12 May 1959
Supreme Court
Download

SHRI JAGDISH MILLS LTD. Vs THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY NORTH, KUTCH A

Case number: Appeal (civil) 681 of 1957


1

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: SHRI JAGDISH MILLS LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE  COMMISSIONER  OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY  NORTH,  KUTCH  AND

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/05/1959

BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) HIDAYATULLAH, M.

CITATION:  1959 AIR 1160            1960 SCR  (1) 236

ACT:        Income-tax-Assessee  company  manufacturing  and   supplying        goods from outside British India-Stipulation for Payment  by        cheque  Cheques  remitted by post  from  British  India-Post        Office,  if  an agent of the assess--income if  received  in        taxable  territoriesIndian Income-tax Act (XI Of  1922),  s.        4(1)(a).

HEADNOTE:        The appellant company, carrying on business in manufacturing        and  selling textiles at Baroda, received in the  assessment        years  1942-43  and  1943-44 payments in  cheques  from  the        Government  of India for the supply of such goods  on  bills        submitted, as agreed upon in prescribed printed forms  which        provided  that the Government should pay the amount  due  to        the  appellant by cheque.  The appellant, however,  did  not        request  or write to the Government indicating in  what  way        the payment by cheque was                                    237        to  be made.  The Government sent the cheques from Delhi  by        post to the appellant at Baroda and it received and accepted        them in Baroda in full and unconditional satisfaction of its        claim  and cashed them through its bank accounts  in  Bombay        and Ahmedabad.  The question was whether the amounts of  the        cheques  were  income,  profits and gains  received  by  the        appellant  in  the  taxable territories -and  were  as  such        liable to tax under S. 4(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act.        The  Income-tax Officer held that the amounts were  received        in  British  India  as the cheques were drawn  on  banks  in        British  India and the Appellate Assistant  Commissioner  on        appeal   affirmed  his  order.   The  Income-tax   Appellate        Tribunal  on appeal held that even though the appellant  did        not  ask the Government to send the cheques by  post,  there        was  an implied request to do so and following the  decision        of this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay South v.        Messrs.   Ogale Glass Works Ltd. [1955] I S.C.R.  185,  held        that the amounts of the cheques were received in the taxable        territories  and  as such the appellant was  liable  to  tax        under s. 4(1)(a) of the Act.  Hence these appeals by special        leave.   The question for decision was whether in the  facts        and circumstances of the case the stipulation that  payments

2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

      should be made by cheques implied a request by the appellant        to  the  Government  to send the cheques by post  so  as  to        constitute  the  Post Office its agent  for  receiving  such        payments.        Held,  that  regard  being  had to  the  general  course  of        business usage which was followed in this case, there  could        be  no  doubt  that the parties intended  that  the  cheques        should  be  sent  by post which was the  normal  agency  for        transmission  of such articles and, consequently, there  was        an  implied  request by the appellant to the  Government  to        send the cheques by post so as to constitute the Post Office        its agent for the purpose of receiving those payments.        Commissioner  of Income-tax, Bombay South v. Messrs.   Ogale        Glass Works Ltd. [1955] I S.C.R. 185 and Norman v.  Rickets,        (1886) 3 T.L.R. 182, applied.        Pennington v. Crossley and Sons (Limited), [1879] 13  T.L.R.        513, considered.        Thorappa  v. Umedmalji (1923) 25 Bom.  L.R. 604 and  Exparte        Cote In -ye Deveza, (1873) L.R. 9 Ch. 27, distinguished.

JUDGMENT:        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 681 and  682        of 1957.        Appeals  by  special leave from the order  dated  August  2,        1954, of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal of India,  Bombay        Bench  ’A’  in Income-tax Appeals Nos. 3756 of  1948-49  and        2161 of 1950-51.        R.   J. Kolah and I. N. Shroff, for the appellants.        H.   N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,        K.N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the respondent.        238        1959.  May 12.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by        BHAGWATI J.-These two appeals with special leave under  Art.        136  of the Constitution are directed against the  order  of        the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal of India, Bombay Bench " A        " (hereinafter referred to as " the Tribunal ") dated August        3, 1954, in Income-tax Appeals Nos. 3756 of 1948-49 and 2161        of  1950-51  whereby the Tribunal held that the  amounts  of        cheques  of Rs.1,98,643 and Rs. 4,96,365 for the  assessment        years  1943-44  and 1944-45 were received by  the  appellant        from  the Government in the taxable territories and were  as        such liable to tax under s. 4(1)(a) of the Indian Income Tax        Act (XI of 1922) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").        At all material times the appellant was a public joint stock        company  incorporated under the then Baroda State  Companies        Act  and  having  its  registered  office  at  Baroda.   The        appellant  was  the owner of a textile mill and  carried  on        business in manufacturing and selling textiles at Baroda.        In  the accounting years 1942 and 1943 tenders were  invited        by  the  Government  of  India  for  some  of  the  articles        manufactured  by the appellant and the  appellant  submitted        its  tenders to the Government of India which  accepted  the        tenders  and placed orders for supply of goods  manufactured        by  the  appellant.   These  orders  were  accepted  by  the        appellant  at  Baroda  and  the  deliveries  of  the   goods        manufactured  by  the  appellant  and- sold  by  it  to  the        Government  of India were pursuant to the said orders to  be        and  were in fact effected F. 0. B. Baroda.  In fact so  far        as  the  manufacture and sale of the goods supplied  to  the        Government  of India were concerned, as also the  deliveries        thereof,  everything took place at Baroda, outside the  then        British India.        According  to the conditions of the contracts governing  the

3

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

      supplies made by the appellant to the Government, the system        of  payment was, that unless otherwise agreed  upon  between        the parties, payment for delivery of the goods would be made        on  submission  of  the  bills in  the  prescribed  form  in        accordance with                                    239        the instructions given in the acceptance of the tender by  a        cheque  on a Government Treasury or a Branch of the  Reserve        Bank  of  India or the Imperial Bank of’  India  transacting        Government   business.    The  appellant   after   effecting        deliveries  of the goods, submitted bills in the  prescribed        printed form which contained the sentence that "  Government        should  pay the amount due to the appellant by cheque "  but        the appellant did not request or write to the Government, in        what way the payment by cheque was to be made by  Government        to  the  appellant.   After  submission  of  the  bills  the        appellant  received  at  Baroda, in  payment  of  its  bills        cheques  through  post  from  the  Government  drawn  on   a        Government  Treasury or on a branch of the Reserve  Bank  of        India  or the Imperial Bank of India transacting  Government        business.   The said cheques were received at Baroda by  the        appellant from the Government, along with a memo stating:-        " The undersigned has the honour to forward herewith  cheque        No. dated in payment of the bills noted below."        then  followed a tabular statement setting out  the  number,        amount and date of the bills.  On the top of the memo  there        was  a  direction that " it be immediately returned  to  the        Controller  of  Supplies Accounts, with  the  acknowledgment        form   on  the  reverse  duly  signed  and   stamped."   The        acknowledgment form was expressed as follows:-        "  The undersigned has the honour to acknowledge cheque  No.        dated           for  Rs.          in payment  of  the  bills        noted in the first column on the reverse."        The payments made by cheques were accepted by the  appellant        unconditionally  and in full satisfaction of its  claim  for        goods  supplied  to  the Government.  On  receipt  _of  such        cheques,  the  appellant  endorsed the same  and  sent  them        either to Bombay or Ahmedabad in the Banking account of  the        appellant at such places.        By his orders dated September 20, 1945, and March 16,  1943,        for  the  assessment  years  1942-43  (account  year   being        calendar year 1941) and 1943-44 (account year being calendar        year 1942) the Income-tax Officer        240        held  that the sums of Rs. 1,98,643 and Rs.  4,96,365  being        the amounts of the cheques received by the appellant for the        goods  supplied  to  the Government  of  India  amounted  to        receipt of income, profits and gains in British India during        the said accounting years inasmuch as the said cheques  were        drawn on banks in British India and were liable to tax.        On  appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner from  the        said  orders  of  the  Income-tax  Officer,  the   Appellate        Assistant  Commissioner confirmed the orders of the  Income-        tax Officer and dismissed the appeals.        From   the   said  decision  of  the   Appellate   Assistant        Commissioner  the  Appellant  appealed  to  the  Income  tax        Appellate  Tribunal who, after two remand orders on  various        points  in the case which have no relevance to the  question        involved in these appeals, finally by its order dated August        3,  1954, held that even though the appellant did not  write        to  the Government saying that the cheques be sent by  post,        there  was an implied request to the Government to send  the        cheques  by  post, observing that where a person  in  Baroda        writes to another in Delhi to send the money due to him by a        cheque  there  is an implied request to send the  cheque  by

4

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

      post.   The  appellant  could not  have  intended  that  the        cheques would be sent otherwise than by post and it was  not        the case of the appellant that the cheques received from the        Government   were  delivered  by  hand  on  behalf  of   the        Government  to  the Appellant at Baroda  and  following  the        decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax  Bombay        South  v. Messrs.  Ogale Glass Works Ltd.(’),  the  Tribunal        held that the amounts of the cheques referred to above  were        received by the appellant in the taxable territories and  as        such the appellant was liable to tax under s. 4(1)(a) of the        Act.        On  December  20, 1954, the appellant  applied  for  special        leave to appeal against the said order of the Tribunal under        Art. 136 of the Constitution which leave was granted by this        Court by its order dated April 15, 1955.  By a further order        dated September 19, 1955, both the appeals were consolidated        for the purposes of printing of the record and for filing of        the        (1)[1955] 1 S.C.R. 185.        241        petitions  of  appeal and the statements  of  case  therein.        These  appeals  have  now  come up  for  hearing  and  final        disposal before us.        On  the  facts narrated above it is clear that the  mode  of        payment agreed upon between the appellant and the Government        of  India,  as specified in Cl. 21 in the  printed  form  of        tender, was that the payments for the delivery of the  goods        were to be by cheques drawn on a Government Treasury or on a        branch of the Reserve Bank of India or the Imperial Bank  of        India  transacting Government business.  The appellant  used        to  submit  the bills in the prescribed printed  form  which        mentioned that the Government should pay the amounts due  to        the  appellant  by cheque.  In payment of  these  bills  the        appellant  used to receive at Baroda cheques’ drawn  by  the        Government as aforesaid along with a memo of  acknowledgment        which  stated  that  the  cheques  mentioned  therein   were        forwarded  in  payment  of the bills noted  in  the  tabular        statement  setting  out the amount, number and date  of  the        bills.   The  acknowledgmet  it  form  on  the  reverse  was        thereafter  duly  signed  and  -stamped  by  the   appellant        acknowledging  the receipt of the cheques in payment of  the        said  bills  and  was despatched by  the  appellant  to  the        Government.  These payments by cheques were accepted by  the        appellant  unconditionally and in full satisfaction  of  its        claims for the goods supplied to the Government.        The case of the Revenue in the first instance was that  even        though  these  cheques  were received by  the  appellant  in        Baroda they were sent by the appellant after duly  endorsing        the  same  either  to Bombay or  Ahmedabad  in  the  banking        accounts  of the appellant at such places and these  cheques        were  cashed and the proceeds thereof were received  by  the        appellant in either Bombay or Ahmedabad and accordingly  the        income,  profits  and gains were received by  the  appellant        within the taxable territories.  This contention was  really        of  no avail to the Revenue because on the particular  facts        of  the present case it was common ground that the  payments        made   by   cheques   were   accepted   by   the   appellant        unconditionally  and in full satisfaction of its claims  for        goods supplied to the        31        242        Government and therefore if the cheques be held to have been        received by the appellant in Baroda the  income, profits and        gains  were  also received in Baroda which was  outside  the        taxable territories.  Even if the receipts of the cheques at

5

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

      Baroda   be  treated  as  a  conditional  payment   of   the        appellant’s claims for the goods supplied to the Government,        the  position was no better, for the simple reason that  the        cheques  not  having been dishonoured but having  been  duly        cashed  the  payments  related  back to  the  dates  of  the        receipts  of  the cheques and in law the dates  of  payments        were  the  dates of the delivery of the  cheques  which  was        certainly  in Baroda-out side the taxable  territories.   In        either event, it could not be urged by the Revenue that  the        income, profits and gains were received by the appellant  at        any  place  other  than Baroda  (Vide  the  Commissioner  of        Income-tax,  Bombay South v. Messrs. Ogale Glass Works  Ltd.        (1),  ibid at 196).  The position which was, however,  taken        up  by  the Revenue subsequently was that the  cheques  were        posted by the Government in Delhi at the implied request  of        the  appellant  and therefore the payments must be  held  to        have  been  received  by the appellant at  Delhi,  the  Post        Office being thus constituted the agent of the appellant for        the purposes of receiving the same.  Learned Counsel for the        appellant  contested this position by urging that  the  only        thing  mentioned by the appellant was that the  payment  for        the goods supplied by the appellant to the Government was to        be  by  cheques and there was no request either  express  or        implied  emanating  from the appellant for the  despatch  of        these cheques by post with the result that if the Government        chose to send these cheques by post from Delhi it was not in        pursuance  of  any request express or implied  made  by  the        appellant  in  that  behalf  but  it  was  so  done  by  the        Cxovernment on its own initiative thus constituting the Post        Office the agent of ’the Government and there was no receipt        of  the  monies by the appellant until the  cheques  reached        their  destination at Baroda.  The case of the  Commissioner        of  Income-tax, Bombay South v. Messrs.  Ogale  Glass  Works        Ltd. (1), which was relied upon by Revenue was sought        (1)[1955] 1 S.C.R. 18_˜.                                    243        to  be  distinguished on the ground that in  that  case  the        assessee  had written on the bill form the words  "  Kindly.        remit  the amount by a cheque in our favour on any  bank  in        Bombay  "  which  was an express  request  conveyed  to  the        Government  by the assessee to send the cheque by post  thus        constituting the Post Office the agent of the assessee.   No        such  words having been used by the appellant in  this  case        the only consequence of the provision contained in the  bill        form  that  the  payment  be made by  cheque  was  that  the        Government was authorised or entitled to make the payment by        cheque; but how to reach those cheques to the appellant  was        left to the sweet will and discretion of the Government  and        if the Government chose to send those cheques by post  there        was  no  request,  express or implied,  emanating  from  the        appellant  to send the cheques by post so as  to  constitute        the Post Office the agent of the appellant for the  purposes        of receiving the same.        It  is true that in the Commissioner of  Income-tax,  Bombay        South  v. Messrs.  Ogale Glass Works Ltd. (1), the  words  "        kindly  remit  the amount by a cheque in our favour  on  any        bank in Bombay " were specifically used by the assessee  and        these  words were construed to be an express request by  the        assessee to the Government to send the cheques by post.        The   various  authorities  which  were   discussed,   viz.,        Thairlwall  v. The Great Northern Railway  Co.(’);  Badische        Anilin  Und  Soda Fabrik v. The Basle  Chemical  Works  Bind        Schedler  (3)  ; Comber v. Layland (’)and  MitchellHenry  v.        Norwich  Union Life Insurance Society (5), were  also  cases        where  the  expressions  used were  construed  as  words  of

6

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

      express  request constituting the Post Office the  agent  of        the  party  receiving  the money or the goods  and  went  to        support  the case made by the Revenue that the  post  office        was  constituted the agent of the assessee for the  purposes        of  receiving  the  cheques when they  were  posted  by  the        Government in Delhi.  Where, however, no such express  words        were  used and the matter rested merely in  the  stipulation        that the payment would be made by cheques, would the mere        (1) [1955] 1 S-C.R. 185.   (3) [1898] A.C, 200.        (2) [1910] 2 K.B. 509.     (4) [1898] A.C   524.        (5)(19I8] 2 K.B. 67.        244        posting of the cheques in Delhi be enough to constitute  the        Post Office the agent of the appellant so that the  ’income,        profits  and gains may be said to have been received by  the        appellant within the taxable territories ?        If  there was nothing more, the position in law is that  the        Post Office would not become the agent of the addressee  and        the mere posting of the cheque would not operate as delivery        of  the cheque to the addressee so as to pass the  title  in        the cheque to the addressee. (Vide Thorappa v. Umedmalji (1)        and the case of Exparte Cote In re Daveza (2).        Where,  however, on the facts and circumstances of the  case        an  implied  request by the creditor to send the  cheque  by        post can be spelt out, the Post Office would be  constituted        the  agent  of the addressee for the purposes  of  receiving        such payment.  The authority in support of this  proposition        is  to  be  found in Norman v. Ricketts(3).   In  that  case        Madame Phillippe, one of the plaintiffs, carried on business        as  a milliner in Bondstreet, and one of her  customers  was        the  defendant,  Mrs.  Ricketts.  Between  March  1884,  and        March, 1885, goods were supplied by Madame Phillippe to Mrs.        Ricketts to the amount of pound 142.  Mrs. Ricketts lived in        Suffolk,  and  at the end of March, 1885,  Madame  Phillippe        wrote  to  her in Suffolk saying, " the favour of  a  cheque        within  a week will oblige ". Mrs. Ricketts accordingly,  on        April  6, sent Madame Phillippe a cheque for the  amount  by        post.  The cheque was an open cheque payable to the order of        Madame Phillippe.  The cheque was stolen in the transit, and        Madame Phillippe never received it, but it was paid by  Mrs.        Ricketts’  bankers  to  the thief.   Madame  Phillippe  then        commenced  this action to recover the amount, and Mr.  Baron        Huddleston who tried the case without a jury, held [(1885) 2        T.L.R. (607)] that the sending of the cheque was payment and        gave  judgment for the defendant.  The  plaintiffs  appealed        and  the  appeal  was  dismissed  by  the  Court  of  Appeal        consisting  of Lord Esher, M. R., Lindley and Lopes, L.  JJ.        The Master of the Rolls said that if a debtor had to pay his        creditor        (1) (1923) 25 Bom.  L.R. 604.   (2) (1873) L.R. 9 Ch. 27.        (3) (1886) 3 T.L.R. 182.        245        money,  as a general rule the debtor must come and  pay  his        creditor.   But  if  the  creditor asked him  to  pay  in  a        particular  way,  the debtor might do so.  If asked  to  pay        through  the post, the putting the letter in the  post  with        the  money  was a sufficient.  The only  question  here  was        whether the plaintiffs asked the defendant in effect to send        the  money  through the post.  An express  request  to  send        through the post was not necessary.  If what the  plaintiffs        said  amounted to a request to send the cheque by the  post,        then  there  was  payment.   To  answer  that  question  the        existing  circumstances  must be looked at.  A  milliner  in        London wrote to a lady in Suffolk asking for a cheque.  ]bid        that letter reasonably lead the lady to suppose and did  she

7

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

      suppose  that she might send the cheque by post ? She  could        not suppose that she was to send a messenger with it or come        up  to  London  herself.  The  only  reasonable  and  proper        meaning  to  be attached to it,  whatever  Madame  Phillippe        might have intended, was that she was to send the cheque  by        post.   She,  therefore, reasonably believed  that  she  was        invited to send her cheque by post, and she did what she was        asked to do.  Consequently, what she did amounted to payment        to  the appellant.  The Lords Justices concurred  with  this        judgment.        Resting itself upon the observations in this case this Court        observed  in  Commissioner of Income-tax,  Bombay  South  v.        Messrs.   Ogale Glass Works Ltd. (1) at p. 295:         "  According to the course of business usage in general  to        which,  as part of the surrounding circumstances,  attention        has  to  be  paid under the  authorities  cited  above,  the        parties  must have intended that the cheques should be  sent        by   post  which  is  the  usual  and  normal   agency   for        transmission   of  such  articles  and  according   to   the        Tribunal’s  findings  they  were in  fact  received  by  the        assessee by post."        Learned  Counsel  for the appellant  particularly  drew  our        attention  to  the case of Pennington v. Crossley  and  sons        (Limited)(’) a decision of the Court of Appeal consisting of        Lord Esher, M.R., A.L. Smith and Rigby, L. JJ., where Norman        v.  Ricketts  (3)  was  distinguished.   In  that  case  the        plaintiff sold on December 10,        (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 185.         (2) [1897]13T.L.R. 5i3.        (3)(1886) 3 T.L.R. 182.        246        1896 the goods in question to the defendants and on the same        date  an invoice was sent to the defendants under which  the        defendants were entitled to discount if the payment was made        within  14 days.  Upon December 24 the defendants  posted  a        cross cheque made payable to the plaintiff or his order; and        with the cheque was sent a form of receipt for signature  by        the  plaintiff.   The  envelope containing  the  cheque  was        properly addressed to the plaintiff, but was not registered.        There  was  no express request to send the cheque  by  post.        The  cheque  was  never received by the  plaintiff  but  was        cashed by a stranger on the strength of a forged endorsement        of the plaintiff’s name thereupon.  On an action to  recover        the  price  of the goods sold and delivered  the  defendants        contended that the posting of the cheque amounting in law to        payment,  and gave evidence that for about 20  years  before        this transaction payments for goods in question; as  between        the plaintiff and the defendants were always made by  cheque        sent  by  post  in the form of  receipt  given  above.   The        learned  Judge held that the course of business showed  that        the  parties had agreed that the payment should be  made  by        cheque,  and  that  the posting of the  cheque  amounted  to        payment,  and accordingly gave judgment for the  defendants.        The  Court of Appeal reversed this decision.  The Master  of        the  Rolls in his judgment distinguished the case of  Norman        v.  Ricketts (1), stating that in that case there  was  what        amounted to a request to send a cheque by post and the Court        held that the posting of the cheque was payment.  There  was        no  such request here.  The course of business  between  the        plaintiff  and  the defendants was not taken  to  mean  that        there was a request to the defendants to send the cheque  by        post  and  that  the plaintiffs would run the  risk  of  the        cheques miscarrying in the transit.  The defendants sent  to        the plaintiff cheques by post on the various sales, together        with a form of receipt to be signed by him independently  of        any arrangement.  There was nothing in the circumstances  to

8

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

      warrant  the conclusion that putting the cheque in the  post        was  to’  be  taken as the delivery of  the  cheque  to  the        plaintiff, the only facts        (1)  (1886) 3 T.L.R. 182.        247        being  that the defendants always sent cheques by  post  and        that  when  the  plaintiff received them he  sent  back  the        receipt duly signed.        This  case  does  not  militate against  the  ratio  of  the        decision  in Norman -v.  Ricketts (1), but  really  confirms        the  same.  If on the facts and circumstances of  that  case        the  Court  of  Appeal had been able to  find  any  request,        express or implied, to send the cheques by post the decision        would  certainly have been confirmed but in so far as  there        was nothing in the circumstances of the case from which such        an inference could be raised the Court of Appeal observed:-        It would be most monstrous to infer from those circumstances        a  request to send a cheque by post and that  the  plaintiff        would  consider  that he had received it as soon as  it  was        posted."        The  other  Lord  Justices delivered judgment  to  the  same        effect and the appeal was allowed.        The  above  ratio is really determinative  of  the  question        before  us.   The stipulation in the  contract  between  the        appellant  and the Government was that the payment would  be        made  by  cheques.  The Government of India was  located  in        Delhi and the cheques would be necessarily drawn by it  from        Delhi.   Could it be imagined that in the normal  course  of        affairs  the cheques thus drawn in Delhi would be sent by  a        messenger  to  Baroda so that they may be delivered  to  the        appellant  in Baroda?  Or that the officer  concerned  would        come  to  Baroda  himself  and hand the  same  over  to  the        appellant in Baroda ? The only reasonable and proper way  of        dealing  with  the situation was that the payment  would  be        made  by  cheques  which the Government would  send  to  the        appellant  at  Baroda by post.  According to the  course  of        business  usage  in  general  which  appears  to  have  been        followed  in this case, the parties must have intended  that        the  cheques should be sent by post which is the  usual  and        normal  agency for transmission of such articles.   If  that        were  so,  there was imported by  necessary  implication  an        implied request by the appellant to send the cheques by post        from  Delhi thus constituting the Post Office its agent  for        the purposes of receiving those payments.        (1)  (1886) 3 T.L.R 182.        248        Learned Counsel for the appellant further drew our attention        to  certain provisions of the Post Office Act, 1898 and  the        postal regulations framed thereunder and tried to argue that        the  Post Office was really the agent of the Government  and        the  Government could recall the cheques at any time  before        they  actually reached the appellant at Baroda.   All  these        provisions were discussed by this Court in the  Commissioner        of  Income-tax, Bombay South v. Messrs.  Ogale  Glass  Works        Ltd. (1), and it was held that these provisions did not help        the   assessee.   The  position  as  it  obtains  was   thus        summarised at p. 204:-        "  there can be no doubt that as between the sender and  the        addressee it is the request of the addressee that the cheque        be sent by post that makes the post office the agent of  the        addressee.  After such request the addressee cannot be heard        to  to  say  that the post office was  not  his  agent  and,        therefore,  the loss of the cheque in transit must  fall  on        the  sender on the specious plea that the sender having  the        very  limited  right to reclaim the cheque  under  the  Post

9

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

      Office  Act,  1898, the post-office was his agent,  when  in        fact  there was no such reclamation.  Of course if there  be        no  such request, express or implied, then the  delivery  of        the  letter or the cheque to the post-office is delivery  to        the agent of the sender himself."        In our opinion the principle which has been enunciated by us        in  the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay South v.  Messrs.        Ogale  Glass Works Ltd. (1), is applicable to the  facts  of        the  present  case,  even though the words "  to  remit  the        amount  by cheque " have not been specifically used  herein.        Non-user of those words does not make any difference to  the        position  and it is not possible to distinguish the  present        case from that case merely on this ground.        We are, therefore, of opinion, that the Income-tax Appellate        Tribunal  was right in the conclusion to which it  came  and        these appeals must accordingly be dismissed with costs,  one        set between the two appeals.        Appeals dismissed.        (1)[1955] 11 S.C.R. 185.                                    249