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PETITIONER: SHYAMARAJU HEGDE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: U. VENKATESHA BHAT & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/09/1987

BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH DUTT, M.M. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 2323            1988 SCR  (1) 340  1987 SCC  Supl.  321     JT 1987 (3)   663  1987 SCALE  (2)646  CITATOR INFO :  *          1987 SC 203  (*)  E          1988 SC 812  (2,3,13,14,18,19,26,27,29,32)

ACT:      Karnataka Rent  Control Act, 1961: s. 50(1) & (2)/(Code of Civil  Procedure, 1908:  s. 115-Revision  order  made  by District Judge  under s.  50(2)-Whether revisable  under  s. 50(1) of the Act read with s. I 15 of the Code.      Constitution  of  India,  Art.  141-Judicial  propriety warrants that  decisions of  the Supreme Court must be taken as wholly binding on the High Courts.

HEADNOTE:      Sub-section (1)  of s. SO of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961  confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court in respect  of orders  passed or  proceedings taken  by  the Court of  Small Causes or the Court of Civil Judge under the Act while  sub-s. (2)  empowers the District Judge to revise the orders  passed or  proceedings taken  by  the  Court  of Munsif and makes his order final.      A Full  Bench of  the Karnataka High Court in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shriodkar  v. Gurupad  Shivaram Kavalekar  & ORS., (ILR 1978  Kar. 1585), following the decisions of this Court in Chhagan  Lal v. The Municipal Corporation. Indore, [1977] 2 SCR  871  and  Krishnadas  Bhatija  v.  A.S.  Venkatachala Shetty, (SLP  No. 913  of 1978  decided on  13th Feb., 1978) held that  the fact  that the  order of  the District  Judge under s.  SO(2) of  the Karnataka  Rent Control Act, 1961 is made final,  does not  affect the  jurisdiction of  the High Court under  s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to revise such orders  of the  District Judge,  in the  absence of any express words in the statute taking away such jurisdiction.      Later this  Court, in  Vishesh Kumar  v. Shanti Prasad, [1980] 3  SCR 32  while interpreting s. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes  Courts Act,  as amended  by the U.P. Amendment Act, 1978,  under  which  the  revisional  jurisdiction  was shared between  the District  Court and the High Court, took the view  that the High Court was not vested with revisional jurisdiction under  s. 115  CPC in  respect of  a revisional order made  by the  District Court  under  that  section.  A similar view was also

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341 taken in  Aundal Ammal  v. Sadasivan Pillai, AIR 1987 SC 203 while construing  s. 20  of the  Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 .      Relying on  the aforesaid  two decision a Full Bench of the High  Court of  Karnataka in  M.M. Yaragatti  v. Vasant, (ILR 1987  Kar. 1286  took a  contrary view  to  Krishnaji’s case.      The appellant’s revision petition having been dismissed by a Single Judge of the High Court following the Full Bench decision in Yaragatti’s case, he preferred an appeal to this Court by special leave.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD: 1.  A revision  application is maintainable under s. 115  of the Code of Civil Procedure read with s. 50(1) of the Karnataka  Rent Control  Act, 1961 when a District Judge has made  an order  in his  revisional jurisdiction under s. 50(2) of the Act.      Chhagan  Lal  v.  The  Municipal  Corporation,  Indore, [1977] 2 SCR 871 and Krishnadas Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachala Shetty, (S.L.P. No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13th of February, 1978, referred to.      Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [1980] 3 SCR 32; Aundal Ammal v.  Sadasivan Pillai,  AIR 1987  SC  203;  South  Asia Industries Private Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh & ors.J [1965] 2 SCR 756  and  National  Sewing  Thread  Co.  Ltd.  v.  James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., [1953] SCR 1028. distinguished.      Krishnaji  Venkatesh   Shirodkar  v.  Gurupad  Shivaram Kavalekar & ors.. ILR 1978 Kar. 1585 approved.      M.M. Yaragatti v. Vasant, ILR 1987 Kar. 1286 overruled.      2. The  decision of  a Full  Bench of  the  High  Court consisting of  three Judges rendered in Krishnaji’s Case was binding on  a bench  of equal  strength unless that decision had directly  been overruled  by this  Court or by necessary implication  became   unsustainable.  There   is   no   such overruling of  Krishnaji’s decision by this Court. It cannot also be said that by necessary implication the ratio therein supported by  the  direct  authority  of  this  Court  stood superseded. [349B-C]      3. Judicial  propriety warrants  that decisions  of the Supreme 342 Court must  be taken wholly binding on the High Courts. That is the  necessary outcome of the tier system. Article 141 of the Costitution  unequivocally states  that the law declared by this  Court shall  be binding  on all  courts within  the territory of  India. A  coordinate Bench  of the High Court, therefore, should  not have  chosen to  overrule an  earlier judgment of  that  Court  based  upon  a  decision  of  this Court.[349C-F]      Broom v. Cassell & Co., [19721 1 AER 801, referred to.      4. It  is one  of the  essential  requirements  of  the administration  of   justice  that   judgments  rendered  by superior courts  and particularly  with the  approval of the apex court  should  not  be  frequently  changed  so  as  to unsettle  settled   positions.  The   fact  that  the  State Legislature has  not thought  it necessary  to amend the law and set  at naught  the decisions  in  Krishnaji’s  case  or Bhatija’s case is indicative or the position that this Court had not  taken a  wrong view  of the  legislative  intention [349H: 350A]

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JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: CIVIL APPEAL No. 1324 of 1987.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  15.4.1987  of  the Karnataka High Court in C.R.P. No. 3030 of 1985.      R.B. Datar and Ranjit Kumar for the Appellant.      B.  Krishna   Prasad  and   K.R.   Nagaraja   for   the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      RANGANATH MISRA,  J. This  appeal by  special leave  is directed against the order made by a learned Single Judge of the  Karnataka   High  Court   in  exercise   of  revisional jurisdiction. The  High Court  relied upon  the ratio of its Full Bench  decision in M.M. Yaragatti v. Vasant, ILR (1987) Kar.  1286  and  dismissed  the  revision  petition  as  not maintainable.      The short  question for consideration in this appeal is as to  whether a  revision application is maintainable under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 50(1) of  the  Karnataka  Rent  Control  Act,  1961  when  a District  Judge   has  made   an  order  in  his  revisional jurisdiction under  section 50(2)  of  the  Act.  This  very question had  come up  for consideration before a Full Bench of the 343 Karnataka High  Court in  the case  of  Krishnaji  Venkatesh Shirodkar v.  Gurupad Shivram  Kavalekar &  Ors., ILR (1978) Kar. 1585.  Venkataramiah, J.,  as he then was, speaking for the Full Bench held:-           "The  second  for  consideration  is  whether  the      declaration made in section 50(2) that the order of the      District  Judge   shall  be   final  takes   away   the      jurisdiction of  this Court  to exercise  its powers of      revision under section 115 CPC. A doubt about the above      question arose  in view  of some observations made by a      Division Bench  of  this  Court  in  Diwakar  Hegde  v.      Karkala Taluk Agriculture Produce Cooperative Marketing      Society Ltd., [1975] 2 Kar. L.J. 390 to the effect that      when  a  statute  declares  that  the  decision  of  an      authority shall  be  final,  it  cannot  be  questioned      either in  appeal or  revision under  the statute.  The      doubt however  stands resolved  by the  decision of the      Supreme  Court   in  Chhagan   Lal  v.   The  Municipal      Corporation, Indore,  [ 1977]  2 SCR  871. In that case      section 149 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation      Act, 1956  which provided  that  the  decision  of  the      district court  in an  appeal filed against an order of      the  Municipal  Commissioner  was  final  came  up  for      consideration. Rejecting  the contention  that the said      provision debarred  the revisional  jurisdiction of the      High Court  under section 115 CPC over the order of the      district court  passed in  appeal,  the  Supreme  Court      observed-                ’The second  contention is  based on  section           149 of  the Madhya  Pradesh Municipal  Corporation           Act, 1956.  It provides  that an  appeal shall lie           from the decision of the Municipal Commissioner to           the district  court when  any dispute arises as to           the  liability   of  any   land  or   building  to           assessment.  Sub-section   (i)  of   section   149           provides that  the decision  of the district court           shall be final. It was submitted that the decision           of the district court was therefore final and that           the High  Court was  in error  in  entertaining  a           revision petition.  This plea  cannot be  accepted

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         for, under  section 115  of the CPC the High Court           has got power to revise the order passed by courts           subordinate to  it. It cannot be disputed that the           district court  is  a  subordinate  court  and  is           liable to  the revisional jurisdiction of the High           Court .......... ’ " 344 The Full  Bench also  relied upon  a brief  decision of this Court in  Krisnadas  Bhatija  v.  A.S.  Venkatachala  Shetty (dead) by  Lrs., (Special  Leave Petition  No. 913  of  1978 dated 13th  of February,  1978) where  referring to the very provision, this Court observed:-           "The petitioner  contends that  the order  of  the      High  Court.  is  without  jurisdiction  because  under      section 50  of the  Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, a      revision does  not lie  to the  High Court.  We do  not      agree. Section  115 CPC  gives powers to the High Court      to revise any order from the district court, subject of      course to  the limitations  set out therein. The narrow      point then  is as  to whether the District Judge can be      equated  with   a  district   court.  The  High  Court,      following its  own earlier  decisions, has  held so. We      agree that in the scheme of Karnataka Rent Control Act,      the  District   Judge  and   the  district   court  are      interchangeable expressions  and nothing  turns on  the      mere  fact   that  the   section  uses  the  expression      ’District Judge’. Section 115 CPC therefore applies and      the revisional  jurisdiction  is  vested  in  the  High      Court."      The Full Bench thereafter stated:-           "In view  of the  above decision  of  the  Supreme      Court it has to be held that the fact that the order of      the District  Judge under  section SO(2) is made final,      does not  affect the  jurisdiction of  this Court under      section 115  of the  CPC to  revise the  orders of  the      District Judge  made under section SO(2) in the absence      of any  express words  in the  statute taking away such      jurisdiction."      As we  have mentioned  earlier the learned Single Judge      has relied upon a later Full Bench decision of the High      Court in  the  case  of  M.M.  Yaragatti  (supra).  Two      questions had  been referred  to  the  Full  Bench  for      opinion, namely:-                (I) Whether  a revision  under section 115 of           the Code of Civil Procedure lies to the High Court           from a  revisional order  made by a District Judge           under  sub-section   (2)  of  section  SO  of  the           Karnataka Rent  Control Act,  1967, as substituted           by Karnataka Act 3 1 of 1975? and                (2) Whether  the ruling  of the Full Bench of that Court  in  Krishnaji  Venkatesh  Shirodkar  v.  Gurupad Shivaram Kavelekar, (supra) requires reconsideration in view of the ruling of the 345      Supreme Court  in Vishesh  Kumar v. Shanti Prasad?, AIR      1987 SC 203. The learned  Chief Justice  of the  High Court who spoke for the Full  Bench noticed  the decision in Krishnaji’s case as also the view expressed by this Court while disposing of the special leave petition and stated:-           If the  matter had  rested here,  there would  not      have been  any controversy,  but after  the decision of      the Full Bench in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar’s case,      two decisions  of the Supreme Court have been rendered,      i.e., one  in Vishesh  Kumar’s case  and the  other  in

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    Aundal Ammal  v. Sadasivan  Pillai, AIR 1987 SC 203. It      was on  the basis  of the judgment of the Supreme Court      in Vishesh Kumar’s case that the questions posed by the      Division Bench  had to  be referred  for decision  to a      larger Bench.  After the reference, the latest judgment      of the  Supreme Court  in Aundal  Ammal’s case has also      been rendered. It is in the wake of these two judgments      that we  are required  to decide  whether the  law laid      down in  Krishnaji  Venkatesh  Shirodkar’s  case  still      survives" The Full  Bench on the authority of those two decisions came to the  conclusion that  the decision in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar’s case  (supra)  did  not  survive  and  a  second revision to the High Court was not maintainable.      A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Vishesh Kumar’s case was considering  whether the High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction  under   Section  115  of  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure in respect of an order of the District Court under Section 115 disposing of a revision petition and whether the High Court  possessed revisional  jurisdiction under Section 115 against  an order  of District Court under Section 25 of the Provincial  Small Cause  Courts Act  as amended  by  the Uttar Pradesh  Amendment Act  1978. The amendment shows that the District  Court had  also revisional  jurisdiction under Section 115  and  the  revisional  jurisdiction  under  that Section was  shared between  the High Court and the District Court  by  providing  that  the  High  Court  has  exclusive revisional jurisdiction  in cases  arising out  of  original suits or  other proceedings  of the  value of  Rs.20,000 and above and  the District Court alone had such jurisdiction in any other  case. This  Court after discussing this provision and some authorities of the Allahabad High Court 346 reached the  conclusion that  the High  Court was not vested with revisional  jurisdiction under  Section 115 of the Code of Civil  Procedure in  respect of a revisional order may by the District Court under that Section.      This conclusion  was obviously  reached-and in our view very rightly-on  account of  the fact  that the  power under Section 115 of the Code had clearly indicated the revisional jurisdiction of  the District  Court and  the High Court and vested that  jurisdiction exclusively in either the District Court  or  the  High  Court  depending  upon  the  pecuniary valuation of the dispute.      This Court  then proceeded  in Vishesh  Kumar’s case to examine the  second question.  Section 25  of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act vested revisional jurisdiction in the High Court and that provision was amended in its application of Uttar  Pradesh from  time to time. By amendment it vested revisional jurisdiction in the District Judge and by a later amendment provided that in relation to any case decided by a District  Judge  or  Additional  District  Judge  exercising jurisdiction of  a Judge  of  Small  Causes,  the  power  of revision under  Section 25  would vest in the High Court. In that case  the District Judge had exercised revisional power under Section  25 and  the question  arose as to whether the High Court  could entertain a further revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court took the view by analysing Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act that  it  was  a  self-contained  Code  and  Section  25 provided the  whole revisional  jurisdiction and, therefore, the question  of invoking  the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115  of the  Code of  Civil Procedure did not at all arise.  The  answer  to  the  second  question  was  in  the negative. The  two conclusions  reached in  Vishesh  Kumar’s

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case on  the facts thereof were certainly correct but we are concerned with  a different  set of facts and law. The ratio of the  decision in  Vishesh Kumar’s  case is  not  directly applicable to the present facts.      The other  case of  this Court  upon which reliance has been placed  by the  Full Bench  is that  of Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai,  (supra). A  two-Judge Bench  in that case was considering  the tenability  of a  second revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the High Court in view  of the  provision  of  Section  20  of  the  Kerala Buildings (Lease  and Rent  Control) Act  (2 of  1965). That Section provides:           "(1)  In   cases  where  the  appellate  authority empowered 347           under Section  18 is a Subordinate Judge, District           Court, and  in other  cases the High Court may, at           any time,  on the  application  of  any  aggrieved           party, call  for and  examine the records relating           to any  order passed  or proceedings  taken  under           this Act  by such  authority for  the  purpose  of           satisfying itself  as to  the legality, regularity           or propriety of such order in reference thereto as           it thinks fit .. . .. "      With reference  to that  provision a  Full Bench of the Kerala High  Court had held that a second revision lay. This Court stated in its judgment:           "It was  contended by  Shri Poti,  learned counsel           for the  appellant, that  no revision  lay to  the           High Court.  He submitted  that Section  185  read           with Section  20 of  the Act has completely ousted           the High Court’s jurisdiction to interfere in this           matter under  Section 115  of the  Code  of  Civil           Procedure"      That contention  was examined  by this Court. It may be relevant to  briefly refer  Section 18  which  provided  for appeal against  the order  of the  Rent Control  Court. Sub- section (5) thereof provides:-           "The decision  of  the  appellate  authority,  and           subject to  such decision,  an order  of the  Rent           Control Court  shall be  final and  shall  not  be           liable to  be called  in question  in any Court of           law, except as provided in Section 20."      In construing the meaning and effect of the word final, reliance was  placed on  the judgment of this Court in South Asia Industries  Private Ltd.  v. S.B.  Sarup Singh  & Ors., [1965] 2  SCR 756.  In that  case the  question arose  as to whether in  view of the provision in Section 43 of the Delhi Rent Control  Act attaching  finality  to  the  judgment  in Second Appeal  by the  High Court,  a Letters  Patent Appeal could be  entertained. Several  authorities were referred to and the  conclusion in  National Sewing  Thread Co.  Ltd. v. James Chadwick  & Bros.  Ltd., []953] SCR 1028 was approved. Relying upon  that decision  as also the decision in Vishesh Kumar’s case,  this Court held that jurisdiction of the High Court under  Section 115  of the Code of Civil Procedure was excluded.      On the  analysis presented  above, the  two cases  upon which the  Full Bench  has placed  reliance are  really  not direct authorities on the 348 point. We  have already noticed that in Krishnaji‘s case the earlier Full  A Bench  had re1ied  upon the decision of this Court in  Chhagan Lal’s  case. A  three-Judge Bench  in that case broadly  dealt with  a similar  contention  as  arising

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here. At page 875 of the Reports it is stated that:           "The second  contention is based on Section 149 of           the  Madhya  Pradesh  Municipal  Corporation  Act,           1956. It  provides that  any appeal shall lie from           the decision  of the Municipal Commissioner to the           District Court,  when any dispute arises as to the           liability of  any land  or building to assessment.           Sub-section (1)  of Section  149 provides that the           decision of  the District Court shall be final. It           was submitted  that the  decision of  the District           Court was there fore final and that the High Court           was in  error in entertain in a Revision Petition.           This plea  cannot be  accepted for,  under Section           115 of the Civil Procedure Code the High Court has           got a  power to  revise the order passed by courts           subordinate to  it. It cannot be disputed that the           District Court  is  a  subordinate  court  and  is           liable to  the revisional jurisdiction of the High           Court .. "      It is  this observation in that judgment which had been followed in Krishnaji’s case. We may point that the judgment of the  Full Bench  in Krishnaji’s case was delivered by our learned Brother  Venkataramiah, J.  as a  member of the Full Bench then and incidentally he was one of the members of the two-Judge Bench in Aundal Ammal’s case where a contrary view has been taken. If this Court really intended to reverse the effect of  the Full  Bench decision  in Krishnaji’s  case to which our  learned Brother  was  a  party,  one  would  have expected reference to Chhagan Lal as also Krishnaji.      As against  the two  authorities of this Court, namely, the cases  of Vishesh  Kumar and  Aundal Ammal  dealing with provisions of different statutes, there is a direct decision of this  Court in  the case  of Krishnadas Bhatija which has already been  quoted. This  Court was  dealing with the very provision after  its amendment in 1975 and the very question which now  falls for consideration was before this Court. In Krishnaji’s case  the decision of this Court had been relied upon as  a binding  authority and  it was concluded that the High Court  has powers to entertain a revision under Section 115 of  the Code  of Civil  Procedure against the revisional order of  a District Court. It is conceded that the impugned provision which  was  being  considered  by  this  Court  in Krishnadas Bhatija’s  case continues  to be the same. Though the deci 349 sion rendered in Bhatija’s case (supra) by this Court is not a detailed  one, the  conclusion on  the point  is clear and admits of  no ambiguity.  The Full  Bench  in  the  impugned judgment clearly  went wrong  in holding  that the two-Judge Bench of  this Court  referred to  by it had brought about a total change  in the  position and on the basis of those two judgments. Krishnaji’s  case would  be no more good law. The decision of a Full Bench consisting of three Judges rendered in Krishnaji’s case was binding on a bench of equal strength unless that  decision had  directly been  overruled by  this Court or  by  necessary  implication  became  unsustainable. Admittedly there is no overruling of Krishnaji’s decision by this Court  and on  the analysis  indicated above  it cannot also be said that by necessary implication the ratio therein supported by  the  direct  authority  of  this  Court  stood superseded. Judicial  propriety warrarants that decisions of this Court  must be  taken as  wholly binding  on  the  High Courts. That is the necessary outcome of the tier system. We may briefly refer to the observations of the Lord Chancellor in Broom  v. Cassell & Co., [1972] 1 AER 801. where the Lord

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Chancellor administered a warning by saying: "I hope it will never be necessary to say so again, that in the hierarchical system of  courts  which  exists  in  this  country,  it  is necessary for  each  lower  tier,  including  the  Court  of Appeal, to  accept  loyally  the  decisions  of  the  higher tiers". This  has been  approved by  this Court on more than one occasion. Added to the above is the provision of Article 141 of  the Constitution which unequivocally states that the law declared  by this  Court shall  be binding on all courts within  the   territory  of   India.  In   the   facts   and circumstances of  the case,  the High  Court should not have taken into  itself, the  responsibility of  saying that  its earlier Full  Bench judgment  based upon  a decision of this Court in  the circumstances  indicated above  had  lost  its binding authority in view of two other judgments rendered in different situations  and setting.  We are  really not  in a position to  appreciate the  manner in  which  a  coordinate Bench of  the High  Court has  chosen to overrule an earlier judgment of that Court.      On the  view we  have taken, it must follow that we too are bound  by the decision taken by this Court in Krishnadas Bhatija’s case.  Krishnaji’s case  was  rendered  under  the Karnataka Rent  control (Amendment)  Act, 1975  and has held the field  for over  a decade.  No  justification  has  been pointed out  by the High Court why that should be discarded. It  is   one  of   the   essential   requirements   of   the administration  of   justice  that   judgments  rendered  by superior courts  and particularly  with the  approval of the apex court  should  not  be  frequently  changed  so  as  to unsettle  settled   positions.  The   fact  that  the  State Legislature 350 has not  thought it  necessary to  amend the  law and set at naught Krishnaji  or Bhatija  is indicative  of the position that  this   Court  had  not  taken  a  wrong  view  of  the legislative intention. In these circumstance we feel advised not to  enter into  an analysis of the provisions of the Act for a fresh look at the matter and prefer to follow Bhatija. We make  it clear  that we  have not  felt it  necessary  to examine whether  the ratio  of Aundal  Ammal is  binding  or requires reconsideration  in the  presence of Bhatija in the field as a direct authority.      For the  reasons we  have indicated above, we allow the appeal, set  aside the  judgment of the Karnataka High Court and  declare   that  the  earlier  Full  Bench  decision  in Krishnaji’s case  holds the  field.  This    appeal  became necessary on  account of  the wrong  view taken  by the High Court. We do nat think it is proper to saddle the respondent with costs of the  appeal. P.S.S.                                       Appeal allowed. 351