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PETITIONER: D.K. YADAV

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: J.M.A. INDUSTRIES LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/05/1993

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. KULDIP SINGH (J) RAMASWAMI, V. (J) II

CITATION:  1993 SCR  (3) 930        1993 SCC  (3) 259  JT 1993 (3)   617        1993 SCALE  (3)39

ACT: % Constitution of India, 1950: Articles  14 and 21-Right of private employer  to  terminate service under certified standing order, without holding  any domestic enquiry--Whether violative of principles of natural justice  and fundamental rights--Held: Since termination  of service results in deprivation of right to livelihood, it is to be effected in accordance with just, fair and  reasonable procedure. Article  141-Precedents-Reconsideration of on  new  grounds- Whether & when permissible. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: Sections  25F, 25FF and 25FFF-Retrenchment  under  Certified Standing  Orders-Whether  attracts  principles  of   natural justice-Whether  employer’s  action  to be  fair,  just  and reasonable. Section 2(oo)--Retrenchment--Meaning and scope of. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946: Section  5--Certified  Standing  Orders-Absence  from  duty- Deemed termination of service without enquiry or opportunity of  hearing--Validity  of--Whether  attract  principles   of natural justice and Articles 14 and 21 of the  Constitution- Whether principles of natural justice to be read into clause 13 (2) (iv)    of Certified Standing Orders. Administrative Law: Rule  of  natural  justice--Aim  of--Whether  principles  of natural justice applicable to both quasi-judicial as well as administrative action. 931

HEADNOTE: The  respondent-company terminated the appellant’s  services on the ground that since he had willingly absented from duty continuously  for  more than 5 days from December  3,  1980, without leave or prior information of intimation or previous permission  of  the management, he had been deemed  to  have left the service of the company on his own and lost the lien and  the appointment with effect from December 3, 1980.   It relied on clause 13(2) (iv) of the Certified Standing  Order in support of its action.

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The  appellant’s plea that despite his reporting to duty  on December  3, 1980 and every day continuously thereafter,  he was prevented entry at the gate and was not allowed to  sign the  attendance register and that he was not   permitted  to join duty without assigning any reasons, was not accepted. The  Labour Court upheld the termination order as legal  and valid.   It held that the appellant had failed to prove  his case,  that the action of the respondent was  in  accordance with  the Standing Orders and it was not a  termination  nor retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act and that  the appellant  in terms of Standing Orders lost his lien on  his appointment and was not entitled to reinstatement. Allowing the appeal of the employee, this Court HELD:1.1.  The action of the management in  terminating  the appellant’s  service  is  violative  of  the  principles  of natural  justice.   Under clause 13 (2)  (iv)  of  Certified Standing  Orders,  on  completion of  eight  calendar  days’ absence  from  duty  an employee shall  be  deemed  to  have abandoned the services and lost his lien on his appointment. Thereafter,  the management is empowered to strike  off  the name  from the Muster Rolls.  But it is not correct  to  say that  expiry of eight days’ absence from duty  brings  about automatic loss of lien on the post and nothing more need  be done  by  the management to pass an  order  terminating  the service  and per force termination is automatic.  The  prin- ciples  of  natural justice must be read into  the  Standing Order   No.  13  (2)  (iv).   Otherwise,  it  would   become arbitrary, unjust and unfair violating Article 14. Keshwanand Bharti v. Union of India, [1973] Suppl.  S.C.R. 1 and  State Bank of India v. Workmen of State Bank  of  India and Anr. [1991] 1 S.C.C. 13, referred to. 1.2. In  the instant case,admittedly,the management did  not conduct  any  domestic enquiry nor gave  the  appellant  any opportunity to put forth his case. 932 The  Labour  Court  did  not  record  any  findings  on  the appellant’s  plea  that  despite his reporting  to  duty  on December 3,1980 and on all subsequent days and readiness to, join  duty he was prevented from reporting to duty,  nor  he was permitted to sign the attendance register, but held that the  management had power under clause 13 of  the  Certified Standing  Orders to terminate the service of the  appellant. Under  the circumstances, the award of the Labour  Court  is set  aside.  The respondent should reinstate  the  appellant forthwith with 50 per cent of the back wages. 2.1. Certified Standing Orders have statutory force which do not  expressly exclude the application of the principles  of natural  justice.  Conversely, the Industrial  Disputes  Act made exceptions for the application of principles of natural justice by necessary implication from specific provisions in the  Act like Sections 25F, 25FF, 25FFF etc.  The  need  for temporary  hands to cope with sudden and temporary spurt  of work  demands appointment temporarily, to a service of  such temporary workmen to meet such exigencies and as soon as the work or service is completed, the need to dispense with  the services may arise.  In that situation, on compliance of the provisions  of Section 25F resort could be had  to  retrench the  employees in conformity therewith.  Particular  statute or  statutory rules or orders having statutory  flavour  may also  exclude the application of the principles  of  natural justice  expressly  or by necessary implication.   In  other respects,  the  principles of natural  justice  would  apply unless  the employer should justify the exclusion  on  given special and exceptional exigencies. Col.   J.N. Sinha v. Union of India & Anr., [1971] 1  S.C.R.

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791, relied on. 3.1. Application  of the principles of natural justice  that no  man should be condemned unheard intends to  prevent  the authority  to  act arbitrarily affecting the rights  of  the concerned  person.   No decision must be  taken  which  will affect the right of any person without first being  informed of  the case and be given him/her an opportunity of  putting forward his/her case.  An order involving civil consequences must he made consistently with the rules of natural justice. It  is  not  so much to act judicially but  to  act  fairly, namely,  the  procedure  adopted  must  he  just,  fair  and reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. 3.2. The  procedure  prescribed for depriving  a  person  of livelihood  must  meet the challenge of Article  14  of  the Constitution  and such law would be liable to be  tested  on the anvil of Article 14.  The procedure prescribed by a 933 statute  or statutory rule or rules or orders affecting  the civil  rights or result in civil consequences would have  to answer  the  requirement  of the  Article.   The  manner  of exercise  of the power and its impact on the rights  of  the person  affected would be in conformity with the  principles of  natural justice.  Article 14 has a pervasive  processual potency and versatile quality, equalitarian it its soul  and allergic  to  discriminatory  dictates.   Equality  is   the antithesis  of arbitrariness.  Therefore, the principles  of natural  justice  are part of Article 14 and  the  procedure prescribed  by law must be right, just, fair and  reasonable and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. Mohinder   Singh   Gill  &  Anr.  v.  The   Chief   Election Commissioner & Ors. [1978] 2 S.C.R. 272; State of Orissa  v. Dr.  (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors., [1967] 2 S.C.R. 625;  State of  West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] S.C.R.  284  and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621, relied on. Blak’s law Dictionary 4th Edn. p. 1487; referred to. 4.   Article 21 of the Constitution clubs life with liberty, dignity of person with means of livelihood without which the glorious  content of dignity of person would be  reduced  to animal  existence.  When it is interpreted that  the  colour and  content  of  procedure established by law  must  be  in conformity with the minimum fairness and processual justice, it   would   relieve   legislative   callousness   despising opportunity  of  being  heard  and  fair  opportunities   of defence.   The  order of termination of the  service  of  an employee/workman   visits   with   civil   consequences   of jeopardising not only his/her livelihood but also career and livelihood  of  dependents.  Therefore,  before  taking  any action putting an end to the tenure of an  employee/workman, fair  play  requires that a reasonable  opportunity  to  put forth  his  case  is given and  domestic  enquiry  conducted complying with the principles of natural justice. Delhi  Transport  Corpn. v. D. T.C.  Mazdoor  Congress,  and Ors., [1991] Suppl. 1 S.C.C. 600, relied on. 5.1. The  aim  of the rule of natural justice is  to  secure justice  or to put it negatively to prevent  miscarriage  of justice.  These rules operate in the area not covered by law validly made or expressly excluded. 5.2. There  can be no distinction between  a  quasi-judicial function  and an administrative function for the purpose  of principles   of   natural   justice.   The   aim   of   both administrative inquiry as well as the quasi-judicial enquiry is to 934 arrive, at a just decision and if a rule of natural  justice

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is calculated to secure justice or to put it negatively,  to prevent  miscarriage  of  justice,  it  must  logically   be applicable both to quasi-judicial enquiry and administrative enquiry and not only to quasi-judicial enquiry. A.   K.  Kriapak and Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [1969]  2 S.C.C. 262, relied on. 6.1. An  authoritative  law laid after considering  all  the relevant provisions and the previous precedents is no longer open to be recanvassed on new grounds or reasons that may be put  forth  in  its  support  unless  the  Court  deemed  it appropriate to refer to a larger bench in the larger  public interest to advance the cause of justice. Ambika  Prasad  Mishra  v. State of U. P. &  Ors.  [1980]  3 S.C.C. 7 10 and Keshwanand Bharti v. Union of India,  [1973] Suppl.  S.C.R. 1, relied on. 6.2. The Constitution Bench in fact went into the self  same question  visa-vis  the right of the employer to  fall  back upon the relevant provision of the Certified Standing Orders to   terminate   the  service   of   the   workman/employee. Therefore,  it is not correct to say that since the  present appeal  was deleted from the Constitution Bench to be  dealt with  separately,  the  finding of  the  Constitution  Bench deprived  the respondent of putting forth the plea based  on clause  13  of the Certified Standing Order to  support  the action in question and the respondent is entitled to canvass afresh  the  correctness  of the view  of  the  Constitution Bench. 7.   The  definition of ’retrenchment’ in Section  2(oo)  of the  Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947 is a  comprehensive  one intended to cover any action of the management to put an end to the employment of an employee for any reason whatsoever. Punjab  Land  Development  and  Reclamation  Corpn.    Ltd., Chandigarh  v. Presiding Officer, Labour  Court,  Chandigarh and Ors., [1990] 3 S.C.C. 632; State Bank of India v. Sri N. Sundara  Mani,  [1976] 3 S.C.R 160; Delhi  Cloth  &  General Mills Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherjee & Ors., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 591;  Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer,  Labour Court,  [1977]  1 S.C.R. 586: Robert D’ Souza  v.  Executive Engineer Southern Railway, and Anr., [1982] 1 S.C.C. 645 and H.D.  Singh  v.  Reserve  Bank of India  &  Ors.,  [1985]  4 S.C.C.201, referred to. 935

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 166 (NL)  of 1983. From. the Award dated 19.4.1982 of the Labour Court, Haryana at Faridabad in Reference No. 227 of 198 1. R.K.  Jain, R.P. Singh, Aseem Malhotra, Ashish Verma,  Manoj Goel, R.K. Khanna and Ms. Abha R. Sharma for the Appellant. Dr.  Anand Prakash,  Ghosh for M/s Fox Mandal & Co. and  Som Mandal for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K.   RAMASWAMY,  J. This appeal by special leave is  against the  award of the Labour Court, Haryana at  Faridabad  dated April  19, 1982 which was published in the State Gazette  on August 10, 1982.It upheld the termination of the appellant’s service  as legal and valid.  The respondent, by its  letter dated December 12, 1980 which was received by the  appellant on December 19, 1980, intimated that the appellant  wilfully absented  from duty continuously for more than 8  days  from December  3,  1980  without leave or  prior  information  or intimation  or previous permission from the management  and,

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therefore,  "deemed to have left the service of the  company on  your own account and lost your lien and the  appointment with  effect  from  December 3, 1980."  In  support  thereof reliance  was placed on clause 13 (2) (iv) of its  Certified Standing  Order.   The appellant averred  that  despite  his reporting   to  duty  on  December  3,  1980  and   everyday continuously  thereafter he was prevented entry at the  gate and he was not allowed to sign the attendance register.   He pleaded  that  he  was not permitted to  join  duty  without assigning  any reasons.  His letter of December 3, 1980  was marked  herein  as  Annexure ’A’ wherein  he  explained  the circumstances  in which he was prevented to join duty.   The Tribunal  found that the appellant had failed to  prove  his case.   The action of the respondent is in  accordance  with the  standing  Orders  and  it  is  not  a  termination  nor retrenchment  under  the Industrial Disputes Act,  1947  for short ’the Act’.  The appellant in terms of standing  orders lost  his lien on his appointment and so is not entitled  to reinstatement. Clause 13 (2) (iv) standing order reads thus:               "If   a   workman   remains   absent   without               sanctioned leave or beyond the period of leave               originally  granted or subsequently  extended,               he shall lose his lien on his               936               appointment unless.               (a)   he returns within 3 calander days of the               commencement  of the absence of the expiry  of               leave   originally  granted  or   subsequently               extended as the case may be; and               (b)   explains  to  the  satisfaction  of  the                             manager/management the reason of his absence o r               his  inability to return on the expiry of  the               leave,  as  the  case may.   The  workman  not               reporting  for duty within 8 calander days  as               mentioned  above,  shall  be  deemed  to  have               automatically abandoned the services and  lost               his  lien on his appointment.  His name  shall               be struck off from the Muster Rolls in such an               eventuality." A  reading thereof does indicate that if a  workman  remains absent without sanction of leave or beyond the period of the leave  originally  granted  or  subsequently  extended   the employee  loses his lien on employment unless he returns  to duty  within eight calander days of the commencement of  the absence or the expiry of leave either originally granted  or subsequently  extended.   He  has  to  give  a  satisfactory explanation  to  the Manager/Management of his  reasons  for absence or inability to return to the duty on the expiry  of the  leave.  On completion of eight calander  days’  absence from duty he shall be deemed to have abandoned the  services and  lost  his  lien on  his  appointment.   Thereafter  the management  has been empowered to strike off the  name  from the Muster Rolls. Section  2(oo) of the Act defines ’Retrenchment’  means  the termination by the employer of the service of a workman  for any  reason  whatsoever,  otherwise  than  as  a  punishment inflicted  by  way  of disciplinary  action,  but  does  not include-               (a) voluntary retirement of the workman, or               (b)   retirement  of the workman  on  reaching               the  age of superannuation of the contract  of               employment   between  the  employer  and   the               workman  concerned contains a  stipulation  in

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             that behalf, or               (c)   termination of the service of a  workman               on the ground of continued ill health." Section  25F prescribes mandatory procedure to  be  followed before  the   retrenchment  becomes  valid  and  legal   and violation thereof visits with invalida- 937 tion of the action with consequential results. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh  v. Presiding Officer, Labour  Court,  Chandigarh and Ors., [1990] 3 SCC 632 the Constitution Bench considered the scope of the word ’retrenchment’ defined by s.2(oo)  and held  in para 71 at page 716 that "analysing the  definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo) we find that termination by the employer of the service of a workman would not otherwise have  covered  the  cases excluded in Clauses  (a)  and  (b) namely, voluntary retirement and retirement on reaching  the stipulated age of retirement or on the grounds of  continued ill  health.  There would be no violational element  of  the employer.  Their express exclusion implies that those  would otherwise  have been included".  In para 77 at page  719  it was  further  held  that  "right of  the  employer  and  the contract  of  employment has been  effected  by  introducing Section  2(oo)".   The  contention  of  the  management   to terminate  the  service of an employee under  the  certified standing  Orders and under the contracts of  employment  was negatived holding that the right of the management has  been effected by introduction of s. 2(oo) and s. 25F of the  Act. The  second  view was that the right as such  has  not  been effected  or  taken  away, but  only  an  additional  social obligation has been imposed on the employer to abide by  the mandate  of  s. 25F of the Act to tide  over  the  financial difficulty  which subserves the social policy.   This  court relied  on the maxim-Stat pro ratione valuntas  populi;  the will  of  the  people  stands in  place  of  a  reason.   In paragraph  82  at  page 722 this court  concluded  that  the definition in s.2(oo) of the Act of retrenchment means  "the termination by the employer of the service of a workman  for any reason whatsoever except those expressly excluded in the section".   Same  view was taken by three benches  of  three Judges  of  this  Court in State Bank of  India  v.  Sri  N. Sundara Mani; [1976] 3 SCR 160 ; Delhi Cloth & General Mills Lid.  v. Shambhu Nath Mukherjee & Ors [1978] 1 SCR  591  and Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer.  Labour Court [1977]  1  SCR 586 and two benches of two judges  in  Robert D’Souza  v.  Executive Engineer, Southern Railway  and  Anr. [1982]  1 SCC 645 and H. D. Singh v. Reserve Bank  of  India and Ors. [1985] 4 SCC 201 took the same view.  Therefore, we find force in the contention of Sri R. K. lain, the  learned Senior  counsel  for  the  appellant  that  the   definition ’retrenchment’ in S.2(oo) is a comprehensive one intended to cover  any  action of the management to put an  end  to  the employment  of  an employee for any reason  whatsoever.   We need  not, however, rest our conclusion on this point as  in our  considered  view  it  could be  decided  on  the  other contention raised by Sri Jain that the order is violative of the  principles of natural justice.  We are  impressed  with that  argument.  Before dealing with it, it is necessary  to dispose  of  inter related contentions raised by  Dr.  Anand Prakash. 938 The  contention of Dr. Anand Prakash that since this  appeal was  deleted  from the constitution bench to be  dealt  with separately,  the finding of the constitution bench  deprived the respondent of putting forth the contention based on  Cl.

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13  of  the  certified standing order  to  support  impugned action and the respondent is entitled to canvass afresh  the correctness of the view of the constitution bench is  devoid of force.  It is settled law that an authoritative law  laid after  considering  all  the  relevant  provisions  and  the previous precedents, it is no longer open to be  recanvassed the same on new grounds or reasons that may be put forth  in its support unless the court deemed appropriate to refer  to a larger bench in the larger public interest to advance  the cause of justice.  The constitution bench in fact went  into the  self same question vis-a-vis the right of the  employer to  fall back upon the relevant provision of  the  certified standing   Orders   to   terminate  the   service   of   the workman/employee.  By operation of S. 2(oo) the right of the employer under Cl.13(2) (iv), and the contract of employment has  been  effected.  Moreover in Ambika  Prasad  Mishra  v. State  of U.P. and Ors., [1980] 3 SCC 719 at 72-23 para 5  & 6.  A  constitution bench held that every new  discovery  or argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel  reconsideration of  a  binding precedent.  It does not  lose  its  authority ’merely’   because   it  was  badly   argued,   inadequately considered  and  fallaciously reasoned.  In  that  case  the ratio  of this court on Art. 31A decided by 13 Judges  bench in  Keshwanand Bharti v. Union of India [1973]  Suppl.   SCR was sought to be reopened but this court negatived the same. His contention that expiry of eight days’ absence from  duty brings about automatic loss of lien on the post and  nothing more  need  be  done  by the management  to  pass  an  order terminating  the  service  and  per  force  termination   is automatic,  bears  no  substance.   The  constitution  bench specifically held that the right of the employer given under the  standing Orders gets effected by  statutory  operation. In  Robert  D’ Souza’s case (supra) in para  7,  this  court rejected  the  contention  that  on  expiry  of  leave   the termination  of  service is automatic  and  nothing  further could  be  done.  It was further held that striking  of  the name  from  the  rolls for unauthorised  absence  from  duty amounted to termination of service and absence from duty for 8 consequitive days amounts to misconduct and termination of service on such grounds without complying with minimum prin- ciples  of  natural  justice would  not  be  justified.   In Shambhunath’s case three Judges bench held that striking  of the name of the workman for absence of leave itself amounted to  retrenchment.  In H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India  & Ors. (supra), this court held that striking of the name from the rolls amounts to an arbitrary action.  In State Bank  of India v. Workmen of State Bank of India and Anr.[1991] 1 SCC 13,  a  two judge bench of this court to which  one  of  us, K.R.S.,J.  was  a  member  was to  consider  the  effect  of discharge on one month’s notice or pay in 939 lieu  thereof.   It  was held that it was  not  a  discharge simplicitor  or  a  simple termination of  service  but  one camouflaged  for serious misconduct.  This court lifted  the veil  and looked beyond the apparent tenor of the order  and its  effect.  It was held that the action was not  valid  in law. The  principle  question is whether the impugned  action  is violative of principles of natural justice.  In A.K. Kriapak and  Ors.  v.  Union of India & Ors., [1969]  2  SCC  262  a Constitution  bench of this court held that the  distinction between   quasi  judicial  and  administrative   order   has gradually  become  thin.   Now it  is  totally  clipsed  and obliterated.  The aim of the rule of the natural justice  is to  secure  justice  or  to put  it  negatively  to  prevent

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miscarriage of justice.  These rules operate in the area not covered by law validly made or expressly excluded as held in Col.  J.N. Sinha v. Union of India & Anr. [1971] 1 SCR  791. It  is  settled  law that  certified  standing  orders  have statutory   force  which  do  not  expressly   exclude   the application   of   the  principles   of   natural   justice. Conversely  the Act made exceptions for the  application  of principles  of  natural justice necessary  implication  from specific  provisions  in the Act like Ss.25F;  25FF;  25FFF; etc,  the need for temporary hands to cope with  sudden  and temporary spurt of work demands appointment temporarily to a service  of such temporary workmen to meet  such  exigencies and  as soon as the work or service are completed, the  need to dispense with the services may arise.  In that situation, on  compliance of the provisions of s. 25F resort  could  be had  to  retrench  the  employees  in  conformity  therewith particular  statute  or  statutory rules  or  orders  having statutory  flavour may also exclude the application  of  the principles  of  natural justice expressly  or  by  necessary implication.   In other respects the principles  of  natural justice  would apply unless the employer should justify  its exclusion on given special and exceptional exigencies. The  cardinal point that has to be borne in mind,  in  every case,  is  whether  the  person  concerned  should  have   a reasonable  opportunity  of  presenting  his  case  and  the authority   should  act  fairly,  justly,   reasonably   and impartially.  It is not so much to act judicially but is  to act fairly, namely’ the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances of the  case. In  other  words application of the  principles  of  natural justice  that no man should be condemned unheard intends  to prevent  the  authority  to act  arbitrarily  effecting  the rights of the concerned person. 940 It  is  a fundamental rule of law that no decision  must  be taken  which  will affect the right of  any  person  without first  being informed of the case and be given him/  her  an opportunity  of  putting  forward his/her  case.   An  order involving civil consequences must be made consistently  with the rules of natural justice.  In Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v.  The Chief Election Commissioner & Ors. [1978] 2 SCR  272 at 308F the Constitution Bench held that ’civil consequence’ covers  infraction of not merely property or personal  right but  of  civil  liberties, material  deprivations  and  non- pecuniary  damages.   In its comprehensive  connotion  every thing  that affects a citizen in his civil life  inflicts  a civil  consequence.   Black’s Law Dictionary,  4th  Edition, page  1487 defined civil rights are such as belong to  every citizen of the state or country they include rights  capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.  In  State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors., this court held that  even  an  administrative order  which  involves  civil consequences  must  be made consistently with the  rules  of natural  justice.  The person concerned must be informed  of the case, the evidence in support thereof supplied and  must be  given  a  fair opportunity to meet the  case  before  an adverse  decision is taken.  Since no such  opportunity  was given  it was held that superannuation was in  violation  of principles of natural justice. In State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [1952] SCR  289, per  majority,  a seven Judge bench held that  the  rule  of procedure laid down by law comes as much within the  purview of  Art. 14 of the Constitution as any rule  of  substantive law.   In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,. [1978] 2 SCR  62 1,  another bench of seven judges held that the  substantive

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and procedural laws and action taken under them will have to pass the test under Art, 14.  The test of reason and justice cannot be abstract.  They cannot be divorced from the  needs of  the  nation.  The tests have to be  pragmatic  otherwise they would cease to he reasonable.  The procedure prescribed must  be just, fair and reasonable even though there  is  no specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the right of that individual.  The duty  to  give reasonable opportunity to be  heard  will  be implied  from the nature of the function to be performed  by the  authority  which  has the power  to  take  punitive  or damaging  action.   Even executive  authorities  which  take administrative  action  involving  any  deprivation  of   or restriction on inherent fundamental rights of citizens, must take  care  to  see  that  justice  is  not  only  done  but manifestly appears to be done.  They have a duty to  proceed in  a  way  which  is  free  from  even  the  appearance  of arbitrariness, unreasonableness or unfairness.  They have to act  in a manner which is patently impartial and  meets  the requirements of natural justice.  The law must therefore be now taken to be well-settled that procedure  prescribed for depriving a person  of  livelihood must meet the challenge of Art. 14. 941 and  such law would be liable to be tested on the  anvil  of Art.  14  and  the  procedure prescribed  by  a  statute  or statutory rule or rules or orders effecting the civil rights or  result  in civil consequences would have to  answer  the requirement  of Art. 14.  So it must be right,just and  fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive.  There can be  no distinction   between  a  quasi-judicial  function  and   an administrative  function  for the purpose of  principles  of natural justice.  The aim of both administrative. inquiry as well  as the quasi-.judicial enquiry is to arrive at a  just decision  and if a rule of natural justice is calculated  to secure   justice  or  to  put  it  negatively,  to   prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be  applicable  only to quasi-judicial enquiry  and  not  to administrative enquiry.  It must logically apply to both. Therefore,  fair play in action requires that the  procedure adopted  must be just, fair and reasonable.  The  manner  of exercise  of the power and its impact on the rights  of  the person  affected would be in conformity with the  principles of  natural  justice.   Art. 21  clubs  life  with  liberty, dignity of person with means of livelihood without which the glorious  content of dignity of person would be  reduced  to animal  existence.  When it is interpreted that  the  colour and  content  of  procedure established by law  must  be  in conformity with the minimum fairness and processual justice, it would relieve legislative callousness despising  opportu- nity of being heard and fair opportunities of defence.  Art. 14 has a pervasive processual potency and versatile quality, equalitarian  in  its soul and  allergic  to  discriminatory dictates.  Equality is the antithesis of arbitrariness.   It is,  thereby,  conclusively  held by  this  Court  that  the principles  of natural justice are part of Art. 14  and  the procedure   prescribed  by  law  must  be  just,  fair   and reasonable. In  Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D. T. C. Mazdoor Congress  and Ors,  [1991] Suppl. 1 SCC 600 this court held that right  to public  employment and its concomitant right  to  livelihood received protective umbrella under the can copy of Arts.  14 and 21 etc.  All matters relating to employment includes the right  to  continue  in service till  the  employee  reaches

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superannuation  or until his service is duly  terminated  in accordance   with  just.  fair  and   reasonable   procedure prescribed under the provisions of the constitution and  the rules made under the provisions of the constitution and  the rules made under proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution  or the  statutory  provisions  or  the  rules,  regulations  or instructions   having  statutory  flavour.   They  must   be conformable  to the rights guaranteed in Part III and IV  of the  Constitution.  Art. 21 guarantees right to  life  which includes  right to livelihood, the deprivation thereof  must be in accordance with just and fair procedure prescribed  by law  conformable to Arts. 14 and 21 so as to be  just,  fair and  reasonable and not fanciful, oppressive or  at  vagary. The principles of natural 942 justice  is  an integral part of the Guarantee  of  equality assured  by  Art. 14.  Any law made or action  taken  by  an employer  must  be fair,just and reasonable.  The  power  to terminate  the service of an employee/workman in  accordance with  just,  fair and reasonable procedure is  an  essential inbuilt of’ natural justice.  Arts. 14 strikes at  arbitrary action.  It is not the form of the action but the  substance of  the order that is to be looked into.  It is open to  the court to lift the veil and gauge the effect of the  impugned action  to  find  whether it is  the  foundation  to  impose punishment  or  is only a motive.  Fair play  is  to  secure justice,  procedural as well as substantive.  The  substance of  the order is the soul and the affect thereof is the  end result. It  is  thus well settled law that right to  life  enshrined under  Art.  21 of the Constitution would include  right  to livelihood.   The order of termination of the service of  an employee/workman   visits   with   civil   consequences   of jeopardising not only his/her livelihood but also career and livelihood  of  dependents.  Therefore,  before  taking  any action  putting an end to the tenure of an  employee/workman fair  play  requires that a reasonable  opportunity  to  put forth  his  case  is given and  domestic  enquiry  conducted complying with the principles of natural justice.  In D.  7. C.  v.  D.  T.C.  Mazdoor  Congress  and  Ors.  (supra)  the constitution  bench, per majority, held that termination  of the service of a workman giving one month’s notice or pay in lieu  thereof without enquiry offended Art. 14.   The  order terminating the service of the employees was set aside. In  this  case admittedly no opportunity was  given  to  the appellant and no enquiry was held.  The appellant’s plea put forth at the earliest was that despite his reporting to duty on December 3, 1980 and on all subsequent days and readiness to  join duty he was prevented to report to duty, nor he  be permitted to sign the attendance register.  The Tribunal did not  record  any  conclusive finding  in  this  behalf.   It concluded that the management had power under Cl. 13 of  the certified  Standing Orders to terminate with the service  of the  appellant.  Therefore, we hold that the  principles  of natural justice must be read into the standing order No.  13 (2)  (iv).  Otherwise it would become arbitrary. unjust  and unfair violating Arts. 14.  When so read the impugned action is violative of the principles of natural justice. This  conclusion leads us to the question as to what  relief the  appellant  is  entitled to.   The  management  did  not conduct  any  domestic enquiry nor given the  appellant  any opportunity to put forth his case.  Equally the appellant is to  blame  himself  for the impugned  action.   Under  those circumstances  50 per cent of the back wages would meet  the ends  of justice.  The appeal is accordingly  allowed.   The

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award of the Labour Court is set aside and the letter  dated December 12, 1980 943 of the management is quashed.  There shall be a direction to the respondent to reinstate the appellant forthwith and  pay him back wages within a period of three months from the date of the receipt of this order.  The appeal is allowed accord- ingly.  The parties would bear their own costs. N.P.V.                                  Appeal allowed. 944