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PETITIONER: SHRI BALAGANESAN METALS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI M.N. SHANMUGHAM CHETTY & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/04/1987

BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 1668            1987 SCR  (2)1173  1987 SCC  (2) 707        JT 1987 (2)   247  1987 SCALE  (1)1110  CITATOR INFO :  R          1987 SC2166  (1)  RF         1989 SC 302  (4)  RF         1989 SC 682  (12)  F          1989 SC1420  (10)

ACT:     Tamil Nadu Buildings (lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960: ss. 2(2) and 10(3)(a) & (c)--Eviction--Bona fide requirement for additional accommodation--Comparative  hardship--Consid- eration of Building’--Whether includes part of a building. Statutory Interpretation.     Provisions  of Statutes--Not to be interpreted so as  to render any other provision otiose.     Words & Phrases: Expression ’as the case may be--Connec- tion of Word ’Any ’--Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     Clause  (c)  of sub-s. (3) of s. 10 of  the  Tamil  Nadu Buildings  (Lease  and Rent Control) Act,  1960,  enables  a landlord occupying only a part of a building, whether  resi- dential  or  non-residential, to seek eviction of  a  tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part  of the building, notwithstanding anything contained in cl. (a), for  bona fide requirement of additional accommodation.  The first proviso thereto enjoins the Rent Controller to  reject the application of the landlord under that clause even where the  need is found to be genuine, if the hardship caused  to the  tenant  would outweigh the advantage to  the  landlord. Sub-clause (i) of cl. (a) of s. 10(3) enables eviction  from residential  building if the landlord or any member  of  his family is not occupying a residential building of his own in the  city,  while sub-cl. (iii) enable  eviction  from  non- residential  building if the landlord or any member  of  his family  is not occupying for purposes of a business  a  non- residential building in the city. A ’building’ is defined in s. 2(2) to mean any building or hut or part of a building or hut,  let  or to be let separately for residential  or  non- residential purposes.     The respondent-legatees of the landlady, using the first floor  of the building for residence sought eviction of  the appellant-tenant  from  the ground floor used by  him  as  a

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godown  for  storing his business wares on the  ground  that they bona fide required additional accommodation 1174 for  their  residential needs. The  Rein  Controller  upheld their  claim. The Appellate Authority reversed the  findings of  the Rent Controller but in revision the High  Court  re- stored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller.     In  this Appeal by Special leave it was  contended  that since  the  ground floor constituted a  building  by  itself within  the meaning of s. 2(2) of the Act.  the  respondents could   seek  eviction  of  the  appellant  only  under   s. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act and not under s. 10(3)(c), that  even if the respondents were entitled to invoke s. 10(3)(c)  they could  seek eviction only if they required the ground  floor for  non-residential purposes and not for  residential  pur- poses,  that  the factors of relative hardship  between  the parties  weighed  more in favour of the appellant  than  the respondents, and that the High Court was in error in  inter- fering  with the findings of fact rendered by the  Appellate Authority while exercising its revisional powers under s. 25 of the Act. Dismissing the Appeal, the Court,     HELD: 1.1 The ground floor of the building in occupation of the appellant did not constitute a distinct and  separate unit.  The respondent-landlords could. therefore seek  evic- tion under s. 10(3)(c) of the Act.     1.2 A ’building’ has been defined in s. 2(2) of the  Act as not only a building or hut but also part of a building or hut,  let  separately  for  residential  or  non-residential purposes,  which could only means that a part of a  building that  has been let out or that has to be let out  separately can also be construed as a separate and independent building without  reference to the other portion or portions  of  the building  where  it  is not necessary to  treat  the  entire building as one whole and inseparable unit. A limitation has thereby been placed by the Legislature itself, by  providing that  the  application of the definition is subject  to  the contextual  position.  It follows therefrom that  where  the context warrants. the entire building being construed as one integral unit. It would be inappropriate to view the  build- ing as consisting of several disintegrated units and not  as one integrated structure.     1.3 In enacting s. 10(3)(c) the Legislature has intended that the entire building. irrespective of one portion  being occupied  by the landlord and the other portion or  portions being  occupied by a tenant or tenants should be  viewed  as one whole and integrated unit and not as different entities. 1175     1.4 There is vast difference between the words "residen- tial  building"  and "non-residential building" used  in  s. 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) on the one hand and s. 10(3)(c) on the other.  While s. 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) refer to  a  building only  as residential or non-residential, s. 10(3)(c)  refers to a landlord occupying a part of a building, whether  resi- dential or non-residential. Furthermore, s. 10(3)(c)  states that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order  of eviction being passed against the tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building.     1.5  TO  import  the expansive definition  of  the  word "building"  in  s.  2(2) into s. 10(3)(c)  would  result  in rendering  meaningless the words "part of a building"  occu- pied  by the landlord and a tenant "occupying the  whole  or any portion of the remaining part of the building",  leaving no scope for such a landlord to seek eviction.     1.6  The provisions of an Act should be  interpreted  in

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such a manner as pot to render any of its provisions  otiose unless there are compelling reasons for the Court to  resort to  the extreme contingency. If a portion of a building  let out  to  a tenant is to be treated in all  situations  as  a separate  and independent building then s. 10(3)(c) will  be rendered otiose because the landlord can never then ask  for additional accommodation since s. 10(3)(a) does not  provide for eviction of tenants on the ground of additional accommo- dation for the landlord either for residential or  non-resi- dential purposes.     Saraswathi Sriraman v.P.C.R. Chetty’s Charities,  [1972] 2 M.L.J. 515; Mohammed Jaffar v. Palaniappa Chettiar, [1964] 1  M .L.J. 112 and Cheilaromal v. Accommodation  Controller, [1967] 2 M.L.J. 453, approved.     2.1 It cannot be said that a landlord can seek addition- al  accommodation  for residence only if the building  is  a residential one and likewise he can seek additional accommo- dation for business purposes only if the building is a  non- residential one.     2.2 Section 10(3)(c) provides for both situations,  viz. a landlord occupying a part of a building which is  residen- tial  or  non-residential.  The words used in  it  arc  "any tenant" and not "a tenant" who can be called upon to  vacate the  portion in his occupation. Unless the  legislature  had intended  that  both classes of tenant i.e.  residential  or nonresidential, can be asked to vacate by the Rent  Control- ler  for providing landlord the additional accommodation  it would not have used the 1176 words  "any"  instead of using the letter "a"  to  denote  a tenant.  Further, the words "as the case may be" in cl.  (0) only mean "whichever the case may be", i.e. either  residen- tial or non-residential. They do not restrict the landlord’s right  to  secure additional accommodation  for  residential purposes  only in respect of a residential building  and  in the  case of additional accommodation for business  purposes only to a non-residential building.     2.3 Section 10(3)(c) stands on a different footing  from s.  10(3)(a)  (i)  and s.  10(3)(a)(iii).  The  non-obstante clause  has been added to cl. (c) to give it  an  overriding effect over both the restrictions placed by cls. (a)(i)  and (a)(iii), viz., landlord seeking eviction of a tenant should not  be  occupying a building of his own  and  secondly  the nature  of  user of the leased property by the  tenant  must correspond to the nature of the requirement of the landlord. Thus, the requirement of additional accommodation under  cl. (c) is not a case of a landlord not occupying a  residential or  non-residential  building  of his own but a  case  of  a landlord  occupying a part of a residential or  non-residen- tial  building  of his own and putting it to  such  user  as deemed  fit by him. If it was the intention of the  legisla- ture that only a tenant occupying a residential portion of a building  can  be asked to vacate for  providing  additional residential accommodation to the landlord and corresponding- ly a tenant occupying a portion of a building for  non-resi- dential  purposes alone being asked to vacate for  the  non- residential  requirements  of the landlord.  it  would  have provided specific stipulation to that effect in cl. (c).     In  the  instant  case. the  requirement  of  additional accommodation  pertains to the need of the landlord and  the manner of user of the portion of the building already in his occupation  and consequently the bona fides of his  require- ment  will  outweigh  all the  restrictions  imposed  by  s. 10(3)(a). K. Parasuramaiah v. Lakshmamma, (AIR 1965: 220). approved.

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   Thirupathi  v. Kanta Rao. [1981] Vol. 1 ILR  Madras  128 overruled.     3.  Once  a landlord is able to satisfy  the  Controller that he is bona fide in need of additional accommodation for residential  or nonresidential purposes and that the  advan- tage  derived by him by an order of eviction  will  outweigh the hardship caused to the tenant. then he is entitled to an order of eviction irrespective of any other consideration. 1177     4.  The  Rent Controller has gone into the  question  of comparative hardship and rendered a finding in favour or the respondents.  The Appellate Authority’s findings  have  been vitiated  because of its non advertance to the evidence  and application  of  wrong tests in  assessing  the  comparative hardship  between the parties. The High Court,  was.  there- fore, entitled to allow the revision.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1314  of 1980.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  28.9.1978  of  the Madras  High  Court in Civil Revision Petition  No.  782  of 1977. A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellant. S. Padmanabhan and M. Raghuraman for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     NATARAJAN,  J.  This  appeal by special leave  is  by  a tenant  against whom an order of eviction passed under  Sec- tion  10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease  and  Rent Control) Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as the "Act", by the Rent Controller was restored by the High Court of Madras after  setting aside the dismissal of the eviction  petition by the Appellate Authority.     The facts are not in controversy and may briefly be  set out  as  under. A one-storeyed building in  Wall  Tax  Road, Madras was originally owned by one Unnamalai Ammal. She  was using  the first floor for her residence and had leased  out the  ground  floor to the appellant herein to be used  as  a godown  for storing his business ware. It is  common  ground the  appellant’s shop is situate in an  adjoining  building. The  tease was for a period of 10 years with an  option  for renewal  for  a further period of 5 years.  Unnamalai  Ammal however refused to renew the lease and filed a suit  against the  appellant  for eviction on the ground  she  bona  fide. required the ground floor also for her residential use.  The suit  did not meet with success. Unnamalai Ammal  bequeathed the  property  to her son-in-law and grand son who  are  the respondents herein. As legatees of the premises the respond- ents  filed  a petition under Section 10(3)(c)  of  the  Act praying  for  eviction of the appellant on the  ground  they bona fide required additional accommodation for their  resi- dential needs. The Rent Controller upheld their claim, after finding the relevant factors of bona fide need and com- 1178 parative  hardship in their favour and ordered eviction.  On appeal  by the appellant, the Appellant  Authority  reversed the  findings of the Rent Controller and further  held  that the  respondent were not entitled to recover  possession  of non-residential premises for their residential  requirements and dismissed the petition for eviction. On further revision to  the High Court by the respondents Remaprasada Rao,  C.J. set aside the order of the Appellant Authority and  resorted the  order  of eviction passed by the Rent  Controller.  The

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aggrieved tenant has preferred this appeal.     The  judgment under appeal is assailed by the  appellant on four grounds viz. (1) Since the ground floor  constitutes a  building by itself within the meaning of Section 2(2)  of the Act, the respondents can seek eviction of the  appellant only  under  Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act  and  not  under Section 10(3)(c);     (2)  Even  if  the respondents are  entitled  to  invoke Section 10(3)(c) they can seek eviction only if they require the  ground floor for non-residential purposes and  not  for residential purposes;     (3)  In any event the factors of relative  hardship  be- tween the parties weigh more in favour of the appellant than the respondent; and     (4) The High Court was in error in interfering with  the findings  of fact rendered by the Appellate Authority  while exercising  its  revisional powers under Section 25  of  the Act.     Before  proceeding to examine the merits of the  conten- tions, it will be relevant to state a few facts. The  ground floor, though used as a godown, is of a residential  pattern and  consists of two rooms and a hall besides a kitchen  and toilet  rooms. The first floor is being used as their  resi- dence  by the respondents, the other members of  the  family being  the wife and daughter of the second  respondent.  The first floor consists of only two rooms and it is the case of the  respondents that the accommodation in the  first  floor has  become inadequate for their growing residential  needs. It is also their case that the first respondent who is  over 65  years of age finds it difficult to climb the  stairs  on account of his old age and frail health. Their further  plea is that the water supply to the first floor is inadequate in spite  of the electric motor and pump set installed  in  the ground floor to pump up water. In contrast the appellant  is said to have a spacious three-storeyed building in Door  No. 39  adjoining the leased premises and also to  have  another godown close by. 1179     One  of  the contentions of the appellant was  that  the eviction proceedings were a continuation of the unsuccessful attempt by Unnamalai Ammal herself to get the tenant evicted and, therefore, the eviction petition lacked bona fides. The High  Court has rejected his contention and in our  opinion, rightly too, because the respondents who are the legatees of the building cannot be attributed mala fides because of  the earlier  eviction suit filed by their predecessor in  title. We  may also dispose of another contention of the  appellant at  this  juncture itself which had found  favour  with  the Appellate Authority. The contention was that with the  death of  Unnamalai Ammal the family had become smaller and  hence there  was no need for additional accommodation. This  argu- ment  overlooks  the fact that additional  accommodation  is sought  for  because of the difficulty  experienced  by  the first  respondent in climbing the stairs in his old age  and the  need for the second respondent’s daughter,  growing  in years, to have a room all for herself for keeping her  books and reading at home.     We will now proceed to consider the legal contentions of the appellant in seriatim. The first and foremost contention was that under the Act the ground floor constitutes a  sepa- rate building and as such the respondents can seek  recovery of  possession  of  the  ground  floor  only  under  Section 10(3)(a)(i) and not under Section 10(3)(c). For dealing with this  contention,  the relevant provisions of the  Act  need setting out.

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             Section  2  which is  the  definition  Section               reads as under:-               "Definitions:- In this Act, unless the context               otherwise requires--                         (2) "building" means any building or               hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be               let separately for residential or non-residen-               tial purpose and includes--               (a)  .........               (b)  .........               Section  10 sets out the grounds on which  the               eviction  of a tenant can be ordered. For  our               purpose it is enough to refer to the following               provisions alone:-               "Section 10(3)(a):- A landlord may, subject to               the               1180               provisions  of clause (d), apply to  the  Con-               troller  for an order directing the tenant  to               put  the landlord in possession of the  build-               ing--                         (i)  in  case it  is  a  residential               building, if the landlord requires it for  his               own  occupation or for the occupation  of  any               member  of his family and if he or any  member               of  his family is not occupying a  residential               building  of  his  own in the  city,  town  or               village concerned;               (ii) ommitted               (iii) in case it is any other  non-residential               building if the landlord or any member of  his               family  is  not occupying for  purposes  of  a               business which he or any member of his  family               is  carrying on, non-residential  building  in               the  city, town or village concerned which  is               his own:               (b) ommitted.               (c) A landlord who is occupying only a part of               a  building, whether residential or  non-resi-               dential,  may, notwithstanding  anything  con-               tained in clause (a), apply to the  Controller               for  an order directing any  tenant  occupying               the whole or any portion of the remaining part               of the building to put the landlord in posses-               sion thereof, it he requires additional accom-               modation  for  residential  purposes  or   for               purposes  of a business which he  is  carrying               on, as the case may be.               Provided  that, in the case of an  application               under clause (c), the Controller, shall reject               the  application if he is satisfied  that  the               hardship which may be caused to the tenant  by               granting it will outweigh the advantage to the               landlord:               Provided further that the Controller may  give               the  tenant a reasonable time for putting  the               landlord in possession of the building and may               extend  such  time so as not to  exceed  three               months in the aggregate."     It  is no doubt true that under Section 2(2) a  building has been. defined as not building or hut but also part of  a building or hut let separately for residential or  non-resi- dential purpose. That would, however, only mean that a  part of  a building which has been let out or which is to be  let out separately can also be construed as a separate and

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1181 independent building without reference to the other  portion or  portions  of the building where it is not  necessary  to treat the entire building as one Whole and inseparable unit. A limitation on the definition has been placed by the Legis- lature  itself  by  providing that the  application  of  the definition is subject to the contextual position. Therefore, it follows that where the context warrants the entire build- ing being construed as one integral unit, it would be  inap- propriate  to  view the building as  consisting  of  several disintegerated  units and not as one integerated  structure. Secondly  there is vast difference between the words  "resi- dential  building"  and "non-residential building"  used  in Section  10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) on the one hand  and  Section 10(3)(c)  on the other. While Section 10(3)(a)(i) and  (iii) refer  to a building only as residential or  non-residential Section  10(3)(c) refers to a landlord occupying a pan of  a building, ’whether residential or non-residential. (Emphasis supplied).  Further-more,  Section 10(3)(c)  states  that  a landlord  may apply to the Controller for an order of  evic- tion being passed against the tenant "occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining pan of the building"  (Emphasis supplied). If as contended by the appellant each portion  of a building let out separately should always be construed  as an  independent unit by itself then there is no scope for  a landlord  occupying "a part of a building" seeking  eviction of  a  tenant  "occupying the whole or any  portion  of  the remaining  part of the building". It is, therefore,  obvious that in so far as Section 10(3)(c) is concerned the Legisla- ture has intended that the entire building, irrespective  of one  portion  being occupied by the landlord and  the  other portion  or portions being occupied by a tenant  or  tenants should be viewed as one whole and integrated unit and not as different  entities. To import the expansive  definition  of the  word "building" in Section 2(2) into  section  10(3)(c) would  result in rendering meaningless the words "part of  a building"  occupied by the landlord and a tenant  "occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the build- ing". The third factor militating against the contention  of the appellant is that if a portion of a building let out  to a  tenant is to be treated in all situations as  a  separate and  independent  building  then Section  10(3)(c)  will  be rendered otiose because the landlord can never then ask  for additional  accommodation  since Section 10(3)(a)  does  not provide for eviction of tenants on the ground of  additional accommodation  for  the landlord either for  residential  or non-residential  purposes.  It  is a well  settled  rule  of interpretation  of statutes that the provisions of  the  Act should be interpreted in such a manner as not to render  any of its provisions otiose unless there are compelling reasons for the Court to resort to that extreme contingency. 1182     Yet  another noteworthy feature to be borne in  mind  is that  Section 10(3)(c) is governed by two provisos which  is not the case when eviction orders are made under any of  the sub-clauses  of Section 10(3)(a). The first proviso  enjoins the Controller to reject the application of a landlord under Section.  10(3)(c) for additional accommodation, even  where the  need  of the landlord is found to be  genuine,  if  the hardship  caused to the tenant by an order of eviction  will outweigh  the advantage to the landlord by the  said  order. The  second  proviso  empowers the Controller  to  give  the tenant  a reasonable time not exceeding three months in  the aggregate  to vacate the portion in his occupation  and  put the  landlord  in possession thereof. Obviously  the  second

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proviso  has  been  made to facilitate the  tenant  to  find alternate   residential  or  non-residential   accommodation elsewhere,  since the landlord who is already in  possession of a portion of the building can put up with the hardship of inadequate accommodation for a period of three months at the most.     The  above  analytical  consideration  of  the  relevant provisions  bring out clearly the fallacy contained  in  and the  untenability  of the contention that the  ground  floor occupied  by the appellant is a distinct and  separate  unit and  as such the respondents cannot seek his eviction  under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act.     This aspect of the matter has been considered in varying degrees  in the following decisions and interpreted  in  ac- cordance  with  our  conclusion;  vide  Saraswathi  Sriraman v.P.C.R.  Chetty’s Charities, [1972] 2 M.L.J. 515;  Mohammed Jarfar  v.  Palaniappa  Chettiar, [1964] 1  M.L.J.  112  and Chellammal v. Accommodation Controller, [1967] 2 M.L.J. 453. Even  the  Division Bench ruling relied on  by  Mr.  Sampath concedes this position and has observed as follows:               "Therefore,  if  the context in  a  particular               provision  requires  that  the  word  building               should not be understood as defined in Section               22, certainly it is open to the Court to  give               the normal, natural and ordinary meaning which               it  is capable of and for that purpose, it  is               not necessary to rely upon any decision. (vide               page 153 of the report)."     Taking  up now for consideration the second  contention, there  were conflicting decisions in the Madras  High  Court and  this  led to a reference of the case in  Thirupathi  v. Kanta Rao, [1981] Vol. 1 ILR Madras 128 to a Division Bench. While  the  Division Bench has taken one  view.  a  Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has 1183 taken  a contrary view on the identical issue. It is  perti- nent to state here that the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Act are in pari tnetria  with the provisions of the Madras Act in so far  as Sections  10(3)(a) and (c) are concerned. The  conflict  was with  reference  to the interpretation of  Section  10(3)(c) viz.  whether a landlord occupying a part of a building  for residential  purposes  is  entitled to seek  eviction  of  a tenant  occupying the whole or any portion of the  remaining part  of the building for non-residential purposes  for  his (landlord’s)  residential use and vice versa. While  it  was held  in  Govindan v. Rajagopal Nadar, [1968] 2  M.L.J.  315 that a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant under  Section 10(3)(c)  for  additional residential purposes only  if  the tenant  also is putting the building to residential use  and likewise  a landlord can seek additional  accommodation  for business  purposes  only if the tenant is also  putting  the building to non-residential use, it was held to the contrary in Premchand Motichand v. Hatneed Sultan, [1958] 1 M.L.J. 32 (S.N.); P.I. Kurian v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 85 L.W. 364 and   Saraswathi  Sriraman  v.  P.C.R.  Chetty’s   Charities (supra).  The latter view was taken by Ismail, J., also,  as he  then was, in an unreported case viz. Rangaswami  Reddiar v. Minor N. Jayaraj (C.R.P. No. 2380 of 1977).  Subsequently in  the  referred  case, the Division  Bench  consisting  of Ismail, C.J. and Rathnam J. rendered judgment in  Thirupathi v.  Kanta Rao, (supra). (Ismail, C.J., changing his  earlier view) holding that a landlord will be entitled under Section 10(3)(c)  to seek additional accommodation  for  residential purposes only if it is a residential building in the occupa-

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tion Of a tenant and likewise a landlord can seek additional accommodation  for  non-residential  purposes  only  if  the building is a non-residential one.     The  Division Bench has further taken the view that  the non  obstante clause is only to entitle a landlord  to  seek eviction  even  when he is in possession of a portion  of  a building .belonging to him and nothing more.     In a later decision G.N. Rajaram v. Mukunthu N. Venkata- rama  Iyer.  MLJ 1985(2) 173 the Division Bench  ruling  has been followed and eviction was ordered of a tenant occupying a room in the ground floor of a residential building for his business purposes. On the other hand a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Parasuramaiah v. Lakshmamma, AIR  1965  220  has held that if a  landlord  satisfies  the Controller  that  he wants additional accommodation  in  the same  building  for his residential or  non-residential  re- quirements then notwithstanding the user to which the tenant was putting the 1184 leased  portion.  the  landord is entitled to  an  order  of eviction so that he can re-adjust the additional  accommoda- tion in the manner convenient to him and it is not necessary that the additional accommodation sought for should be  used by  the landlord for the same purpose for which  the  tenant sought  to  be  evicted was using it. In the  words  of  the Division Bench:-               "Clause (c) makes it twice clear that a  land-               lord who occupies a part of a building, wheth-               er  residential or nonresidential can ask  for               eviction of a tenant occupying another portion               whatever  may  be  his  requirements,  whether               residential or non-residential". For holding so, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken  the words  "notwithstanding  anything in clause (a)"  as  having over  riding  effect over both the conditions laid  down  in Section 10(3)(a) and (iii) viz. a landlord (1) not having  a building  of his own for residential or nonresidential  pur- poses;  and (2) seeking the eviction of a tenant from  resi- dential  premises  only for residential  purposes;  and  (3) seeking  eviction of a tenant from non-residential  premises only for nonresidential purposes.    We  will now examine for ourselves the interpretation  to be given to Section 10(3)(c). In so doing we will first  see the  legislative intent behind Section 10(3)(c) before  con- sidering the thrust given by nonobstante clause in it. Since Section  10(3)(c) provides for both situations viz. a  land- lord occupying a part of a building which is residential  or non-residential, the sub-clause can be read separately so as to have reference exclusively to a residential building or a non-residential  building.  In  Thirupathy  v.  Kanta   Rao, (supra)  the learned Judges have noticed this  position  and set out Section 10(3)(c) distinctively. But in so doing they have  restricted the relief of additional  accommodation  to the landlord for residential purposes to residential  build- ings  alone and the relief of additional  accommodation  for business  purposes  to nonresidential  buildings  alone  and therein  the error has crept in. In our view. this  restric- tion is not envisaged by Section 10(3)(c). The proper way of distinctively viewing the Section should be as under:-               "A landlord who is occupying only a part of  a               residential   building   may   notwithstanding               anything contained in clause (a), apply to the               Controller  for an order directing any  tenant               occupying  the  whole or any  portion  of  the               remaining  part  of the building  to  put  the

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             landlord in possession               1185               thereof. if he requires additional  accommoda-               tion for residential purposes or for  purposes               of a business which he is carrying on, as  the               case may be."               "A landlord who is occupying only a part of  a               non-residential  building may  notwithstanding               anything contained in clause (a), apply to the               Controller  for an order directing any  tenant               occupying  the  whole or any  portion  of  the               remaining  part  of the building  to  put  the               landlord in possession thereof, if he requires               additional   accommodation   for   residential               purposes  or for purposes of a business  which               he is carrying on, as the case may be."     If  clause (3) is construed in this manner there can  be no scope for a contention that a landlord cab seek addition- al  accommodation  for residence only if the building  is  a residential one and likewise he can seek additional accommo- dation for business purposes only if the building is a  non- residential one.     There are several reasons which persuade us to take this view.  In  the first place it has to be noted  that  Section 10(3)(c)   stands  on  a  different  footing  from   Section 10(3)(a)(i) and Section 10(3)(a)(iii). It is not a case of a landlord  not  occupying a  residential  or  non-residential building  of  his own but a case of a landlord  occupying  a part of a residential or non-residential building of his own and putting it to such user as deemed fit by him. Since  the requirement  of additional accommodation by the landlord  is with reference to the manner of his user of that part of the building which is in his occupation it is the nature of that requirement  that should prevail over the manner of user  of the tenant of the portion leased out to him. In other words, the  additional accommodation is for extending the  user  of the  building by the landlord to the leased portion for  the same  purpose for which the portion not leased out is  being put to. Such being the case which the landlord is  genuinely in need of additional accommodation for residential or  non- residential  requirements,  as the case may be,  he  can  be given relief only it the tenant occupying the other  portion of the building is asked to vacate. If it is to be held that Section  10(3)(c) can be invoked only if the nature  of  the requirement  of the landlord and the nature of user  of  the leased portion by the tenant coalesce then the landlord will be  left without any remedy when the nature of his need  and the  nature of the user of the leased portion by the  tenant do not tally. Take for example, a case where a landlord  has got  grown-up sons and daughters or there is a  married  son and growing daughters or there 1186 are old parents who cannot climb stairs etc. If the landlord is  to be refused additional accommodation  for  residential purposes  merely  because the tenant is making  use  of  the leased  portion  for nonresidential  purposes  the  landlord would  be  placed in an awful predicament. Similarly.  if  a landlord bona fide requires additional accommodation for his business and his business would suffer serious detriment  if he  cannot secure additional accommodation, it  would  cause great  hardship and gave injustice to the landlord if he  is to  be  denied accommodation merely because  the  tenant  is making  use of the leased portion for residential  purposes. It is, therefore, that the Legislature has provided  Section 10(3)(c)  in its present form so that a landlord  bona  fide

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requiring additional accommodation is not confronted with  a permanently  irremediable  situation. In  its  anxiety  that Section 10(3)(c) should fully serve the purpose for which it has  been  enacted the Legislature has also  added  the  non obstante  clause.  Having regard to the  object  of  Section 10(3)(c)  and the terms in which it is worded there is  war- rant  and  justification for holding that the  non  obstante clause has been provided to have overriding effect over both the  restrictions  placed by Section 10(3)(a)(i)  and  (iii) viz.  landlord  seeking eviction of a tenant should  not  be occupying  a building of his own and secondly the nature  of user of the leased property by the tenant must correspond to the nature of the requirement of the landlord.     In  construing Section 10(3)(c) it is pertinent to  note that the words used are "any tenant" and not "a tenant"  who can be called upon to vacate the portion in his  occupation. The word "any" has the following meaning:-               "Some; one out of many; an indefinite  number.               One  indiscriminately  of  whatever  kind   or               quantity."                         Word "any" has a diversity of  mean-               ing  and may be employed  to  indicate   "all"               or   "every"  as well as "some" or  "one"  and               its  meaning in a given statute  depends  upon               the  context  and the subject  matter  of  the               statute.                         It   is   often   synonymous    with               "either", "every" or "all". Its generality may               be  restricted by context; (Black’s  Law  Dic-               tionary; Fifth Edition).     Unless the legislature had intended that both classes of tenants  can be asked to vacate by the Rent  Controller  for providing the. landlord additional accommodation. be it  for residential or non-residential 1187 purposes.  it would not have used the word "any" instead  of using the letter "a" to denote a tenant.     Thirdly  it  is  significant to note that  there  is  no reference  in  clause (c) to the nature of the user  of  the tenant  occupying  the leased portion of the  building  viz. whether  he  is using it for residential  or  nonresidential purposes.  If it was the intention of the  legislature  that only a tenant occupying a residential portion of a  building can be asked to vacate for providing additional  residential accommodation  to the landlord and correspondingly a  tenant occupying  a portion of a building for non-residential  pur- poses  alone  being asked to vacate for  the  nonresidential requirements  of  the landlord, the legislature  would  have provided specific stipulations to that effect in clause (c). On that ground also it must be construed that clause (c) has been  provided.  in order to enable a landlord to  seek  the eviction of any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the  remaining part of the building for residential or  non- residential purposes for satisfying the additional needs  of the  landlord irrespective of whether the need is for  resi- dential or business purposes.     The  words "as the case may be" in sub clause  (c)  have been  construed  by the Division Bench of  the  Madras  High Court  to  mean that they restrict the landlord’s  right  to secure  additional  accommodation for  residential  purposes only in respect of a residential building and in the case of additional  accommodation  for business purpose  only  to  a non-residential  building.  We are of the view that  in  the context  of sub-clause (c). the words "as the case  may  be" would  only  mean "whichever the case may  be"  i.e.  either

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residential or non-residential.     To  sum up, the requirement of additional  accommodation pertains to the need of the landlord and the manner of  user of the portion of the building already in his occupation and consequently the bona fides of his requirement will outweigh all the restrictions imposed by Section 10(3)(a) i.e. nature of the building. nature of user of the leased portion by the tenant  etc.  Even  so, the Legislature has  taken  care  to safeguard the interests of the tenant by means of the provi- sos  to the sub-clause. The first proviso enjoins  the  Con- troller  to  balance the interests of the landlord  and  the tenant and to refuse eviction if the hardship caused to  the tenant  will  outweight  the advantage to  the  landlord  by reason  of  the  evicton. The second  proviso  empowers  the Controller  to  grant  adequate time to the  tenant  upto  a maximum  of three months to vacate the building  and  secure accommodation elsewhere. It. there.fore. follows that once a landlord is able to satisfy the 1188 Controller that he is bona fide in need of additional accom- modation  for  residential or non-residential  purposes  and that  the advantage derived by him by an order  of  eviction will outweigh the hardship caused to the tenant, then he  is entitled  to an order of eviction irrespective of any  other consideration.     In  the light of our conclusion we approve the ratio  in K.  Prasuramaiah v. Lakshmamma, (supra) and  disapprove  the ratio in Thirupathy v. Kanta Rao. (supra).     The third and fourth question posed for consideration do not  present  any difficulty. The Rent Controller  has  gone into  the  question of comparative hardship and  rendered  a finding  in  favour of the respondents. The High  Court  has observed  that the Appellate Authority. while reversing  the order.  has  failed to take due note of  relevant  materials placed  by the respondents. The High Court  has,  therefore, held  that  the  Appellate Authority’s  findings  have  been vitiated  because of its non-advertance to the evidence  and the apparent errors noticed in its assessment of the compar- ative  hardship between the parties. In so far as  the  High Court interfering with the findings of the Appellate Author- ity is concerned, the High Court has justified its action by pointing  out  that Appellate Authority  had  applied  wrong tests  and  had also failed to give effect  to  unchallenged findings  of the Rent Controller and hence the order of  the Appellate  Authority  suffered from manifest errors  in  the exercise of its jurisdiction. The High Court was, therefore. entitled  to allow the revision and consequently  the  third and fourth contentions also fail.     In the result we find no merit in the appeal and accord- ingly it will stand dismissed. Mr. Sampath, learned  counsel for  the appellant made a request that in the event  of  the appeal being dismissed, the appellant should be given suffi- ciently  long  time to secure another godown and  shift  his stock of goods to that place. Mr. Padmanabhan learned  coun- sel for the respondents very fairly stated that the respond- ents  are  agreeable  to give time  to  the  appellant  till 31.12.87 to vacate the leased portion. Accordingly we  order that  in spite of the dismissal of the appeal the  appellant will  have  time till 31.12.87 to vacate  the  ground  floor premises  in his occupation and deliver peaceful and  vacant possession to the respondents subject however to the  appel- lant  filing  an  under-taking in the usual  terms  in  this behalf within 4 weeks from today failing which the  respond- ents will be entitled to recover possession of the  building forthwith. The parties will bear their respective costs.

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P.S.  S                                         Appeal  dis- missed. 1189