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PETITIONER: SHRI BHAGWAN AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAM CHAND AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/03/1965

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) DAYAL, RAGHUBAR RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1965 AIR 1767            1965 SCR  (3) 218  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1966 SC 282  (10)  R          1966 SC 893  (14)  RF         1968 SC 372  (11)  RF         1968 SC 850  (11)  D          1970 SC 971  (6)  R          1970 SC1919  (10,11)  RF         1971 SC2361  (5)  R          1972 SC1910  (9)  R          1974 SC  87  (11)  RF         1977 SC 161  (7)  R          1982 SC1302  (14)  RF         1988 SC  94  (8)  R          1990 SC 261  (19)  RF         1991 SC1893  (19)

ACT:     U.P.  Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act,  1947, ss.  3(4)  and 7-F--Power of District  Magistrate  to  grant permission to sue a tenant for eviction--Whether  revisional power of State Government quasi-judicial and be exercised by observing rules of natural justice.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellants  applied  to  the  Rent  Controller  and Eviction Officer under s. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary)  Control of  Rent  and Eviction Act, 1947, for permission to  file  a suit  in ejectment against the  predecessors-in-interest  of the  respondents  who were the present  tenants  of  certain premises  in Agra. After a series of proceedings before  the Officer  and the appellate authority, the latter  eventually ordered  that the permission applied for should be  granted. The  respondent  then  moved the  Commissioner  of  Agra  in revision and the order granting permission was set aside  by him; but upon an application made to it under s. 7-F of  the Act,  the  State  Government directed  the  Commissioner  to revise  his  order.  Accordingly the  latter  cancelled  his previous  order and confirmed the order granting  permission passed by the appellate authority.     The  appellants’  ejectment suit, in which  one  of  the issues  was  whether  the  permission  granted  to  sue  the respondents  was  valid,  was  decreed  in  favour  of   the

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appellants  and an appeal against this decree to  the  First Additional Civil Judge was dismissed.     However, on appeal to the High Court, the single  Judge, differing  from the view expressed in earlier  decisions  of the  High  Court that the revisional order which  the  State Government  was authorised to pass under s. 7-F is a  purely administrative  order,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the permission granted was invalid because the State Government, vhen  exercising its authority under s. 7-F of the  Act  was required to decide the matter in a quasi-judicial manner and by  following principles of natural justice and should  have given  the  respondents an opportunity of  being  heard.  On appeal to this Court:     HELD’:  The revisional proceedings which go  before  the State  Government  under s. 7-F are,  like  the  proceedings before  the  District Magistrate under s. 3(2)  as  well  as before  the  Commissioner under s. 3(3),  quasi-judicial  in character and all these three authorities must act according to the principles of natural justice. [226 B, C].     The  right  conferred on the tenant not to  be  evicted. except  on the specified grounds enumerated in cls.  (a)  to (g)  of s. 3(1) is a statutory right of  great  significance and it is this statutory right of which the tenant would  be deprived  when the landlord obtains’ the permission  of  the District  Magistrate.  Therefore the Act must  be  taken  to require that in exercising their respective powers to  grant the permission, the appropriate authorities have to consider the  matter  in a quasi-judicial manner and  to  follow  the principles   of  natural  justice  before   reaching   their conclusion. [226H-227B]. The  Associated. Cement Companies Ltd. v.  Bhupendra  Cement Works, Surajpur v.P.N. Sharma, [1965] 2 S.C.R. 366 and Ridge v. Baldwin & Ors. L.R. [1964] A.C. 40, referred to.        219     Narottam  Saran v. State of U.P. A.I.R., 1954, All.  232 and  Murlidhar  v.  State  of U.P.  A.I.R.  1964  All.  148, disapproved. Laxman Purshottam  Paimputkar  v.    State of Bombay [1964] 1 S.C.R. 200, considered. Obiter:Considerations of  judicial   propriety  and  decorum require  that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter  is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of  the High  Court,  whether  of a Division Bench or  of  a  single Judge,  need to be reconsidered, he should not  embark  upon that enquiry sitting as a single Judge, but should refer the matter  to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place  the relevant  papers before the Chief Justice to enable  him  to constitute  a larger Bench to examine the question. That  is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is rounded on healthy principles  of judicial decorum and propriety. [228B-D]

JUDGMENT:    CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  764  of 1954.     Appeal  by  special leave from the judgment  and  decree dated  May  9, 1963, of the Allahabad High Court  in  Second Appeal No. 2272 of 1959.     A.V. Viswanatha Sastri, B.R.L. lyengar, S.K. Mehta,  and K.L. Mehta, for the appellants.     C.B.  Agarwala,  S.S. Khanuja and Ganpat  Rai,  for  the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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   Gajendragadkar,  C.J.  The short question of  law  which arises  in  this  appeal by special  leave  is  whether  the revisional  order  passed by the State Government  of  Uttar Pradesh  under  s.  7-F of  the  Uttar  Pradesh  (Temporary) Control  of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter  called the  Act),  is rendered invalid by reason of the  fact  that before passing the said order, the State Government did  not hear  the two respondents, Ram Chand and Kailash Chand,  who were  affected by it. This question arises in this way.  The respondents are the present tenants of the premises  bearing municipal  No.  863, situated at Jumna  Kinara  Road,  Agra, commonly known as Putaria Mahal. Their predecessors were let into  possession  as tenants by the  appellants,  Lala  Shri Bhagwan  and Shrimati Gopal Devi, on an agreement that  they would  pay  a  monthly rent of-’ Rs.  58-4-0  and  that  the tenancy  would commence from the Sudi 1 of each Hindi  month and  end on Badi  15  of the next month. The two  appellants applied   to  the  Rent  Controller  and  Eviction   Officer (hereafter  called the Officer), under s. 3 of the  Act  for permission   to  file  a  suit  in  ejectment  against   the predecessors-in-interest  of  the respondents.  The  Officer granted permission by his order passed on September 1, 1951. The   respondents  then  moved’  the   Additional   District Magistrate,   who  had  been  authorised  by  the   District Magistrate  to  hear  appeals against the  decision  of  the Officer.  The  appellate authority declined to  confirm  the permis- 220 sion granted to the appellants and remanded the case to  the Officer  for a fresh hearing. On re-hearing the matter,  the Officer  changed  his  view  and  rejected  the  appellants’ application for permission on August 9, 1952. The appellants then moved the appellate authority again and prayed that the original  order  granting   permission to them  to  sue  the respondents  should  be restored. On December 9,  1952,  the appellate  authority  ordered  that  permission  should   be granted  to  the  appellants for suing  the  respondents  in ejectment.  The respondents then moved the  Commissioner  of Agra  in  revision.  On February  4,  1953,  the  revisional authority  allowed      the revisional application  and  set aside  the  appellate  order  granting  permission  to   the appellants. That took the appellants to the State Government under  s.  7-F  of  the Act. On  May,  7,  1953,  the  State Government directed the Commissioner to revise his order  on the  ground that it thought that the need of the  appellants was  genuine.  Acting in pursuance of  this  direction,  the Commissioner passed an  order on July 28, 1953, by which  he cancelled his previous order and confirmed the order  passed by  the  appellate  authority, granting  permission  to  the appellants  to sue the respondents in ejectment. This  order was clearly the result of the direction issued by the  State Government  under  s.7-F of the Act. After  this  order  was passed, the appellants sued the respondents in ejectment  in the court of the Civil Judge, Agra. The  claim  made  by the appellants  for  ejectment  of  the respondents was resisted by them on several grounds, and  on the  contentions raised by the respondents, the trial  court framed  six  issues.  One  of the  issues  was  whether  the permission granted to the appellants to sue the  respondents was  valid. It is with this issue that we are  concerned  in the  present appeal. The trial Judge found in favour of  the appellants  on  this issue and recorded  his  conclusion  in their favour even on the other issues which had been  framed by  him. In the result, the trial court passed a  decree  in favour of the appellants on August 31, 1957. The respondents

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challenged this decree by preferring an appeal in the  court of the First Additional Civil Judge, Agra. In their  appeal, they  disputed the correctness of the findings  recorded  by the trial court on all the issues, including the issue about the  validity  of the sanction obtained  by  the  appellants before  filing the present suit. The appeal court  confirmed all  the  findings recorded by the. trial  Judge,  with  the result  that the respondents’ appeal was dismissed,  on  the 30th May, 1959.     The respondents then went to the Allahabad High Court by way  of second appeal. The learned single Judge of the  said High  Court, who heard the said appeal, was called  upon  to consider  the question as to whether the permission  granted to  the  appellants was valid. That, in fact, was  the  only issue  which was raised before him. The other  issues  which had been found in favour of  the appellants were not  raised before the learned Judge. On the issue as to the validity of the sanction obtained by the appellants, the learned      221 Judge  came  to the conclusion that the  said  sanction  was invalid  inasmuch as the State Government in exercising  its authority  under  s.7-F  of  the  Act,  had  not  given   an opportunity to the respondents to be heard. He took the view that  in  exercising its authority under s. 7-F,  the  State Government was required to decide the matter in revision  in a quasi-judicial manner and it was absolutely essential that the principles of natural justice should have been  followed by the State Government before reaching its decision and  an opportunity  should have been given by it to the  respondent to place their case before it. It  appears  that  this  question  had  been  considered  by Division Benches of the Allahabad High Court in the past and the  consensus of judicial opinion appears to have  been  in favour  of  the, view that the revisional  order  which  the State Government is authorised to pass under s. 7-F, is  not a quasi-judicial order but is a purely administrative order, and so, it is not necessary that the State Government should hear  the parties before exercising its  jurisdiction  under the said section. The learned single Judge was persuaded  by the respondents to consider whether the said decisions  were right  and he came to the conclusion that the view taken  in the said decisions was not right. The judgment delivered  by the  learned  single Judge shows that he  had  reached  this conclusion on re-examining the question in the light of some decisions of this Court to which his attention was  invited. After  he  had reached this conclusion and  had  dictated  a substantial part of his judgment, his attention was drawn to a  decision of this Court in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar  v. State of Bombay and others(1), which was then not  reported. The learned Judge considered the blue print of the  judgment to which his attention was invited and thought that the said judgment  confirmed the view he had already taken about  the nature of the proceedings and the character the jurisdiction contemplated   by  s.  7-F.  Having  held  that  the   State Government   was  bound  to  give  an  opportunity  to   the respondents  to  place their version before  it,  before  it exercised  its  authority under s. 7-F,  the  learned  Judge naturally  came  to the conclusion that the  impugned  order passed by the State Government under s. 7-F was invalid, and that  inevitably meant that under s. 3 of the Act, the  suit was incompetent. In the result, the second appeal  preferred by  the  respondents was allowed and  the  appellants’  suit ordered  to be dismissed. In the circumstances of the  case, the  learned  Judge directed that the  parties  should  bear their own costs throughout. It is against this decision that

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the appellants have come to this Court by special leave; and so,  the only point which falls for our decision is  whether the revisional order passed by the State Government under s. 7-F,  without  giving an opportunity to the  respondents  to place their case before it, is rendered invalid.      When  a legislative enactment confers jurisdiction  and power  on any authority or body to deal with the  rights  of citizens, it (1) [1964] I.S.C.R. 200. 222 often   becomes  necessary  to  enquire  whether  the   said authority  or body is required to act judicially  or  quasi- judicially  in  deciding questions entrusted to  it  by  the statute.  It  sometimes also becomes necessary  to  consider whether  such an authority or body is a tribunal or not.  It is well-known that even administrative bodies or authorities which  are  authorised  to deal with  matters  within  their jurisdiction  in an administrative manner, are  required  to reach  their  decisions  fairly  and  objectively;  but   in reaching  their  decisions, they would be  justified  taking into   account   considerations   cf   policy.   Even    so, administrative bodies may, in acting fairly and objectively, follow the principles of natural justice; but that does  not make the administrative bodies tribunals and does not impose on  them an obligation to follow the principles  of  natural justice. On the other hand, authorities or bodies which  are given jurisdiction by statutory provisions to deal with  the rights of citizens, may be required by the relevant  statute to act judicially in dealing with matters entrusted to them. An  obligation  to  act judicially may, in  some  cases,  be inferred  from  the scheme of the relevant statute  and  its material provisions. In such a case, it is easy to hold that the  authority  or  body must act  in  accordance  with  the principles   of  natural  justice  before   exercising   its jurisdiction  and its powers; but it is not  necessary  that the  obligation to follow the principles of natural  justice must  be expressly imposed on such an authority or body.  If it  appears that the authority or body has been given  power to  determine questions  affecting the rights  of  citizens, the  very  nature of the power would inevitably  impose  the limitation that the power should be exercised in  conformity with the principles of natural justice.  Whether or not such an  authority or body is a tribunal, would depend  upon  the nature of the power conferred on the authority or body,  the nature  of  the rights of citizens, the  decision  of  which fails within the jurisdiction of the said authority or body, and  other  relevant circumstances. This question  has  been considered  by  this  Court on  several  occasions.  In  the Associated  Cement Companies Ltd., Bhupendra  Cement  Works, Surajpur v. P.N. Sharma and another(1), both aspects of this matter have been elaborately examined, and it has been held, adopting  the view expressed by the House of Lords-in  Ridge v.  Baldwin and others(1) that the extent of the area  where the  principles of natural justice have to be  followed  and judicial  approach has to be adopted, must depend  primarily on the nature of the jurisdiction and the power conferred on any  authority or body by statutory provisions to deal  with the  questions  affecting the rights of citizens.  In  other words,  in that decision this Court has held that  the  test prescribed  by  Lord  Reid in his judgment in  the  case  of Ridge(2)  affords  valuable assistance in dealing  with  the vexed  question with which we are concerned in  the  present appeal. Let us, therefore, examine. the scheme of the Act and the  (1) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 366.

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(2) L.R. [1964] A C. 40.       223 nature of the power and jurisdiction conferred on the  State Government  by  s. 7-F. The Act was passed in 1947  and  its main object obviously was, in the words of the preamble,  to continue  during  a  limited period powers  to  control  the letting  and  the rent of  residential  and  non-residential accommodation  and  to  prevent  the  eviction  of   tenants therefrom. The preamble further provides that whereas due to shortage  of accommodation in Uttar Pradesh it is  expedient to  provide for the continuance during a limited  period  of powers  to  control  the  letting  and  the  rent  of   such accommodation  and  to  prevent  the  eviction  of   tenants therefrom,  the Act was enacted. Indeed, it is a  matter  of common  knowledge that similar Acts have been passed in  all the States in India.     Section 3 of the Act provides that "subject to any order passed  under  sub-s.  (3),  no  suit  shall,  without   the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil court   against   a  tenant  for  his  eviction   from   any accommodation,  except  on  one or  more  of  the  following grounds". Then follow seven clauses (a) to (g) which set out the grounds on which a landlord can seek to evict his tenant even  without the permission of the District Magistrate  The scheme of s. 3, therefore, is that in ,order to protect  the tenants from eviction, the legislature has provided that the landlords could evict their tenants only if there was  proof of  the existence of one or the other of the  seven  grounds specified  by clauses (a)to (g)in s. 3(1). Having made  this general  provision, s. 3(1) makes an exception  and  enables the  landlord  to seek to evict his tenant even  though  his case may not fall under any of the seven clauses of s. 3(1), provided  he  has obtained the permission  of  the  District Magistrate,  In  other  words, if  the  District  Magistrate grants  permission to the landlord, he can sue to evict  the tenant  under  the  general provisions of  the  Transfer  of Property  Act, as for instance, s. 106. This  clearly  means that the District Magistrate is empowered to grant exception to  the  landlord from complying with  the  requirements  of clauses  (a)  to  (g) of s. 3(1) and take the  ease  of  the tenancy  in  question  outside the provisions  of  the  said clauses.  That  is  the  nature  and  effect  of  the  power conferred on the District Magistrate to grant permission  to the landlord to sue his tenant in eviction.     Section  3, as it was originally enacted, provided  that no  suit  shall,  without the  permission  of  the  District Magistrate, be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the grounds specified by clauses (a) to (f). Clause (g)  has been subsequently added.     In 1952, clauses (2), (3) and (4) were added to s. 3  by the  Amending  Act 24 of 1952. It is as a  result  of  these amendments  that  s. 3(1) now provides that subject  to  any order passed under sub-s. (3), the permission granted by the District  Magistrate  would enable the landlord to  sue  his tenant  in ejectment. It is now necessary to  read.  sub-ss. (2), (3) and (4), which are as follows:               "(2)  Where any application has been  made  to               the District               224               Magistrate for permission to sue a tenant  for               eviction   from  any  accommodation  and   the               District Magistrate grants or refuses to grant               the  permission,  the party aggrieved  by  his               order  may,  within 20 days from the  date  on

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             which the order is communicated to him,  apply               to the Commissioner to revise the order."                   "(3)  The  Commissioner  shall  hear   the               application made under sub-section (2), as far               as  may be, within six weeks from the date  of               making it, and he may, if he is not  satisfied               as  to the correctness, legality or  propriety               of the order passed by the District Magistrate               or  as to the regularity of  proceedings  held               before  him,  alter or reverse his  order,  or               make  such  other  order as may  be  just  and               proper."                   "(4)  The order of the Commissioner  under               sub-section  (3) shall, subject to  any  order               passed  by the State Government under s.  7-F,               be final." The scheme of these three sub-sections is that the  District Magistrate should first consider whether the landlord should be  allowed to sue without complying with clauses (a) to (g) of  s.  3(1). When he decides the question one  way  or  the other. the party aggrieved by the decision has been given  a right to apply to the Commissioner to revise the said  order within  the limitation prescribed by sub-s. (2). That  takes the  proceedings before the Commissioner, and  he  exercises his revisional jurisdiction and reaches his own decision  in the  matter.  Sub-section (4) provides that  the  revisional order passed by the Commissioner shall, subject to the order passed by the State Government under s. 7-F, be final.  That takes us to s. 7-F. Section 7-F reads thus:                     "The  State Government may call for  the               record  of  any case granting or  refusing  to               grant permission for the filing of a suit  for               eviction referred to in s. 3 or requiring  any               accommodation  to be let or not to be  let  to               any person under s. 7 or directing a person to               vacate any accommodation under s. 7-A and  may               make such order as appears to it necessary for               the ends of justice." As we have already indicated, the question we have to decide in  the  present  appeal  is: what  is  the  nature  of  the proceedings  taken before the State Government under s.  7-F and  what  is the character of the  jurisdiction  and  power conferred on the State Government by it; are the proceedings purely  administrative, and can the State Government  decide the question and exercise its jurisdiction without complying with the principles of natural justice?     In dealing with this question, we have first to  examine the nature of the power conferred on the District Magistrate himself. There is no doubt that what the District Magistrate is  authorised  to  do is to permit the  landlord  to  claim eviction of his tenant, though 225 he may not comply with s. 3(1), clauses (a) to (g) and  that clearly  means that the order which the District  Magistrate may  pass while. granting sanction to the landlord  has  the effect  of  taking  away  from  the  tenants  the  statutory protection  given  to  them  by the scheme  of  s.  3(1).  A landlord can normally evict his tenant by complying with the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 3(1)  imposes  a statutory limitation on the said  power  by requiring the proof of one or the other of the seven grounds stated in clauses (a) to (g) of s. 3(1), before he can  seek to  evict  his  tenant. That limitation is  removed  by  the sanction which District Magistrate may grant; and so, it  is plain  that the order which the District  Magistrate  passes

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under  s. 3(2) affects the statutory rights of the  tenants. That is one aspect of the matter which cannot be ignored.   The second aspect of the matter is that the party who  may feet  aggrieved  by’  the  order  passed  by  the   District Magistrate,  is given the right to move the Commissioner  in revision  within  the prescribed period of  limitation,  and this   provision  necessarily  implies  that  the   District Magistrate  should  indicate  his reasons  why  he  makes  a particular  .order  under  s.  3(2).  Unless  the   District Magistrate indicates, though briefly, the reasons in support of  his final order, the Commissioner would not be  able  to exercise  his  jurisdiction  under s. 3(3).  How  could  the Commissioner  consider the question as to whether the  order passed by the District Magistrate is correct or is legal  or is proper. unless he knows the are,q. sons on which the said order  is  based?  Thus,  the  provision  for  a  revisional application  to  the Commissioner also  indicates  that  the District  Magistrate has to weigh the pros and cons  of  the matter and come to a certain conclusion before he makes  the order.  The rule naturally imports the requirement that  the parties should be allowed to put their versions before  him. The District Magistrate cannot reasonably weigh the pros and cons  unless both the landlord and the tenant are  given  an opportunity  to place their versions before him,  Therefore, we  are  satisfied that the jurisdiction  conferred  on  the District  Magistrate to deal with the rights of the  parties is  of such a character that principles of  natural  justice cannot be excluded from the proceedings before him.     This  conclusion  is  very  much  strengthened  when  we consider the provisions of s. 3(3). This clause specifically requires the Commissioner to hear the application made under sub-s.  (2)  within the specified period.  This  requirement positively   enacts   that  the   proceedings   before   the Commissioner   are  quasi-judicial.  This   clause   further provides that the Commissioner has to be satisfied as to the correctness,  legality,  or  propriety of  the  order  under revision.  He  can  also  examine the  question  as  to  the regularity  of  the  proceedings held  before  the  District Magistrate.  In our opinion, it is impossible to escape  the conclusion that these provisions unambiguously suggest  that the  proceedings before the District Magistrate as  well  as before the Commissioner are quasi-judicial in character 226 Further,  the  revisional power has to be  exercised  and  a revisional  order  has to be passed by the  Commissioner  to serve  the purpose of justice, because the  clause  provides that  the Commissioner may make such other order as  may  be just  and  proper.  Thus, we are  satisfied  that  when  the District Magistrate exercises his authority under s 3(2) and the  Commissioner  exercises his revisional power  under  s. 3(3), they must act according to the principles of  natural’ justice. They are dealing with the question of the rights of the landlord and the tenant and they are required to adopt a judicial approach.     If   that  be  the  true  position  in  regard  to   the proceedings contemplated by sub-s. 3(2) and sub-s. 3(3),  it is  not  difficult to hold that the  revisional  proceedings which  go  before the State Government under  s.  7-F,  must partake  of  the same character. It is true that  the  State Government  is authorised to call for the record  suo  motu, but  that  cannot alter the fact that the  State  Government would not be in a position to decide the matter entrusted to its   jurisdiction  under  s.  7-F,  unless  it   gives   an opportunity  to both the parties to place  their  respective points  of view before it. It is the ends of  justice  which

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determine the nature of the order which the State Government would  pass under s. 7-F, and it seems to us plain  that  in securing  the ends of justice, the State  Government  cannot but  apply  principles  of  natural  justice  and  offer   a reasonable   opportunity  to  both  the  parties  while   it exercises its jurisdiction under s. 7-F.     We  have already referred to the general policy  of  the Act.  In that connection, we may mention two other  sections of  the  Act.  Section 14 provides that no  decree  for  the eviction  of a tenant from any accommodation  passed  before the date of commencement of this Act, shall, in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed  against him  so long as this Act remains in force, except on any  of the  grounds  mentioned in s. 3. This  section  emphatically brings  out the main object of the Act which is to save  the tenants  from  eviction.  That is why it  prescribes  a  bar against  the  execution of the decrees which may  have  been passed for the eviction of tenants before the Act came  into force,  unless  the landlords are able to show  one  or  the other ground mentioned ins 3.     A  similar  provision  is made by s.  15  in  regard  to pending suits.. It lays down that in all suits for  eviction of  tenants  from any accommodation pending on the  date  of commencement  of this Act, no decree for eviction  shall  be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in  s. 3.  The provision also emphasises the importance attached by the Act to the protection of the tenants from eviction.  The right  conferred on the tenant no to be evicted,  except  on the specified grounds enumerated by clause (a) t,9 (g) of s. 3(1),  is a statutory right of great significance and it  is this statutory right of which the tenants would be  deprived when  the  landlord  obtains the sanction  of  the  District Magistrate. That is    227 why  we  think  the Act must be taken  to  require  that  in exercising  their  respective powers under s.  3(2)  and  s. 3(3),  the  appropriate  authorities have  to  consider  the matter  in  a  quasi-judicial manner. and  are  expected  to follow  the  principles of natural justice  before  reaching their conclusions.     We have already indicated that the Allahabad High  Court had  consistently taken the contrary view and held that  the functions discharged by the appropriate authorities under s. 3(2)  and  s. 3(3) are administrative and an  obligation  to follow  the principles of natural justice cannot be  imposed on  the  said authorities vide Narettam Saran  v.  State  of U.P.(1). Indeed. after the learned single Judge had held  in the  present proceedings that the view taken by the  earlier decisions  of  the  Allahabad High Court  was  erroneous.  a Division  Bench of the said High Court considered  the  same question  once again and re-affirmed its earlier view  vide: Murlidhar v. State of U.P.(2). We have carefully  considered the  reasons  given  by the learned  Judges  when  they  re- affirmed  the  earlier  view  taken by  the  High  Court  of Allahabad  on  this point. With respect, we  are  unable  to agree with the decision in Murlidhar’s(2) case.     In  this  connection, we may refer to the  decisions  of this Court in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar’s(3) case on which the  learned single Judge partly relied in support   of  his conclusion.   In  that case, this Court was called  upon  to consider  the question whether the  revisional  jurisdiction conferred  on the State Government under s. 79 of the  Satan Act was purely administrative. and it came to the conclusion that  in  exercising the said revisional  jurisdiction.  the State  Government is not acting purely as an  administrative

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authority;  its decision is judicial or quasi-judicial,  and so, it is essential that the State Government should  follow the  principles  of  natural  justice  before  reaching  its conclusion  under that section. The scheme of  the  relevant provisions  of the Watan Act cannot. however, be said to  be exactly  similar to the scheme of the Act with which we  are concerned;  whereas section 3 of the Act with which  we  are concerned  in  the present appeal deals with  the  statutory rights  conferred on the tenants, the relevant  sections  of the  Watan  Act dealt with the right of  possession  of  the Watan property itself. That being so, it cannot be said that the decision in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar’s(3) case can be deemed  to have overruled by necessary implication the  view taken by the Allahabad High Court in regard to the nature of the power conferred on the appropriate authorities by ss.  3 and 7-F of the Act.     Before  we part with this appeal, however, we  ought  to point out that it would have been appropriate if the learned single  Judge  had not taken upon himself  to  consider  the question as to whether the earlier decisions of the Division Benches of the High Court (1) A.I.R. 1954 All. 232. (2) [1964] 1964 All.148. (3) [1964] 1 S.C.R.200. (N) 3 SCI--2 228 needed to be re-considered and revised. It is plain that the said  decisions had not been directly or even  by  necessary implication overruled by any decision of this Court; indeed, the  judgment  delivered by the learned single  Judge  shows that  he was persuaded to re-examine the matter himself  and in  fact he had substantially recorded his  conclusion  that the  earlier  decisions  were  erroneous  even  before   his attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in  Laxman Purshottam  Pimputkar’s(1) case. It is hardly  necessary  to emphasis  that  considerations  of  judicial  propriety  and decorum  require  that if a learned single Judge  hearing  a matter  is  inclined  to  take the  view  that  the  earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench  or of  a single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he  should  not embark  upon  that enquiry sitting as a  single  Judge,  but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a  proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice  to enable  him  to  constitute a larger Bench  to  examine  the question.  That  is the proper and traditional way  to  deal with such matters and it is rounded on healthy principles of Judicial decorum and propriety.  It is to be regretted  that the learned single Judge departed from this traditional  way in  the  present  case and chose  to  examine  the  question himself.     The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed.  There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. (1) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 200 229