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PETITIONER: SHRI ABHEY RAM & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       22/04/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD, G.B. PATTANAIK

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted. Heard counsel for the parties.      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment of the  Division Bench  of the High Court of Delhi passed on 2.3.1987 in C.W. No. 2657/85.      Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  (for short  the "Act")  was published on November 5,1980 acquiring  a large  extent of land admeasuring 50,000 bighas  situated   in  several  villages  including  Khirkee village. The  land in Khirkee Village admeasures 1011 bighas of which  the appellant  is  in  possession  of  25  bighas. Declaration under  Section 6  was published on June 7, 1985. Challenging the  declaration, several writ petitions came to be filed  in the High Court. The primary contention was that the declaration  having been  published after  3  years,  is barred by  law. The  notification under  Section 4(1) stands lapsed.  Similar   to  the   appellants,   several   persons approached the High Court. The Full Bench in Balak Ram Gupta v.  Union  of  India,  [C.W.P.  No.1639/85  decided  on  May 27,1987] upheld  the  validity  of  the  notification  under Section 4(1)  and declaration  under Section 6 on the ground that some  of the  land owners  whose land was covered under the common  notification  under  Section  4(1)  had  already approached the  High Court  and  obtained  stay  of  further proceedings  including   publication  of  declaration  under Section 6. As a consequence, the stay obtained continuing in operation stood  excluded by  operation of Explanation II to Section  6(1)  of  the  Act.  Accordingly,  the  declaration published under Section 6(1) was held valid in law. When the present writ  petition had come up for hearing, the Division Bench of  the High  Court passed  an order  stating that the controversy raised  was covered  by the judgment of the full Bench and  no other  point has  been raised or argued before the Division  Bench. The  writ petition  has been dismissed. Thus this appeal by special leave.      Shri Rajinder Sachhar, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, contends that the view taken by the Full Bench of  the High  Court is  not correct in law. In view of the fact  that the  appellants had  not  obtained  any  stay pending the  writ petition  qua the  appellants, there is no

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prohibition for  the respondent U.O.I. to proceed further by publicating  the  declaration  under  Section  6  and  that, therefore, the  declaration  having  been  published  beyond three years,  is invalid  in law.  He further  contends that after the  Full Bench  judgment was rendered, the matter was remitted  to   the  Division   Bench,  which   quashed   the declaration  under   Section  6   on  the  ground  that  the objections filled  under  Section  5A  were  not    properly considered  and   that,  therefore,   publication   of   the declaration under  Section 6  was quashed in respect of t he writ petitioners  therein. The same benefits should inure to the appellants  as  well.  In  support  thereof,  he  placed reliance on  the judgment of this Court in Delhi Development Authority v.  Sudan Singh & Ors. [1991 Delhi Law times 602]. He also  sought  support  from  the  judgment  in  Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nndoliya v. State of Gujarat & Anr. [(1991) 4 SCC 531]. Learned  counsel for  the respondents,  on  the  other hand, contends  that  the  appellants  have  not  filed  any objections before the Land Acquisition Collector for enquiry under Section  5-A. Therefore,  the need  to consider  their objections  does   not  arise.  The  Division  Bench,  after remittance,  confined   the  controversy   of  quashing  the declaration in respect of the lands of the writ petitioners. Therefore, it  operates only with regard to them and not the persons who were not  eonominee parties to that judgment. In fact, many  persons had  accepted the  award,  received  the compensation and  sought and  had reference.  Therefore, the publication of  the declaration  under Section 6 was not bad in law on the ground of non-consideration of the objections. Under these  circumstances, the view taken by the Full Bench is correct in law.      Having regard  to  the  respective  contentions,    the questions that  arises   for consideration  is: whether  the view taken by the Division Bench and the Full Bench in Balak Ram Gupta’s  case is  correct in  law:  It  is  an  admitted position that  notification under section 4(1) was published on November  5, 1980  and the declaration under section 6(1) came to  be published  on June 7, 1985. Therefore, ex facie, it is  beyond three  years as contemplated under the proviso to Section  6(1) of  the Act.  The question  is: whether the stay obtained by some of the persons would inure the benefit to other  persons under  Explanation II  to Section 6? It is seen that  notification  under  Section  4(1)  is  a  common notification with  reference to all the lands situated in 12 villages. The Full Bench has noted in Paragraph 6 as under :      "6. In  the cases  before  us,  the      declaration under S. 6 were made on      27.5.1985  ,6.6.1985,7.6.1985   and      26.2.1986 (the  individual  details      of which need not be set out here).      This is  clearly beyond a period of      three years  from the  dates of the      notifications   under   S.4,   viz.      5.11.1980 and  25.11.1980. They are      clearly barred  by limitation under      the proviso  t o S. 6(1) unless the      period  can   be  got  extended  by      invoking   the    terms   of    the      explanation  newly  substituted  in      1984 (which  is the  attempt of the      respondents here)."      It has extracted the various orders passed by the Court from time  to time in paragraphs 20,21 and 22 which reads as under:      "20. It may be useful here to refer

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    to  the   stay  orders   which  the      respondents rely on to bring the S.      6 declarations  within the scope of      the explanation.  In Munni  Lal  v.      Lt.  Governor   (CW  426  of  1981)      wherein   the   validity   of   the      notification dated  25.11.1980  was      challenged by  certain residents of      village  Satbari,   the   following      interim  order  was  passed  in  CM      668/81 on 18.3.1981.      ’Case   for   27.4.1981.   in   the      meanwhile, respondents  1 and 2 are      restrained   from    issuing    any      declaration under S. 6’      The above  interim order  was  made      absolute on  4.5.1981,  when    the      writ petition was admitted.;      ’Stay order passed on 18.31981 made      absolute till  further orders  with      liberty    to    the    appropriate      authorities of  the respondents  to      take action according to law if the      existing conditions and requirement      of the  Master Plan and Zonal Plan,      if any, are breached or violated by      the petitioners.’      This writ petition was dismissed on      15.11.1983  (see   ILR  2130).   In      Laguna  Farms   (p)  Ltd.   v.  Lt.      Governor  (CW   1251/81)  also  the      petitioner challenged  the validity      of  the   S.4  notification   dated      25.11.80.  The  writ  petition  was      admitted on 26.5.81 when an interim      order in  the following  terms  was      also made in CM  1717/81.      ’Notice  for   29.7.1981.  In   the      meanwhile,    we    stay    further      proceedings in  consequence of  the      impugned notification under S.4 and      declaration   under   S.   6   Land      Acquisition Act’.      This order  was  made  absolute  on      29.7.1981 and this C. W  along with      a  number   of  other   C.Ws.,  was      disposed of 15.11.83 along with C.W      426/81. In  Gogia v.  Lt.  Governor      (CW 175/82)  the writ  petition was      admitted  on   21.182.  An  interim      order was  made in  C.M. 250/82  on      the  same   date  staying  "further      proceedings  in  pursuance  of  the      impugned     notification     dated      25.11.80."  This   order  was  made      absolute on 4.3.82 "with liberty to      the respondents  to move this Court      for variation  of the  order, if so      advised,  "This   C.W.   was   also      disposed of on 15.11.83  along with      C.W. 426/81  (though  the  list  of      cases  given  at  the  top  of  the      judgment in  C.W 175/81, apparently      by oversight).  An order similar in      terms to  that set  out  above  was

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    made on  11.2.82  in  CM4514/81  in      Ansal Housing  & Estates  Pvt. ltd.      v. Lt. Governor (CW 2451/81), Vijay      Narain   v.    Lt.   Governor   (CW      2450/81). Smt. Bherco Duggal v. Lt.      Governor (CW 2468/81), Daryao Singh      v.  Lt.   Governor  (CW   2135/82).      Except   the   last,   other   were      disposed of  on 15.11.83  with   CW      426/81.      21.   The    operation    of    the      notification  dated  5.11.1980  was      stayed in  similar terms  by orders      dated 30.9.81  and  11.2.82  in  CM      4226/81 in  CW  2263/81  (Bishamber      Dayal  v.  Lt.  Governor),  a  writ      petition  filed   by  some  of  the      residents   of   the   village   of      Tughlakabad    following    similar      orders  in   Om  Prakash   v.   Lt.      Governor (CW  1250/81). These  writ      petitions were  also disposed of on      15.11.83.  But  this  list  is  not      exhaustive and  it  appears,  there      are other writ petitions pending in      this court  today in which the stay      order passed  continues  to  be  in      force (e.g. CW 861/82).      22. Reference has also been made on      behalf  of   the   petitioners   to      certain orders  in CW 1203/82 (Budh      Vihar  Welfare   Society   v.   Lt.      Governor), though  that was  a writ      petition   which   challenged   the      validity  of   a  S.4  notification      dated  31.12.1981.  In  that  case,      the Court  had granted  an  interim      order on  23.4.82 "restraining  the      respondents  from   taking  further      proceedings in  consequence of  the      impugned notification  "  and  this      was apparently, later made absolute      till disposal of the writ petition.      The  Petitioner   thereafter  moved      C.M.315/84  on  24.1.1984  alleging      that       "the   respondents   are      misinterpreting the  aforesaid stay      order  and   are  saying  that  the      aforesaid stay  order is in respect      of the  entire village  of Rithala"      and praying, therefore, that as the      petitioners  had  prayed  for  stay      only in respect of their lands, the      court should  be please "to clarify      the order  dated 23.4.1982  to  the      effect that  the stay  is only   in      respect of  the petitioners  ’land,      Khasra  Nos.  of  which  have  been      mentioned in  the  writ  petition".      The above position was contested by      the Union of India which urged that      the stay order had been granted qua      notification under  S.4 and was not      in  respect   of  particular  land.      After  hearing  both  parties,  the

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    court  passed  following  order  on      24.2.1984.      "We   do    not   understand   that      clarification is needed. The prayer      in CM 1759/82 was in respect of the      petitioners’   land.   It   follows      necessarily that  the interim order      we passed  was  in  regard  to  the      petitioners. No  further order  is,      therefore, necessary."      22A. The  petitioners also  seek to      derive support from an order passed      by this  Court  on    7.8.1985  CCP      152/82 in CW 861 of 1982 (Manakvala      v.   Chaudhary).    That   contempt      petitioner was  moved  because  the      respondents had  made a declaration      under S.6  in respect of some lands      covered by  the notification  under      S.4  dated  25.11.1980  during  the      subsistence of  a stay order at the      request of some petitioners who had      challenged the  said  notification.      The court observed:      ‘It is no doubt true that there was      stay of  other proceedings  but  in      land  acquisition   matters  it  is      really the  dispossession which  is      of  consequence.  Apart  from  this      position, a  large number  of other      lands were  obviously  the  subject      matter of  notification  under  S.4      and 6  and it could not be expected      that the  authorities should  delay      further acquisition  proceedings in      regard to them.      Mere notification  under S.6 may be      technically  not   right  qua   the      petitioners  but  we  cannot  agree      that it amounts to contempt calling      for any action.      Of course,  as long  as stay  order      stands   dispossession    of    the      petitioners cannot  take place  and      no  one   has  passed   the   order      ordering dispossession. Dismissed."      Ultimately, after  consideration of  all the respective contentions, the  Full Bench  has observed  in paragraphs 30 and 31 which read as under:      "30.   Secondly   the   nature   of      proceedings in  which  stay  orders      are   obtained    are   also   very      different from  the old  pattern of      suits confined  to parties in their      scope   and   effect.   Section   4      notifications  are   challenged  in      writ  petitions   and  it   is  now      settled law  that in  this type  of      proceedings, the principle of locus      standi stands  considerably dluted.      Any  public   spirited  person  can      challenge    the     validity    of      proceedings   of   acquisition   on      general grounds  and when  he  does      this the  litigation is  not  inter

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    parties  simpliciter   :  It  is  a      public  interest  litigation  which      affects   wider    interests.   The      grounds   of   challenge   to   the      notification   may    be    nothing      personal    to    the    particular      landholder but are, more often than      not,  grounds   common  to  all  or      substantial  blocks   of  the  land      owners.  In  fact,  this  group  of      petitions  now   listed  before  us      raise practically  same contentions      just as  the previous batch of writ      petition      challenging       the      notifications  under   S.4   raised      certain  common   contentions.   To      accept  the   contention  that  the      challenges and  their  lands  would      virtually  provide   persons   with      common  interests   with  a  second      innings. If  the initial  challenge      succeeds, all of them benefit; and,      if for  some reason  that fails and      the second  challenge succeeds on a      ground  like   the  one   presently      raised,   the    first   batch   of      petitioners  also   get  indirectly      benefited    because     of     the      impossibility      of       partial      implementation of  the  scheme  for      which the acquisition is intended,"      "31. We  have, therefore,  to  give      full effect  to the language of the      section  and  the  stay  orders  in      question, in  the above context and      background. The  use  of  the  Word      "any"    in     the     explanation      considerably  amplifies  its  scope      and   shows    clearly   that   the      explanation can  be invoked  in any      case if  some action  or proceeding      is stayed.  It may  be  a  complete      stay of the operation of the entire      notification  or   may  even  be  a      partial stay-partial  in degree  or      in regard  to persons  or lands  in      respect of  whom it  will  operate.      The words  used in  the explanation      are of  the  widest  amplitude  and      there is  no justification whatever      to confine  its terms and operation      only to the cases in which the stay      order is actually obtained".      It concluded  in  paragraph  39  as      under:      "39.  We   have,  for  the  reasons      stated   above,    come   to    the      conclusion that  the period  during      which stay  orders  were  in  force      should be excluded in computing the      validity of  the  declaration under      S.6  so  far  as  the  notification      dated  25.11.80  is  concerned,  we      find that  the latest  of  the  S.6      declarations was  on 269.2.86.  The

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    stay order (in C.M.P 668/81) was in      operation from  18.381 to  15.11.83      i.e. for  a period  of 2  years,  7      months  and   27  days.  They  are,      therefore,  in   time  having  been      issued within  three years  plus  2      years 3  months,  i.e.  5  years  3      months  of   the  S.4  notification      dated 15.11.1980  is concerned,  we      find that  the latest  of  the  S.6      declaration  was   issued  7.6.1980      i.e. 4 years 7 months after the S.4      notification. The stay order in CMP      4226//81 Was operative from 30.9.81      to 15.11.83,  i.e. for  2 years and      1-1/2 months.  In  this  period  is      excluded the  declaration is within      time. we answer the principal issue      debated before us accordingly."      Accordingly, the  Full Bench has upheld the validity of the notification.  It is true, as contended by  Mr. Rajinder Sachhar,  that  the  Division  Bench  after  remittance  has quashed the  declaration  published  under  Section  6.  The operative part thereof reads as under:      "The  orders  of  Land  Acquisition      Collectors under  Section  5-A  and      the under  section 6  of  the  Land      Acquisition   Act   together   with      further      land       acquisition      proceedings in  all the  above writ      petitions are quashed and set aside      with cost.  There shall  be two set      of counsel’s  fees  at  Rs.  1500/-      each as   the  group  of  petitions      were heard  mainly in  the two writ      petitioners   .   The   respondents      affidavits in  all the petitions as      it was  agreed to complete two sets      of    petitions     with    counter      affidavits.  The   rule   is   made      absolute. ’Reasons to follow’.      Therefore, the  reasons given in B.R. Gupta v. U.O.I. & Ors.[37{1989)  Delhi   Law  Times   150]  are  obvious  with reference  to   the  quashing  of  the  publication  of  the declaration under  section 6  vis-a-vis the writ petitioners therein. The  question  thus  arise  for  consideration  is: whether the  stay obtained  by some  of  t  he  persons  who prohibited  the   respondents  from   publication   of   the declaration under  section 6  would equally be extendible to the cases  relating to  the appellants?  We proceed  on  the premise that the appellants had not obtained any stay of the publication of  the declaration  but since the High Court in some of the cases has, in fact, prohibited them as extracted hereinbefore,   from   publication   of   the   declaration, necessarily,  when   the  court   has  not   restricted  the declaration  in  the  impugned  orders  in  support  of  the petitioners therein,  the officers  had to  hold back  their hands till  the matters are disposed of. In fact, this Court has  given  extended  meaning  to  the  orders  of  stay  or proceeding in  various cases,  namely, Yusufbhai  Noormohmed Nendoliya v.  State of  Gujarat &  Anr. [(1991)  4 SCC 531], Hansraj Jain  v. state  of Maharashtra  & Ors.  [1993 (4) JT 360], Sangappa  Gurulingappa Sajjan  v. State of Karnataka & Ors. [(1994)  4 SCC  145], Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. etc.  etc. v.  State of  Rajasthan &  Ors. [1993 (8) JT

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194], G.  Narayanaswamy Reddy (dead) by Lrs. & Anr. v. Govt. of Karnataka & Anr. [1991 (8) JT 12] and Roshnara Begum etc. v. U.O.I  & Ors. [1986 (1) Apex Decision 6]. The words "stay of the action or proceeding’ have been widely interpreted by this court  and mean  that any  type of the orders passed by this Court  would be an inhibitive action on the part of the authorities  to   proceed  further.   When  the   action  of conducting an enquiry under Section 5-A was put in issue and the declaration  under section 6 was questioned, necessarily unless the  Court  holds  that  enquiry  under  Section  5-A properly  conducted  and  the  declaration  published  under Section 6  to be valid, it would not be open to the officers to proceed  further into  the matter.  As a consequence, the stay granted  in respect  of some  would  be  applicable  to others also who had not obtained stay in that behalf. We are not concerned  with the correctness of the earlier direction with regard  to Section  5-A enquiry  and  consideration  of objections as it was not challenged by the respondent union. We express  no opinion on its correctness, though it is open to doubt.      The question  then arises  is: whether  the quashing of the declaration  by the  Division Bench  in respect  of  the other matters  would enure  the benefit  to  the  appellants also?   Though,   prima   facie,   the   argument   of   the learned counsel is  attractive, on  deeper consideration, it is difficult  to give  acceptance to  the contention,  it is difficult to  give  acceptance  to  the  contention  of  Mr. Sachhar. When  the  Division  Bench  expressly  limited  the controversy to  the quashing of the declaration qua the writ petitioners before the Bench, necessary consequence would be that the  declaration published under Section 6 should stand upheld.      It is seem that before t he Division Bench Judgment was rendered, the petition of the appellants stood dismissed and the appellants  had filed the special leave petition in this Court. If  it were  a case  entirely relating  to Section  6 declaration  as   has  been   quashed  by  the  High  Court, necessarily that  would enure  the benefit  to others  also, though they did not file any petition, except to those whose lands were  taken possession of and were vested in the State under Sections  16 and  17(2)  of  the  Act  free  from  all encumbrances.  But  it  is  seen  that  the  Division  Bench confined the  controversy to the quashing of the declaration under Section  6 in  respect of  the persons  qua  the  writ petitioners  before  the  Division  Bench.  Therefor,    the benefit of  the quashing  of the declaration under Section 6 by the Division Bench does not enure to the appellants.      It is  true that  a Bench  of this Court has considered the effect of such a quashing in Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan  Singh &  Ors. etc. reported in [45(1991) Delhi Law Times 602  (sc)].  But,  unfortunately,  in  that  case  the operative part  of the  judgment referred to earlier has not been brought  to t  he notice  of this Court. Therefore, the ratio therein  has no application to the facts in this case. It is  also true  that in  Yusufbhai Noormohmed  Nendoliya’s case (supra),  this court  had also  observed that  it would enure the  benefit to those petitioners. In view of the fact that the notification under Section 4(1) is a composite on e and equally  the declaration  under Section   6  is  also  a composite one,  unless the  declaration under  Section 6  is quashed in  toto, it  does not operate as if that the entire declaration requires  to be  quashed. It  is seen  that  the appellants had not filed any objections to the notice issued under Section 5-A.      Under these circumstances, there is no need to consider

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their objections,  as pointed  out by  the Division Bench of the High  Court in  Delhi Development Authority case (supra) which, relied on by Mr. Sachhar, has no application. Thus we hold that  the declaration  qua the  appellants has not been barred by  proviso to  Section 6  nor is  it vitiated by any error of law warranting interference.      The appeal is dismissed. No costs.