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PETITIONER: SHRI HARISH TANDON

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE ADDL.DISTRICT MAGISTRATE,  ALLAHABAD, U.P. AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/01/1995

BENCH: SINGH N.P. (J) BENCH: SINGH N.P. (J) SAWANT, P.B. ANAND, A.S. (J)

CITATION:  1995 AIR  676            1995 SCC  (1) 537  JT 1995 (1)   290        1995 SCALE  (1)65

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: 1.   This  appeal  has  been filed against  an  order  dated 21.9.1992  passed  by  the Allahabad High Court  on  a  Writ Petition  filed on behalf of Respondent Nos.5 to 7.  By  the impugned  order,  the High Court has  quashed  orders  dated 13.8.1981  and  18.11.1981  passed by  the  Rent  Controller declaring  a vacancy under Section 12(2) read  with  Section 12(4)  of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation  of  Letting, Rent  and  Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred  to  as ’the Act’). 2.   The  dispute is in respect of a shop bearing  Municipal No.24-34 situated at Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Civil Lines Mar- 294 ket,  Allahabad.  In the year 1937, the shop was let out  to late Sheobux Roy by the grand father of the appellant.   The said Sheobux Roy started a business in the name and style of "M/s.  B.N. Rama & Co.". Sheobux Roy died on 3.2.1941  leav- ing  behind five sons namely Khush Bakht Roy, Sant Bux  Roy, Sampat  Roy, Ganpat Roy and Sheopat Roy.  In the year  1943, there  was a family  partition amongst the sons  of  Sheobux Roy and the shop in dispute fell to the share of Sampat Roy, Ganpat  Roy and Sheopat Roy.  The other two sons  ceased  to have  any  interest or concern with the  shop  in  question. Sampat  Roy,  Ganpat Roy and Sheopat Roy  were  carrying  on their  business in the name and style of "M/s.  B.N. Rama  & Co.".  In the year 1976, Ganpat Roy and his son  Ramesh  Roy constituted a new partnership firm with one Swarup  Kailash, son-in-law  of Ganpat Roy under the name and style of  "M/s. B.N.  Rama & Co.(Textiles)" for carrying on the business  in textile, in the premises in question.  In the year 1979, the appellant filed suit for eviction of the  respondent-tenants (hereinafter referred to as ’the respondents’) on the ground that there was a sub-letting of the premises by induction of Swarup  Kailash, the son-in-law of Ganpat Roy as  a  partner for carrying on the business in the shop in dispute.

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3.   In March 1981, one Ramesh Nath Kapur    and      Radhey Shyam  filed  an  application  for  allotment  of  the  said premises  to  them, on the ground that there  was  a  deemed vacancy  of the premises.  The Rent Controller and  Eviction Officer  by his order dated 13.8.1981 held that there was  a deemed  vacancy  in  respect of the  said  premises  and  he directed that the said vacancy be notified.  A petition  was filed  by  the  respondents on 11.9.1981  making  prayer  to recall the aforesaid order dated 13.8.1981 and to give  them permission  to file objections and to contest  the  proceed- ings.  That petition was allowed by the Rent Controller  and Eviction  Officer  by his order dated 13.9.198 1.  The  Rent Controller   and  Eviction  Officer  by  his   order   dated 18.11.1981 negatived the contention of the respondents  that there  was no deemed vacancy in respect of the  premises  in question.  Thereafter a Writ Application was filed on behalf of  the  respondents which was dismissed by the  High  Court saying that it was not maintainable.  The Respondents  filed a  Special  Leave  Petition before this  Court  against  the aforesaid order of the High Court.  This Court allowed their appeal  on 29.3.1985 and directed the High Court  to  rehear the  Writ Petition filed by the respondents on  merits.   It was further said by this Court that pending disposal of  the writ  petition before the High Court, there shall be a  stay of  further proceedings in respect of the allotment  of  the premises  in  question  and the  respondents  shall  not  be dispossessed from the same. 4.   The Writ Petition, aforesaid, was ultimately allowed by the impugned order dated 21.9.1992 by the High Court on  the finding that after the death of Sheobux Roy on 3.2.1941, his sons  became  tenants in common and not joint  tenants.   As such  for  any contravention made by Ganpat Roy one  of  the sons of Sheobux Roy by inducting his son-in-law as a partner of  the  firm shall not result into deemed  vacancy  of  the whole premises under the provisions of the Act.  It is  this finding which has been put in issue before us. 5.   In order to appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to refer to certain 295 provisions of the Act.  Section 3(g) defines ’family’ :               "Section  3(g)   "family", in  relation  to  a               landlord  or tenant of a building, means,  his               or her               (i) spouse,               (ii)  male lineal decedents,               (iii) such   parents,  grandparents  and   any               unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially               separated  daughter  or  daughter  of  a  male               lineal  descendant, as may have been  normally               residing with him or her,               and  includes, in relation to a landlord,  any               female  having a legal right of  residence  in               that building;" Section 12 of the Act prescribes the conditions under  which deemed vacancy shall occur.  The relevant part thereof is as follows :               Section  12   "Deemed vacancy of  building  in               certain  cases  (1) A landlord or tenant of  a               building  shall  be deemed to have  ceased  to               occupy the building or a part thereof if-               (a)   he has substantially removed his effects               therefrom, or               (b)   he has allowed it to be occupied by  any               person who is not a member of his family, or               (c)   in  the case of a residential  building,

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             he as well as members of his family have taken               up  residence, not being temporary  residence,               elsewhere.               (2)   In the case of non-residential building,               where  a  tenant carrying on business  in  the                             building admits a person who is not a member o f               his  family as a partner or a new partner,  as               the case may be, the tenant shall be deemed to               have ceased to occupy the building.               (3)   In  the case of a residential  building,               if  the  tenant or any member  of  his  family               builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state               or gets vacated a residential building in  the               same city, municipality, notified area or town               area  in which the building under  tenancy  is               situate, he shall be deemed to have ceased  to               occupy the building under his tenancy:               Provided  that if the tenant or any member  of               his  family  had built  any  such  residential               building  before the date of  commencement  of               this Act, then such tenant shall be deemed  to               have  ceased to occupy the building under  his               tenancy upon the expiration of a period of one               year from the said date.               Explanation   For  the purposes of  this  sub-               section -               (a)   a   person  shall  be  deemed  to   have               otherwise  acquired a building, if he  is  oc-               cupying  a  public  building  for  residential               purposes as a tenant, allottee or licensee;               (b)   the  expression "any member of  family",               in  relation to a tenant, shall not include  a               person who has neither been normally  residing               with nor is wholly dependent on such tenant.                .................................               (4)   Any building or part which a landlord or               tenant has ceased to occupy within the meaning               of  sub-section  (1), or sub-section  (2),  or               sub-section  (3),  subsection  (3-A)  or  sub-               section (3-B), shall, for the purposes of this               Chapter, be deemed to be vacant. In  view of sub-section (2) of Section 12, in case  of  non- residential building, if the 296 tenant admits a person who is not a member of his family  as a  partner,  the tenant shall be deemed to  have  ceased  to occupy  the  building and by virtue of  sub-section  (4)  of Section 12, such building shall be deemed to be vacated. 6.   Section  25  enjoins that no tenant shall  sub-let  the building under his tenancy and it also prescribes as to what shall amount to a deemed sub-letting               "25.   Prohibition  of  sub-letting   (1)   No               tenant shall sub-let the whole of the building               under his tenancy.               (2)   The  tenant may with the  permission  in               writing  of the landlord and of  the  District                             Magistrate, sub-let a part of the building.               Explanation  For the purposes of this section               (i) where the tenant ceases, within the  meaning               of clause (b) of sub-section (1)    of    sub-               section  (2)  of  Section 12,  to  occupy  the               building  or  any part thereof,  he  shall  be               deemed to have sub-let that building or part;               (ii)  lodging a person in a hotel or a lodging

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             house shall not amount to subletting.  " 7.   In view of explanation (i) of Section   25,  where  the tenant is deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under sub-section (2) of Section 12 aforesaid, he shall be  deemed to have sub-let that building or part thereof Once a  tenant carrying on business in a non-residential building, admits a person  who is not a member of his family as a partner,  the said  tenant  shall be deemed to have ceased to  occupy  the building and by operation of the explanation (i) of  Section 25,  it  shall be deemed that such tenant has  sub-let  that building  or  part  thereof, which shall  be  a  ground  for eviction  of such tenant because of section  20(2)(e)  which specifically says that a suit for eviction of a tenant  from building   after  determination  of  his  tenancy   may   be instituted  on the ground "that the tenant has  sub-let,  in contravention  of  the provisions of Section 25, or  as  the case  may  be, of the old Act the whole or any part  of  the building". 8.   It  may be mentioned that before this Court, there  was no  dispute in respect of the facts stated above.  It is  an admitted position that the premises in question were let out to Sheobux Roy who died in the year 1941 leaving behind five sons.   Later only three of his sons Ganpat Roy, Sampat  Roy and  Sheopat  Roy  carried on their  business  in  the  said premises.  It is also admitted that on 19.8.1976, Ganpat Roy inducted  his  son-in-law,  Swarup Kallash, as  one  of  the partners in the firm "M/s.  B.N. Rama & Co. (Textiles)"  for carrying  on  the business in textile in the  disputed  pre- mises.  The controversy between the parties is in respect of (i)  as  to whether in the facts and  circumstances  of  the case, there shall be a deemed vacancy because of  subsection (2) and sub-section (4) of Section 12; (ii) whether  because of  explanation (i) of Section 25, it shall amount  to  sub- letting within the meaning of Section 20(2)(e)  a ground for eviction  of the respondents; (iii) even if it is held  that because  of the induction of Swarup Kailash as a partner  in the firm, which amounted to a sub-letting within the meaning of  Section 25 of the Act, whether the whole premises  shall be deemed to be vacant. 9.   It cannot be disputed that a son-in- 297 law shall not be deemed to be a member of the family  within the  definition  as  given in the Act  under  Section  3(g). Section 12(2) says that in case of non-residential building, where  tenant  admits a person who is not a  member  of  his family  as  a partner, the tenant shall be  deemed  to  have ceased  to  occupy  the building.  By  induction  of  Swarup Kailash,  the son-in-law of Ganpat Roy, as a partner in  the firm, sub-section (2)    of Section 12 is attracted. 10.  According  to  the learned counsel for  the  respondent tenants,  the  object of sub-section (2) is to  exclude  and restrict  the unauthorised induction of persons as  partners in a firm with primary object to pass on the tenancy to such persons after their induction.  In other words,  sub-section (2)  of  Section 12 imposes a restriction on the  tenant  in sub-letting  the premises or part thereof, by the device  of inducting any person as a partner in the business.  As such, before  it  is  held that the induction  of  Swarup  Kailash amounted to sub-letting of the premises, a finding has to be recorded  that the object of inducting Swarup Kailash  as  a partner  of the firm was, to actually and factually  sub-let the  premises  to  him.  His induction as a  partner  was  a design  and  device to circumvent the  consequence  provided under Section 20(2)(e)  ejectment from the premises. 11.  It  is true that the primary object of sub-section  (2)

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of  Section  12  appears to be to check  and  restrict  sub- letting  of premises or part thereof by the original  tenant by  inducting any person who is not a member of  the  family within the meaning of the Act as a partner in the  business. But the special feature of sub-section (2) of Section 12  is that  there is a deeming clause in the said subsection.   If the  said  sub-section  ha  provided  that  where  a  tenant carrying on business in the building admits a person who  is not a member of his family as a partner, it shall amount  to sub-letting  of  the  premises, then  there  was  scope  for investigation and examination as to whether, in the  process of  inducting such person as a partner in the  business   in fact there has been a sub-letting of the premises.  But sub- section (2) says in clear and unambiguous words that once  a person  who is not a member of the family is admitted  as  a partner in the business by the tenant, ’the tenant shall  be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building’. 12.  On  behalf  of the respondents, it was urged  that  the expression ’deemed’ occurring in sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 1.2 as well as in the explanation (i) of Section  25 should  not  be read as conclusive.  It should  be  read  as ’deemed until the contrary is proved.  Reference was made to the  cases  Gray  v. Kerslake, (1957)  Vol.II  Dominion  Law Reports (2nd Series) page 225 (at p. 239); Robert Batcheller &  Sons. Limited v. Batcheller, (1945) 1  Chancery  Division 169; and Spencer v. Kennedy (1926) 1 Chancery Division  125, where  it was observed that if the word ’deemed’ is held  to be  conclusive,  then  it shall amount to  imputing  to  the Legislature the intention of requiring the Court to hold  as a fact something directly contrary to the true fact.  It was also said that such deemed clauses should be read to mean as required by the statute, until the contrary is proved. 13.  The  role  of a provision in a statute  creating  legal fiction  is by now well settled.  When a Statute  creates  a legal fiction saying that something shall be deemed to  have been  done  which in fact and truth has not been  done,  the Court has to examine and 298 ascertain  as to for what purpose and between  what  persons such  a statutory fiction is to be resorted to.   Thereafter full effect has to be given to such statutory fiction and it has  to be carried to its logical conclusion.  In  the  well known  case  of  East End Dwellings Co.  Ltd.  v.  Finbsbury Borough  Council,  (1952) A.C. 109(B),  Lord  Asquith  while dealing with the provisions of the Town and County  Planning Act, 1947, observed :               "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state               of  affairs as real, you must  surely,  unless               prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real               the  consequences and incidents which, if  the               putative,   state  of  affairs  had  in   fact               existed,  must inevitably have flowed from  or               accompanied it..... The statute says that  you               must  imagine a certain state of  affairs;  it               does  not  say that having done so,  you  must               cause  or  permit your imagination  to  boggle               when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of               that state of affairs." That  statement of law in respect of a statutory fiction  is being  consistently  followed by this Court.   Reference  in this  connection may be made to the case of State Bombay  v. Pandurang  Vinayak  and others, AIR 1953 SC 244 =  1953  SCR 773.   From  the  facts of that case it  shall  appear  that Bombay Building (Control on Erection) Ordinance, 1948  which was applicable to certain areas mentioned in the schedule to

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it,  was extended by a notification to all the areas in  the province in respect of buildings intended to be used for the purposes  of  cinemas.   The  Ordinance  was  repealed   and replaced  by an Act which again extended to areas  mentioned in the schedule with power under sub-section (3) of  Section 1  to extend its operation to other areas.  This Court  held that  the deemed clause in Section 15 of the Act  read  with Section 25 of the Bombay General Clauses Act has to be given full  effect and the expression ’enactment’ in the Act  will cover  the  word ’Ordinance’ occurring in  the  notification which had been issued.  In that connection it was said :               "The   corollary   thus   of   declaring   the               provisions  of  S.25, Bombay  General  Clauses               Act, applicable to the repeal of the ordinance               and of deeming that ordinance an enactment  is               that  wherever the word "ordinance" occurs  in               the notification, that word has to be read  as               an enactment.  " 14.   In  the case of Chief Inspector of Mines  and  another etc. v. Karani Chand Thapar etc., AIR 1961 SC 838 =  1962(1) SCR 9, it was said:               "Were  these  regulations  in  force  on   the               alleged  date  of  contravention?   Certainly,               they were, in consequence of the provisions of               S.24  of  the General Clauses Act.   The  fact               that  these  regulations  were  deemed  to  be               regulations  made under the 1952 Act does  not               in any way affect the position that they  were               laws   in  force  on  the  alleged   date   of               contravention.  The argument that as they were               "regulations"   under   the   1952   Act    in               consequence of a deeming provision, they  were               not  laws  in  force on the  alleged  date  of               contravention is entirely misconceived." 15.  In the case of M/s J.K Cotton Spinning  and     Weaving Mills Ltd. and another v.     Union of India and others, AIR 1988 SC   191 = 1988(1) SCR 700, it was said:               "It  is well settled that a deeming  provision               is  an admission of the non-existence  of  the               fact  deemed.   Therefore,  in  view  of   the               deeming provisions under Explanations to  Rr.9               and 49, although the goods which are  produced               or manufac-               299               tured  at  an intermediate stage  and,  there-               after, consumed or utilised in the  integrated               process   for  the  manufacture   of   another               commodity  is  not actually removed  shall  be               construed   and  regarded  as  removed.    The               Legislature  is  quite competent  to  enact  a               deeming provision for the purpose of  assuming               the existence of a fact which does not  really               exist." 16.  Recently in the case of M. Venugopal v. The  Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra  Pradesh, & Anr., JTF 1994(1) SC 281 = 1994  (2)  SCC 323  after referring to the case of East End  Dwellings  Co. Ltd.  v. Finsbury Borough Council (supra) it was  said  that when one is bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, he must surely, unless prohibited from doing so,  also imagine  as real the consequences and incidents which,  must inevitably have flowed. 17.  When  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  12  provides  that whenever a tenant carrying on business in a building  admits a  person, who is not a member of his family, as a  partner,

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the  tenant  shall be deemed to have ceased  to  occupy  the building, full effect has to be given to the mandate of  the Legislature.   There is no escape from the  conclusion  that such   tenant  has  ceased  to  occupy  the  building.    No discretion is left to the Court to enquire or investigate as to  what  was the object of such tenant  while  inducting  a person as partner who was not the member of his family.   It can be said that the aforesaid statutory provision  requires the   Court   to  come  to  the  conclusion  that   by   the contravention made by the tenant, such tenant has ceased  to occupy  the  building.   The framers of  the  Act  have  not stopped only at the stage of Section 12(2) but have  further provided  in  Section  25,  Explanation  (i)  another  legal fiction  saying that where the tenant ceases to  occupy  the building within the meaning of 11 sub-section (2) of Section 12  ’he  shall be deemed to have sub-let  that  building  or part’.   In view of the three deeming clauses introduced  in sub-section (2) of Section 12, sub-section (4) of Section 12 and  Explanation (i) to Section 25, no scope has  been  left for  the  Courts  to  examine and  consider  the  facts  and circumstances  of  any particular case, as to what  was  the object  of admitting a person who is not the member  of  the family, as partner and as to whether, in fact, the  premises or part thereof have been sub-let to such person. 18. It was then urged that if such strict interpretation  is given  to  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  12,  then  similar interpretation  should be given to Section 12(1)(b)  and  to Section  12(3) of the Act which prescribe  other  conditions under  which  the tenant shall be deemed to have  ceased  to occupy  the building under his tenancy.  It was pointed  out that  sub-Section (1)(b) of Section 12 says that a  landlord or  tenant of a building shall be deemed to have  ceased  to occupy  the building or a part thereof if he has allowed  it to  be  occupied by any person who is not a  member  of  his family.  According to the learned counsel for respondents if the daughter-in-law or son-in-law of the landlord or  tenant comes  to  reside  in the building  in  occupation  of  such landlord  or tenant, then it shall be deemed to have  ceased to be in occupation of such landlord or tenant, which  shall lead to an absurd result.  Clause (b) of sub-section (1)  of Section  12  shall not be applicable to such  occupation  by daughter-in-law or son-in-law or even outsider with the ten- ant   himself   The  words  ’allowed’   and   ’occupy’   are significant.  The landlord or the 300 tenant,  as the case may be, shall be deemed to have  ceased to occupy the building only if he has allowed it to be occu- pied  by any person who is not a member of his family.   The words "allowed to be occupied" indicate that the  possession of  such  building has been given to a person who is  not  a member  of the family.  It shall not be attracted  when  any person  who  is not a member of the family resides  in  such building  either  along with the landlord  or  the  original tenant.   If the landlord or the tenant allows  any  person, who is not a member of the family within the meaning of  the Act to occupy the premises, with the object that such person shall occupy such premises in his own rights, in that event, clause  (b)  of  sub-section  (1) of  Section  12  shall  be attracted. 19. So far as sub-section (3) of Section 12 is concerned, it says that in case of residential building, if the tenant  or any member of his family builds or otherwise acquires, in  a vacant  state or gets vacated a residential building in  the same  city,  municipality, notified area or  town  area,  in which  the  building under tenancy is  situate,  the  tenant

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"shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy".  It was submitted that if full effect is given to the deeming clause, then in a house where the tenant  was living  with  his  four sons, one of his  sons  getting  any accommodation  in  the same city or town, the  tenant  along with his remaining three sons have to be evicted which shall lead to an absurd result.  Although we are not concerned  in the  present  case  with the scope  of  sub-section  (3)  of Section  12, but in order to appreciate the submission  made on  behalf  of the respondents, we may point out  that  sub- section (3) of Section 12, does not conceive that if one  of the sons living with the tenant, who is not wholly dependent on  such tenant, acquires any other residential building  in the  same city or town, then even the original tenant  shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building in question. This  is apparent from Explanation (b) to  said  sub-section (3) which says:               "the  expression  "any member of  family",  in               relation  to  a tenant, shall  not  include  a               person who has neither been normally  residing               with nor is wholly dependent on such tenant." In  view  of  the  explanation  any  member  of  the  family mentioned in sub-section (3) shall not include a person  who has  neither  been  normally residing  with  nor  is  wholly dependent  on such tenant.  As such, if a son of the  tenant who is not wholly dependent on such tenant acquires or  gets any residential building in the same city or town, there  is no  question of the tenant deeming to have ceased to  occupy the building under sub-section (3) of Section 12. 20.  The Act with which we are concerned is a Statute  which purports  to regulate the relationship between the  landlord and the tenant and in many respects contains provisions  for achieving that object which are different from the  Transfer of  Properties Act.  As such it was open to the  framers  of the Act to look to the interest of the tenant as well as the landlord and to prescribe conditions under which the  tenant can continue to occupy a building and having contravened any of the conditions prescribed shall be deemed to have  ceased to occupy the building. 21.  On  the  question as to whether  any  contravention  by Ganpat Roy, one of the 301 heirs of Sheobux Roy, will be a ground for eviction from the whole premises, the High Court was of the opinion that after the  death of Sheobux Roy, his five sons became  tenants  in common  and  not joint tenants of the  premises  because  of which  contravention  by one of the tenants shall not  be  a ground  for  eviction,  so  far  the  other  co-tenants  are concerned.  In support of this finding, reliance was  placed by  the  High  Court on a judgment of this  Court  in  Mohd. Azeem v. District Judge, Aligarh and Ors., 1985(3) SCR  906. From  the  facts of that case it appears that  the  original tenant  had died in 1969 leaving behind a widow, three  sons and  a  daughter.   In connection with  sub-section  (3)  of Section  12,  after  making  reference  to  the  Full  Bench Judgment of Allahabad High Court it was said:               "The  Full Bench proceeded on the  basis  that               the  heirs become joint tenants  and  answered               the main problem by saying that if any  member               of  the family of such joint tenants built  or               acquired  a house in vacant state the  tenancy               would  be deemed to have ceased.   In  framing               these questions for reference and in answering               the  referred  questions,  the  definition  of               ’tenant’ was lost sight of.  All the heirs  as

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             normally  reside with the deceased  tenant  in               the  building at the time of his death  become               tenants.  The definition does not warrant  the               view that all the heirs will become a body  of               tenants  to give rise to the concept of  joint               tenancy.   Each  heir satisfying  the  further               qualification  in s.3(a)(1) of the Act in  his               own right becomes a tenant and when we come to               s.    12(3) of the Act, the words "the  tenant               or    any member of his family" will refer  to               the  heir  who has become a tenant  under  the               statutory   definition  and  members  of   his               family." 22.       However, this Court in the case of H.C. Pandey  v. G.C.  Paul, 1989(3) SCC 77, in connection with the same  Act said:               "It  is now well settled that on the death  of               the original tenant, subject to any  provision               to the contrary either negativing or  limiting               the succession, the tenancy rights devolve  on               the   heirs  of  the  deceased  tenant.    The               incidence of the tenancy are the same as those               enjoyed  by  the  original tenant.   It  is  a               single  tenancy which devolves on  the  heirs.               There is no division of the premises or of the               rent payable therefor. That is the position as               between  the  landlord and the  heirs  of  the               deceased  tenant.  In other words,  the  heirs               succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants." 23.  The  attention of the learned Judges  constituting  the Bench  in the case of H.C. Pandey v. G.C. Paul  (supra)  was not drawn to the view expressed in the case of Mohd.   Azeem v. District Judge, Aligarh (supra).  There appears to be  an apparent conflict between the two judgments.  It was on that account  that the present appeal was referred to a Bench  of three Judges.  According to us, it is difficult to hold that after  the  death of the original tenant  his  heirs  become tenant  in common and each one of the heirs shall be  deemed to  be an independent tenant in his own right.  This can  be examined with reference to Section 20(2) which contains  the grounds  on  which a tenant can be evicted.  Clause  (a)  of Section 20(2) says that if the tenant is in arrears of  rent for  not  less than four months, and has failed to  pay  the same  to  the  landlord within one month from  the  date  of service upon him of a notice of demand, then that shall be a ground  on  which  the landlord can  institute  a  suit  for eviction.   Take  a case where the original tenant  who  was paying the rent dies leaving behind four sons.  It need  not be pointed out that after the death of the 302 original  tenant, his heirs must be paying the rent  jointly through  one  of  his sons.  Now if there is  a  default  as provided  in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20  in respect of the payment of rent, each of the sons will take a stand that he has not committed such default and it is  only the  other  sons who have failed to pay the  rent.   If  the concept  of  heirs  becoming independent tenants  is  to  be introduced, there should be a provision under the Act to the effect  that each of the heirs shall pay  the  proportionate rent  and in default thereto such heir or heirs alone  shall be  liable  to  be  evicted.  There is  no  scope  for  such division  of liability to pay the rent which was being  paid by  the  original  tenant, among the heirs  as  against  the landlord  what  the  heirs do inter se,  is  their  concern. Similarly,  so  far  as ground (b)  of  sub-section  (2)  of

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Section  20,  which  says that if the  tenant  has  wilfully caused  or permitted to be caused substantial damage to  the building,  then  the tenant shall be liable to  be  evicted; again,  if one of the sons of the original  deceased  tenant wilfully  causes  substantial damage to  the  building,  the landlord  cannot  get possession of the  premises  from  the heirs of the deceased tenant since the damage was not caused by  all  of them.  Same will be the position in  respect  of clause  (c) which is another ground for eviction,  i.e.  the tenant has without the permission in writing of the landlord made  or  permitted  to be made, any  such  construction  or structural  alteration  in the building which is  likely  to diminish  its value or utility or to disfigure it.  Even  if the  said ground is established by the landlord,  he  cannot get  possession  of the building in  which  construction  or structural alterations have been made diminishing its  value and utility, unless he establishes that all the heirs of the deceased  tenant had done so.  Clause (d) of subsection  (2) of  Section 20 prescribes another ground for eviction   that if  the  tenant has without the consent in  writing  of  the landlord,  used it for a purpose other than the purpose  for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the building or  has been convicted under any law for the time being in force  of an  offence of using the building or allowing it to be  used for  illegal  or immoral purposes; the landlord  cannot  get possession  of the building unless he establishes  the  said ground  individually against all the heirs.  We are  of  the view that if it is held that after the death of the original tenant,  each of his heirs becomes independent tenant,  then as  a corollary it has also to be held that after the  death of the original tenant, the otherwise single tenancy  stands split  up  into several tenancies and the landlord  can  get possession of the building only if he establishes one or the other  ground  mentioned in sub-section (2)  of  Section  20 against  each of the heirs of original tenant.  One  of  the well  settled rules of interpretation of statute is that  it should be interpreted in a manner which does not lead to  an absurd situation. 24.  It appears to us, in the case of H. C. Pandey v. G.  C. Paul  (supra) it was rightly said by this Court  that  after the  death of the original tenant, subject to any  provision to the contrary, the tenancy rights devolve on the heirs  of the deceased tenants jointly.  The incidence of the  tenancy are the same as those enjoyed by the original tenant.  It is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs and there is no division of the premises or of the rent payable therefor and the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. 25.  In the case of Smt.Gian Devi Anand 303 v.   Jeevan  Kumar  and  others, 1985 (Suppl.)  SCR  1,  the Constitution  Bench of this Court in connection  with  Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 said:               "The  heirs  of  the deceased  tenant  in  the               absence  of any provision in the Rent  Act  to               the  contrary will step into the  position  of               the  deceased  tenant and all the  rights  and               obligations  of the deceased tenant  including               the protection afforded to the deceased tenant               under the Act will devolve on the heirs of the               deceased  tenant.  As the protection  afforded               by   the   Rent   Act  to   a   tenant   after               determination of the tenancy and to his  heirs               on  the death of such tenant is a creation  of               the Act for the benefit of the tenants, it  is               open  to  the Legislature which  provides  for

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             such protection to make appropriate provisions               in  the  Act  with regard to  the  nature  and               extent  of  the benefit and protection  to  be               enjoyed and the manner in which the same is to               be  enjoyed.   If the  Legislature  makes  any               provision  in the Act limiting or  restricting               the  benefit and the nature of the  protection               to  be  enjoyed in a specified manner  by  any               particular  class  of heirs  of  the  deceased               tenant  on  any  condition  laid  down   being               fulfilled,  the benefit of the protection  has               necessarily to be enjoyed on the fulfilment of               the condition in the manner and to the  extent               stipulated in the Act." 26.The  framers  of  the Act have  clearly  expressed  their intention  in  Sections 12, 20 and 25 while  protecting  the tenant  from  eviction except on the  grounds  mentioned  in Section 20, that after the death of the original tenant  his heirs  will  be deemed to be holding the premises  as  joint tenants,  and for any breach committed by any of such  joint tenants,  all  the  heirs of the  original  tenant  have  to suffer.  They cannot take a plea that unless the grounds for eviction  mentioned  in sub-section (2) of  Section  20  are established  individually  against each one  of  them,  they cannot be evicted from the premises in question. 27.It  was then submitted that although Swarup Kailash,  the son-in-law  of Ganpat Roy may not be held to be a member  of the  family  within the meaning of the definition  given  in Section 3(g), nonetheless he shall be deemed to be a  member of  the  family  as the  expression  ’family’  is  generally understood, and by admitting a son-in-law or daughter-in-law as a partner, it shall not amount to sub-letting within  the meaning of the Act.  It was pointed out that Section 3 opens with  the words "In this Act, unless the  context  otherwise requires"  and as such the definition of the  family  should not  be strictly construed as given in Section 3(g)  and  in the  context of the present case a wider  interpretation  to the  expression  ’family’ should be given so as  to  include even   the  sons-in-law  and  daughters-in-law.    In   this connection,  reliance  was placed on the  judgment  of  this Court  in the case of Pushpa Devi and others v. Milkhi  Ram, 1990(2)  SCC 134.  As has already been pointed out  that  in the Act with which we arc concerned, wherever the expression ’member of the family’ has been used, it is consistent  with the  definition of ’family’ given in Section 3(g) and  there is no scope for interpreting that expression in a  different manner  in connection with subsection (2) of Section  12  of the Act.  Once the finding of the High Court that after  the death  of  Sheobux Roy, his sons became  tenants  in  common instead  of  joint  tenants, is  reversed  for  the  reasons mentioned  above, the result will be that it has to be  held that because of the admission of Swamp Kailash, the  son-in- law  of Ganpat Roy, as a partner in the business, there  has been a deemed vacancy 304 of  the premises within the meaning of subsections  (2)  and (4) of Section 12 and it shall amount to sub-letting  within the  meaning  of  Section 25, Explanation (i),  which  is  a ground  for eviction under subsection 2(e) of Section 20  of the  Act.  The judgment in Mohd Azeem’s case, does  not  lay down  the  correct law and on the other hand  we  hold  that H.C.Pandey’s case (supra) lays down the correct law. 28.  In the result, the appeal is allowed. The    judgment of the High Court allowing the     Writ   Petition  of   the respondent-tenants  is set aside and the orders of the  Rent

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Controller  and  Eviction  Officer  are  restored.   In  the circumstances  of  the case, there shall be no order  as  to costs. 29.  However,  respondents  shall not be  evicted  from  the premises  in  question upto 30th June, 1995,  if  they  file usual  undertaking before this Court within four weeks  from today. 306