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PETITIONER: SHRI NEKI S/O BAKHATAWAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI SATNARAIN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       19/12/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the order of the Division  Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, made on August  7, 1984  in CWP  No.3447/84 dismissing  the  writ petition in limine.      The appellant-tenant  admittedly was  in possession for the post 50 years, of the demised land. As per the contract, he is  liable to  pay 1/3rd  of the produce to the landlord. The respondent,  claiming to  be General  Power of  Attorney (GPA) of  the landlord, filed on application under Section 9 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (for short, the ‘Act’).  The appellant pleaded that he has paid the rent for all  the years except for the rabi crop in the year 1978 due to  failure of  crops in that year; he was not obtaining any receipt  on account of faith in the GPA of the landlord. The primary authority held that on the admission made by the appellant that  he had  not paid rent, for the year 1978, he is liable to be ejected. The appeal was dismissed summarily. The revision,  though all  the contentions  of the appellant were heard, has been decided against him. As stated earlier, the writ petition was dismissed in limine. Thus, this appeal by special leave.      Shri K.K.  Mohan, learned  counsel for  the  appellant, contends that  the view  taken by  the  authorities  is  not correct in  law. Since he has been paying the rent regularly and there  was no  practice of obtaining receipt in proof of payment of  it, the appellant was under the bona fide belife and did  not obtain  the receipt  from the  landlord. Tenant frankly admitted that due to failure of the crop in the year 1978,  he   could  not   pay  the  share  of  the  crop  but subsequently he  had  paid  the  same.  It  is  his  further contention that  under Section  9 (a)  of the  Act read with Section  70   of  the   Punjab  Tenancy  Act,  1887,  on  an application filed  by the  tenant for  determination of  the compensation for  improvement of  the lands  effected by him unless it  is decided  and value  of improvements determined and paid, he is not liable to ejectment and, therefore, even the order of ejectment is illegal.      The question,  therefore, is:  whether the  appellant’s default in  the payment  of rent for the year 1978 warranted

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his ejectment  from the  demised property?  It is brought to our notice that the GPA of the respondent died and the legal representatives  are  not  substituted;  so  the  appeal  is abated.  It   is  seen   that  since  the  proceedings  were instituted by the GPA on the basis of the power given by the principal, the matter is always to be adjudicated only by or on behalf of the principal. Mere death of the agent does not cause any  impediment in  the way  for disposal  without his Legal Representatives  being brought  on  record  and  given notice. As  per the  statement of  the counsel, the landlord did not respond to this correspondence. On the facts in this case, we  think that  it is  not necessary  to  adjourn  the matter any  further on  the ground that the GPA of the first respondent died.      Since the  appellant has  been tenant  for the  past 50 years and never committed default in the payment of share of the crop, it is unlikely that he would commit default in the payment of  rent for 1978. The normal probable human conduct would show that he must have paid the amount to the agent of the principal landlord. It is also an admitted position that subsequent to  the filing of the application for three years he had  already paid  the rent  to the  respondent’s  G.P.A. Under these  circumstance, the question emerges: whether the appellant has  subsequently paid  the rent for the year 1978 also? On  a conspectus  of the  relevant provisions  and the probable  human   conduct,  the   finding  recorded  by  the Commissioner is  not sustainable.  Generally, tenant  is not expected to demand from the landlord issue of a rent receipt for payment  of the  amount. After all, it is a relationship of confidence  between the  landlord and  the tenant, unless there is  a special  contract in  that behalf. In this case, there appears  to be  a common practice of payment by way of the share  in the  crop, after  the harvest, to the agent of the landlord.  Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the finding that the appellant has committed default in payment of rent for the year 1978 due to failure of crop and had paid  the same  in the  later year is not correct. He is not liable  to ejection.  The finding contra is not sound in law. The  High Court  has committed manifest error of law in not interfering  with  the  finding  thus  recorded  by  the primary authority and the revisional authority. In this view of the  matter, it  is unnecessary  to go  into  the  second question.      It  is   contended  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the respondent that  even during  the pendency  of the appeal in this Court,  the appellant  has committed default in payment of the rent and that he did not deposit the rent as directed by this  Court. It  is seen that the appellant has deposited the rent for the years 1996 also. Under these circumstances, it would  be clear that the appellant-tenant is not derelict in payment  of rent, 1/3rd share in the form of the crop, as contended for.  It is also to be seen that on three previous occasions, the  GPA  of  the  respondent  made  unsuccessful attempts to  have the  respondent ejected  on the  self-same ground of  the default.  So, it  would be  unlikely that  he would commit  default. Thus,  it  would  be  seen  that  the appellant was  acting bona  fide to  sustain  his  right  to tenancy by  paying the  rents regularly  to the agent of the landlord.      The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.