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PETITIONER: SHREENATH & ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJESH & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       13/04/1998

BENCH: K. VENKATASWAMI, A.P. MISRA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T Misra, J.      The seekers  of justice  many a time has to take a loan circuitous routes,  both on  account of  hierarchy of Courts and the  procedural law. Such persons are and can be dragged till the  last ladder  of the  said hierarchy  for receiving justice but  even here  he only breaths earness of receiving the fruits of that justice for which he has been aspiring to receive. To reach this stage is in itself an achievement and satisfaction as  the, by  then has  passed  through  a  long arduous journey  of the  procedural  law  with  may  hurdles replica of  mountain attain with ridges and furrows. When he is ready  to take  the bite  of that  fruit, he  has to pass through the  same terrain  of  the  procedural  law  in  the execution proceedings  the morose is writ large on his face. What looked  inevitable to  him to  receive it  at his hands distance is  deluded back  into the horizon. The creation of hierarchy of  Courts was  for  a  reasonable  objective  for confering greater  satisfaction to  the parties that errors, if any, by any of the lower Courts under the scruitiny  of a higher Court be rectified and long procedural laws also with good intention  to exclude  and filter  out all unwanted who may be  the cause  of obstruction  to such  seekers  in  his journey to  justice. But this obviously is one of the causes of delay in justice. Of course, under this pattern the party wrongfully gaining  within permissible limits also stretches and litigation  an much as possible. Thus, this has been the cause  of   anxiety  and  concern  of  various  authorities, Legislators  and  Courts.  How  to  eliminate  such  a  long consuming justice?  We must confess that we have still to go long  way   before  true  satisfaction  in  this  regard  is received. Even  after one reaches the stage of final decree, he has  to undergo  a long  distance by  passing through the ordained procedure  in the  execution proceedings  before he receives the bowl of justice.      The   Courts   within   its   limitations   have   been interpreting the  procedural laws  so  as  to  conclude  all possible disputes pertaining to the decreetal property which is within  fold in  an execution  proceeding i.e., including what  may  be  raised  later  by  way  of  another  bout  of

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litigations through  a fresh  suit.  Similarly  legislatures equally are  also endeavouring  by amendments to achieve the same objective.  the present  case is  one in  this  regard. Keeping this  in view, we now proceed to examine the present case.      In interpreting any procedural law, where more than one interpretation is  possible,  the  one  which  curtails  the procedure without  eluding the justice is to be adopted. The procedural law  is always  subservient to  and is  in aid to justice. Any  interpretation which  eludes or frustrates the receipient of justice is not to be followed.      This appeal arises out of the judgment and order of the High Court  of Madhya  Pradesh, Bench  at Indore,  in  Civil Revision No. 406 of 1983.      The question  raised is,  whether the  third  party  in possession of  a property  claiming independent  right as  a tenant not  party to  a decree  under execution could resist such decree  by seeking adjudication of his objections under order 21, Rule 97 of the Civil Procedure code?      The respondent  No. 1,  Rajesh, filed  a suit  for  the redemption of  his mortgage  against respondent  No.2,  Prem Shanker, which was decreed. The decree directed the delivery of vacant  possession  of  the  mortgaged  property  to  the applicant (Respondent  No.1). In  the said suit, admittedly, the present  appellants were  not parties. The decree-holder put his  decree in execution in which the present appellants obstructed on  the ground  that vacant  possession cannot be delivered in  execution because they were the tenants in the shop from  the year  1952 much  before the  execution of the mortgage which  was in the year 1962, hence, only symbolical possession can  be given.  There  has  been  two  rounds  of proceedings in  execution. Initially,  the  Executing  Court held that  the decree-holder was not entitled to take actual possession in  execution of  the  decree  against  the  non- applicants. The  case of  the decree-holder  is that  in the suit it  was held  that the  mortgagor had to deliver vacant possession to  the mortgagee.  hence he  is entitled  to get back vacant  possession. Thus   he  made strong  plea for  a vacant possession  in terms  of the  decree. For  him, it is submitted that a similar objection was taken by the judgment debtor Prem  Shanker that  only symbolic possession could be given to  the decree-holder.  The objection was negatived by the trial court, appellate court, and even by the High Court in the  second appeal.  Hence, the executing court cannot go behind the  decree. The  appellants case  is they  were  not parties to those proceedings. However, this objection of the decree-holder  was  rejected  in  the  first  round  by  the Executing Court  and the  Revisional Court  holding that the person  resisting  viz.  the  present  appellants  were  not parties to the suit nor there is any decree against them. It seems subsequently,  the decree-holder  again moved  another application in the aforesaid execution case No. 1A of 19970- 81 for delivery of vacant possession. The present appellants also moved an application/objections under order 21, Rule 97 C.P.C. resisting  that they  cannot be dispossessed in terms of the  said decree,  as they  were not  parties to the said suit nor  they are  deriving any right and title through the Judgement debtor.  They claim separate and independent legal right, not  affected either by the mortgage or redemption of the mortgage.  it is  not clear  as under what circumstances the second application for actual possession was made by the decree-holder after  the matter  was  earlier  disposed  of. Since this point seem not raised either before the Executing Court or the High Court, we are not adverting to this point. We  find   the  Executing  Court  in  the  second  round  on

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consideration of  a subsequent decision of the Full Bench of the M.P.  High Court  in  Smt.  Usha  Jain  and  others  Vs. manmohan Bajaj and others (AIR 1980 (Vol 67) M.P. 146), held that the  appellants had  no right  to object  to the decree under order 21, Rule 97. The said full Bench held :-           "The executing  Court  has  no      jurisdiction to  start  an  enquiry      suo motu  or at  the instance  of a      third party  other than the decree-      holder/aution-purchaser under 0.21,      Rule  97.   This  rule   is  merely      permissive  and  not  mandatory  so      that   the    decree-holder/aution-      purchaser not  resort to it against      his will  and may  even  apply  for      fresh warrant  under 0.21,  R.  35,      C.P.C. Executing Court is not bound      to stay  its  hands  the  moment  a      third party  files an  objection to      the execution  nor the  stay  would      continue till  an unwilling decree-      holder/auction-purchaser is  forced      to apply for investigation into the      right or title claimed by the third      party  and   negative   the   claim      therein.  If  the  executing  Court      were  to   stay  its   hands   till      investigation into  a third party’s      claim is  not finally  decided then      it would  result in  depriving  the      decree-holder of  his possession by      filing repeated spurious claims.           No enquiry  into the  title or      possession  of  a  third  party  is      contemplated at  any  rate  at  his      instance either  under Rules 35 and      36 or rules 95 and 96 of Order, 21,      C.P.C. when  the  decree-holder  or      the  auction-purchase  applies  for      obtaining possession.  Subsequently      when the decree-holder or auction -      purchaser is  met with  obstruction      or   resistancee    in    obtaining      possession, one of the options open      to him  is to  apply under  Rule 97      but  that   provision   is   merely      permissive and not mandatory and it      is    open     to    the    decree-      holdr/auction-purchaser       apply      instead  for  a  fresh  warrant  of      possession.  an   enquiry  at   the      instance  of   a  third   party  in      possession  is   contemplated  only      under  0.21.R   100  after  he  was      dispossessed and not before it.           The omission  by the executing      Court  to   investigate  into   the      objection filed  by a  third  party      does not result in injustice to the      third party. It cannot be said that      he would  have no remedy to protect      his possession  and have  his title      judicially  investigated  brief  to      his dispossession  his only  remedy      then being under order 21, Rule 100

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    after dispossession. Another remedy      available to  such a third party is      to institute  an independent  civil      suit for a declaration of his title      claiming  therein   the  relief  of      temporary injuction  to protect his      possession."      The High  Court  upheld  the  Executing  Court’s  order following the  said Full  Bench decision  of the  M.P.  High Court. hence  this appeal.  The  only  question  raised  is, whether the  Full Bench  decision is  correctly decided.  In view of this Full Bench decision, objection of the appellant was rejected  without considering the points raised on merit or other objections.      In order  to appreciate the controversy, order 21, Rule 35, order  21, Rule  36 and  order 21,  Rule 97  are  quoted hereunder :-           "O.  21.  R.  35:  Decree  for      immovable property :-           (1) Where  a decree is for the      delivery of any immovable property,      possession   thereof    shall    be      delivered to  the party  to whom it      has  been   adjudged,  or  to  such      person as he may appoint to receive      delivery on  his  behalf,  and,  if      necessary, be  removing any  person      bound by  the decree who refuses to      vacate the property.           (2) Where  a decree is for the      joint   possession   of   immovable      property, such  possession shall be      delivered by affixing a copy of the      warrant in  some conspicuous  place      on the  property and proclaiming by      beat of  drum, or  other  customary      mode, at some convenient place, the      substance of the decree.           (3) Where  a possession of any      building  is  enclosure  is  to  be      delivered   and   the   person   in      possession,  being   bound  by  the      decree,  does   not   afford   free      access,  the   court,  through  its      officers,   may,    after    giving      reasonable warning  and facility to      any woman  not appearing  in public      according to  the  customs  of  the      country to withdraw, remove or open      any lock  or bolt or break open any      door or  do any other act necessary      for putting  the  decree-holder  in      possession.           O.21, R.36 Decree for delivery      for  immovable   property  when  in      occupancy of tenant:-           Where  a  decree  is  for  the      delivery of  any immovable property      in the  occupancy of  a  tenant  or      other person entitled to occupy the      same and not bound by the decree to      relinquish  such   occupancy,   the      court shall  order delivery  to  be      made by  affixing  a  copy  of  the      warrant in  some conspicuous  place

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    on the property, and proclaiming to      the occupant  by beat  of  drum  or      other  customary   mode,  at   some      convenient place,  the substance of      the  decree   in  regard   to   the      property.           O.21, R.  97 :  Resistance  or      obstruction   to    possession   of      immovable property :-           (1)  Where  the  holder  of  a      decree  for   the   possession   of      immovable property the purchaser of      any such property sold in execution      of  a   decree   is   resisted   or      obstructed   by   any   person   in      obtaining   possession    of    the      property,   he    may    make    an      application    to     the     Court      complaining of  such resistance  or      obstruction.           (2) Where  any application  is      made under  sub rule  (1) the court      shall proceed  to  adjudicate  upon      the application  in accordance with      the provisions herein contained."      This sub-clause (2) was substituted by the Amending Act 1976. Earlier sub-clause (2) was :           "The Court  shall fix a day of      investigating the  matter and shall      summon the  party against  whom the      application is  made to  appear and      answer the same."      Under sub-clause  1 order  21, Rule  35, the  Executing Court delivers  actual physical  possession of  the disputed property to the decree-holder and, if necessary, by removing any person  bound by  the decree  who refuses  to vacate the said property.  The significant  words are  by removing  any person bound  by he  decree. Order  21, Rule 36 conceives of immovable property  when in  occupancy of  a tenant or other person  not   bound  by   the  decree,  the  Court  delivers possession  by   fixing  a  copy  of  the  warrant  in  some conspicuous place  of the  said property and proclaiming  to the occupant by beat of drum or other customary mode at some convenient place,  the substance  of the decree in regard to the property.  In other  words, the  decree-holder gets  the symbolic  possession.   Order  21,   rule  99  conceives  of resistance or  obstruction to  the possession  of  immovable property when  made in  execution  of  a  decree  by  "  any person". this  may be  either by  the person  bound  by  the decree, claiming  title through  judgment debtor or claiming independent right  of his  own including tenant not party to the suit  or even a stranger. A decree holder, in such case, may make  an application  to the Executing Court complaining such resistance, for delivery of possession of the property. Sub-clause  (2)   after  1976   substitution  empowers   the executing Courts  when such  claim is  made  to  proceed  to adjudicate upon  the applicants  claim  in  accordance  with provisions contained  hereinafter. This  refers to Order 21, Rule 101 (As ammended by 1976 Act) under which all questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties under Order 21, Rule 97 or Rule 99 shall be determined  by the  Court and  not by a separate suit, By the amendment,  one has  not to  go for a fresh suit but all matter pertaining  to that  property even if obstructed by a stranger is  adjudicated and  finality  given  even  in  the

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executing proceedings.  We find  the expression "any person" under sub-clause  (1) is  used deliberately for widening the scope of  power so that the Executing court could adjudicate the claim  made in any such application under order 21, Rule 97. Thus  by the  use of  the words ’any person’ it includes all persons resisisting the delivery of possession, claiming right in  the property  even those  not bound by the decree, includes tenants  or other  persons claiming  right on their own including a stranger.      So, under  order 21,  Rule 101 all disputes between the decree-holder and  any such  person is  to be adjudicated by the Executing  Court. A  party is not thrown out to religate itself to  the long  drawn out arduous proceedure of a fresh suit. This  is to  salvage the possible hardship both to the decree-holder and  other person  claiming title on their own right  to   get  it   adjudicated  in   the  very  execution proceedings. We find that order 21, Rule 35 deals with cases of delivery  of possession  of an  immovable property to the decree-holder by  delivery of actual physical possession and by removing  any person  in possession  who is  bound  by  a decree,  while   under  Order  21,  Rule  36  only  symbolic possession is  given where  tenant is  in actual possession. Order 21,  rule 97  as aforesaid,  conceives of  cases where delivery of  possession to  decree-holder  or  purchaser  is resisted by any person. ’Any person’ , as aforesaid, is wide enough to  include even  a person  not bound  by a decree or claiming right  in the property on his own including that of a tenant including stranger.      Prior to the 1976 Ammending Act, provisions under Order 21, Rules  97 to 101 and 103 were different which are quoted hereunder :-           "97.(1) Where  the holder of a      decree  for   the   possession   of      immovable property or the purchaser      of  any   such  property   sold  in      execution of  a decree  is resisted      or  obstructed  by  any  person  in      obtaining   possession    of    the      property he may make an application      to the  Court complaining  of  such      resistance or obstruction.      (2) The  Court shall  fix a day for      investigating the  matter and shall      summon the  party against  whom the      application is  made to  appear and      answer the same.      98. Where  the Court  is  satisfied      that the  resistance or obstruction      was  occasioned  without  any  just      cause by  the judgment debtor or by      some   other    person    at    his      instigation, it  shall direct  that      the   applicant    be   put    into      possession  of  the  property,  and      where  the   applicant   is   still      resisted or obstructed in obtaining      possession, the  court may also, at      the  instance   of  the  applicant,      order the  judgment-debtor, or  any      person acting at his instigation to      be detained in the civil prison for      a term  which may  extend to thirty      days.      99. Where  the court  is  satisfied      that the  resistance or obstruction

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    was occasioned by any person (other      than the  judgment-debtor) claiming      in good  faith to  be in possession      of the  property on his own account      or on  account of some person other      than the judgment-debtor, the Court      shall make  an order dismissing the      application.      100. (1)  Where  any  person  other      than   the    judgment-debtor    is      dispossessed of  immovable property      by the  holder of  a decree  for he      possession  of  such  property  or,      where such  property or  where such      property has been sold in execution      of  a decree, by purchaser thereof,      he may  make an  application to the      Court    complaining     of    such      dispossession.      (2) The  Court shall  fix a day for      investigating the  matter and shall      summon the  party against  whom the      application is  made an  answer the      same.      101. Where  the Court  is satisfied      that   the    applicant   was    in      possession of  the property  on his      own account  or on  account of some      person  other  than  the  judgment-      debtor, it  shall direct  that  the      applicant be put into possession of      the property.      103.  Any   party   not   being   a      judgment-debtor  against   whom  an      order is  made under  rule 98, rule      99 and  rule 101  may  institute  a      suit to  establish the  right which      he claims to the present possession      of the  property, but,  subject  to      the result  of such  suit (if any),      the order shall be conclusive."      So far  sub-clause (1) of Rule 97 the provision is same but after  1976  amendment  all  disputes  relating  to  the property made  under Rules  97 and  99 is  to be adjudicated under Rule  101, while  under unamended provision under sub- clause (2) of Rule 97, the Executing Court issues summons to any such  person obstructing  possession over  the  decretal property. After  investigation under  Rule 98  he Court puts back a  decree-holder in  possession where  the Court  finds obstruction was  occassioned without  any just  cause, while under rule  99 where obstruction was by a person claiming in good faith  to be  in possession  of the property on his own right,  the   Court  has   to  dismiss   the   decree-holder application. Thus  even prior  to 1976  right of  any person claiming right  on his  own or as a tenant, not party to the suit such person’s right has to be adjudicated under rule 99 and he  need not fall back to file a separate suit, By this, he is  saved from  a long  litigation. So  a tenant  or  any person claiming  a right  in the  property, on  his own,  if resists delivery  of possession  to  the  decree-holder  the dispute and his claim has to be decided after 1976 amendment under Rule  97 read with Rule 101 and prior to the amendment under Rule 97 read with Rule 99. However, under the old law, in cases  order  is  passed  against  the  person  resisting possession under Rule 97 read with Rule 99 then by virtue of

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Rule 103, as it then was, he has to file a suit to establish his right.  But now  after the   amendment one need not file suit even  in such  cases as  all disputes are to be settled by the Executing court itself finally under rule 101.      We find  both either  under the  old law or the present law the  right of  a tenant  or any person claiming right on his own  of the  property in  case he resists, his objection under order  21, Rule 97, has to be decided by the Executing court itself.      Rule 100  of the  old law, as referred in the aforesaid Full Bench  decision of  the madhya  Pradesh High Court is a situation different  from what  is covered by Rule 97. Under rule 100  (old law)  and Order  99 the  new law covers cases where persons  other than judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property  by the  decree-holder, of  course,  such cases are also covered to be decided by the Executing Court. but this will not defeat the right of such person to get his objection decided  under Rule  97 which  is a stage prior to his dispossession  or a  case where  he is in possession. In other  words,   when  such   person  is  in  possession  the adjudication to  be under  rule 97  and in case dispossessed adjudication to  be under  rule 100  (old law)  and Rule  99 under the  new law.  Thus a  person holding possession of an immovable property  on his  own  right  can  object  in  the execution proceeding under Order 21, rule 97. One has not to wait for  his dispossession  to enable him to participate in the execution  proceedings. This  shows that such person can object  and  get  adjudication  when  he  is  sought  to  be dispossessed by  the decree-holder.   For  all the aforesaid reasons, we  do not  find the  Full Bench  in Smt. Usha jain (supra) correctly decided the law.      In Noorduddin  Vs. Dr. K.L. Anand (1995 (1) SCC 242) it is held :-           "Para B:  Thus the  scheme  of      the Code  clearly  adumbrates  that      when an  application has  been made      under Order  21, Rule 97, the court      is enjoinded to adjudicate upon the      right, title  and interest  claimed      in the property arising between the      parties to  a proceeding or between      the decree-holder  and  the  person      claiming independent  right,  title      or  interest   in   the   immovable      property  and   an  order  in  that      behalf be  made. the  determination      shall  be  conclusive  between  the      parties  as  if  it  was  a  decree      subject or  right of appeal and not      a  matter   to  be  agitated  by  a      separate suit.  In other  words, no      other proceedings  were allowed  to      be taken.  It has  to be remembered      that preceding Civil Procedure Code      Amendement Act, 1976, right of suit      under Order  21, rule  103 of  1908      code was  available which  has been      now  taken   away.   By   necessary      implication,    the     legislature      relegated   the   parties   to   an      adjudication  of  right,  title  or      interest in  the immovable property      under execution  and  finality  has      been  accorded  to  it.  Thus,  the      scheme of the Code appears to be to

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    put an  and to  the protraction  of      the execution  and to  shorten  the      litigation between  the parties  or      persons claiming  right, title  and      interest in  the immovable property      in exeuction."      In Brahmdeo  Chaudhary Vs. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and Another (1997) (3) SCC 694), the question raised was whether a stranger  occuping the  premises on  his  own  right  when offered resistance  to the  execution of the decree obtained by the  decree holder  can or  cannot request  the Executing Court to  adjudicate his  claim without  being insisted upon that first  he must handover the possession and then move an application under Order 21, Rule 97. It is held in para 9 :-           "Para  9   :  In   short   the      aforesaid statutory  provisions  of      Order 21  lay down  a complete code      for    resolving    all    disputes      pertaining  to   execution  of  the      decree for possession obtained by a      decree-holder and whose attempts at      executing the said decree meet with      rough weather.  Once resistance  is      offered by  a purported stranger to      the decree  and which  comes to  be      noted by  the  executing  court  as      well as  by the  decree-holder  the      remedy  available  to  the  decree-      holder the  remedy available to the      decree-holder   against   such   an      obstructionist is  only under Order      21, Rule  97, sub-rule  (1) and  he      cannot bypass  such obstruction and      insist on reissuance of warrant for      possession under  Order 21, Rule 35      with the  help of  police force, as      that   course   would   amount   to      bypassing  and   circumventing  the      procedure laid down under Order 21,      Rule 97.. ..............."      In view of the aforesaid finding and the law being well settled the interpretation given by the aforesaid full Bench of the  M.P. High Court in the case of Usha Jain Vs.Manmohan Bajaj (supra)  cannot be  held to  be a good law. As we have recorded above,  both the Executing Court and the High court have rejected  the application  of the applicant under Order 21, Rule  97 only  on the  basis  of  the  said  Full  Bench decision,  hence   the  said   order  cannot  be  sustained. Accordingly, both  the  orders  dated  20th  February,  1985 passed by  the High  Court in civil Revision No. 406 of 1983 and the  order dated  20th April,  1983 passed  by Executing Court in execution  case No. 1-A/70/81 is herewith quashed.      We direct  the Executing  Court to consider and dispose of the  objections and  the application  of  the  appellants under Order  21, Rule  97 after  giving opportunity  to  the parties in  accordance with  law. The  appeal is accordingly allowed. On the facts and circumstances of the case, cost on the parties.