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PETITIONER: SHRI A. C. AGGARWAL SUB-DIVISIONAL MAGISTRATE,DELHI & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MST. RAM KALI, ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/08/1967

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. WANCHOO, K.N. (CJ) BACHAWAT, R.S. RAMASWAMI, V. MITTER, G.K.

CITATION:  1968 AIR    1            1968 SCR  (1) 205  CITATOR INFO :  R          1975 SC2473  (12)  F          1977 SC 740  (10)  R          1980 SC 161  (14)

ACT: Suppression  of immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act  (104 of  1956),  s.  18(1)--If  violative  of  Art.  14  of   the Constitution--Duty  of  Magistrate when  cognizable  offence under ss. 3 or 7 disclosed.

HEADNOTE: Section  18 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic  in  Women and  Girls  Act,  1956, provides for two  classes  of  cases namely,  (1) those coming under ss. 3 or 7 as well as  under s.  18, and (2) those coming only under s. 18.   Sections  3 and  7 provide for the punishment of persons guilty  of  the offences  mentioned  therein after a regular trial,  with  a right  of  appeal.   Section 18  is  a  preventive  measure, dealing  with  premises,  and is intended  to  minimise  the chance  of  a  brothel being run near a  public  place,  and provides for a summary enquiry.  [211 D-E; G-H]. In the present case, on the strength of reports submitted by the  police  to him, the  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate  passed orders  under s. 18 (1) with respect to certain premises  in the  occupation  of the respondents.   They  challenged  the validity  of the section, and the High Court held  that  the section violated Art. 14 of the Constitution. In appeal to this Court, Held,:    Section  18 provides for two distinct  classes  of cases  and  the  classification  being  reasonable  is   not violative   of  Art.  14  of  the  Constitution.   But   the proceedings taken by the Magistrate not being in  accordance with  law  should  be set aside.  The  reports  disclosed  a cognizable offence under s. 3 of the Act and in such a case, the  Magistrate  cannot ignore the  cognizable  offence  and merely have recourse to s. 18, thus depriving parties of the benefit of a trial and appeal. The,  Magistrate should have taken action under s.  190  (1) (b)  of the Criminal Procedure Code after  investigation  by

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such police officer as is mentioned in s. 13 of the Act, and it  was  only after the disposal of the  cases  against  the parties that action could be taken under s. 18 if there  was occasion for it. [212 A-D]. State  of West Bengal v. Anwar AU Sarkar. [1952] S.C.R.  284 and  Delhi  Administration v. Ram.  Singh. [1962]  2  S.C.R. 694, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals No.  76-82 of 1965. Appeals from the judgment and order dated September 9,  1963 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Criminal Writs Nos. 3-D, 4-D, 5-D, 6-D, 7-D, 10-D and 12-D of 1962. B. R. L. Iyengar and R. N, Sachthey, for the appellants (in all the   appeals). G.   S. Bawa and Harbans Singh, for the respondents (in Cr. As. Nos. 76, 81 of, 1965). 206 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J.-These are companion appeals.  They were brought to this  Court on the strength of the certificates  issued,  by the High Court-of Punjab.  The only question that falls  for decision in these appeals is whether s.18 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred  to  as  the Act) is ultra vires  Art.  14  of  the Constitution.  The attack on the validity of that section on the  basis of Art-19(d), (e) and (f) was not pressed at  the time of the hearing.  Hence there is no need to examine  the said plea. The  first appellant in these appeals, Shri A. C.  Aggarwal. Sub-Divisional  Magistrate,  Delhi, issued  notices  to  the respondents in these appeals--except that in criminal appeal No.  82 of 1965-to show cause why the premises  occupied  by them  should not be attached under . (1) of the Act.   Those notices  were  issued on the basis of  police  reports  that those  premises  were  being used  as  brothers. In  reply amongst   other  pleas  those  respondents  challenged   the validity of s.18. They moved the learned magistrate to refer the  question as to the validity of S. 18 to the High  Court under s.432 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898.  As  the learned  magistrate  rejected .that prayer, they  moved  the High  Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution  in  criminal writs ’Nos. 3D to 7D and 10D of 1962, challenging the  vires of s.18. Respondent in criminal appeal No. 82 of 1962 claims to be the tenant in flat No. 54 on the first floor of  Japan Building,   which   premises  had  been  attached   in   the proceedings against one Mst.  Ambar under s.-18(1). His case was that be ’had permitted the said Mst.  Ambar to use those premise’s  temporarily  but she lad vacated  the  same and therefor he was entitled to their possession as according to him he was unaware of the fact that Mst.Ambar was using  the premises in question for an improper purpose.But the learned magistrate  rejected his application holding  that(a)  there was no satisfactory proof of the ’fact that lie was a tenant in  those promises and (b) he was aware of the unlawful  use to which the premises in question were being put.  Aggrieved ’by  that decision, ’he moved the High ’Court of  Punjab  in Ur.   Writ No,. 12-0/62 to quash :the order of  the  learned Magistrate  on  the  around that S. 18 was  ultra  vires  of Article 14. The aforementioned writ petitions were heard by Mahajan  and Shamsher Bahadur, JJ. and by a common order dated  September

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9, 1963, they Allowed those petition and quashed the notices issued to the respondents in criminal appeals Nos. 76 to  81 of 1965 . They also quashed the order refusing to raise  the attachment  in respect of flat No. 154 of which  Siri  Chand the respondent in Criminal appeal No. 82 / 65 claimed to  be the  tenant.  The learned Judges held that "whenever  action is  taken under s.18 independently of s.7, ’it would  offend Art.14 of the Constitution and to that extent s. 18 would be ultra vires of the Constitution." 207 In  the  course of their order dated 23rd  July,  1963,  the learned Judges observed:               "The  requirements  for  taking  action  under               Section  18 or under Section 7 of the Act  are               identical.   The Act leaves the choice of  the               action under one or the other provision to the               executive  in  the case of  persons  similarly               situate  and thus can lead  to  discrimination               without there being any rational basis for the               same.   The consequences of an action  in  one               case are of an extremely penal nature  whereas               in the other case, that is, under Section  18,               of comparatively inconsequential nature.   The               discrimination  can  come about where  in  the               case of a number of prostitutes, who carry  on               their profession within two hundred yards of a               public  place,  as defined in Section  7,  the               authorities  may take action against some  of’               them  under Section 18 and against the  others               under Section 7. The fact that this can happen                             is not controverted by the learned cou nsel for               the Delhi State.  We also find. no  rationable               behind  this  type  of  discrimination.   The,               scheme  of the Act also does not  provide  any               key  for such, sort of discrimination  between               persons  of  the  same  class.  and  similarly               situate". The  inhibition of Art. 14 that the State shall not deny  to any  person equality before the law or the equal  protection of  the  laws. was resigned to protect all  persons  against discrimination  by the State amongst equals and  to  prevent any  person or class of persons from being singled out as  a special  subject for discrimination and  hostile  treatment. If  law  deals equally with all of a  certain  well  defined class, it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the  charge of  denial of equal protection on the ground that it has  no application to other persons, for the class for whom the law has   been  made  is  different  from  other  persons   and, therefore, there is no discrimination against equals.  Every classification  is  in some degree likely  to  produce  some inequality  but mere production of inequality is not all  by itself enough.The inequality pruduced in order to encounter the challenge of the of the Constitution  must be the result of  some  arbitrary  step taken  by  the  State.  Reasonable classification is permitted but suchclassification  must be based upon some real and substantial distinction  bearing a  reasonable and just relation to the thing in  respect  of which  such  classification  is made.   The  presumption  is always  in favour of the constitutionality of an  enactment, since  it must be assumed that the  legislature  understands and  correctly appreciates the needs of its own people,  and its   laws  are  directed  to  problems  made  manifest   by experience  and  its discriminations are based  on  adequate grounds.

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The  contention  advanced on behalf of the  respondents  and accepted  by  the High Court, is that  s.  18  discriminates against the-, 208 person who is proceeded against under that section,  without first  being  prosecuted under s.3 or s.7 as  the  case  be, though the information laid against him discloses an offence either  under s.3 or s.7. Section 18 covers two  classes  of cases,  namely, persons who have been prosecuted  and  found guilty  of  an offence either under s.3 or s.7 as  well,  as persons not dealt with under those provisions.  In the  case of the former, they have the benefit of regular trial,  they can  crossexamine the prosecution witnesses, adduce  defence evidence  and also go up in appeal if convicted.  In  those, cases  the  result  of the proceedings  under  s.18  largely though  not entirely depends on the result of the  connected prosecution.  But in the case of the latter, i.e., those who are only proceeded against under s.18 they have only a right of  ’hearing’.   It is further urged on  their  behalf  that under s.3 or s.7 action is taken before a court, whereas the proceeding  under S. 1 8 is taken before a  magistrate.   In the  latter case the Act does not lay down the scope of  the hearing provided for. It  was  lastly urged that the facts to be  proved  both  in prosecutions under ss.3 and 7 and in proceedings under  s.18 are identical; hence, there is no justification for adopting two  widely  different  procedures.   In  support  of  their contention  that  the  difference  in  the  two   procedures prescribed  amounts  to  a  discrimination  under  Art.  14, reliance  was  placed on the decision of this Court  in  the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar(1). We  shall  now proceed to examine the correctness  of  these contentions.   The  Act  was  enacted  in  pursuance  of  an international  convention signed at New York on the 9th  day of  May, 1950.  It provides for the suppression  of  immoral traffic in women and girls.  The sections that are  material for our present purpose are 3, 7 and 18.  Section 3 provides for punishment for keeping a brothel or allowing premises to be  used  as  a  brothel.  Section  3(1)  provides  for  the conviction  and punishment of a person who keeps or  manages ,or  acts  or  assists in the keeping or  management  of,  a brothel.   Sub-s.(2)  of  that  section  provides  for   the conviction  and punishment of a person who being (a)  tenant lessee or occupier or person incharge of any premises,  uses or  knowingly allows any other person to use, such  premises or any part thereof as a brothel,(b)    the owner lessor  or landlord  of any premises or the agent of such  owner,lessor or landlord, lets the premises or any part thereof with the knowledge  that the same or any part thereof is intended  to be  used as a brothel or is wilfully a party to the  use  of such premises or any part thereof, as a brothel.   "Brothel" is defined in s.2(a) as including a house, room, or place or any  portion of any house, room or place, which is used  for the  purpose of prostitution for the gain of another  person or  for  the  mutual  gain  of  two  or  more   prostitutes. "Prostitute"  is defined in s.2(e) as meaning a  female  who offers her body for promiscuous sexual intercourse for  hire whether in money or in kind. (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 284. 209 Section 7 provides for the Punishment of prostitution in  or in the vicinity of public places.  That section reads: "(1) Any woman or girl who carries on prostitution, and  the person with whom such prostitution is carried on, ’in any premises which are within a distance of two  hundred

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yards of any place of public religious worship,  educational institution,  hostel, hospital, nursing home or  such  other public  place of any kind as may be notified in this  behalf by the Commissioner of Police or District Magistrate in  the manner prescribed, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months.               (2)   Any person who-               (a)   being  the  keeper of any  public  place               knowingly permits prostitutes for purposes  of               their  trade  to resort to or remain  in  such               place; or               (b)   being  the tenant, lessee,  occupier  or               person  in charge of any premises referred  to                             in  sub-section (1) knowingly permits the  same               or   any   part  thereof  to  be.   used   for               prostitution; or               (c)   being  the owner, lessor or landlord  of               any  premises referred to in sub-section  (1),               or   the  agent  of  such  owner,  lessor   or               landlord,  lets the same or any  part  thereof               with  the knowledge that the same or any  part               thereof  may be used for prostitution,  or  is               wilfully  a  party  to  such  use,  shall   be               punishable    on   first    conviction    with               imprisonment  for a term which may  extend  to               three months, or with fine which may extend to               two  hundred rupees, or with both, and in  the               event  of  a second or  subsequent  conviction               with imprisonment for a term which may  extend               to  six  months and also with fine  which  may               extend to two hundred rupees.". Public  place  is defined in s. 2(h) as  meaning  any  place intended for use by or accessible to the public and includes and public conveyance.               Now we may refer to s. 18.  It reads: -                "  (1)  A  Magistrate,  may,  on  receipt  of               information from the police or otherwise, that               any house, room, place or any portion  thereof               within a distance of two hundred yards of  any               public place referred to in sub-section (1) of               section  7, is being run or used as a  brothel               by any person, or is being used by prostitutes               for  carrying on their trade, issue notice  on               the owner, lessor 210               or landlord of such house, room, place or por-               tion  or  the agent of the  owner,  lessor  or               landlord  or on the tenant,  lessee,  occupier               of,  or  any other person in  charge  of  such               house, room, place, or portion, to show  cause               within seven days of the receipt of the notice               why  the  same  should  not  be  attached  for               improper  user thereof; and if, after  hearing               the   person  concerned,  the  Magistrate   is               satisfied  that  the house,  room,  place,  or               portion  is  being, used as a brothel  or  for               carrying on prostitution, then the  Magistrate               may pass orders-               (a)   directing   eviction  of  the   occupier               within seven days of the passing of the  order               from the house, room, place, or portion;               (b)   directing  that  before letting  it  out               during  the  period of  one  year  immediately               after  the  passing of the order,  the  owner,

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             lessor or landlord or the agent of the  owner,               lessor  or landlord shall obtain the  previous               approval of the Magistrate: Provided  that,  if  the Magistrate finds  that  the  owner, lessor or landlord as well as the agent of the owner, lessor or landlord, was innocent of the improper user of the house, room, place or portion, he may cause the same to be restored to the owner, lessor or landlord, or the agent of the owner, lessor  or landlord, with a direction that the house,  room, place or portion shall not be leased out, or otherwise given possession  of, to or for the benefit of the person who  was allowing the improper user therein. (2)  A  Court  convicting  a person  of  any  offence  under section  3  or section 7 may pass orders  under  sub-section (1), without further notice to such person to show cause  as required in that sub-section. (3)  Orders  passed  by the Magistrate or court  under  sub- section  (1)  or  sub-section (2) shall not  be  subject  to appeal and shall not be stayed or set aside by the order  of any  court,  civil or criminal, and the  said  orders  shall cease to have validity after the expiry of one year: Provided that where a conviction under section 3 or  section 7  is  set aside on appeal on the ground  that  such  house, room, place or any portion thereof is not being run or  used as  a  brothel  or  is not being  used  by  prostitutes  for carrying on their trade, any order passed by the trial court under sub-section (1) shall also be set aside. 211               (4)   Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in               any  other  law for the time being  in  force,               when  a Magistrate passes an order under  sub-               section (1), or a court passes an order  under               sub-section (2), any lease or agreement  under               which  the  house, room, place or  portion  is               occupied  at  the time shall become  void  and               inoperative.               (5)   When  an owner, lessor or  landlord,  or               the  agent of such owner, lessor  or  landlord               fails  to comply with a direction given  under               clause  (b)  of sub-section (1)  he  shall  be               punishable with fine which may extend to  five               hundred rupees or when he fails to comply with               a  direction  under the proviso to  that  sub-               section, he shall be deemed to have  committed               an offence under clause (b) of sub-section (2)               of section 3 or clause (c) of sub-section  (2)               of  section  7,  as  the  case  may  be,  and,               punished accordingly." Sections  3  and  7 provide for the  punishment  of  persons guilty of the offences mentioned therein.  Any contravention of the provisions mentioned therein amounts to a  cognizable offence  in view of section 14, whereas a  proceeding  under s.18  is  in  no sense a prosecution.  It  is  a  preventive measure.  It is intended to minimise the chance of a brothel being run or prostitution being carried on in premises  near about   public   places.    Naturally,  in   the   case   of prosecutions,  a  regular trial with a right  of  appeal  is provided  for.  The enquiry contemplated by s.18 is  summary in character. The  attachment contemplated by that section can enure  only for  a  period  of  one  year.   Under  these  circumstances evidently  the Legislature thought that a regular trial  and an appeal against the order of the magistrate is not  called for.   In these cases it is unnecessary for us to spell  out the  scope of the expression "hearing" found in s.18. It  is

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necessary  to  remember that ss.3 and 7  deal  with  persons guilty  of  offences whereas s.18 deals  with  the  premises mentioned therein.  It is not correct to say that the set of facts  to be proved in prosecutions under ss.3 or 7  and  in proceedings  under  s.18 are identical.  In the  former  the prosecution to succeed has to establish either the intention or knowledge referred to therein but in the latter they  are not  necessary  ingredients.  Section 18  provides  for  two classes of cases namely, (1) those coming either under s.  3 or 7 as well as under s. 18 and (2) those coming only  under s.   18.    They  are  two  distinct  classes   of   cases-a classification  which has reasonable relationship  with  the object sought to be achieved and therefore falls outside the rule laid down by this Court in Anwar Ali Sarkar’s(1) case. (1) [1962] S.C.R. 284. (N)1SCI-15(a) 212 From  the copies of the reports made in these cases  to  the magistrate by the police-made available to us at the hearing of  these  appeals-it is clear that they  disclose  offences under s.3 against the respondents.  Therefore, the  question is   whether  the  magistrate  can  choose  to  ignore   the cognizable offence complained of and merely have recourse to s.18  and thus deprive the parties proceeded against of  the benefit of a regular trial as well as the right of appeal in the event of their conviction.  Bearing in mind the  purpose of these provisions as well as the scheme of the Act and  on a  harmonious construction of the various provisions in  the Act,  we are of the opinion that in cases like those  before us  the magistrate who is also a court as provided  in  s.22 must  at  the  first instance proceed  against  the  persons complained  against under the penal provisions in ss.3 or  7 as  the  case may be, and only after the disposal  of  those cases  take action under s.18 if there is occasion  for  it. Under  s.190(1)(b)  of the Code of Criminal  Procedure,  the magistrate  is  bound to take cognizance of  any  cognizable offence brought to his notice.  The words "may. take  cogni- zance" in the context means "must take, cognizance".  He has no discretion in the matter, otherwise that section will  be violative   of  Art.  14.   But  as  laid  down   in   Delhi Administration v. Ram Singh(1) only an officer mentioned  in s.13  can  validly  investigate an offence  under  the  Act. Hence  if the cases before us had been investigated by  such an  officer,  there is no difficulty for the  magistrate  to take cognizance of those cases.  Otherwise it is open to him to direct fresh investigations by competent police  officers before deciding whether the facts placed before him disclose any cognizable offence. In  the  result, we hold, for the reasons  mentioned  above, that the proceedings taken by the learned magistrate against the  respondents  are not in accordance with law as  he  has proceeded  against  them  under s.18  without  first  taking action under s.3. For that reason we uphold the  conclusions reached  by the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court  but on  grounds  other than those relied on by them.   But  this conclusion  of  ours does not debar the  learned  magistrate from  taking  fresh proceedings against the  respondents  in accordance with law as explained by us earlier. In the result, these appeals fail and are dismissed.                                   Appeals dismissed. V.P.S. (1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 694. 213

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