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PETITIONER: SHYAM SUNDER AGARWAL & CO.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/01/1996

BENCH: ANAND, A.S. (J) BENCH: ANAND, A.S. (J) FAIZAN UDDIN (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 1100            1996 SCC  (2) 471  JT 1996 (1)    79        1996 SCALE  (1)133

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T G.N.Ray.J.      Leave granted.      Heard learned  counsel for  the parties. This appeal is directed against  the judgment  dated October 8, 1991 passed by the  Division  Bench  of  Gauhati  High  Court  in  Civil Revision Case No.74 (SH) of 1989. The aforesaid decision was made by  the Division Bench of the High Court on a reference by a  learned Single  Judge of the Gauhati High Court in the said Civil  Revision Case  No.74 (SH)  of 1989.  The learned Single Judge  having disagreed  with a  decision by a Single Bench of  the Gauhati  High Court  in  Union  of  India  Vs. D.S.Narula &  Co, in  Civil Revision  No.33(H) of 1985 (1991 GLJ  400)  that  no  revision  lies  against  the  appellate judgment passed  in the  appeal  under  Section  39  of  the Arbitration Act,  referred the Revision Case to the Division Bench for  deciding  the  maintainability  of  the  Revision Petition  filed   under  Rule  36A  of  the  Rules  for  the Administration of  Justice  and  Police  in  the  Khasi  and Janitia HIlls  1937. against the appellate order dated March 28,  1968   passed  by   the   learned   Additional   Deputy Commissioner, East  Khasi Nille, Shillong arising out of the order dated  July 21,  1984 passed  by the  Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner  at Shillong  rejecting  the  objections made under  Section 30 of the Arbitration Act and making the award in question, a rule of court.      A  contract   was  awarded  to  the  appellant  by  the respondent for  levelling of  the  sites  at  Mashipur  near Silcher. In view of dispute between the parties on the claim of the  appellant for  the aforesaid  work, the  dispute was referred to  the sole  arbitrator  being  Engineer-in-Chief. Defence Headquarters,  New Delhi  by an  order of Court. The sole  arbitrator  after  hearing  the  parties  made  a  non speaking award on July 28, 1982, for a sum of Rs.6,72,645.56 in favour  of the appellant with interest on the said sum at

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10% from the date of award till realisation.      On August 11, 1982 the appellant filed the award in the Court  of  the  Assistant  to  the  Deputy  Commissioner  at Shillong and  the respondent  filed objection  to the  award under Section  30  of  the  Arbitration  Act  to  which  the appellant filed  their rejoinder.  The learned  Assistant to the Deputy  Commissioner rejected the objection and made the award a rule of Court.      The respondent thereafter filed an appeal under Section 39 of  the Arbitration  Act against the said decision of the Assistant to  the Deputy  Commissioner  before  the  learned Deputy Commissioner  at Shillong  and the  said  appeal  was dismissed by  the learned  Deputy Commissioner. A degree was drawn up in terms of the said award.      The respondent  challenged the  said appellate order by filing a  revision petition under Rule 36 A of the Rules for the Administration  of Justice  and Police  in the Khasi and Janitia HIlls,  1937 before  a Single  Bench of  the Gauhati High Court.      The learned  Single Bench was of the view that the said revision petition  under  Rule  36  A  was  maintainable  by disagreeing with a contrary view expressed by another Single Bench of  the said  High Court in the case of Union of India Vs. D.  S. Narula  & Co.  and referred the revision case for adjudication of  the issue as to maintainability of the said revision application by a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court.      By the  impugned judgment,  the Division Bench has held that under  Section 39  of the  Arbitration  Act,  a  second appeal from  appellate judgment and order has been expressly barred. There  is no  provision in the Arbitration Act which puts an  embargo on  the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court against  the appellate  order. It has been held by the Division  Bench   that  there  is  no  provision  conferring revisional  jurisdiction   on  the  High  Court  against  an appellate order.  But Court has been defined under Section 2 (c) of  the Arbitration  Act.  The  proceedings  before  the appellate court  under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act are judicial proceedings  and the  Judge exercises a power under Section  39   as  a  judicial  officer.  Section  115  Civil Procedure Code  confers revisional  powers on the High Court in respect  of a decision of a court subordinate to it if no appeal lies  against such  decision of the subordinate court provided any  of the  three clauses  under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code  is fulfilled. It appears that relying on the decision of  Allahabad High Court in L.Charan Das Vs. L. Gur Saran Das  (AIR 1945  Allahabad 146)  and a  decision of the Pepsu High  Court in  Lal Chand  Vs. Dev Raj (AIR 1951 Pepsu 115) holding  that against  an appellate order under Section 39 of  the Arbitration  Act, revision  lies before  the High Court, the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court answered the reference  in favour  of  maintainability  of  the  said revision  application  before  the  Gauhati  High  Court  by indicating that  the contrary  view expressed  by  a  Single Bench of the said High Court in D.S. Narula & Co. s case was incorrect. The  Division Bench  directed that  the  revision case being  maintainable should  be disposed of an merits by the proceedings  before the Court, and to all appeals, under this Act, and      (b)  the  Court   shall  have,  for  the      purpose  of,   and   in   relation   to,      arbitration proceedings,  the same power      of making  orders in  respect of  any of      the  matters   set  out  in  the  Second      Schedule as  it has  for the purpose of,

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    and  in  relation  to,  any  proceedings      before the Court:           Provided that nothing in clause (b)      shall be  taken to  prejudice any  power      which may  be vested in an arbitrator or      umpire for making orders with respect to      any of such matters."      "47. Act to  apply to all arbitrations.-      Subject to the provisions of Section 46,      and save  in  so  far  as  is  otherwise      provided by  any law  for the time being      in force,  the provisions  of  this  Act      shall apply  to all  arbitrations and to      all proceedings thereunder:           Provided that  an arbitration award      otherwise obtained  may with the consent      of all  the parties  interested be taken      into consideration  as a  compromise  or      adjustment of a suit by any Court before      which the suit is pending.      It will  also be  appropriate at this stage to refer to the relevant  provisions of the Rules for the Administration of Justice  and Police  in the Khasi and Janitia Hills. 1937 (hereinafter referred  to as  the  Rules).  The  Rules  were published under  Notification No.2618-A.P.  dated March  29, 1937 after  they were  promulgated by the Governor under the powers vested in him by Section 6 of the Scheduled Districts Act XIV  of 1874.  These Rules  extend to  the whole  of the United Khasi  Janitia Hills  Districts excluding  the  areas which were known as the Khasi States before the commencement appropriate Single Bench of the High Court.      For the  purpose of  appreciating rival  contentions of the parties to this appeal, it would be appropriate to refer to the  provisions of  Sections 39,  40, 41  and 47  of  the Arbitration Act.      "39. Appealable orders  - (1)  an appeal      shall  lie  from  the  following  orders      passed  under  this  Act  land  from  no      others, to  the Court  authorised by law      to hear appeals from original degrees of      the Court passing an order :-      An order-      (i)  superseding an arbitration      (ii) on an award stated in the form of a      special case;      (iii)     modifying  or   correcting  an      award.      (iv) filing  or   refusing  to  file  an      arbitration agreement;      (v)  staying or  refusing to  stay legal      proceedings   where    there    is    an      arbitration agreement;      (vi) setting aside  or refusing  to  set      aside an award;           Provided  that  the  provisions  of      this section  shall  not  apply  to  any      order passed by a Small Cause Court.      (2)  No second  appeal shall lie from an      order  passed   in  appeal   under  this      section, put  nothing  in  this  section      shall affect  or take  away any right to      appeal to the Supreme Court."      "40. Small  Cause   Court  not  to  have      jurisdiction  over   arbitrations   save      arbitrations in  suit  before  it.  -  A

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    Small  Cause   Court   shall   have   no      jurisdiction   over    any   arbitration      proceedings  or   over  any  application      arising  thereout  save  on  application      made under Section 2."      "41. Procedure  and  power  of  Court  -      Subject to  the provisions  of this  Act      and of rules made thereunder-      (a)  the provisions of the Code of Civil      Procedure, 1908,  shall apply  to all of      the Constitution  of India.  Rule 31  of      the Civil  Rules framed  under Chapter 4      of the  Rules deals with the exercise of      original  jurisdiction   by  the  Deputy      Commissioner  and   his  Assistants.  It      appears that  there is  no dispute  that      the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner      was   competent    to    entertain    an      arbitration award  filed before  it  for      the purpose  of  making  it  a  rule  of      court. There  is also  no  dispute  that      against such  order of  the Assistant to      the  Deputy   Commissioner   the   party      aggrieved  by   the  order   making  the      arbitration award  a rule  of court  can      prefer  an   appeal  before  the  Deputy      Commissioner. Rule  31 and  Rule 36A  of      the Rules are set out hereunder:      "31. Exercise of  original  jurisdiction      by   Deputy    Commissioner   and    his      Assistants. The  Deputy Commissioner and      his Assistants shall not ordinarily hear      suits triable  by sardars  and dolois or      other    duly     recognised     village      authorities, but  they have a discretion      to do  so when  they  think  right:  and      suits,  which   under  these  rules  the      village authorities  cannot try, must be      tried by the Deputy Commissioner, or his      Assistants.  A  register  of  all  suits      tried by the Deputy Commissioner and his      Assistants shall be kept in such form as      the High Court shall direct."      "36-A.    Appeal and revision - The High      Court or the Deputy Commissioner may, on      application or  otherwise, call  for the      proceedings of  any case  decided by any      officer subordinate to him and pass such      orders as he may deem fit.           The Deputy  Commissioner shall be a      court of  appeal from  a decision  of an      Assistant. The  High Court  shall  be  a      court  of   appeal  from   an   original      decision of  the Deputy  Commissioner if      the value  of the  suit be  rupees  five      hundred or over, or if the suit involves      a question  of tribal  right or customs,      or  of   right  to,  on  possession  of,      immovable property."      The learned  counsel for  the appellant  has  submitted that the Rules apply only to the disputes between the tribes known as  the Khasi  or the Janitias. They do not govern the disputes between  the non  tribal people  of the  area.  It, however, appears  to us  that the Rules provide for trial of certain categories  of civil  cases by  village  authorities

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like sardars  and colois and other chief village authorities as may  be recognised  by the  Deputy Commissioner  by samad under his signatures as competent to try cases without limit as to  amount but with the reservations mentioned in clauses (a) and  (b) of  Rule 26.  Rule 32 provides for reference of civil disputes  to Panchayat  by Deputy  Commissioner or his Assistant in  all cases  in which the parties are indigenous inhabitants of  the hills.  Rule 33 provides for appeal from decision of village authorities to Deputy Commissioner or an Assistant to  the Deputy  Commissioner.            (emphasis supplied)      Rule 36A  provides for  appeal and  revision before the High Court  and to  the Deputy  Commissioner as the case may be, as  indicated in  Rule 36A.  Rule 36A  provides that the Deputy Commissioner  shall be  a  court  of  appeal  from  a decision of an Assistant. The High Court shall be a court of appeal from  an original decision of the Deputy Commissioner if the  value of  the suit be Rupees five hundred or over or if the  suit involves question of tribal right or customs or of right to or possession of immovable property. (emphasis supplied)      The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the  Rules apply  to the  disputes between  the  tribes knwon as  the Khasi or the Janitias cannot be accepted. Such contention does  not appear  to have  been raised before the High Court.  Moreover, no material has been placed before us to indicate  that the  Rules are applicable only to Khasi or Janitia tribes.  It appears  to us on a reference to Chapter IV of the Rules dealing with administration of civil justice that a  special forum  for trial  of civil disputes has been made in  respect of  the area  where Rules  have  been  made applicable. The specific provision of referring all disputes to village  Panchayats in  which the  parties are indioenous inhabitants of  the hill in Rule 32 only indicates that such reference is  to  be  made  in  respect  of  all  indigenous inhabitants of  the hill  and not only in respect of members of Khasi or Janitia tribes. Similarly, in Rule 36A, the High Court has  been made  a court  of appeal  from  an  original decision of  the Deputy  Commissioner if  the suit  involves question  of  tribal  rights  and  customs.  Such  provision indicates that  the original decision of Deputy Commissioner may be in respect of other matters and in respect of persons other than Khasi and Janitia tribals.      The appellant  filed the  award in  the  court  of  the Assistant to  the Deputy  Commissioner for  making the award rule of  court and  also conceded to the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner  in entertaining appeal under Section 39 of the  Arbitration Act. In the aforesaid circumstances, the contention as  to non  availability of Rule 36A of the Rules by the respondent as sought to be raised only at this stage, should not countenanced.      It  has   been  very   strongly  contended   that   the Arbitration Act  does not  contemplate any  revision of  the appellate order.  The very purpose of the Arbitration Act is to achieve adjudication within a short time by avoiding time consuming procedure in civil court in respect of the dispute between the  parties to the arbitration agreement as covered by such agreement, by a judge to be chosen by the parties in terms of  arbitration agreement  or by  the arbitrator to be appointed by  court where  parties have  failed in selecting their arbitrator.  In order  to expedite  the finality of an arbitration proceeding,  Section 39  of the  Arbitration Act clearly indicates  that only  one appeal  will lie from such orders  passed  under  the  Arbitration  Act  as  have  been indicated in  Section 39.  Sub section  (2)  of  Section  39

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specifically indicates  that no  second appeal will lie from an order  passed on  an appeal made under Section 39. It has been submitted that although under Letters Patent, an appeal lies to the Division Bench from the decision of Single Bench of the High Court but it has been clearly held by this Court that within the Scheme of Arbitration Act, any second appeal from appellate  order under Section 39 is parred and Letters Patent appeal  from an  appellate  order  under  Section  39 before a Division Bench is no exception to such embargo on a second appeal.  For this contention, reference has been made to the  decision of  this Court  in Union  of India  Vs. The Moninder Supply Co. (AIR 1962 SC 256).      The learned  counsel for  the appellant  has  submitted that even  if it  is assumed  that the High Court is clothed with revisional power under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code to revise  an order  passed by  a court  subordinate  to  it within the  specified ambit  indicated in clauses (a) to (c) of Section  115 Civil  Procedure  Code  no  such  revisional application under  Section 115 Civil Procedure Code has been filed before  the High  Court. But  a revisional application under Rule  36A of  the Rules has been filed before the High Court for  the purpose  of assailing  the correctness of the appellate order  under Section  39 of  the Arbitration  Act. Such revisional  application under  Rule 36A is allen to the scheme under the Arbitration Act.      The learned  counsel for  the appellant  has  submitted that Rule 36A contemplates revision of original or appellate decision of the Deputy Commissioner because under the Rules, there is no provision to approach the High Court against the appellate decision  of the  Deputy Commissioner. As a matter of fact,  appeal  before  the  High  Court  is  contemplated against original  decision of the Deputy Commissioner (i) if the value  of the  suit be  Rupees five  hundred or over, or (ii) if  the suit involves question of trial right or custom or (iii)  if right  to and possession of immovable property. As Rule  36A contemplates revisional power of the High Court entirely  in   a  different  situation,  the  principle  for exercise of  revisional powers  within the  ambit of clauses (a) to (c) of Section 115, may not be strictly applicable to revisional power contemplated under Rule 36A of the Rules.      It has  been contended  by the  learned counsel for the appellant that  the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy  Commissioner may  be clothed  with the  power to entertain arbitration  award for  making the  award Rule  of Court or  to entertain  appeal  from  the  decision  of  the Assistant to  the Deputy  Commissioner but for such exercise of statutory  powers with  which the  said  authorities  are clothed, they  cannot  be  held  to  be  a  civil  court  as contemplated under  Section 115  Civil Procedure  Code or  a Court as  defined in  Section 2  (c) of the Arbitration Act. The Division  Bench, therefore,  erred  in  relying  on  the decisions of  Allahabad High  Court (AIR 1945 Allahabad 146) and Pepsu  High Court  (AIR 1951  Pepsu 115)  which are  not authorities  for   the   decision   of   the   question   of maintainability of  revision application  under Rule  36A of the  Rules.  The  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  has contended that  revisional application  under Rule  36A  not being maintainable  against an appellate order under Section 39 of  the Arbitration Act, the impugned order should be set aside and  the revision  application pending before the High Court should be dismissed in limine.      Mr.Reddy  the   learned  Additional  Solicitor  General appearing for  the respondent  has submitted that Section 39 of the  Arbitration Act has expressly barred a second appeal against an  appellate order  under Section  39 of the Act. A

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bar of  a second  appeal does not ipso facto bar supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. He has submitted exercise of revisional power  by the  High Court  even when  a statutory appeal is  expressly barred  has been  recognised by various High Courts  and also  by this  Court. In  support  of  such contention,. Mr.Reddy  has  referred  to  the  decisions  of Allahabad High Court (AIR 1945 Allahabad 146) and Pepsu High Court (Allahabad 1951 Pepsu 115) since relied on by the High Court in  the impugned  decision. Mr.Reddy has also referred to a  decision of  this Court  in Chhaganlal  Vs.  Municipal Corporation. Indore  (1977  (2)  SCC  409).  In  that  case, maintainability of  a revisional  application under  Section 115 of  Code of  Civil Procedure, against an order passed by the  appellate  authority  (District  Court)  on  an  appeal preferred against  the decision  of Municipal  Commissioners was taken  into consideration.  Although Section  149 (1) of M.P. Municipal  Corporation  Act  provides  that  the  order passed by  the appellate  authority (District  Court) on  an appeal against  the decision  of the Municipal Commissioners will be  final. It  has been  held by  this Court  that  the District Court  being subordinate  to High  Court, the  High Court can  exercise  revisional  jurisdiction  against  such appellate order  of the District Court and finality attached to such  order does  not dust the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.      Mr.Reddy  has   submitted  that  Section  39  (2)  only indicates that  no second  appeal from appellate order under Section 39  of the  Arbitration Act can be filed. Because of such express  bar of a second appeal, this Court in Mohinder Supply Co.  s case  (supra) has held that such bar of second appeal will also apply to any form of second appeal and even by way  of appeal under Letters patent. In the instant case, only revisional  application under Rule 36A of the Rules has been made.      Mr.Reddy has submitted that considering socio political and economic  situation prevailing in the United Khasi Hills District and  Janitia Hills  District the  Rules were framed for administration  of justice  and police in the said area. There is  no dispute  that such  Rules are applicable in the area  in   question.  Such   Rules  provide  for  forum  for resolution of  civil and  criminal cases.  In view  of  such provisions  in   the  Rules  the  Assistant  to  the  Deputy Commissioner and  the Deputy Commissioner exercise powers of Civil Courts.  Such authorities  exercising powers  of civil courts within the said territorial limits must be held to be civil courts  subordinate to Gauhati High Court. Hence, High Court has  revisional jurisdiction  in respect  of  decision rendered by  Deputy Commissioner  under Section  39  of  the Arbitration Act.  Since Rule  36A specifically  provides for revision  before   the  High  Court  against  the  appellate decision  of   the  Deputy   Commissioner,  such  revisional application has  been made.  But there  is no  difficulty in treating the  said revisional application also under Section 115 C.P. Code.      Mr.Reddy has  submitted that  bar of  a  second  appeal before  the   High  Court   under  Section  39  (2)  of  the Arbitration Act  does not  operate as  a bar  to exercise of revisional powers  in respect  of a  decision of civil court even if such decision has been made in exercise of appellate power. It  is immaterial  if such  revisional power is to be exercised under  Section 115  Civil Procedure  Code or under any specific  statutory provisions  under  which  revisional application is permitted before the High Court. Mr.Reddy has submitted that  the legal  principle enunciated  by the High Courts of  Allahabad and  Pepsu and  also by  this Court  in

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Chhaganlal’s case  (supra) that  the bar  of  second  appeal under Section  39 (2)  of the  Arbitration Act  or  finality attached to  an appellate order does not dust the revisional jurisdiction of  the High Court, applies in all fours to the revisional application  under Rule  36A and  the  contention that decisions  in respect  of maintainability of revisional applications under  Section 115 Civil Procedure Code have no application in  deciding the  maintainability of  revisional application under  Rule 36A should be discarded as devoid of any substance.      Mr.Reddy has  further submitted  that although there is no indication  in Rule  36A as  to how  and to  what  extent revisional powers  under Rule 36A are to be exercised by the High  Court,   judicial  decisions   are  quite  clear  that revisional power  is not  co extensive with appellate power. Such power  is quite  limited in  its application.  In  this connection. Mr.Reddy  has referred  to a  decision  of  this Court in  Hari Shanker Vs. Rao Girdhari Lal (1962 Suppl. (1) SCR 933).  In the  said decision,  scope of  revision  under Section 35  (1) of  Delhi and  Ajmer Rent  Control  Act  was considered by  this Court.  In this  case, the  trial  Judge decreed the suit for eviction and the appeal court confirmed the decision  under Section  34. In  exercise of  revisional jurisdiction under  Section 35 (1) of the said Act, a Single Bench of  the High  Court  reconsidered  the  decision  upon reapreciation  of   evidence  and  on  such  reconsideration interfered with  the  impugned  decision  of  the  appellate authority affirming  the decision of trial judge. This Court has held  by the  majority decision  in the  said case  that distinction between  appeal and  revision is  a real  one. A right of appeal carries with it right of rehearing on law as well as  on fact  unless the  statute  conferring  right  of appeal limits  the  rehearing  in  some  way.  It  has  been indicated by  this Court that power of revision is generally to a  superior court  so that  it may  satisfy itself that a particular case  has been  decided  according  to  law.  The phrase according  to law appearing in Section 35 of the said Rent Act,  according to the majority decision of this Court, refers to  the decision  as a whole and not to be equated to errors of  law or of fact simplicitor. It has been indicated that all  that the High Court can see that there has been no miscarriage of  justice and the decision is according to law in the sense mentioned. This Court has held that in exercise of revisional  power under  Section 35  of the Rent Act, the High Court was not justified in reassessing the value of the evidence and  substituting its  own conclusion  of facts  in place  of  those  reached  by  courts  below.  Mr.Reddy  has submitted that  the  High  Court  in  exercising  revisional jurisdiction will  not act  as a  court of  appeal but  will consider the  propriety of  the appellate  order within  the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction. He has, therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court being just and  proper does  not warrant  any interference by this Court and the appeal should be dismissed.      After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of  the case  and the  submissions made by the learned counsel  for the  parties, it appears to us that the Assistant to  the  Deputy  Commissioner.  Shillong  and  the Deputy Commissioner.  Shillong have  been clothed  with  the jurisdiction to  act  as  civil  courts  in  some  parts  of Meghalaya. Under  the Meghalaya  Act No.6 of 1972, the Rules have been made applicable to the whole of United Khasi Hills District  and   Janitia  Hills   District.  The   appellant, therefore, filed  the arbitration  award in the Court of the Assistant to  the Deputy Commissioner and obtained the order

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making the  award a  rule of  Court. The respondent Union of India  also   preferred  appeal  under  Section  39  of  the Arbitration Act  before the Deputy Commissioner accepting it as appellate civil court. It has already been indicated that no material  has been  placed before  us to  show  that  the Assistant  to   the  Deputy   Commissioner  or   the  Deputy Commissioner have  not been  clothed with  powers  of  Civil Court for  decision of  Civil disputes in general within the territorial limits  but they  have been  empowered to decide only a  special  category  of  civil  disputes  confined  to particular tribal  people. In  the aforesaid  circumstances, such appellate  order having  been passed  by a civil court, constituted under a special statute. subordinate to the High Court, the  High Court  does not  cease to  have  revisional jurisdiction  under   Section  115  of  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure.      The  appellant   Union  of  India  filed  a  revisional application under  Rule 36A  before the  Single Bench of the High Court  because against  an appellate  order  of  Deputy Commissioner, no  appeal is  provided for  under the  Rules. Even if  there was  any provision  for filing an appeal from such appellate  order of  the Deputy  Commissioner under the Rules, such second appeal, being expressly barred by Section 39 (2)  of the Arbitration Act, would have been incompetent. In  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  revision application under Rule 36A is to be considered in conformity with Section  115 of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure.  Such limited application  of revisional  jurisdiction under  Rule 36A in  assailing an appellate order under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act  is to  be read,  otherwise revisional power under Rule 36A will give occasion to hostile discrimination. For example,  in the  State of Meghalaya where the Rules are not applicable,  a litigant  can only move the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure  against an appellate order under Section 39 of the  Arbitration Act but another litigant where the Rules are applicable,  will avail  larger rights  in  exercise  of revisional power  by the High Court under Rule 36A against a similar appellate  order under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Such  a situation  is not permissible. Revisional power under Rule  36A of  the High  Court in  such case therefore, must be  exercised in  conformity with  the revisional power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.      In our  view, a  revisional application before the High Court against  an appellate order passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration  Act is  maintainable. There  is no  express provision in  the Arbitration Act putting an embargo against filing a  revisional  application  against  appellate  order under Section  39 of the Act. The Arbitration Act has put an embargo on  filing any  second appeal  from appellate  order under Section  39 of  the Act.  The  Arbitration  Act  is  a special  statute  having  limited  application  relating  to matters governed  by the  said Act.  Such  special  statute, therefore, must  have its application as provided for in the said statute.  The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the  Code or  under any  other statute therefore shall not stand  superseded under  the Arbitration  Act if the Act does  not  contain  any  express  bar  against  exercise  of revisional power by the High Court provided exercise of such revisional power  does not mitigate against giving effect to the provisions of the Arbitration Act.      It may  also be  indicated that in R. Mecil and Company Ltd. Vs.  Gauri Shanker Sarda (1991 (2) SCC 548). this Court has held  that Section  41 of  the Arbitration  Act provides that the  provisions of  Civil Procedure Code shall apply to

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all proceedings  before  a  Court  under  the  Act.  As  the Arbitration  Act   has  not   expressly   taken   away   the applicability of  Order 23 of the Civil Procedure Code in an application under Section 34 of the said Act, such provision of Order 23 of the Civil Procedure Code is applicable.      It may  be  stated  that  even  if  a  special  statute expressly attaches  finality to  an appellate  order  passed under that  statute. It  has been  held by this Court in the case of Hari Shanker (supra) that such provision of finality will not take away revisional powers of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is also no such express  provision in  the  Arbitration  Act  attaching finality to the appellate order under Section 39 of the said Act. As already indicated, only bar under sub section (2) of Section 39  is of  a second  appeal from  an appellate order under Section  39. The  impugned order  of  the  High  Court upholding maintainability  of revisional  application  under Rule 36A  of the  Rules,  therefore,  is  justified  and  no interference  against   such  decision  is  warranted.  This appeal, therefore,  fails and is dismissed without any order as to  costs. As  the revision  application is sending for a long  time,  the  High  Court  is  directed  to  dispose  of revisional application  on merits  as early  as possible but not exceeding  four months from the date of communication of this order.