when there is  no compulsive need to fetter a person's limbs, it is  sadistic,  capricious,  despotic  and  demoralizing  to  humble  a man by manacling him.  Such arbitrary  conduct  surely  slaps  Article  14  on  the  face.  The  minimal  freedom  of  movement  which  even  a  detainee is entitled to under Article 19 cannot be  cut  down  cruelly  by  application  of  handcuffs  or  other hoops. It will be unreasonable so to do unless  the State is able to make out that no other practical  way of forbidding escape is available, the prisoner  being  so  dangerous  and  desperate  and  the  circumstances so hostile to safekeeping. (Para 23)

Whether  handcuffs  or  other  restraint  should  be  imposed on a prisoner is a matter for the decision of  the authority responsible for his custody. But there  is  room for  imposing  supervisory  regime over  the  

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exercise  of  that  power.  One  sector  of  supervisory  jurisdiction  could  appropriately  lie  with  the  court  trying the accused, and it would be desirable for the  custodial  authority  to  inform  that  court  of  the  circumstances  in  which,  and the  justification  for,  imposing a restraint on the body of the accused. It  should be for the court concerned to work out the  modalities  of  the  procedure  requisite  for  the  purpose of enforcing such control.”

75. After dealing with the concept of life and liberty under the  

Indian Constitution, we would like to have the brief  survey of  

other  countries  to  ascertain  how  life  and  liberty  has  been  

protected in other countries.

UNITED KINGDOM

76. Life and personal liberty has been given prime importance  

in the United Kingdom. It was in 1215 that the people of England  

revolted against King John and enforced their rights, first time  

the King had acknowledged that there were certain rights of the  

subject could be called Magna Carta 1215.  In 1628 the petition  

of rights was presented to King Charles-I which was the 1st step  

in the transfer of Sovereignty from the King to Parliament.  It was  

passed as the Bill of Rights 1689.

77. In the Magna Carta, it is stated “no free man shall be taken,  

or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or banished or any ways  

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destroyed, nor will  the King pass upon him or commit him to  

prison, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the  

land”.

78. Right to life is the most fundamental of all human rights  

and any decision affecting human right  or which may put an  

individual’s life at risk must call for the most anxious scrutiny.  

See: Bugdaycay  v.  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  

Department (1987) 1 All ER 940.  The sanctity of human life is  

probably the most fundamental of the human social values.  It is  

recognized in all civilized societies and their legal system and by  

the internationally recognized statements of human rights.  See:  

R  on  the  application  of  Pretty  v. Director  of  Public  

Prosecutions (2002) 1 All ER 1.    

U.S.A.

79. The importance of personal liberty is reflected in the Fifth  

Amendment to the Constitution of U.S.A. (1791) which declares  

as under :-

“No person shall be…..deprived of his life, liberty or  property,  without  due  process  of  law.”  (The  ‘due  process’  clause  was  adopted  in  s.1(a)  of  the  Canadian Bill of Rights Act, 1960.  In the Canada  Act, 1982, this expression has been substituted by  ‘the principles of fundamental justice’ [s.7].

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80. The Fourteenth Amendment imposes similar limitation on  

the  State  authorities.  These  two  provisions  are  conveniently  

referred to as the ‘due process clauses’.  Under the above clauses  

the American Judiciary claims to declare a law as bad, if it is not  

in  accordance  with  ‘due  process’,  even  though  the  legislation  

may be within the competence of the Legislature concerned.  Due  

process is conveniently understood means procedural regularity  

and fairness. (Constitutional Interpretation by Craig R. Ducat, 8th  

Edn. 2002   p.475.).

WEST GERMANY   

81. Article  2(2)  of  the  West  German  Constitution  (1948)  

declares:

“Everyone  shall  have  the  right  to  life  and  physical  inviolability.  The  freedom of  the  individual  shall  be  inviolable.  These rights may be interfered with only on  the basis of the legal order.”

Though the freedom of life and liberty guaranteed by the above  

Article may be restricted, such restriction will be valid only if it is  

in  conformity  with  the  ‘legal  order’  (or  ‘pursuant  to  a  law,  

according  to  official  translation).   Being  a  basic  right,  the  

freedom guaranteed by Article 2(2) is binding on the legislative,  

administrative and judicial organs of the State [Article 1(3)].  This  

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gives the individual the rights to challenge the validity of a law or  

an  executive  act  violative  the  freedom  of  the  person  by  a  

constitutional  complaint  to  the  Federal  Constitutional  Court,  

under  Article  93.   Procedural  guarantee  is  given  by  Articles  

103(1) and 104. Article 104(1)-2(2) provides:

“(1) The freedom of the individual may be restricted  only on the basis of a formal law and only with due  regard to the forms prescribed therein……….

(2) Only  the  Judge  shall  decide  on the admissibility  and continued deprivation of liberty.”

82. These  provisions  correspond  to  Article  21  of  our  

Constitution and the court is empowered to set a man to liberty  

if it appears that he has been imprisoned without the authority  

of a formal law or in contravention of the procedure prescribed  

there.

JAPAN   

83. Article XXXI of the Japanese Constitution of 1946 says :

“No person shall be deprived of life or liberty nor shall  any  other  criminal  penalty  be  imposed,  except  according to procedure established by law.”

This article is similar to Article 21 of our Constitution save that it  

includes  other  criminal  penalties,  such  as  fine  or  forfeiture  

within its ambit.

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CANADA  

84. S. 1(1) of the Canadian Bill of Rights Act, 1960, adopted the  

‘Due Process’ Clause from the American Constitution.  But the  

difference in the Canadian set-up was due to the fact that this  

Act  was  not  a  constitutional  instrument  to  impose  a  direct  

limitation on the Legislature but only a statute for interpretation  

of Canadian status, which, again,  could be excluded from the  

purview of the Act of 1960, in particular cases, by an express  

declaration made by the Canadian Parliament itself  (s.2).   The  

result was obvious : The Canadian Supreme Court  in R. v. Curr  

(1972)  S.C.R.  889 held  that  the  Canadian  Court  would  not  

import  ‘substantive  reasonableness’  into s.1(a),  because of  the  

unsalutary experience of substantive due process in the U.S.A.;  

and that as to ‘procedural reasonableness’, s.1(a) of the Bill of  

Rights  Act  only  referred  to  ‘the  legal  processes  recognized  by  

Parliament and the Courts in Canada’.  The result was that in  

Canada, the ‘due process clause’ lost its utility as an instrument  

of judicial review of legislation and it came to mean practically  

the same thing as whatever the Legislature prescribes, - much  

the same as ‘procedure established by law’ in Article 21 of the  

Constitution of India, as interpreted in A.K. Gopalan (supra).

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BANGADESH

85. Article 32 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972 [3 SCW  

385] reads as under:

“No person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty  save in accordance with law.”

This provision is similar to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.  

Consequently,  unless  controlled  by  some  other  provision,  it  

should be interpreted as in India.

PAKISTAN   

86. Article 9 Right to life and Liberty. – “Security of Person : No  

person shall be deprived of life and liberty save in accordance  

with law.”

NEPAL  

87. In the 1962 – Constitution of Nepal, there is Article 11(1)  

which deals with right to life and liberty which is identical with  

Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

INTERNATIONAL CHARTERS

88. Universal Declaration, 1948. – Article 3 of the Universal  

Declaration says:

“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of  person.”

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Article 9 provides:

“No  one  shall  be  subjected  to  arbitrary  arrest,  detention or exile.”

Cl.10 says:

“Everyone  is  entitled  in  full  equality  to  a  fair  and  public  hearing  by  an  independent  and  impartial  tribunal,  in  the  determination  of  his  rights  and  obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”  [As  to  its  legal  effect,  see  M.  v.  Organisation  Belge,  (1972) 45 Inter, LR 446 (447, 451, et. Sq.)]

89. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - Article 9(1) of the  

U.N. 1966, 1966 says:

“Everyone  has  the  right  to  liberty  and  security  of  person.  No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest  or detention.  No one shall be deprived of his liberty  except on such grounds and in accordance with such  procedure as are established by law.”

90. European Convention on Human Rights,  1950. –  This  

Convention contains a most elaborate and detailed codification of  

the rights and safeguards for the protection of life and personal  

liberty against arbitrary invasion.

91. In every civilized democratic country, liberty is considered  

to be the most precious human right of every person.   The Law  

Commission  of  India  in  its  177th Report  under  the  heading  

‘Introduction to the doctrine of “arrest” has described as follows:

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“Liberty is  the most precious of  all  the human  rights”.  It has been the founding faith of the human  race  for  more  than 200  years.   Both  the  American  Declaration  of  Independence,  1776  and  the  French  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man  and  the  Citizen,  1789, spoke of  liberty  being one of  the natural  and  inalienable rights of man. The universal declaration of  human  rights  adopted  by  the  general  assembly  on  United  Nations  on  December  10,  1948  contains  several  articles designed to protect  and promote the  liberty  of  individual.   So  does  the  international  covenant on civil and political rights, 1996. Above all,  Article 21 of the Constitution of India proclaims that  no one shall be deprived of his right to personal liberty  except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by  law.  Even Article 20(1) & (2) and Article 22 are born  out of a concern for human liberty.  As it is often said,  “one  realizes  the  value  of  liberty  only  when  he  is  deprived of it.”  Liberty, along with equality is the most  fundamental  of  human  rights  and  the  fundamental  freedoms  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution.  Of  equal  importance is the maintenance of peace, law and order  in the society. Unless, there is peace, no real progress  is possible.  Societal peace lends stability and security  to the polity.  It provides the necessary conditions for  growth, whether it is in the economic sphere or in the  scientific and technological spheres.”

92. Just as the Liberty is precious to an individual, so is the  

society’s interest in maintenance of peace, law and order.  Both  

are equally important.  

93. It is a matter of common knowledge that a large number of  

undertrials  are  languishing  in  jail  for  a  long  time  even  for  

allegedly  committing  very  minor  offences.   This  is  because  

section  438  Cr.P.C.  has  not  been  allowed  its  full  play.  The  

46

Constitution Bench in  Sibbia’s case (supra) clearly mentioned  

that  section  438  Cr.P.C.  is  extraordinary  because  it  was  

incorporated in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and before  

that other provisions for grant of bail were sections 437 and 439  

Cr.P.C.  It is not extraordinary in the sense that it should be  

invoked  only  in  exceptional  or  rare  cases.   Some  courts  of  

smaller  strength  have  erroneously  observed  that  section  438  

Cr.P.C.  should  be  invoked  only  in  exceptional  or  rare  cases.  

Those orders are contrary to the law laid down by the judgment  

of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s case (supra).  According to  

the report of the National Police Commission, the power of arrest  

is grossly abused and clearly violates the personal liberty of the  

people, as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then  

the courts need to take serious notice of it.  When conviction rate  

is admittedly less than 10%, then the police should be slow in  

arresting  the  accused.  The  courts  considering  the  bail  

application  should  try  to  maintain  fine  balance  between  the  

societal interest  vis-à-vis personal liberty while adhering to the  

fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that the accused  

that  the  accused is  presumed to  be  innocent  till  he  is  found  

guilty by the competent court.  

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94. The  complaint  filed  against  the  accused  needs  to  be  

thoroughly  examined  including  the  aspect  whether  the  

complainant  has  filed  false  or  frivolous  complaint  on  earlier  

occasion.  The court should also examine the fact whether there  

is any family dispute between the accused and the complainant  

and the complainant must be clearly told that if the complaint is  

found to be false or frivolous,  then strict  action will  be taken  

against him in accordance with law. If the connivance between  

the complainant and the investigating officer is established then  

action be taken against the investigating officer  in accordance  

with law.

95. The gravity of charge and exact role of the accused must be  

properly comprehended. Before arrest, the arresting officer must  

record  the  valid  reasons  which  have  led  to  the  arrest  of  the  

accused  in  the  case  diary.   In  exceptional  cases  the  reasons  

could  be  recorded  immediately  after  the  arrest,  so  that  while  

dealing with the bail application, the remarks and observations  

of  the  arresting  officer  can also  be  properly  evaluated  by  the  

court.

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96. It  is  imperative  for  the  courts  to  carefully  and  with  

meticulous  precision  evaluate  the  facts  of  the  case.   The  

discretion  must  be  exercised  on  the  basis  of  the  available  

material and the facts of the particular case.  In cases where the  

court  is  of  the  considered  view  that  the  accused  has  joined  

investigation and he is fully cooperating with the investigating  

agency  and  is  not  likely  to  abscond,  in  that  event,  custodial  

interrogation should be avoided.

97. A great ignominy, humiliation and disgrace is attached to  

the arrest.  Arrest leads to many serious consequences not only  

for the accused but for the entire family and at times for the  

entire  community.  Most  people  do  not  make  any  distinction  

between arrest at a pre-conviction stage or post-conviction stage.

Whether the powers under section 438 Cr.P.C. are subject to  limitation of section 437 Cr.P.C.?

98. The question which arises for consideration is whether the  

powers under section 438 Cr.P.C. are unguided or uncanalised  

or are subject to all the limitations of section 437 Cr.P.C.? The  

Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s case (supra) has clearly observed  

that there is no justification for reading into section 438 Cr.P.C.  

and the limitations mentioned in section 437 Cr.P.C.   The Court  

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further observed that the plentitude of the section must be given  

its full play.  The Constitution Bench has also observed that the  

High Court is not right in observing that the accused must make  

out  a  “special  case”  for  the  exercise  of  the  power  to  grant  

anticipatory  bail.    This  virtually,  reduces  the  salutary  power  

conferred by section 438 Cr.P.C.  to a dead letter.   The Court  

observed that “We do not see why the provisions of Section 438  

Cr.P.C. should be suspected as containing something volatile or  

incendiary, which needs to be handled with the greatest care and  

caution imaginable.”  

99. As  aptly  observed  in  Sibbia’s  case  (supra)  that  a  wise  

exercise  of  judicial  power  inevitably  takes  care  of  the  evil  

consequences which are likely to flow out of its intemperate use.  

Every kind of judicial discretion, whatever may be the nature of  

the matter in regard to which it is required to be exercised, has  

to be used with due care and caution. In fact, an awareness of  

the context in which the discretion is required to be exercised  

and of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of its use, is the  

hallmark of a prudent exercise of judicial discretion. One ought  

not to make a bugbear of the power to grant anticipatory bail.     

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100. The  Constitution  Bench  in  the  same  judgment  also  

observed that a person seeking anticipatory bail  is still  a free  

man entitled to the presumption of innocence.  He is willing to  

submit  to  restraints  and  conditions  on  his  freedom,  by  the  

acceptance of conditions which the court may deem fit to impose,  

in  consideration  of  the  assurance  that  if  arrested,  he  shall  

enlarged on bail.

101. The  proper  course  of  action  ought  to  be  that  after  

evaluating the averments and accusation available on the record  

if the court is inclined to grant anticipatory bail then an interim  

bail be granted and notice be issued to the public prosecutor.  

After hearing the public prosecutor the court may either reject  

the bail application or confirm the initial order of granting bail.  

The court would certainly be entitled to impose conditions for the  

grant of bail.   The public prosecutor or complainant would be at  

liberty to move the same court for cancellation or modifying the  

conditions  of  bail  any  time  if  liberty  granted  by  the  court  is  

misused.   The  bail  granted  by the  court  should ordinarily  be  

continued till the trial of the case.   

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102. The order granting anticipatory bail for a limited duration  

and  thereafter  directing  the  accused  to  surrender  and  apply  

before a regular bail is contrary to the legislative intention and  

the  judgment  of  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Sibbia’s case  

(supra).     

103. It is a settled legal position that the court which grants the  

bail also has the power to cancel it.  The discretion of grant or  

cancellation of bail can be exercised either at the instance of the  

accused,  the  public  prosecutor  or  the  complainant  on finding  

new material or circumstances at any point of time.

104. The intention of the legislature is quite clear that the power  

of  grant  or  refusal  of  bail  is  entirely  discretionary.   The  

Constitution Bench in  Sibbia’s case (supra) has clearly stated  

that grant and refusal is discretionary and it should depend on  

the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.   The  Constitution  

Bench in the said case has aptly observed that we must respect  

the  wisdom  of  the  Legislature  entrusting  this  power  to  the  

superior  courts  namely,  the  High  Court  and  the  Court  of  

Session.  The Constitution Bench observed as under:

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“We would, therefore, prefer to leave the High Court  and the Court of Session to exercise their jurisdiction  under Section 438 by a wise and careful use of their  discretion  which,  by  their  long  training  and  experience, they are ideally suited to do. The ends of  justice will be better served by trusting these courts to  act  objectively  and  in  consonance  with  principles  governing the grant of bail which are recognized over  the years, than by divesting them of their discretion  which  the  legislature  has  conferred  upon  them,  by  laying down inflexible rules of general application. It is  customary, almost chronic,  to take a statute as one  finds it on the grounds that, after all "the legislature  in, its wisdom" has thought it fit to use a particular  expression. A convention may usefully grow whereby  the  High  Court  and  the  Court  of  Session  may  be  trusted to exercise their discretionary powers in their  wisdom, especially when the discretion is entrusted to  their care by the legislature in its wisdom. If they err,  they are liable to be corrected.”

GRANT OF BAIL FOR LIMITED PERIOD IS CONTRARY TO  THE LEGISLATIVE INTENTION AND LAW DECLARED BY THE  CONSTITUTION BENCH:

105. The court which grants the bail has the right to cancel the  

bail according to the provisions of the General Clauses Act but  

ordinarily after hearing the public prosecutor when the bail order  

is  confirmed  then  the  benefit  of  the  grant  of  the  bail  should  

continue till the end of the trial of that case.   

106. The judgment in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh (supra)  

is  contrary  to  legislative  intent  and  the  spirit  of  the  very  

provisions of the anticipatory bail itself and has resulted in an  

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artificial and unreasonable restriction on the scope of enactment  

contrary to the legislative intention.

107. The restriction on the provision of anticipatory bail under  

section 438 Cr.P.C.  limits  the  personal  liberty  of  the  accused  

granted  under  Article  21  of  the  constitution.   The  added  

observation is nowhere found in the enactment and bringing in  

restrictions which are not found in the enactment is again an  

unreasonable restriction.  It would not stand the test of fairness  

and  reasonableness  which  is  implicit  in  Article  21  of  the  

Constitution after the decision in Maneka Gandhi’s case (supra)  

in which the court observed that in order to meet the challenge  

of Article 21 of the Constitution the procedure established by law  

for  depriving  a  person  of  his  liberty  must  be  fair,  just  and  

reasonable.

108. Section 438 Cr.P.C. does not mention anything about the  

duration to which a direction for release on bail in the event of  

arrest can be granted.  The order granting anticipatory bail is a  

direction specifically to release the accused on bail in the event  

of  his  arrest.   Once  such  a  direction  of  anticipatory  bail  is  

executed  by  the  accused  and  he  is  released  on  bail,  the  

54

concerned court would be fully justified in imposing conditions  

including direction of joining investigation.

 109. The court does not use the expression ‘anticipatory bail’ but  

it provides for issuance of direction for the release on bail by the  

High  Court  or  the  Court  of  Sessions  in  the  event  of  arrest.  

According to the aforesaid judgment of  Salauddin’s case, the  

accused  has  to  surrender  before  the  trial  court  and  only  

thereafter he/she can make prayer for grant of bail by the trial  

court. The trial court would release the accused only after he has  

surrendered.

110. In pursuance to the order of the Court of Sessions or the  

High Court,  once  the  accused is  released on bail  by the  trial  

court, then it would be unreasonable to compel the accused to  

surrender before the trial court and again apply for regular bail.

111. The court must bear in mind that at times the applicant  

would approach the court for grant of anticipatory bail on mere  

apprehension  of  being  arrested  on  accusation  of  having  

committed a non-bailable offence.  In fact, the investigating or  

concerned agency may not otherwise arrest that applicant who  

has applied for anticipatory bail but just because he makes an  

55

application before the court and gets the relief from the court for  

a limited period and thereafter he has to surrender before the  

trial  court  and  only  thereafter  his  bail  application  can  be  

considered and life of anticipatory bail comes to an end.  This  

may  lead  to  disastrous  and  unfortunate  consequences.   The  

applicant who may not have otherwise lost  his liberty loses it  

because he chose to file application of anticipatory bail on mere  

apprehension  of  being  arrested  on  accusation  of  having  

committed  a non-bailable  offence.   No arrest  should be made  

because it is lawful for the police officer to do so.  The existence  

of  power  to  arrest  is  one  thing  and  the  justification  for  the  

exercise of it is quite another.  The police officer must be able to  

justify the arrest apart from his power to do so.  This finding of  

the said judgment (supra) is contrary to the legislative intention  

and law which has been declared by a Constitution Bench of this  

court in Sibbia’s case (supra).

112. The validity of the restrictions imposed by the Apex Court,  

namely,  that  the  accused  released  on  anticipatory  bail  must  

submit  himself  to  custody  and  only  thereafter  can  apply  for  

regular bail.  This is contrary to the basic intention and spirit of  

section  438  Cr.P.C.   It  is  also  contrary  to  Article  21  of  the  

56

Constitution.  The test of fairness and reasonableness is implicit  

under  Article  21  of  the  Constitution  of  India.   Directing  the  

accused to surrender to custody after the limited period amounts  

to deprivation of his personal liberty.   

113. It is a settled legal position crystallized by the Constitution  

Bench of  this  court  in  Sibbia’s  case  (supra) that  the  courts  

should not impose restrictions on the ambit and scope of section  

438  Cr.P.C.  which  are  not  envisaged  by  the  Legislature.  The  

court cannot rewrite the provision of the statute in the garb of  

interpreting it.

114. It  is  unreasonable  to lay down strict,  inflexible  and rigid  

rules  for  exercise  of  such discretion  by  limiting  the  period  of  

which an order under this section could be granted.  We deem it  

appropriate to reproduce some observations of the judgment of  

the  Constitution  Bench  of  this  court  in  the  Sibbia’s  case  

(supra).

“The  validity  of  that  section  must  accordingly  be  examined by the test of fairness and reasonableness  which is implicit in Article 21. If the legislature itself  were  to  impose  an  unreasonable  restriction  on  the  grant  of  anticipatory  bail,  such  a  restriction  could  have been struck down as being violative of Article 21.  Therefore, while determining the scope of Section 438,  the  court  should  not  impose  any  unfair  or  

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unreasonable  limitation  on  the  individual’s  right  to  obtain an order of anticipatory bail. Imposition of an  unfair  or  unreasonable  limitation,  according  to  the  learned  Counsel,  would  be  violative  of  Article  21,  irrespective of whether it is imposed by legislation or  by judicial decision.

xxx xxx xxx

Clause (1)  of  Section 438 is  couched in terms,  broad  and  unqualified.  By  any  known  canon  of  construction, words of width and amplitude ought not  generally  to  be  cut  down  so  as  to  read  into  the  language  of  the  statute  restraints  and  conditions  which the legislature itself did not think it proper or  necessary to impose. This is especially true when the  statutory  provision  which  falls  for  consideration  is  designed to secure a valuable right  like the right to  personal  freedom  and  involves  the  application  of  a  presumption  as  salutary  and  deep  grained  in  our  criminal  jurisprudence  as  the  presumption  of  innocence.”

xxx xxx xxx

“I desire in the first instance to point out that the  discretion given by the section is very wide. . . Now it  seems to  me  that  when  the  Act  is  so  expressed  to  provide a wide discretion, ... it is not advisable to lay  down any rigid rules for guiding that discretion. I do  not doubt that the rules enunciated by the Master of  the  Rolls  in  the  present  case  are  useful  maxims in  general, and that in general they reflect the point of  view from which judges would regard an application  for  relief.  But  I  think  it  ought  to  be  distinctly  understood that there may be cases in which any or  all of them may be disregarded. If it were otherwise,  the  free  discretion  given  by  the  statute  would  be  fettered  by  limitations  which  have  nowhere  been  enacted.  It  is  one  thing  to  decide  what  is  the  true  meaning  of  the  language  contained  in  an  Act  of  Parliament.  It  is  quite  a  different  thing  to  place  

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conditions upon a free discretion entrusted by statute  to the court where the conditions are not based upon  statutory enactment at all. It is not safe, I think, to say  that  the  court  must  and  will  always  insist  upon  certain things when the Act  does not  require  them,  and the facts of some unforeseen case may make the  court wish it had kept a free hand.”

xxx xxx xxx

“The concern of the courts generally is to preserve  their discretion without meaning to abuse it.  It will be  strange if we exhibit concern to stultify the discretion  conferred upon the courts by law.”

115. The  Apex  Court  in  Salauddin’s  case (supra)  held  that  

anticipatory bail should be granted only for a limited period and  

on the expiry of that duration it  should be left  to the regular  

court to deal with the matter is not the correct view.  The reasons  

quoted in the said judgment is that anticipatory bail is granted  

at a stage when an investigation is incomplete and the court is  

not informed about the nature of evidence against the alleged  

offender.

116. The said reason would not be right as the restriction is not  

seen in the enactment and bail orders by the High Court and  

Sessions Court are granted under sections 437 and 439 also at  

such stages and they are granted till the trial.

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117. The view expressed by this Court in all the above referred  

judgments have to be reviewed and once the anticipatory bail is  

granted then the protection should ordinarily be available till the  

end of the trial unless the interim protection by way of the grant  

of  anticipatory  bail  is  curtailed  when  the  anticipatory  bail  

granted by the court is cancelled by the court on finding fresh  

material  or  circumstances  or  on  the  ground  of  abuse  of  the  

indulgence by the accused.

SCOPE AND AMBIT OF ANTICIPATORY BAIL:

118. A good deal of misunderstanding with regard to the ambit  

and scope of section 438 Cr.P.C. could have been avoided in case  

the Constitution Bench decision of this court in  Sibbia’s case  

(supra) was correctly understood, appreciated and applied.   

119. This  Court  in  the  Sibbia’s case (supra)  laid  down  the  

following principles with regard to anticipatory bail:

a) Section 438(1) is to be interpreted in light of Article  21 of the Constitution of India.

b) Filing of FIR is not a condition precedent to exercise  of power under section 438.

c) Order under section 438 would not affect the right  of police to conduct investigation.

d) Conditions  mentioned  in  section  437  cannot  be  read into section 438.

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e) Although the power to release on anticipatory bail  can be described as of an “extraordinary” character  this  would  “not  justify  the  conclusion  that  the  power must be exercised in exceptional cases only.”  Powers are discretionary to be exercised in light of  the circumstances of each case.

f) Initial  order  can be  passed  without  notice  to  the  Public  Prosecutor.   Thereafter,  notice  must  be  issued  forthwith  and  question  ought  to  be  re- examined  after  hearing.   Such  ad  interim  order  must conform to requirements of  the section and  suitable  conditions  should  be  imposed  on  the  applicant.  

120. The Law Commission in July 2002 has severely criticized  

the police of our country for the arbitrary use of power of arrest  

which,  the  Commission  said,  is  the  result  of  the  vast  

discretionary powers  conferred upon them by this  Code.   The  

Commission  expressed  concern  that  there  is  no  internal  

mechanism within the police department to prevent misuse of  

law in this manner and the stark reality that complaint lodged in  

this regard does not bring any result.  The Commission intends  

to suggest amendments in the Criminal Procedure Code and has  

invited suggestions from various quarters.  Reference is made in  

this Article to the 41st Report of the Law Commission wherein the  

Commission saw ‘no justification’ to require a person to submit  

to custody, remain in prison for some days and then apply for  

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bail even when there are reasonable grounds for holding that the  

person  accused  of  an  offence  is  not  likely  to  abscond  or  

otherwise  misuse  his  liberty.   Discretionary  power  to  order  

anticipatory  bail  is  required  to  be  exercised  keeping  in  mind  

these  sentiments  and spirit  of  the  judgments  of  this  court  in  

Sibbia’s case  (supra) and  Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P.  

and Others (1994) 4 SCC 260.  

Relevant consideration for exercise of the power

121. No  inflexible  guidelines  or  straitjacket  formula  can  be  

provided for grant or refusal of anticipatory bail.  We are clearly  

of the view that no attempt should be made to provide rigid and  

inflexible  guidelines  in  this  respect  because  all  circumstances  

and situations of future cannot be clearly visualized for the grant  

or refusal of anticipatory bail.  In consonance with the legislative  

intention  the  grant  or  refusal  of  anticipatory  bail  should  

necessarily depend on facts and circumstances of each case. As  

aptly observed in the Constitution Bench decision in  Sibbia’s  

case  (supra)  that  the High Court  or  the Court  of  Sessions to  

exercise their jurisdiction under section 438 Cr.P.C. by a wise  

and careful use of their discretion which by their long training  

and experience they are ideally suited to do.  In any event, this is  

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the  legislative  mandate  which  we  are  bound  to  respect  and  

honour.   

122. The  following  factors  and  parameters  can  be  taken  into  

consideration while dealing with the anticipatory bail:  

i. The nature and gravity of the accusation and the  exact  role  of  the  accused  must  be  properly  comprehended before arrest is made;

ii. The antecedents of the applicant including the fact  as  to  whether  the  accused  has  previously  undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court  in respect of any cognizable offence;

iii. The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice;  

iv. The possibility of the accused’s likelihood to repeat  similar or the other offences.

v. Where the accusations have been made only with  the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant  by arresting him or her.

vi. Impact of grant of anticipatory bail particularly in  cases  of  large  magnitude  affecting  a  very  large  number of people.

vii. The  courts  must  evaluate  the  entire  available  material  against  the  accused  very  carefully.   The  court must also clearly comprehend the exact role  of  the  accused  in  the  case.   The  cases  in  which  accused is implicated with the help of sections 34  and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, the court should  consider  with  even  greater  care  and  caution  because over implication in the cases is a matter of  common knowledge and concern;

viii. While  considering  the  prayer  for  grant  of  anticipatory  bail,  a  balance  has  to  be  struck  between two factors namely, no prejudice should be  

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caused to the free,  fair  and full  investigation and  there  should  be  prevention  of  harassment,  humiliation  and  unjustified  detention  of  the  accused;

ix. The court to consider reasonable apprehension of  tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat  to the complainant;

x. Frivolity  in  prosecution  should  always  be  considered  and  it  is  only  the  element  of  genuineness that shall have to be considered in the  matter  of  grant  of  bail  and in  the  event  of  there  being  some  doubt  as  to  the  genuineness  of  the  prosecution,  in  the  normal  course  of  events,  the  accused is entitled to an order of bail.

123. The  arrest  should  be  the  last  option  and  it  should  be  

restricted to those exceptional cases where arresting the accused  

is imperative in the facts and circumstances of that case.   

124. The  court  must  carefully  examine  the  entire  available  

record and particularly the allegations which have been directly  

attributed to the accused and these allegations are corroborated  

by other material and circumstances on record.   

125. These are some of the factors which should be taken into  

consideration while  deciding the anticipatory bail  applications.  

These  factors  are  by  no  means  exhaustive  but  they  are  only  

illustrative in nature because it is difficult to clearly visualize all  

situations and circumstances in which a person may pray for  

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anticipatory  bail.   If  a  wise  discretion  is  exercised  by  the  

concerned judge, after consideration of entire material on record  

then most of the grievances in favour of grant of or refusal of bail  

will be taken care of.  The legislature in its wisdom has entrusted  

the power to exercise this jurisdiction only to the judges of the  

superior courts.  In consonance with the legislative intention we  

should  accept  the  fact  that  the  discretion  would  be  properly  

exercised.  In any event, the option of approaching the superior  

court against the court of Sessions or the High Court is always  

available.

126. Irrational  and Indiscriminate  arrest  are  gross violation of  

human rights.    In  Joginder  Kumar’s  case (supra),  a  three  

Judge Bench of this Court has referred to the 3rd report of the  

National Police Commission, in which it is mentioned that the  

quality of arrests by the Police in India mentioned power of arrest  

as one of the chief sources of corruption in the police. The report  

suggested  that,  by  and large,  nearly  60% of  the  arrests  were  

either  unnecessary  or  unjustified  and  that  such  unjustified  

police action accounted for 43.2% of the expenditure of the jails.

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127. Personal liberty is a very precious fundamental right and it  

should be curtailed only when it becomes imperative according to  

the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

128 In case, the State consider the following suggestions in  

proper perspective then perhaps it  may not be necessary to  

curtail  the  personal  liberty  of  the  accused  in  a  routine  

manner.   These  suggestions  are  only  illustrative  and  not  

exhaustive.

1)     Direct the accused to join investigation and only  when  the  accused  does  not  cooperate  with  the  investigating  agency,  then  only  the  accused  be  arrested.

2)    Seize  either  the  passport  or such other related  documents, such as, the title deeds of properties  or the Fixed Deposit Receipts/Share Certificates  of the accused.

 3)     Direct the accused to execute bonds;  

4) The accused may be directed to furnish sureties  of  number  of  persons  which  according  to  the  prosecution are necessary in view of the facts of  the particular case.   

5) The accused be directed to furnish undertaking  that  he  would  not  visit  the  place  where  the  witnesses  reside  so  that  the  possibility  of  tampering  of  evidence  or  otherwise  influencing  the course of justice can be avoided.

6)     Bank  accounts  be  frozen  for  small  duration  during investigation.

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129)   In case the arrest is imperative, according to the facts of  

the case, in that event, the arresting officer must clearly record  

the reasons for the arrest of the accused before the arrest in the  

case diary, but in exceptional cases where it becomes imperative  

to arrest the accused immediately, the reasons be recorded in the  

case diary immediately after the arrest is made without loss of  

any  time  so  that  the  court  has  an  opportunity  to  properly  

consider  the  case  for  grant  or  refusal  of  bail  in  the  light  of  

reasons recorded by the arresting officer.  

130. Exercise  of  jurisdiction  under  section  438  of  Cr.P.C.  is  

extremely important  judicial  function of  a  judge and must  be  

entrusted  to  judicial  officers  with  some  experience  and  good  

track record.  Both individual and society have vital interest in  

orders passed by the courts in anticipatory bail applications.

131. It  is  imperative  for  the  High  Courts  through  its  judicial  

academies  to  periodically  organize  workshops,  symposiums,  

seminars and lectures by the experts to sensitize judicial officers,  

police officers and investigating officers so that they can properly  

comprehend the importance of  personal  liberty vis-à-vis  social  

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interests.  They must learn to maintain fine balance between the  

personal liberty and the social interests.

132. The performance of the judicial officers must be periodically  

evaluated on the basis of the cases decided by them.  In case,  

they have not been able to maintain balance between personal  

liberty and societal interests, the lacunae must be pointed out to  

them and  they  may  be  asked  to  take  corrective  measures  in  

future.  Ultimately, the entire discretion of grant or refusal of bail  

has  to  be  left  to  the  judicial  officers  and all  concerned  must  

ensure that grant or refusal of bail is considered basically on the  

facts and circumstances of each case.

133. In our considered view, the Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s  

case (supra) has comprehensively dealt with almost all aspects  

of the concept of anticipatory bail under section 438 Cr.P.C.  A  

number  of  judgments  have  been  referred  to  by  the  learned  

counsel for the parties consisting of Benches of smaller strength  

where the courts have observed that the anticipatory bail should  

be  of  limited  duration  only  and  ordinarily  on  expiry  of  that  

duration  or  standard  duration,  the  court  granting  the  

anticipatory bail should leave it to the regular court to deal with  

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the matter.  This view is clearly contrary to the view taken by the  

Constitution Bench in  Sibbia’s case (supra).  In the preceding  

paragraphs,  it  is clearly spelt  out that no limitation has been  

envisaged  by  the  Legislature  under  section  438  Cr.P.C.   The  

Constitution  Bench has  aptly  observed  that  “we  see  no  valid  

reason for rewriting section 438 with a view, not to expanding  

the  scope  and  ambit  of  the  discretion  conferred  on  the  High  

Court or the Court of Session but, for the purpose of limiting it”.  

134. In  view of  the  clear  declaration  of  law laid  down by  the  

Constitution  Bench in  Sibbia’s case (supra),  it  would not  be  

proper  to  limit  the  life  of  anticipatory  bail.   When  the  court  

observed that the anticipatory bail  is  for  limited duration and  

thereafter the accused should apply to the regular court for bail,  

that means the life of section 438 Cr.P.C. would come to an end  

after  that  limited  duration.   This  limitation  has  not  been  

envisaged  by  the  legislature.   The  Constitution  Bench  in  

Sibbia’s case (supra) clearly observed that it is not necessary to  

re-write  section  438  Cr.P.C.  Therefore,  in  view  of  the  clear  

declaration of the law by the Constitution Bench, the life of the  

order  under  section  438  Cr.P.C.  granting  bail  cannot  be  

curtailed.   

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135.  The ratio  of  the  judgment  of  the  Constitution Bench in  

Sibbia’s case (supra) perhaps was not brought to the notice of  

their  Lordships  who  had  decided  the  cases  of  Salauddin  

Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, K. L. Verma v.  

State and Another, Adri Dharan Das v. State of West Bengal  

and Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar and Another (supra).

136.  In Naresh Kumar Yadav v. Ravindra Kumar (2008) 1  

SCC  632,  a  two-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  observed  “the  

power  exercisable  under  section  438  Cr.P.C.  is  somewhat  

extraordinary in character and it should be exercised only in  

exceptional cases. This approach is contrary to the legislative  

intention and the Constitution Bench’s decision in  Sibbia’s  

case (supra).   

137. We  deem  it  appropriate  to  reiterate  and  assert  that  

discretion  vested  in  the  court  in  all  matters  should  be  

exercised with care and circumspection depending upon the  

facts and circumstances justifying its exercise.  Similarly, the  

discretion  vested  with  the  court  under  section  438  Cr.P.C.  

should  also  be  exercised  with  caution and prudence.   It  is  

unnecessary to travel beyond it and subject to the wide power  

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and discretion conferred by the legislature to a rigorous code  

of self-imposed limitations.    

138. The judgments and orders mentioned in paras 135 and  

136  are  clearly  contrary  to  the  law  declared  by  the  

Constitution  Bench of  this  Court  in  Sibbia’s  case  (supra).  

These judgments and orders are also contrary to the legislative  

intention.  The  Court  would  not  be  justified  in  re-writing  

section 438 Cr.P.C.

139. Now we deem it imperative to examine the issue of  per  

incuriam raised  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  parties.   In  

Young v.  Bristol Aeroplane Company Limited (1994) All ER  

293 the House of Lords observed that ‘Incuria’ literally means  

‘carelessness’.  In practice per incuriam appears to mean per  

ignoratium.  English  courts  have  developed  this  principle  in  

relaxation of the rule of stare decisis.  The ‘quotable in law’ is  

avoided and ignored if it is rendered, ‘in ignoratium of a statute  

or  other  binding  authority.   The  same  has  been  accepted,  

approved and adopted by this court while interpreting Article  

141  of  the  Constitution  which  embodies  the  doctrine  of  

precedents as a matter of law.   

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“……… In  Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.)  Vol. 26: Judgment and Orders: Judicial Decisions as  Authorities (pp. 297-98, para 578) per incuriam has  been elucidated as under:

“A  decision  is  given  per  incuriam when  the  court  has  acted  in  ignorance  of  a  previous decision of its own or of a court  of  coordinate  jurisdiction  which covered  the case before it, in which case it must  decide  which  case  to  follow  (Young  v.  Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., 1944 KB 718  at 729 : (1944) 2 All ER 293 at 300.  

In  Huddersfield  Police  Authority  v.  Watson, 1947 KB 842 : (1947) 2 All ER  193.); or when it has acted in ignorance  of  a  House  of  Lords  decision,  in  which  case it must follow that decision; or when  the decision is given in ignorance of the  terms  of  a  statute  or  rule  having  statutory force.”

140. Lord Godard, C.J. in  Huddersfield Police Authority  v.  

Watson (1947) 2 All ER 193 observed that where a case or  

statute had not been brought to the court’s attention and the  

court  gave  the  decision in ignorance or  forgetfulness  of  the  

existence  of  the  case  or  statute,  it  would  be  a  decision  

rendered in per incuriam.  

141. This court in  Government of A.P. and Another v.  B.  

Satyanarayana Rao (dead)  by LRs.  and Others  (2000)  4  

SCC 262 observed as under:

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“The rule of per incuriam can be applied where a  court omits to consider a binding precedent of the  same court or the superior court rendered on the  same issue or where a court omits to consider any  statute while deciding that issue.”

142. In a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Union  

of India v.  Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754, Chief Justice  

Pathak observed as under:

“The doctrine of binding precedent has the merit of  promoting  a  certainty  and  consistency  in  judicial  decisions,  and enables an organic  development  of  the  law,  besides  providing  assurance  to  the  individual  as  to  the  consequence  of  transactions  forming part of his daily affairs. And, therefore, the  need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal  principle in the decisions of a court.”

143. In  Thota  Sesharathamma  and  another  v.  Thota  

Manikyamma (Dead) by LRs. and others (1991) 4 SCC 312 a  

two  Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  held  that  the  three  Judge  

Bench decision in the case of  Mst. Karmi  v. Amru  (1972) 4  

SCC 86 was per incuriam and observed as under:

“…It is a short judgment without adverting to  any provisions of Section 14 (1) or 14(2) of the Act.  The  judgment  neither  makes  any  mention  of  any  argument  raised  in  this  regard  nor  there  is  any  mention of the earlier decision in  Badri Pershad v.  Smt. Kanso Devi.  The decision in Mst. Karmi cannot  be  considered  as  an  authority  on  the  ambit  and  scope of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act.”

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144. In  R.  Thiruvirkolam  v.   Presiding  Officer  and  

Another  (1997)  1 SCC 9 a two Judge  Bench of  this  Court  

observed that the question is whether it was bound to accept  

the  decision  rendered  in  Gujarat  Steel  Tubes  Ltd.  v.  

Mazdoor  Sabha  (1980)  2  SCC  593,  which  was  not  in  

conformity with the decision of a Constitution Bench in  P.H.  

Kalyani  v.  Air France  (1964) 2 SCR 104.  J.S. Verma, J.  

speaking for the court observed as under:

“With  great  respect,  we  must  say  that  the  above-quoted observations in Gujarat Steel at P. 215  are not in line with the decision in  Kalyani   which  was binding or with  D.C. Roy to which the learned  Judge, Krishna Iyer, J. was a party.  It also does not  match  with  the  underlying  juristic  principle  discussed in Wade.  For the reasons, we are bound  to  follow  the  Constitution  Bench  decision  in  Kalyani,  which  is  the  binding  authority  on  the  point.”

145. In  Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.   v.   Mumbai  

Shramik  Sangra  and  others  (2001)  4  SCC  448  a  

Constitution Bench of  this Court  ruled that a decision of  a  

Constitution Bench of this Court binds a Bench of two learned  

Judges of this Court and that judicial discipline obliges them  

to follow it, regardless of their doubts about its correctness.   

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146. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Central Board of  

Dawoodi  Bohra  Community  v. State  of  Maharashtra  

(2005) 2 SCC 673 has observed that the law laid down by this  

Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is  

binding  on  any  subsequent  Bench  of  lesser  or  coequal  

strength.

147. A three-Judge Bench of this court in Official Liquidator  

v. Dayanand and Others (2008) 10 SCC 1 again reiterated  

the clear position of law that by virtue of Article 141 of the  

Constitution, the judgment of the Constitution Bench in State  

of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi (3) and Others (2006)  

4 SCC 1 is binding on all courts including this court till the  

same  is  overruled  by  a  larger  Bench.   The  ratio  of  the  

Constitution Bench has to be followed by Benches of lesser  

strength.  In para 90, the court observed as under:-

“We  are  distressed  to  note  that  despite  several  pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial  increase in the number of cases involving violation  of  the  basics  of  judicial  discipline.  The  learned  Single  Judges  and  Benches  of  the  High  Courts  refuse to follow and accept the verdict and law laid  down  by  coordinate  and  even  larger  Benches  by  citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for  doing  so.  Therefore,  it  has  become  necessary  to  reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos  and breach of discipline have grave impact on the  

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credibility  of  judicial  institution  and  encourages  chance  litigation.  It  must  be  remembered  that  predictability  and  certainty  is  an  important  hallmark of judicial jurisprudence developed in this  country in the last six decades and increase in the  frequency of  conflicting judgments of  the superior  judiciary  will  do  incalculable  harm to  the  system  inasmuch as the courts at the grass roots will not  be able to decide as to which of the judgments lay  down  the  correct  law  and  which  one  should  be  followed.”

148. In  Subhash  Chandra  and  Another v. Delhi  

Subordinate Services Selection Board and Others  (2009)  

15  SCC  458,  this  court  again  reiterated  the  settled  legal  

position  that  Benches  of  lesser  strength  are  bound  by  the  

judgments  of  the  Constitution  Bench  and  any  Bench  of  

smaller  strength  taking contrary  view is  per  incuriam.   The  

court in para 110 observed as under:-

“Should  we  consider  S.  Pushpa v.   Sivachanmugavelu (2005) 3 SCC 1 to be an obiter  following  the  said  decision  is  the  question  which  arises  herein.  We  think we should.  The decisions  referred to hereinbefore clearly suggest that we are  bound by a Constitution Bench decision. We have  referred  to  two  Constitution  Bench  decisions,  namely,  Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v.  Seth G.S.  Medical  College  (1990)  3  SCC  139 and  E.V.  Chinnaiah v.  State  of  A.P. (2005)  1  SCC  394.   Marri  Chandra  Shekhar  Rao (supra)  had  been  followed  by  this  Court  in  a  large  number  of  decisions  including  the  three-Judge  Bench  decisions.  S.  Pushpa  (supra) therefore,  could  not  have ignored either  Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao  

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(supra) or other decisions following the same only  on the basis of an administrative circular issued or  otherwise  and  more  so  when  the  constitutional  scheme as contained in clause (1)  of  Articles  341  and  342  of  the  Constitution  of  India  putting  the  State  and  Union  Territory  in  the  same  bracket.  Following  Official  Liquidator  v.  Dayanand and  Others (2008)  10 SCC 1 therefore,  we are  of  the  opinion that the dicta in  S.  Pushpa  (supra)  is an  obiter and does not lay down any binding ratio.”

149.  The analysis of English and Indian Law clearly leads to  

the  irresistible  conclusion  that  not  only  the  judgment  of  a  

larger strength is binding on a judgment of smaller strength  

but the judgment of a co-equal strength is also binding on a  

Bench of  judges  of  co-equal  strength.   In  the  instant  case,  

judgments mentioned in paragraphs 135 and 136 are by two  

or three judges of this court.  These judgments have clearly  

ignored  a  Constitution  Bench  judgment  of  this  court  in  

Sibbia’s case  (supra) which has comprehensively dealt with  

all  the  facets  of  anticipatory bail  enumerated under  section  

438  of  Cr.P.C..  Consequently,  judgments  mentioned  in  

paragraphs 135 and 136 of this judgment are per incuriam.

150. In case there is no judgment of a Constitution Bench or  

larger  Bench of  binding nature and if  the court doubts the  

correctness of the judgments by two or three judges, then the  

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proper course would be to request Hon’ble the Chief Justice to  

refer the matter to a larger Bench of appropriate strength.   

151.  In the  instant  case  there  is  a  direct  judgment  of  the  

Constitution  Bench  of  this  court  in  Sibbia’s  case  (supra)  

dealing  with  exactly  the  same issue regarding  ambit,  scope  

and  object  of  the  concept  of  anticipatory  bail  enumerated  

under section 438 Cr.P.C.  The controversy is no longer  res  

integra.  We are clearly bound to follow the said judgment of  

the Constitution Bench.  The judicial discipline obliges us to  

follow the said judgment in letter and spirit.   

152. In our considered view the impugned judgment and order  

of the High Court declining anticipatory bail to the appellant  

cannot be sustained and is consequently set aside.

153. We direct the appellant to join the investigation and fully  

cooperate with the investigating agency.  In the event of arrest  

the  appellant  shall  be  released on bail  on his  furnishing  a  

personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with two sureties in  

the like amount to the satisfaction of the arresting officer.

154. Consequently, this appeal is allowed and disposed of in  

terms of the aforementioned observations.

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……….….…….……………………..J.                                            (Dalveer Bhandari)

………….…….……………………..J.                                             (K.S. Panicker  Radhakrishnan)

New Delhi; December 2, 2010  

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