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PETITIONER: SHRI KISHAN DAS & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/09/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  274            1995 SCC  (6) 240  JT 1995 (7)   158        1995 SCALE  (5)567

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                           W I T H                   C.M.P. NO.3 910 OF 1986.                          O R D E R      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment dated August 30, 1979 of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court  in C.M.W. No.35/1977. Notification under Section 4(1) of  the Land  Acquisition Act,  1894 [for  short,  ‘the Act’] was  published in  the Gazette  on September 29, 1976. Declaration under  Section 6 was made on September 30, 1976. While issuing  the notification  under Section  4(1) of  the Act, the  Government exercised the power under Section 17(4) of the Act and dispensed with the September 1976. Therefore, the appellants  should be compensated by payment of interest @ 12  per cent  per annum.  In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Ram Chand & Ors. vs.  Union of  India &  Ors. [(1994)  1 SCC  44] and in particular on  paragraph 16 of the judgment. It is seen that in Ram  Chander’s case  even after the dismissal of the writ petitions by  this Court  in Aflatoon  vs. Lt.  Governor  of Delhi [(1975)  4 SCC  285], no  action was taken by the Land Acquisition Officer to pass the award. Thus, till 1980-81 no award was  made in respect of any of the acquisitions. Under these circumstances,  this Court had directed the Government to pay  interest @  12 per  cent on  the amount  awarded  to compensate the  loss caused  to the  appellants therein.  In this case,  it is  seen that  though  the  notification  was issued in  September 1976,  the writ  petitions came  to  be filed in  the High  Court immediately  thereafter in 1977 in the  High  Court  and  obviously  further  proceedings  were stayed. Accordingly,  the Land  Acquisition Officer  delayed the award.  After the  dismissal of  the writ petitions, the appellants came  to this  Court  and  obtained  status  quo. Obviously,  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  was  not  in  a position to pass the award immediately. Thereafter, it would

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appear that  he passed  the award on March 22, 1983. Section 34 of  the Act  obligates the State to pay interest from the date of  taking possession  under the  unamended Act @ 6 per cent and  after the  Amendment Act  68 of  1984 at different rates mentioned  therein. The  liability of the State to pay interest ceases  with the  deposit made as per Section 34 of the Act.  Further liability  would arise only when the court on reference  under Section  18  enhances  the  compensation under Section  28 of  the Act. Similarly, in an appeal under Section 54  of  the  Act  if  the  appellate  court  further increases the  compensation, then  again similar  obligation under Section 28 arises.      In  the  light  of  the  operation  of  the  respective provisions of  Sections 34  and 28  of the  Act, it would be difficult to direct payment of interest. In fact, Section 23 (1-A) is  a set  off for  loss in cases of delayed awards to compensate the  person  entitled  to  receive  compensation; otherwise a  person who  is responsible  for  the  delay  in disposal of the acquisition proceedings will be paid premium for dilatory  tactics. It  is stated  by the learned counsel for the  respondents that  the amount  of interest  was also calculated and  total amount was deposited in the account of the appellants by the Land Acquisition Officer after passing the  award,   i.e.,  on  November  15,  1976  in  a  sum  of Rs.20,48,615/-. Under  these circumstances, the liability to pay interest  would arise  when possession  of the  acquired land was  taken and the amount was not deposited. In view of the fact  that compensation  was deposited  as soon  as  the award was  passed, we  do not think that it is a case for us to interfere at this stage.      The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.