04 October 1967
Supreme Court
Download

SHRIMANT SARDAR CHANDROJIRAO ANGRE Vs STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Case number: Appeal (civil) 98 of 1965


1

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

PETITIONER: SHRIMANT SARDAR CHANDROJIRAO ANGRE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/10/1967

BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  494            1968 SCR  (1) 761

ACT: Madhya  Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act (Madhya Bharat 28  of 1951), s. 5(b)(iv)--Grove, meaning of.

HEADNOTE: After  the resumption of the appellant’s Jagir lands in  the State  by  the enactment of the Madhya Bharat  Abolition  of Jagirs  Act, he claimed the mango trees, planted by  him  on both sides of a long road, as constituting a "grove"  within the  meaning  of  s.  5(b)(iv) of  the  Act,  and  therefore continued to belong to him. HELD:     A grove irrespective of where it was situate,  but belonging  to  or held by the jagirdar was  to  continue  to belong  to  or to be held by him.  To secure  the  full  and proper use and enjoyment of such a grove, if it was on  land other  than  that which was allowed to be retained  by  him, sub-clause (iv) of s. 5(b) further provides that the land on which such a grove stood with the areas appurtenant  thereto also shall be settled upon him in accordance with the M.  B. Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act Samvat 2007.  The intention of the legislature  appeared to be that properties which the jagirdar was in personal use and  possession  of  or  in respect of  which  he  had  paid valuable  consideration were to be retained by him. [764  H; 765 A]. The  language  of sec. 5(b) (iv) does not require  that  the trees  need be fruit-bearing trees nor does it require  that they  should  have been planted by human labour  or  agency. But  they must be sufficient in number and so standing in  a group as to give them the character of a grove and to retain that character the trees would or when fully grown  preclude the land on which they stand from being primarily used for a purpose  other than that of a grove-land.  Cultivation of  a patch  here and a patch there would have no significance  to deprive  it of its character as a grove.   Therefore,  trees standing  in  a file on the road side  intended  to  furnish shade  to  the road would not fulfil the requirements  of  a grove even as understood in ordinary parlance. [766 C-E]. Daropadi v. Mannu Lal, A.I.R. 1929 All. 557.  Kashi v. Jagoo Bai.  A.I.R, 1934 All. 290, Shiv Sahai v. Hari Nandan, A.I.R 1963 All. 413, Hasan v. State of Bombay, 62 Bom.  L.R.  617, referred to.

2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Civil Appeal No. 98 of 1965. Appeal  by Special Leave from the Judgment and  Order  dated the  December  7,  1961 of the  Madhya  Pradesh  High  Court (Gwalior Bench) in Civil Misc.  Petition No. 77 of 1959. A.   K. Sen, B. D. Gupta, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain,   for the appellant. I.   N. Shroff, for the respondent. 762 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat,  J.  The  appellant is the  ex-jagirdar  of  certain villages called Jagir Nevri Bhorasa.  It appears that  while the jagir was in his possession he had constructed roads one of  which  is the road connecting Bhorasa with  Dewas  Astha Road.   The  road about 1 1/2 miles in length was  lined  on both  sides  with mango trees.  In 1951  the  Madhya  Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 28 of 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was passed for resumption of jagir lands in  the State.  Under that Act, the right, title and interest of the appellant in his said jagir were extinguished and the  jagir lands  vested in the State.  In 1955, the Tehsildar  put  up the mangoes grown on the said trees for public auction.   By his  application  dated  February  8,  1955  the   appellant objected  to the said auction claiming that the  said  trees were  planted  and reared by him, that  they  constituted  a "grove"  within  the meaning of s. 5(b)(iv) of the  Act  and therefore  continued  to  belong  to  him.   The   Tehsildar rejected  the  application.   The  appellant’s  appeal   and thereafter a revision before the Board of Revenue were  also likewise rejected.  The appellant then filed a writ petition in  the  High  Court of Madhya Pradesh  but  that  also  was dismissed  on  the ground that the said trees could  not  be said to constitute a "grove".  The appellant has filed  this appeal after obtaining special leave. The only question arising in this appeal is whether the said trees standing on the two sides of the said road can be said to be a "grove" within the meaning of sec. 5(b)(iv). The  Act  was passed for resumption of  jagir-lands  in  the State  and  to carry out certain land reforms in  the  jagir areas.   Section 3 provides for the date of  resumption  and sec.  4(1) lays down the consequences of resumption.   Under sub-section  (1)  of  that section,  the  right,  title  and interest of a jagirdar in his jagir lands including forests, trees,  fisheries, tanks, wells, ponds, etc., stand  resumed to  the State as from the date of resumption.   The  section also  provides  for  resumption  of  the  right,  title  and interest  of  the jagirdar in all buildings on  jagir  lands used  for  schools,  hospitals and  other  public  purposes. Section  5, however, provides that notwithstanding  anything contained in sec. 4 the jagirdar shall continue to remain in possession  of  land cultivated personally by him;  of  open enclosures used for agricultural or domestic purposes and in continuous  possession for twelve years  immediately  before the  date of resumption, all open house-sites purchased  for valuable  consideration,  all private buildings,  places  of worship, and wells situated in, and trees standing on  lands included in the aforesaid enclosures and house sites and /or land  appertaining  of such buildings or places  of  worship within the limits of village sites.  Sub-cl. (iv) of sec. 5 (b)  reads as under:               "all  groves wherever situate belonging to  or               held  by  the Jagirdar or  any  other  person,

3

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

             shall continue to belong to or be held by such               Jagirdar or other person, as the case                                    763               may  be, and the land thereof with  the  areas               appurtenant thereto shall be settled on him by               the Government according to the provisions  of               the  Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration  and               Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act,  Samvat               2007." Under  cl. (c) also the jagirdar is allowed to  continue  to remain  in  possession  of  all  tanks,  trees,  wells   and buildings in or on occupied land belonging to or held by the jagirdar or any other person. These provisions show clearly that the legislature has  used the  word  "trees"  at  three  places  in  three   different contexts,  in  secs.  4(a), 5(b) and  5(c)  apart  from  the expression "all groves wherever situate" in sub-cl. (iv)  of sec. 5(b).  Whereas under sec. 4(a) the trees are to vest in the State Government along with the forests, fisheries etc., the trees mentioned in sec. 5(b)(iii) and (c) are allowed to continue  to  belong  to  and  be  held  by  the   jagirdar. Obviously, the word "trees" in these provisions has not been used in any uniform sense and therefore has to be  construed in the context in which it is used.  For instance, the  word ’trees’ in sec. 5(b)(iii) and (c) is placed in juxtaposition with  other properties such as private buildings, places  of worship,  wells  situated  in lands  included  in  the  said enclosures  and house sites referred to in sub-cls. (i)  and (ii).   It  appears that the policy of the  legislature  was that  jagir lands including forests, trees in such  forests, fisheries,  wells, tanks, ponds, ferries, pathways,  village sites etc., which were used by, the public and in which  the members of the public were interested were resumed while the land  in  personal cultivation of the  jagirdar,  enclosures used  for  agricultural and domestic purposes,  house  sites purchased  for  valuable consideration,  private  buildings, places  of worship, wells, trees standing on lands  in  such enclosures  and house sites and tanks, trees, private  wells and buildings in or on occupied land belonging to or held by the  jagirdar were allowed to continue to belong to  and  be held by him.  It will be seen that groves in sub-cl. (iv) of sec. (b) are included amongst properties allowed to continue to  belong to and be held by the jagirdar.   Subclause  (iv) also  shows that such groves need not be of fruit trees  nor need  the trees thereof have been planted by  the  jagirdar. The  words  "wherever  situate"  indicate  that  it  is  not necessary that they should be on lands or properties allowed to  be  retained  by the jagirdar under s.  5.  If  a  grove belonged to or was held by him, whether planted by him or of natural  growth  and  wherever  situate  it  is  allowed  to continue to belong to him and be held by him.  The intention of  the legislature appears therefore to be that  properties which the jagirdar was in personal use and possession of  or in  respect of which he had paid valuable consideration  are to be retained by him.  It is in this context that we should construe subcl. (iv) of sec. 5(b).  A grove irrespective  of where  it  is  situate,  but belonging to  or  held  by  the jagirdar  is to continue to belong to or to be held by  him. To  secure the full and proper use and, enjoyment of such  a grove, if it is on land other than that which is 764 allowed  to  be  retained by him,  sub-clause  (iv)  further provides that the land on which such a grove stands with the areas appurtenant thereto also shall be settled upon him  in accordance with the M.B. Revenue Administration and Ryotwari

4

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007. What  then  is the meaning of the word  "grove"  within  the meaning  of  sec.  5(b)(iv)9  Though  the  Act  contains   a definition section the legislature has not chosen to include therein any definition of a "grove".  It intended  therefore that  it  should be understood in  its  ordinary  dictionary sense.   In Webster’s New World Dictionary, p. 641, a  grove has  been defined as a small wood; groups of trees  standing together  without undergrowth.  The Shorter  Oxford  English Dictionary,  Vol. 1, 838 also defines it as a small wood,  a group of trees affording shade or forming avenues or  walks. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 98, p. 688 a grove is defined to mean a cluster of trees not sufficiently extensive to  be called a wood; a group of trees of indefinite extent but not large enough to constitute a forest; especially such a group considered  as  furnishing  shade  for  avenues  and  walks. Though a grove in this sense may consist of a group of trees of indefinite extent it cannot be divorced from the idea  of a  homogeneous or at any rate. a  substantially  homogeneous unit  consisting of a cluster of trees close to each,  other so  as to serve as a shade to walks or avenues.  Apart  from the meaning that the dictionaries offer the word "grove" has also been the subject-matter of a number of decisions.   The case  of Daropadi v. Mannu Lal(1) was, of course an  extreme case  of only 4 fruit trees in an area of 3 bighas and  that too  on the boundaries.  Ashworth J. could therefore  easily discard the contention that the said trees formed a grove or that  the land on which they stood was a grove  land  within the  meaning of sec. 3 of the Agra Tenancy Act,  1926  which provided that so long as any considerable portion of a  plot had  a sufficient number of trees to prevent that plot  from being  cultivated, assuming the trees to have reached  their full  size,  the entire plot would retain the  character  of grove  but not otherwise.  It is true that when the  learned Judge  made, this observation he had in mind the  definition of grove in s. 3 of that Act, but he also observed that that was  the  sense  in which a "grove"  and  "grove  land"’were ordinarily  understood and that the definition did  no  more than  to  bring  out the sense in  which  these  terms  were generally understood.  In Kashi v. Jagoo Bai(2) also, Bennet J.  held that isolated trees cannot be said to constitute  a grove.   But unlike these two cases, the land in Shiv  Sahai v.  Hari  Nandan(3) had 13 mango trees fully grown,  big  in size and covering a major part of it.  It was held that  the land was a grove-land within the meaning of sec. 3(5) of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, in spite of the fact that there was some cultivation on the land.  The Court there observed that the definition merely (1) A.I.R. 1929 All 557       (2) A.I.R. 1934 All 290. (3) A.I.R. 1963 All 413. 765 required that the trees must be in sufficiently large number to preclude the land from being used primarily for a purpose other  than as grove-land.  In Hasan v. State  of  Bombay(1) the  High  Court was concerned with s. 5(h)  of  the  Madhya Pradesh  Abolition of Proprietory Rights  (Estates,  Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1 of 1951 which is in almost identical terms  as  S.  5(b)(iv)  of  the  present  Act.   The  Court interpreted  the word "grove" to mean an area covered  by  a cluster  of trees specially planted by human agency but  not large enough to constitute a forest. It  would seem therefore that the word "grove" conveys  com- pactness  or  at  any rate  substantial  compactness  to  be recognized as a unit by itself which must consist of a group of trees in sufficient number to preclude the land on  which

5

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

they stand from being primarily used for a purpose, such  as cultivation,  other than as a grove-land.  The  language  of sec. 5(b)(iv) does not require however that the trees  needs be fruit bearing trees nor does it require that they  should have been planted by human labour or agency.  But they  must be  sufficient  in number and so standing in a group  as  to give  them  the  character of a grove  and  to  retain  that character  the trees would or when fully grown preclude  the land  on  which they stand from being primarily used  for  a purpose  other than that of a grove-land.  Cultivation of  a patch  here and a patch there would have no significance  to deprive  it of its character as a grove.   Therefore,  trees standing  in  a file on the road sidle intended  to  furnish shade  to  the road would not fulfil the requirements  of  a grove even as understood in ordinary parlance. Counsel, however, contended that although the trees in ques- tion are situate on the road sides along the said road there may   at  some  places  be  a  group  or  groups  of   trees sufficiently  large in number and closely standing  together to  preclude  that  particular  area  from  being  used  for cultivation  or  for any other purpose.  In  that  case,  be argued,  there was nothing in subcl. (iv) to prevent such  a cluster  of trees from being regarded as a grove.  We  think there  is  some  force  in  this  argument  which   requires consideration.  Neither the revenue authorities nor the High Court approached the question from this point of view and no inquiry  at any stage seems to have been made whether  there are at any place or places such group or groups of trees  to constitute  a grove or groves.  All of them appear  to  have dismissed  the  appellant’s claim only because of  the  fact that the trees stand along the two sides of the road.  It is possible  that the road might have been constructed in  this particular  area  because of a number of trees  standing  on both sides of it which would provide shade over it and  form an  avenue.   In  fairness to the  appellant,  we  think  it necessary  that he should have an opportunity  to  establish that  at some place or places along the said road there  are trees  sufficient  in number and proximity to  constitute  a grove or groves. (1) 62 Bom.  L.R. 617 766 The  appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of  the  High Court  are  set aside and the case is remanded to  the  High Court  to  decide  the writ petition in  the  light  of  the observations  hereinabove made after calling a finding  from the Board of Revenue on the question whether there are trees at  any  place or places along the said road  sufficient  in number  and proximity to constitute a grove or groves.   The Board will give an opportunity to the parties  to adduce  on the  aforesaid question such further evidence, as  they  may think  necessary.   In the circumstances, there will  be  no order as to costs. Y.P.                         Appeal allowed. 767