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PETITIONER: SHRINIVASA REDDY AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/11/1959

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) IMAM, SYED JAFFER KAPUR, J.L. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1960 AIR  350            1960 SCR  (2) 130  CITATOR INFO :  R          1961 SC  82  (9,15)  RF         1961 SC1556  (7)  D          1973 SC 974  (15)

ACT:        Motor Vehicles-Nationalisation of transport  services-Scheme        -if  must  be  capable of being  implemented  all  at  once-        Application  for  permit  by  State  Transport  Undertaking-        Procedure-Motor Vehicles Act,1939 (4 of 1939), as amended by        the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 (100 of 1956),  ss.        68C, 681 (1), 57(2).

HEADNOTE: The stage carriage permits of the petitioners, who were also the petitioners in Writ Petition NO. 75 of 1959, previously, reported,  were  expiring  on 31st  March,  1958,  and  were renewed   up   to  March  31,  959.   A  fresh   scheme   of nationalisation having 131 been  approved  and  published under s.  68C  of  the  Motor Vehicles Act, the Regional Transport Authority, in order  to avoid inconvenience to the public, granted temporary permits to  the  petitioners  till the  State  Transport  Department obtained -their permits.  The Department applied for permits under  s.  68F(1) of the Act in accordance with  the  scheme admittedly  less  than six weeks before the date  when  they were  to take effect, contrary to the provision of s.  57(2) of the Act.  The petitioners had also applied for renewal of their  permits.   The Regional  Transport  Authority  issued permits   to  the  Department  and  rejected   the   renewal applications of the petitioners.  The petitioners moved  the High  Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for  quashing ,that order.  The High Court held that the issue of  permits to  the Department was invalid as the provision of S.  57(2) had  not been complied with, and the refusal of  renewal  of the petitioners’ permits was incorrect, but it dismissed the Writ  Petition on the ground that the relief that  could  be granted  to the petitioners could only be short-lived.   The petitioners  applied  for a certificate to  enable  them  to

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appeal to this Court and while that application lay pending, applied to this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution.  It was  contended  on  their behalf  that  before  the  renewal application  could  be rejected and permits granted  to  the Department  under s. 68F(1) of the Act, the Department  must apply  for permits in respect of all the routes  covered  by the  scheme  so that there could be no  possibility  of  any discrimination  between  an  operator  and  an  operator  in infringement  of Art. 14 of the Constitution as  also  their rights to carry on their business under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.  It was further contended that  non-compliance with  the provision of s. 57(2) of the Act  disentitled  the Department  to  any  permits at all.  It  was  contended  on behalf of the Department that it was open to it to implement the  scheme by stage and it was denied that there  could  be any  discrimination in doing so or that S. 57(2) applied  to an application under s. 68F(1) of the Act. Held  (per Sinha, C.J., Imam, Wanchoo and Das  Gupta,  JJ.), that  it was clear from the language of s 68F of  the  Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, that an application by a State Transport Undertaking  for  a permit thereunder must be  made  in  the manner  prescribed  by Ch.  IV of the  Act  and,  therefore, there  could be no doubt that such an application must  fall within  the purview of S. 57(2) of the  Act.   Consequently, the orders granting the application for permits made by  the State  Transport Department in the instant case,  admittedly in breach of S. 57(2) of the Act, were on that ground  alone liable to be quashed. Section  68C of the Act contemplates that where there is  no intention  to operate an entire route but a portion  of  it, that portion alone should be specified as the route and  not the  whole  of it or any portion thereof as in  the  instant case.   The scheme, however, clearly intended that  all  the routes in their entirety 132      were to be taken over and so the qualifying words  were mere surplusage.  Per  Kapur, J.-On a proper construction of ss. 68C and  68F of  the  Act,  it  would not be  correct  to  say  that  the Legislature  intended  that the scheme as approved  must  be implemented all     at  once  or not at all.   It  would  be impractical  to  suggest  that the whole  scheme  should  be implemented   in  a  rigid  manner.   Some  flexibility   in implementing  it must necessarily be implied  for  otherwise nationalisation  of transport services, the  accepted  State policy  in India, was likely to be indefinitely held up,  if not thwarted.  The language used by s. 68F lends no  support to  such a contention nor do the words " in pursuance  of  " occurring, therein mean that the whole of the scheme has  to be put into operation and not a portion of it. Bradford  Corporation v. Myers, (1916) 1 A.C. 242,  referred to, If  the State cannot take over routes for which  application can  be  immediately made, the taking over must  become  not only  difficult but extremely expensive as  other  interests may supervene in the meantime.  Where, therefore, it intends to  run a scheme within a reasonable time, there can  be  no reason why it should not apply for different routes within a reasonable  time  so long as it acts  honestly,  fairly  and without any oblique motives. Since  the State Undertaking in the present case had  imple- mented a part of the scheme and made fresh applications  for permits  in  the  manner  provided by  s.  57(2)  and  their relevant  provisions of Act, it is not necessary to  pass  a formal order quashing the permits granted in its favour.

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K.   N. Guruswamy v. The, State of Mysore, [1955] 1 S.  C.R. 305 referred to.

JUDGMENT:        ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION:  Petition No. 95 of  1959.        Petition   under   Article  32  of  the   Constitution   for        enforcement of Fundamental Rights.        C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India and B.    R. L.        Iyengar, for the petitioners.        H.   N.  Sanyal,  Additional Solicitor-General  of  India,R.        Gopalakrishnan and T. M. Sen, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.        1959.   November  6.  The Judgment  of  Sinha,  C.J.,  Imam,        Wanchoo  and  Das Gupta, JJ. was delivered  by  Wanchoo,  J.        Kapur, J. delivered a separate judgment.        WANCHOO  J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the  Constitution        is  a sequel to Writ Petition No. 75 of 1959, which is  also        being  disposed of today.  It is not necessary therefore  to        set out the early history leading to                                    133        this petition as that has already been given in the judgment        in Petition No. 75.  Suffice it to say that the  petitioners        who are the same as the petitioners in Petition No. 75  were        transport  operators  in the Anekal pocket in the  State  of        Mysore.  They held stage carriage permits for various routes        which  were expiring on March 31, 1958.  They  were  granted        renewal  of  these  permits up to March 31,  1959.   In  the        meantime,  steps were taken to formulate an approved  scheme        under  Chapter  IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act,  No.  IV  of        1939, (hereinafter called the Act).  The scheme was  finally        approved and published on April 23,1959.  In order, however,        to avoid inconvenience to the public temporary permits  were        granted  to  the  petitioners after March 31,  1959,  for  a        period  of  four  months  or  up  to  the  time  the  Mysore        Government Road Transport Department (hereinafter called the        Department) was granted permits under s. 68F, whichever  was        earlier.   Sometime  before June 23,  1959,  the  Department        applied for permits in accordance with the scheme while  the        petitioners  had applied for renewal of their permits.   The        Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore (hereinafter  called        the Authority) issued permits to the Department and rejected        the  renewal  applications of the petitioners  on  June  23,        1959.   The  petitioners then applied to the High  Court  of        Mysore  by a writ petition challenging the issue of  permits        to the Department and the refusal of renewal to, them.  This        petition was disposed of by the High Court on July 14, 1959,        and it was held that the grant of permits to the  Department        was invalid and the rejection of the renewal applications of        the petitioners was incorrect; but the High Court  dismissed        this  petition  on the ground that the relief to  which  the        petitioners were entitled, in view of these findings,  would        be   shortlived.   The  petitioners  then  applied   for   a        certificate to enable them to appeal to this Court and  that        application  is  still pending.  The  present  petition  was        filed on August 3, 1959.        The first contention of the petitioners in this petition  is        that after the scheme had been approved and published  under        Chapter IV-A of the Act, it was the        134        duty  of  the Department to apply under s. 68F for  all  the        routes covered by the scheme and it was only,     when   the        Department applied for all the routes, that it would be open        to the Authority to reject the applications for renewal made        by  the petitioners.           The Department in  this  case

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      applied only for some of the       routes and in  particular        it was pointed out that there was no application at any rate        for  one out of the fourteen routes included in the  scheme.        Therefore,  it is submitted that the Department  by  picking        and choosing which route to apply for and which to leave out        was discriminating against those operators for whose  routes        it applied for permits and in favour of those operators  for        whose  routes  it did not apply for permits.   Further,  the        Authority  by  granting permits to the  Department  in  such        circumstances  was  denying equality before the law  to  the        petitioners.   This  was an infringement of Art. 14  of  the        Constitution and also contravened the petitioner’s right  to        carry   on  business  guaranteed  under  Art.   19   (1)(g).        Secondly, the petitioners contended that the Authority could        not  issue permits in this case as s. 57(2) and (3) was  not        complied  with.   The  petitioners therefore  prayed  for  a        direction  quashing  the  order  of  the  Authority  issuing        permits  to the Department under s. 68F and  refusing  their        renewal applications.        The  petition  has been opposed by the  Department  and  its        contention  is  that even though an  approved  scheme  might        cover  a number of routes, it was open to the Department  to        implement it in stages and that it was the best judge as  to        which route should be taken over first and there could be no        discrimination so long as the holders of the stage  carriage        permits operating on a particular route were treated equally        inter  se in pursuance of the approved scheme.  It  is  also        urged that sub-sections (2) and (3) of s. 57 do not apply to        applications for issue of permits made under s. 68F(1).         We shall begin by examining the second contention.  Section        68F lays down that where in pursuance of ,an approved scheme        any  State  Transport  Undertaking  applies  in  the  manner        specified  in Chapter IV for a stage carriage permit,  etc.,        in respect of a notified area                                    135        or a notified route, the Regional Transport Authority  shall        issue   such  permit  to  the  Undertaking   notwithstanding        anything  to the contrary contained in Chapter IV.   Clearly        therefore  the Undertaking has to apply  for permits in  the        manner  provided  in Chapter IV, even  though  the  Regional        Transport  Authority  may be bound on  such  application  to        issue the permits.  This takes us to s. 45, which lays  down        to which authority the application shall be made and then to        s. 46 which lays down the particulars which the  application        must  contain.   Thus the Undertaking must comply  with  the        terms  of ss. 45 and 46 when it applies for  permits.   Then        comes  s.  57(2) which lays down that an application  for  a        stage  carriage permit (with which we are concerned in  this        case) shall be made not less than six weeks before the  date        on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect  or        if  the Regional Transport Authority appoints dates for  the        receipt  of such applications, on such dates.  In this  case        the  Regional Transport Authority had appointed no date  and        clearly  therefore the Undertaking should have  applied  not        less  than six weeks before the date on which it desired  to        start  the service.  This is necessary to give time  to  the        Regional Transport Authority to deal with the matter and  if        necessary to inform those who might be affected under s. 68F        (2)  to be prepared for the change.  That is why s. 68F  (1)        provided  that the applications shall be made in the  manner        provided  in Chapter IV.  This provision has nothing  to  do        with the publication required under s. 57(3) which is  meant        for  a  different  purpose.  It was  urged  by  the  learned        Solicitor-General  that the procedure provided in  s.  57(3)        also  applies as it is not inconsistent with the  provisions

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      of Chapter IV-A (see s. 68B).  We consider it unnecessary to        go  into  this  matter  for it  is  not  disputed  that  the        applications for permits in this case were not made at least        six  weeks  before the date from which the permits  were  to        take  effect.  In the circumstances the  applications  being        not in the manner provided in Chapter IV and being  actually        in  breach of s. 57 (2), no permits could be issued on  such        applications.  Therefore, the orders in favour of the        136        Department   issuing  permits  to  it  are  liable   to   be        quashed on this ground alone.        In  view of the above decision, it is really  not  necessary        for us to decide the first contention.  We would,   however,        like  to  point out the dangers inherent in  the  claim  put        forward by the Department.  A scheme is      prepared  under        s.  68C.  It is initiated by the Undertaking when it  is  of        opinion  that  for the purpose of  providing  an  efficient,        adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport        services,  it is necessary in the public interest that  road        transport  services  in general or any particular  class  of        such  service  in relation to any area or route  or  portion        thereof  should  be  run and operated  by  the  Undertaking,        whether  to  the exclusion, complete or  partial,  of  other        persons or otherwise.  This section thus gives power to  the        Undertaking  to prepare a scheme in relation to an  area  or        route or portion thereof.  The Undertaking is thus not bound        to prepare a scheme for the whole State at one time; it  has        been given the power to choose particular types of  services        or  a particular area or particular routes or even  portions        thereof, for the reason that it may not be possible for  the        Undertaking  to run services all over the State at the  same        time.  Thus when the Undertaking decides to frame a  scheme,        it must take into account its resources in men, material and        money and frame a scheme only to the extent to which it  can        carry it out in full.  For example, if it can carry out  the        scheme for the whole State at once it may frame a scheme for        the  whole  State.  But if it cannot do so, it can  frame  a        scheme  for  one district.  Even if that is not  within  its        resources  it can frame a scheme for a part of  a  district.        Even  in  a part of the district its scheme  may  deal  with        certain routes and not all.  So long as it can show that the        scheme  is an efficient, adequate, economical  and  properly        coordinated scheme for road transport service, it will  have        a  right to frame a scheme for only a part of the  transport        services  running in a State.  Therefore, the scheme  to  be        framed  must be such as is capable of being carried out  all        at  once and that is why the Undertaking has been given  the        power to frame a                                    137        scheme  for  an  area or route or  even  a  portion  thereof        Further  after  the  scheme is framed  it  is  approved  and        published  by  the State Government.  Thereafter it  is  the        duty  of  the  Undertaking to carry out the  scheme  and  in        pursuance  of that it applies for permits under  s.  68F(1).        If  the Undertaking at that stage has the power to carry  it        out  piecemeal,  it would be possible for it  to  abuse  the        power  of  implementation and to discriminate  against  some        operators and in favour of others included in the scheme and        also to break up the integrity of the scheme and in a  sense        modify  it  against  the  terms of  s.  68E.   There  is  no        difficulty for the Undertaking to apply for permits relating        to  the  entire scheme at the same time, for the  manner  in        which the scheme is prepared under s. 68C takes into account        all the difficulties which might arise in the implementation        of the scheme and with that very object provides for  taking

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      over  particular types of transport services in relation  to        areas  or  routes  or even portions thereof.   We  need  not        however pursue the matter further on this occasion.        Before we go to the other point raised in this petition,  we        should  like  briefly to refer to a feature of  the  scheme,        which has been brought to our notice.  This feature is  that        though  the  scheme  mentions  fourteen  routes  with  their        terminii  and  intermediate  points and the  length  of  the        routes, there is a parrot-like repetition of the words "  or        any portion thereof " in all the fourteen routes.  We should        like  to point out’ that it is the duty of  the  Undertaking        when it prepares a scheme under s. 68C to decide whether  it        will  take  up a whole route or a portion  thereof.   If  it        decides  to take a portion of the route (provided,  however,        conditions  of efficiency, adequacy, economy and proper  co-        ordination  are fulfilled), it should specify  that  portion        only  in the scheme.  S. 68C does not contemplate  that  the        routes should be specified in the manner in which they  have        been  specified in -this case, as, for example, "  Bangalore        to Anekal or any portion thereof." If the intention was  not        to  operate on the whole Bangalore-Anekal route, but only  a        portion of it, that portion should have been specified        18        138        as  the route.  However, in this particular case, we are  of        opinion  that  the  intention  clearly  was  to  take   over        the  whole  route in the case of all  the  fourteen  routes,        which will be clear from the length of the route to be taken        over  mentioned in the schedule to the  scheme.   Therefore,        the words " or any portion thereof " which        have  been        repeated, as if they were some kind of charm, throughout the        schedule are surplusage in view of the length specified  and        may  be ignored and the scheme taken to apply to the  entire        length of the fourteen routes.        The  next question is about the order to be passed  in  this        case.  The contention on behalf of the Department is that as        the  petitioners  had applied to the High  Court  and  their        petition was dismissed and the application for a certificate        to  appeal to this Court is pending before the  High  Court,        this  Court should dismiss the present petition  and  direct        the  petitioners to come either on a certificate granted  by        the High Court or by a special leave application in case the        High  Court  refuses the certificate.  We do  not  think  it        necessary  in this case to decide this general  question  in        view of certain special features of the present case.  It is        true that the writ petition by the petitioners was dismissed        by the High Court; but the judgment of the High Court  shows        that  it was of opinion that the applications under  s.  68F        should  have complied with s. 57 (2) of the Act  and  should        thus have been made at least six weeks before the date  from        which  the scheme was to be implemented.  On that  view  the        High Court held that the issue of permits to the  Department        was not according to law.  It also held in consequence  that        refusal  of the renewal to the petitioners was illegal;  but        it refused to pass an order in favour of the petitioners  on        the  ground that the relief granted to them would be  short-        lived.  In effect, therefore, the judgment of the High Court        was  in  favour  of the petitioners and  not  against  them,        though  in form the writ petition was dismissed.   In  these        circumstances  we  are of opinion that as  the  petitioners’        fundamental right to carry on business is certainly involved        in this case we should not refuse relief to the,                                    139        petitioners  on  the  ground that their  writ  petition  was        dismissed by the High Court and they have not yet been  able

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      to  obtain a certificate permitting them to appeal  to  this        Court.        There are two prayers in the present petition: (1) that  the        proceedings   of  the  Authority  issuing  permits  to   the        Department   be  quashed,  and  (2)  that  the   proceedings        rejecting  the  renewal applications of the  petitioners  be        also quashed.  We see no reason why we should not grant  the        first  prayer  and  quash  the  issue  of  permits  to   the        Department by the Authority on June 23, 1959.  Our attention        in this connection was drawn to K. N. Guruswamy v. The State        of  Mysore  and Others,(1).  In that case this  Court  after        declaring the law in favour of the petitioner did not  issue        a  writ as there was hardly a fortnight left for the  excise        contract  which was involved in that case to expire and  the        issue of a writ would have been meaningless and ineffective.        That  case however is distinguishable because  the  contract        there  would have come to an end within a few days.  In  the        present case there is no reason to assume that the six weeks        period  which is the minimum period prescribed under  s.  57        (2)   is  the  only  period  that  will  be   required   for        implementation  of  the scheme under s.  68F(1).   In  these        circumstances we are of opinion that the prayer for quashing        the  permits  granted to the Department on  June  23,  1959,        should be allowed.  As for the other prayer for quashing the        order rejecting the renewal applications of the petitioners,        it  is now unnecessary in view of our decision in  Petitions        Nos. 54 and 75 of 1959.        We,  therefore,  allow  the petition  and  quash  the  order        issuing  permits  to the Department.  We, order  parties  to        bear  their own costs of this petition taking  into  account        that Petition No. 117 of 1959 filed by the petitioners  with        respect to the validity of the scheme has been withdrawn  by        them  at a late stage and we have directed parties  to  bear        their own costs of that petition also.        KAPUR  J.-I  have read the judgment prepared by  my  learned        brother Wanchoo, J., but I respectfully        (1)  (1955) 1 S.C.R. 305.        140        dissent from the opinion therein given.  I shall proceed  to        give my reasons for the dissent.        It  is not necessary to restate the facts which are set  out        in detail in the proposed judgment but reference may be made        to  certain dates.        On August 28, 1958,  the  proposed        scheme  under Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act,  1939,        as  amended  by  Act  100 of 1956 (which  for  the  sake  of        convenience   will  hereinafter  be  termed  the  Act)   was        published as a draft scheme.  It was approved on October 24,        1958,  but  on  its being challenged in the  High  Court  of        Mysore,  it was quashed on December 3, 1958.  A fresh  draft        scheme-was  published  on January 22, 1959,  and  after  the        Chief  Minister  had  heard objections against  it,  it  was        approved  on April 15, 1959, and was published on April  23,        1959.   The  fresh scheme was also challenged  in  the  High        Court  of Mysore in Civil Writ Petition No. 315 of 1959  but        this  petition was dismissed on June 1, 1959.  The  Regional        Transport  Authority  on  the  application  of  the   Mysore        Government Road Transport Department (hereinafter termed the        Department)  issued in favour of the Department  permits  on        June  23,  1959, and rejected the application of  the  other        operators,  the petitioners.  This order was  challenged  in        the  High  Court by Civil Writ Petition No. 463 of  1959  on        June 24, 1959.  On July 14, 1959, the High Court although it        found  in  favour  of the  petitioners  practically  on  all        points, did not grant any relief and dismissed the  petition        on  the ground that the effectiveness of the relief will  be

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      for  a  short period of six weeks at the most;  but  in  the        order  it  was  stated  that  the  permits  granted  to  the        Department  were invalid as they had not applied for in  the        manner  provided  in  s. 57 of the Act  and  also  that  the        Regional  Transport  Authority  had  been  careless  in  the        exercise  of  its powers.  Against this decision  the  peti-        tioners  applied  to the High Court for  a  certificate  for        appeal to this Court but the matter is still pending in  the        High  Court.   In the meanwhile the petitioners  filed  this        petition in this Court under Art. 32.        The  core of the question is what is the consequence of  the        framing of the scheme under Chapter IV-A                                    141        and how it is to be implemented.  The petitioners  contended        that on a proper construction of ss. 68C and 68F the  scheme        as approved must be implemented as a whole simultaneously or        not  at all.  The submission of the Department on the  other        hand  is two-fold: (1) that in the very nature of things  it        must be left open to the Department to implement the  scheme        in  reasonably convenient stages and (2) if  the  Department        has  applied for and obtained permits for certain routes  in        the scheme and has substantially implemented that scheme the        implemented portion of the scheme cannot be set aside.   The        decision  of  these  rival contentions  would  turn  on  the        interpretation  of  the various sections  in  Chapter  IV-A.        This  Chapter contains special provisions relating to  State        Transport  Undertaking and was inserted in the Act by s.  62        of  Act 100 of 1956: Section 68A contains  definitions,  68B        gives  overriding  effect to this Chapter  qua  Chapter  IV.        Section  68C deals with preparation and publication  of  the        scheme  of  road transport services of the  State  Transport        Undertaking.   Section  68D provides for  objections  to  be        filed against a, proposed scheme; 68E to the consequences of        cancellation  or modification of the scheme.  Then comes  s.        68F  which  provides  for  the issue  of  permits  to  State        Transport Undertakings.  Section 68G provides for the method        of  determining of compensation in case of  State  Transport        taking  over; 68H for payment of compensation and 681  gives        power  to make rules.  We were informed by Mr.  Sanyal  that        rules  have  been framed under this section.   The  relevant        portion of s. 68C is as follows:-        "  Where any State transport undertaking is of opinion  that        for  the  purpose  of  providing  an  efficient,   adequate,        economical  and properly coordinated road transport  service        it  is necessary in the public interest that road  transport        services in general or any particular class of such  service        in  relation to any area or route or portion thereof  should        be  run  and operated by the  State  transport  undertaking,        whether  to  the  exclusion, complete or  partial  of  other        persons or otherwise, the State transport undertaking        142         may   prepare   a   scheme  giving   particulars   of   the        nature  of the services proposed to be rendered the area  or        route proposed to be covered     Section 68F(1) provides:             "  Where, in pursuance of an approved scheme any  State        transport undertaking applies in the    manner specified  in        Chapter IV for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier’s        permit or a contract carriage in respect of a notified  area        or  notified route, the Regional Transport  Authority  shall        issue  such permit to the State Transport undertaking,  not-        withstanding  anything to the contrary contained in  Chapter        IV."        It was contended that the State Transport Undertaking (to be        termed  the Undertaking) can propose a scheme only when  the        conditions in s. 68C are fulfilled, that is, for the purpose

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      of  providing efficient, adequate, economical  and  properly        coordinated  road transport services.  The argument is  that        all these conditions are a sine qua non of the scheme  being        proposed and if for any reason the Undertaking is unable  to        put the whole scheme into effect all at once then it  should        modify  the scheme under s. 68E and implement this  modified        scheme.   No  doubt  the  words  adequate,  economical   and        coordinated are used in the section but they must be read in        the context.  The words of the section require that when the        Undertaking  is of the opinion that for the objects  therein        mentioned the services on any route or in any area should be        operated  by  it,  it may prepare a scheme.   All  that  the        section  requires  is that the Undertaking must be  of  that        opinion  when  it prepares the scheme.  The  scheme  has  to        contain particulars of the services proposed to be rendered,        the areas or routes to be covered.        It  was next submitted that the language of s.  68F  further        supports the contention that if the approved scheme is to be        implemented it must be implemented all at once or not at all        and  emphasis  was laid on the words "in pursuance  of"  and        "permit  in respect of a notified area or  notified  route".        These words, in my opinion, do not necessarily lead        143        to  that  conclusion.   Before the scheme  is  proposed  the        Undertaking is to be of a certain opinion and when it is  to        be  in operation the Undertaking has to proceed in a  manner        prescribed  in the section But it cannot be said  that  when        the scheme is implemented, the whole thing is to be done  in        a  rigid  manner.  Some flexibility  and  practicability  in        effectuating the scheme must necessarily be implied  because        of  the  implications, financial and others  of  the  scheme        itself.    It   may  happen  that  at  the   time   of   the        implementation  it is discovered that the scheme  cannot  be        put  into effect all at once, because of a natural  calamity        or of some unforeseen circumstance beyond the control of the        State  Transport  Undertaking.   If the  contention  of  the        petitioners  is  correct then it would mean that  the  whole        scheme  must  be  scrapped and a  new  scheme  prepared  and        approved with its consequential delays.  In this manner  the        policy of nationalisation which is the State policy in India        would  be indefinitely put off because in the meanwhile  all        kinds   of   interests   -may  come   into   existence   and        circumstances   may  supervene  which  may  delay,  if   not        obstruct, the State in its policy of nationalisation.        The  use  of the words " in pursuance of " in  s.  68F  only        means  that  applications  are made to give  effect  to  the        scheme or in execution of the scheme.  These words import  a        notion  of  obligation  and are more  restrictive  than  the        phrase  "  by  reason of "  which  is  permissive.  Bradford        Corporation v. Myers (1) where Lord Buckmaster in construing        these word said :-        " It is because the act is one which is either an act in the        direct  execution  of a statute, or in the  discharge  of  a        public duty, or the exercise of a public authority." -        Therefore,  the  mere use of the words " in pursuance  of  "        cannot  mean  that  the  whole scheme has  to  be  put  into        operation and not a portion of it,        (1)  (1916) 1 A.C. 242 at p. 247.        144        The second argument raised in support of the contention that        the scheme has to be implemented as a   whole  and  all   at        once  is  the use of the words "  applies            in  the        manner specified in Chapter IV for a stage        carriage        permit  in  respect of a notified area or  notified  route."        Chapter IV deals with the control       of         transport

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      vehicles.  Section 46 deals with applications for such stage        carriage  permits and requires the following particulars  to        be set out in the applications : the route or routes or  the        area or areas for which the application is made, the  number        of vehicles proposed to operate in relation to each route or        area, the minimum and maximum number of daily services  pro-        posed  to be provided in relation to each route, the  number        of  vehicles to be kept in reserve, the arrangements  to  be        made for housing and repair of vehicles and for the  comfort        and convenience of passengers and such other matters as  may        be  prescribed.  This section also applies  to  applications        made  under  68F.  It means therefore that if  the  area  is        extensive or the number of routes which a State  Undertaking        wishes  to take over is large a number of applications  will        have to be made if all these particulars have to be properly        given.  If the contention of the petitioners is correct then        all applications under s. 46 will have to be made at one and        the same time and there is no reason to make allowances  for        mistakes  or accidental omissions.  If accidental  omissions        are to be excused there is no reason to exclude omission due        to unforeseen circumstances, e.g., some vehicle being  found        unusable,  some repair shops not being completed in time  or        some   natural  calamity  making  it  impossible  to   start        operations on a particular route.  If the State cannot  take        over those routes for which applications, can immediately be        made  then it would mean that taking over would  become  not        only  difficult but extremely expensive because, as  I  have        said before, other interests may come in which it may not be        possible  for  the State to take over.   Therefore,  if  the        State  Undertaking intends to run a scheme within a  reason-        able  time then there is no reason why the State should  not        apply for different routes within,% reasonable time        145        so  long  as it acts honestly, fairly  and  without  oblique        motives.        The  third argument on behalf of the respondents ‘ was  that        if  the  State  Undertaking has implemented  the  scheme  in        regard  to certain routes and has actually started  work  on        those  routes after having obtained permits that portion  of        the  implemented  scheme should not be  quashed  because  it        would mean that the stage carriages of the State Undertaking        will  be taken off and somebody else will have to  be  given        the  permits at once or the people will have to  go  without        road transport which cannot be the intention of the Act.  If        the  policy  of the State is nationalisation  then  such  an        order  will  not  only delay but obstruct  and  thwart  that        policy.  In my opinion therefore it is not the intention  of        the  legislature  in ss. 68C and 68F that the  whole  scheme        must be put into operation all at once or not at all.        The  question then arises as to what should be the order  in        the instant case.  The High Court has indicated in its order        that   the  applications  made  on  behalf  of   the   State        Undertaking were not in accordance with s. 57 of the Act and        the  learned Additional Solicitor-General informed  us  that        the State Undertaking had accepted that view of the law  and        proceedd  to make applications in accordance with s. 57  and        other  relevant provisions of Chapter 1V.  In that  view  of        the  matter,  in my opinion, it is not necessary to  pass  a        formal  order quashing the permits granted in favour of  the        State  Undertaking.   The  case  is very  much  like  K.  N.        Guruswamy v. The State of Mysore & Ors.(1).        In this view of the matter and in view of the opinion I have        given  in Petitions Nos. 54, 75 & 76, 1 am of the view  that        this  petition  should be dismissed but the  parties  should        bear their own costs.

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                             ORDER OF COURT        In accordance with the opinion of the majority, we allow the        petition and quash the order issuing permits;        (1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 305.        19        146        to   the  Department.   We  order  parties  to  bear   their        own costs of this petition taking into account that Petition        No.   117   of   1959  filed   by   the   petitioners   with        respect to the validity of the scheme has been with-   drawn        by them at a late stage and we have directed parties to bear        their own costs of that petition also.