http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4  

PETITIONER: SHRI MAHADEO PAIKAJI KOLHE YAVATMAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BOMBAY

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/04/1961

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SARKAR, A.K. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1961 AIR 1517            1962 SCR  (1) 733  CITATOR INFO :  R          1962 SC 694  (28,67)  R          1967 SC1110  (11)  R          1970 SC 439  (14)

ACT: Agricultural  Land-Amendment of law relating  to  tenancies- Constitutional  validity  of enactment  Bombay  Tenancy  and Agricultural  Lands  (Vidarbha Region and Kutch  Area)  Act, 1958 (Bom. 99 of 1958).

HEADNOTE: The  petitioners challenged the constitutional  validity  of the  Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha  Region and Kutch Area) Act, 1958, which extended the provisions  of the  Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment)  Act, 1956, to Vidarbha and Kutch.  That Act was declared valid by this Court in Sri Ram  Narain Medhi v. The State of  Bombay, [1950] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489, and one of the reason-, for doing so  was that the lands covered by that Act fell  within  the definition of the word ’estate’ contained in the Bombay Land Revenue  Code, 1879.  The lands in question in  the  present petitions  were  situated  in Amraoti and  Yeotmal  and  the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that  area was  the Madha Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954.   This  Code did not employ the word ,estate’ and it was contended by the petitioners  that  the  impugned  Act  was  not  within  the protection of Art. 31A of the Constitution. Held, that the contention must fail. Although the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, did not employ the word ’estate’, the relevant definition  contained in  ss. 2(17) and 2(18) of impugned Act and ss. 2(7),  2(20) of  the  Code read with ss. 145 and I46  thereof  leaves  no manner  of  doubt that the lands in the  possession  of  the petitioners were tenures and in substance ,in estate. Since  the petitioners held the lards tinder the  State  and paid land revenue for them, the lands fell within the  class of  local equivalents of the word ’estate.’ as  contemplated by Art. 31A(2)(a) of the Constitution.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4  

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION:  Writ Petitions Nos. 93 and  125  of 1959. Petitions  under  Art. 32 of the Constitution of  India  for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. V.   M.  Limaye, E. Udayarathnam and S. S. Shukla,  for  the petitioners. 734 H.N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and D. Gupta, for the respondent. W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the Interveners. 1961.  April 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-These two writ petitions have been  filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution and they seek to challenge the  validity of the Bombay Tenancy and  Agricultural  Lands Act 99 of 1958 (hereafter called the Act).  The impugned Act in  substance is intended to extend to Vidarbha  region  and Cutch area which had then become a part -of the Greater  Bi- Lingual State of Bombay the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and  Agricultural Lands (Amendment) .Act, 1956 (Act XIII  of 1956).   The preamble to the impugned Act shows that it  was intended   to  amend  the  law  relating  to  tenancies   of agricultural lands and sites used for allied purposes in the two  areas of the State of Bombay and to make certain  other provisions  in  regard  to those lands.   In  extending  the provisions of the earlier Bombay Act XIII of 1956 to the two areas the legislature has conformed to the pattern set up by the said earlier Act.  The policy underlying the Act and the object  intended to be achieved by it are the same  and  the method  adopted in achieving that object is also  the  same. The  validity of the earlier Bombay Act (XIII of  1956)  was challenged before this Court in Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi  v. The State of Bombay (1) but the challenge failed and the Act was  held  to be constitutional.  One of  the  points  which arose for decision in that case was whether the impugned Act was protected by Art. 31A(2)(a) of the Constitution, and the answer  to that question depended upon the determination  of another issue which was whether the lands to which the  said Act applied were an "estate" as required by Art.  31A(2)(a). In dealing with that question this Court held that the  word "estate"  as defined by s. 2(5) of the Bombay  Land  Revenue Code, 1879, clearly applied to the lands (1)  [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489.                             735 covered  by  the Act and so Art. 31A(2)(a)  was  applicable. Having  regard  to this decision the only  point  which  Mr. Limaye  attempted to raise before us in support of  the  two writ  petitions  is  that the lands  belonging  to  the  two petitioners  are not an "estate" within the meaning of  Art. 31A(2)(a), and so the impugned Act is outside the protection of  Art. 31A.  If this contention is not upheld then  it  is obvious  that(  the writ petitions must fail;  if  the  said contention  is upheld then of course the  other  contentions raised  by  the two writ petitions against the  validity  of certain specific provisions of the Act may fall to be consi- dered. The  two  petitioners are Namdeorao  Baliramji  and  Mahadeo Paikaji  Kolhe  respectively.   The  first  one  resides  at Amraoti and the second at Yeotmal.  The first owns about  80 acres  dry lands situated in Amraoti out of which  43  acres are  under  his  personal cultivation and the  rest  in  the possession of the tenants.  The second petitioner owns about 1168  acres dry lands situated in Yeotmal out of  which  400

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4  

acres  are under his personal cultivation and the rest  with the tenants.  The lands in both the cases are charged to the payment of land revenue.  The case for both the  petitioners is  that  the lands thus held by them are  not  an  "estate" within the meaning of Art. 31A(2)(a). Article 31A(2)(a) provides, inter alia, that the  expression "estate"  shall in relation to any local area have the  same meaning  as that expression or its local equivalent  has  in the  existing law relating to land tenures in force in  that area.   The existing local law, it is common ground, is  the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954 (II of 1955), and  so it  is necessary to find whether the lands belonging to  the petitioners can be said to be an ’estate’ within the meaning of  the  said  Code.  Before we do so, however,  it  may  be pertinent  to  refer  to the  relevant  definitions  in  the impugned  Act.   Section 2(17) of the Act  defines  land  as meaning, inter alia, land which is used or capable of  being used  for  agricultural purposes and includes the  sites  of farm  buildings  appurtenant to such  land.   Section  2(18) defines a land-holder as meaning a 736 tenure-holder  whom  the State Government  has  declared  on account  of  tile  extent  and value of  the,  land  or  his interests  therein to be a land-holder  for the purposes  of this Act. Now,s.27 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue  Code in question defines   a  holding  as meaning,  inter  alia,a parcel  of land separately assessed to land  revenue,and  s. 2(20)  defines a tenure-holder as meaning a  person  holding from  the State Government as a Bhumiswami or  a  Bhumidari. Chapter XII of the Code deals with tenure-holders.   Section 145  provides that there, shall be two classes  of  tenure,- holders of lands held from the State, namely, Bhumiswami and Bhumidhari.  Section 146 deals with Bhumiswami.  It provides that "every person who at the coming into force of this Code belongs  to any of the classes specified in clauses  (a)  to (f)  of  the said section shall be called a  Bhumiswami  and shall  have  all  the  rights and  is  subject  to  all  the liabilities  conferred  or imposed upon a Bhumiswami  by  or under  this  Code".   Amongst these  classes  is  the  class covered  by el. (e) which relates to persons in  respect  of lands held by them as occupants in Berar.  Thus reading  the relevant definitions along with the provisions of s. 146  of the Code it would follow that the land in the possession  of the  Bhumiswami who is a tenure-holder is in  substance  all estate.   It is true that the word "estate" as such has  not been employed in the Code, but it must be borne in mind that Art.  31A(2)(a)  refers not only to estate but also  to  its local  equivalent.  It was realised that in many  areas  the existing  law  relating to land tenures  may  not  expressly define  all estate as such though the said areas  had  their local  equivalents described and defined.  That is  why  the relevant provision of the Constitution has deliberately used both   the   word   "estate"    as   well   as   its   local equivalent".The petitioners hold lands under the  State  and they   pay  land  revenue  for  the,  lands  thus  held   by them.Therefore, there is no difficulty in holding that under the existing law relating to land tenures the lands held  by them  fill within the class of the local equivalents of  the word "estate" as contemplated by 737 Art. 31A(2)(a).  If that is so the contention raised by  Mr. Limaye  that  the impugned Act is not protected by Art.  31A cannot  succeed.   As we have already indicated  it  is  not disputed  that if Art. 31A applies there can be  no  further challenge to the validity of the impugned statute.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4  

The  writ petitions accordingly fail and are dismissed  with costs one SEt of hearing costs. Petitions dismissed.